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INationajination: old pins in new pots?
"This Conference marks the most outstanding and
supremely important event in our history. It is
more than a milestone on the road. It is the
dividing line between the past and the future.
A line iihich in time must become so marked as
will permit of no retreat, except in memory, and
then only for the purliose of deepening our
determination to do our part in realising all
the possibilities of the future".
SVNUM Area Council. Executive Report, May, 194-7.
"That's naticnaJ-isation again for you.. The
uonditions were bad for years after. G-ood G-od,
it was a Powell uffr3m product which took over
in I 94-7; it was the same people who were in charge
of everything. $ame everything, barring you be-
came top-heavy with administration... The miners
were definitely let down; they thought it was
manna from heaven then, but it didn't come".
Tommy Howells: ex-Powell Duffr3rn and NCB face-
worker. Recorded in Aberdare, July, 1975.
2The Coal Industry Nationalisation Act establishing the National
Coal Board received the Royal Assent on July 1 2th, I 92^6, and the
Board Members formally took office on July 1 5th of the same year.
Coalfield.s were divided into 2^8 geographical areas (each under
a general manager) grouped into 8 geographicaldivisions; at
the head of each division was a board consisting of 6 full-time
directors including a Chairman and. Deputy Chairman. Thus a
chain of command was established: Colliery Manager responsible
to Area Manager, who was responsible to the Divisional Board,
which in turn was responsible to the National Board.. NCB head-
quarters consisted of eight departments: Production, Marketing,
Finance, Labour Relations, Manpower and Welfare, Scientific,
Legal and Secretary's.
On Vesting Day, Jan. 1st., 192^7, the Board took ove.' 12^,000
collieries, 55 coking plants, 30 fuel manufacturing plants,
85 brick and. pipe works, colliery power stations and waterworks,
arid ropeways and railway sidings. It became the owner of
225,000 acres of farmland, 2,000 farm houses and 12^1 ,000 other
house.s together with railway engines and motor lorries1.
The employees totalled 72^5,000 and, jointly with the Miners'
Welfare Commission, the Board became responsible for the welfare
and educational activities in every coll{ery village. Sir Walter
Citrine, the Board Member for Manpower and. Welfare, was also
1. P.R.O., Coal 2.
3.
Chairman of the Miners' Welfare Commission.
In the South Western Division2 the Coal Board. took control of
220 collieries which were divided, for administrative purposes,
into seven Areas: . Swansea, Maesteg, Rhondda, Aberdare, Rhymney,
Monmouth and the Severn A's. The labour force, numbering wel].
over 115, 000 , produced a saleable tonnage during the first
year of nationalisation of 22 million tons and. its .members
were rewarded with average weekly earnings of £6-i 2-id. (for
underground. workers) and £5- 3-11 d. (for surface workers). By
Dec. 31st., 1957, the number of collieries operating in the
Division had been cut to j38. Between them, they employed just
over 104.,000 miners who produced 23 million tons of coal for
average weekly earnings of £1 4.-I 5-6d. (underground. workers)
and £1 3-7-9d. (st'face workers)3.
Amongst the members of the National and Divisional Boards were
men who formerly had been prominent and. active officials of the
Miners' Union. It was believed, both by management and union
that such individuals would bring to their new posts first-hand
industrial 1iowledge and experience which would serve them well
in the years to follow. The delegates at the S. Wales miners'
Annual Conference in i 94.7 were informed that
a .. . for the first time, ... the miners are
prominently and influentially represented in
the direct control and management of the
Industry"
Matters of general principle were decided,, after 1 94.7, between
Executive
the NCB and the&	 ouncil of the NUl; the application nd
4administration of such mattrs were dealt with by the Divisional
Coal Board and the Area Council of the Union. In the ten months
which had elapsed between the Board assuming power and the S.Wales
miners' conference in May, 1 92^7,, a great deal was accomplished
in connection with the work. of establishing machinery for mutual
discussions. A Conciliation Board Agreement had been concluded
on the coalfield. which comprised, essentially, the National Model
adapted to meet the requirements of the Area. The Agreement
provided for the retention of the existing wage arrangements for
atemporary period pending the completion of the new wage struc-
ture which was being negotiated nationally. Machinery was pro-
vided for questions in dispute to be dealt with at colliery level
between representatives of the Management and the Lodge. In
the event of failure to settle at that stage, eases were to be
referred to the Miners' Agents and the Labour Officers of the
Board in the Area. Any cases still unsettled were then to be
transferred for examination by the Labour Director on the Board
where it had been established that a change of circumstances had
taken place. Whilst the NCB was entitled to invoke the pro-
visions of the National Wage Agreement, they chose instead -
presumably as a gesture of goodwill\ - to proceed with negotiations
for putting into effect the five-day week and also to examine the
proposals for a new wage structure and other matters which could
otherwise have been excluded7. The Exec. Council of the S. Wales
NUM responded with the following public display of gratitude in
its Annual Conference Report:
"These decisions are appreciated as a generous
gesture on the part of the National Coal Board
and are earnest of its desire from the outset
to secure friendly and cooperative relationships
5with the National Union of Mineworkers
as well as with the workmen employed. in
the Industry".8
Consultative Committees were establ shed at National Divisional,
Area and Colliery levels, and all were linked together. At the
collieries the committees were designed to take the place of
existing P,t Production Committees, but with additional functions1
By May, 19.7, the National and Divisional Committees were already
in operation and. committees were in the process of formation at
Area and Colliery levels. All of thers were designed to cover a
wide range of subjects, all of which would have, it was believed,
"a most important bearing on the general conditions of employ-
ment and. health and. safety provisions" . Direct links were to
be established between individual collieries, the areas, the
divisions and the National Committee, with representatives of
the NCB present throughout the various stages.
Executive
At the I 94.7 Conference, the	 cjCnoi1 of the S. Wales miners
declared Its satisfaction with the progress which the NCB had.
been making towards fulfilling the main provisions of the Miners'
10Charter.	 They were especially pleased with the haste with
which the Board and the Government had tackled the questions
of hours of employment and holidays, for, by May, 194.7, the
five-day week and layout f or statutory holidays had been realised.
The union had. also been promised. by the &overnment priority for
the building of houses in the mining areas.11
The operation of the Five Day Week began on bhe first working
day following the S. \!alcs Conference (May th, I 917) and was
6rogardod as a refcrm of ma,or Importance and. one that had bcen
earnestly de.red for many years. It provided that without any
reduction in wages the period of employment in each week should
be five shifts Instead, of six: the aggregate hours to be reduced
to a maximum of 4.2 per week. 'These conditions were familiar
to the S. Wales coalfield as they had. for many years been in
operation there in relation to the afternoon and nightshifts -
the only coalfield in the country where the principle- of five
shifts worked. for six days t pay had been applied hitherto.
The A'ea Executive Council allowed itself and its unionts
members a modicum of self-congratulation that their example,
in defending this "privilege", had pos&ibly helped other coalfields
secure the same benefit: the six-for-five principle had been
"... retained. for many years", decled the author of the 194.7
Annual ConferencQ Report, 'notwithstanding the strenuous efforts
made by the Coalowners for its abo3ition during the several
crises we have experiencedtt.12
The "generoi4'y' t was far from being one-sided however, for
amongst the more painful sacrifices which the workforce made
in return for the re'b concessions ws recognition of the fact
that a number f mIne hu.,ild save to close and their eiployees
re-deployed in more efficient collieries. This physical contraction
of the coal industry was to prove to be probably the most trau-
matic of all post-war developments in South Wales. Its course
between 194-7 and 1967 1 illustrated, below, in Figs1 1-3,
pp. 8, 9&1O..
It on he 'ieen utte c]oarl7 that the years of greatest con-
7traction on the S.. Wales coalfield were those immediately
f'ollowin upon nationalisation and those which followed the
downturn in market demand during the late 'Fifties. The worst
siigle years were I 94-8, 1 94-9 and 1 959, during which a combined
total of no less than 36 collieries ceased production. (See
Fig. 3 p. 10) In terms of numbers of collieries closed as
a proportion of the total situated in any coalfield., S. Wales
along with Scotland and Durham, suffered badly. Within the
Welsh Division. itself, the Area hardest hit by closures was
that of Swansea/Neath, closely followed by those of Monmouth
and the Rhond.da. (See Fig. 2 p. 96) The Areas whioh fared
best between 194-7 and 1957 were Maesteg, Aberdare and Rhyniney.
These closures resulted, in the long term, in great reductions
both of the numbers of miners employed and of the tonnagea
of coal produced. Figure 1^, p. 11 , charts the total sale-
able tonnage produced by individual Divisions from 1 94-7 to
1974- and illustrates the general decline in production of all
the Divisions charted. It can be seen that the initial
closures had little obvious effect upon overall production
which rose generally until stagnation became evident during
the mid-'Fifties. By 1 957, however, production totals every-
where were falling and. nowhere faster than in S. Wales, where
colliery closures once again began to gather a momentum which
- they maintained right through the 'Sixties. Figures 5 - 9,
pp. 13-17 , illustrate the fact that this decline in overall
production totals was paralleled by what was, until the late
I 950s, a very moderate increase in output per rnnshift but
which became, during the 196O, an increase of 8pectacular
proportions and one which reflected itself, most clearly in
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increased productLon per manshift at the coal-face.
(See Figs. 5 and 6)
FigtxL'es 7, 8 and 9 show that, apart from S. Wales which suffered
the moat severe bout of early colliery closures, the NtB
Divisions managed to retain, for the most part, their 194-7
quotas of employees. Enforced redundancies through colliery
closures were argely offset by redeployment of personnel,
and coal output increased by I 3 between j 947 and 1 957, from
197 to 22L, million tons overall, Most of the increase took
place between I 94-7 and I 94-9 with an output level of 21 5 million
toni being achieved in the latter year.13 In S. Wales, over-
all productivity rose quite sharply until 1 950 and stagnated
to 1957.
This flstagaationH belied the fact, however, that productivity
was risi.ng rap-idly in the highly mechanized. and well seamed
pita and that this was largely offset by 'l.ow and failing
proc3uctivity in the poorer, older pit&'. 	 In S. Wales, the
contrast between the more productive pt and. those which were
poorer and/or older was quite startling. It was a contrast
which reflected itself cJ.early in the productivity returns
of the individual Areas, or administrative sub-regions, of
the Division.
The Area Differences
Neither thc size nor the manpower distributions of the in-
dividual Areas of the South Western Division of the NG were
equal. The 1oninouth&üre Area, for example, employed over
12.1,.
27, 000 colliery workers who were deployed across a good part
of the country, whereas the Aberdare Area, comprising of' the
Cynon Valley, part of the Merthyr Valley and. also of the
northern end of Rhondda Fach, employed just over I 2,O0.1
The workforcc of the Rhondda Area 'proper' in 19147 stood at
just over seventeen and. a half thousand; Maesteg, just over
thirteen thousand.; Rhymney, just under fourteen thousand;
and. Swansea employed 22,1 28.
The sizes of the collieries, both in terms of manpower and.
output, varied quite dramatically. ifl the Monmouthshire Area
for instance, the 440,000 tons per year Oakdale pit was op-
eraing in 1947 within five miles of the 6,000 tons per year
rskine colliery near Aberbeeg.1 6 In the environs of Clydach
in the Swansea Area, the Mynydd. Newydd. colliery employed. just
one hundred men and. operated. alongside the Clydach-Merthyr
colliery with its six-hundred and thirty employees.1
The average manpower-figure per colliery for the whole divisIon
18
	 .	 .in 1947 was 573.
	
This fgure is, however, largely meaning-
less when the size-range of individual collieries within any
area Is taken into consideration. There was a wide dieference
in-average colliery sizes even between the designated Areas
themselves. They ranged from 350 men per colliery in the
Sansea Area to 713 men per colliery in the Rhymney Area.19
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Table I
Area Mnnporrer Total and Average Colliery ManerTotals	 jLSt 1947
Area	 Total !anpower	 Average Colliery Manpowr
B/ground. A/ground.Al]. 	 B/gzound. A/ground. Al].
Swansea	 i6,600	 5,528 22,4'28	 263
	 87	 350
Maesteg	 11,019
	
2,080 13,099	 441	 83	 524.
Rhond.da	 iL1.,478	 3,199 17,677
	
4.67
	
103
	
569
Aberdare	 9,871
	 2,24-3 12,114-	 429
	
98	 527
Rhymney	 11 ,565
	
2,4.01 13,966	 642	 133	 775
Monmouthshire 27,204.
	 4,414. 27, 204.	 584.	 113	 697
Source: Figures calculated from lliery Lists, taken from Colliery
Year Book and Coal Trades Directory, 194.7.
These differences in pit size tended to reflect themselves in the
-annual productivity return8, though there was no hard and fast rule
here. Thus, the approximate annual production per employee in the
Aberdare Area in 1947 was just over 271 tons which compared very
favourably with the 199 tons and 196 tons achieved in the same year
in the Swansea and Monmouthshire Areas respectively. The approximate
annual production of the "average" mineworker in each of the six
S. Wales Areas in 194-7 was as follows:
Swansea
Maesteg
Rhondda
Aberdare
Rhymr ey
1 onrnout h
Average (all)
199.2 tons per annum
259.5 tons per annum
238.9 tons per annum
271 .2 tons per annum
308.0 tons per annum
196.5 tons per annum
24.5.5 tons per annum *
C
* This rough figure is based on the returns registered in the
C.1CB. & C.T.D. for the year 194-7. It takes into account only the
tonnage produced at each Area and Colliery, and the manpower it
took to proclue that tonnage. None of the other vitally important
varLables, such as manshi.fta-worked, have been taken into account.
-reat care should be taken in uirg these figures as anything other
20
than the most approximate guide to producti.vity-ratings.
** Ibid.
More accurate returns from individual Areas were compiled by the
Board in 1949 and. released by the N1J in 1950. They illustrate
very clearly the disparities which existed between Areas within
the coalfield. Table 2 charts the numbers of collieries situated
within weekly tonnage categories :
Table 2
Number of collieries in ech_Categ
Weekly	 Area Area Area Area Area Area Area
Tonnage	 No.1
	
No.2 No.3 No.4 No.5 No.6 No.? Totals
7,000 tons -	
-	
6	 7	 4	 -	 18
and over
5,000 to
7,000tons 1	 2	 7	 3	 4	 4	 -	 2j
3,000to	 10	 7	 5	 2	 3	 11	 2	 405,000 tons
2,000 to
3,000tons	 6	 8	 3	 -	 6	 3	 30
1,000 to
2,000 tons 20	 3	 3	 -	 2	 6	 i	 35
Below 16	 2	 2	 2	 -	 4	 -	 26I ,000 tons
-	 20TcYL1AL 	 51	 20	 26	 j6	 35	 6	 170
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Area No.1 also referred o as the Swansea, or Anthraci4 Area.
Area No.2 also referred to a the Maesteg Area.
Area No.3 also referred to as the Rhonda Area.
Area No.11. also referred. to	 the Aberdare Area.
Area No.5 also referred to as the Rhymney Area.
Area No.6 also referred to D5 the Monmouthshire Area.
Area No.? also referred to as the Severn, or F. of Dean & ornerset Area.
An ana:Lysis of these figures reveals that, in the Swansea Area,
ori:Ly in Oe undertaking did the average production exceed I ,000
tons per day, whilzt in approximately 79 per cent. of the under
takings the averge output per day was below 600 tons. The
Maesteg Area fared little better with only two undertakings
averaging I ,000 tons per day and 55 per cent of its pits pro-
ducing lo than an average of 600 tons per day. In the Rhondda
in 8 or approximately 30 per cent. of the undertakings the
average production exceeded I ,000 tons per day whilst 50 per cent.
of its pits produced an average daily output of less than 600
tons. Monmouthahire, also, returned poor figures with only
30 per cent, of its undertakings producing more than an average
cf I ,000 tons per day and. approximately 50 per cent. producing
an average of below 600 tons per day.
Easily the two most productive Areas were the oldest strongholds
of the Powoll puffryn Company: in the Aberdare Area, production
exceeded I ,000 tons per day in 9, or 56 pox' cent. of the under-
takings. In only 32 per cent. of the Area's undertakings did
the output produced per day fail below 600 tons. In the Rhymney
Area, production exceeded ,000 tons per day in ii , or 69 per
22
cent, of the undet takings and in only 1 2.5 per cent • of the
Area'8 pits was production averaging below 600 tons per day.,
In the Severn Area production was below I ,000 tons per day at
all six coflieries. In 8 of the collieries the output ranged
betvjeen 3+00 and. 800 tons per daya2l
Less than 25 per cent. of the undertakings of the S. 1estern
Division produced I ,000 tons or more daily in 1 949 whilst
53.5 per cent, produced an average of 600 tons and less per
day. The standard attained in mining practice in this Division
can also be gauged by the relationship between the output pro-
duced arid length of coal face exposed:
Table 3
OUT PTY PER LENGTH 0? C0i.tFACEEXPOSEDj95 0
Area	 Length of coalface exposed
Yards Miles
Swansea	 25,439	 I 4.4.
hiaeiteg 13,24.5
	
7.5
thondda	 21 ,4.22
	
1 2.1
Aberdare 9.91 6
	
5.6
Rhymney 1 3 406
	
7.6
Monmouth 33,1 71	 '1 8.8
F. oC Dean 2,396
	 1 .3
Somerset	 4,4.64.	 (c..
Output per
annum in tons
1 949
4,376,611
3,04.2,1 60
4. , 753,962
3,700,555
5,312,4.84
6,099,926
759.34.9
662,805
Output per yard
of coal face per
annum
Tons
171.9
229.5
221 .9
373.2
396.2
1 80.8
316.9
1 26.0
Output per yard.
of coal face per
day
Cwts.
13.8
18.5
1 7.9
30.0.
31.9
14.6
25 • 5
10,1
TOTAL	 123,4.88 70.0 28,704,852 	 224.3
	
18.1 22
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The 3. Yales Area NUM Annual Report of 1 950 informed its readers
that these anomalies exi sted. between Areas despite the fact
that its author (i.e. the Exec. Council) had been ".. assured
that by and large the sections of the seams worked in all areas
are somewhat similar", and that these figures revealed a... great
disparities in the standard of mining technique in the several
areas in the Division". 23 They catgorised the average standards
of mine mechariisation for the whole Division 88 follows:
1. Percentage of Coal Produced by undermentionc-d methods of wining:
(a) Hand C-ct/Hand Filled	 ......	 18 per cent.
(b) Macnine Cut/Conveyor Filled ..
	
4-2 per cent.
(c) Hand C-ct/Conveyor Filled .....
	
38 per cent.
(d) Machine Cut/Hand Filled .....	 2 per cent.
2. Percentage of Conveyor Faces with Coal -etter OM of:
(a) Under five tons ..............
	
34. per cent.
(b) Pive tons to ten tons ........
	 55 per cent.
(c) Ten tons and over ............
	
1-1 per cent.
3. Percentage of Conveyor Faces working:
(a) 24--hoar cycle ................	 35 per cent.
(b) 48-hour cycle ................ 	 4-7 per cent.
(c) Over 48-hour cycle ,.........
	 18 per cent.
4-. Percentage of Conveyor Faces:
(a) 100 yards and over .......... 	 62 per cent.
(b) Under 100 yards ..............	 38 per cent.
2J.
These fi&ures i]luatrate the general backwardness of the coal-
fi1c1 a far as the introduction of mechanised mining methods
were concerned. As early as 1939,	 of Britain's coal out-
put was convoyed mechanically at the coal-face and 6i% out by
machine, And it must be remembered. that these figures were
themselves kept low by the poor results achieved in S. Wales
where only 1- of coal was mechanically conveyed at the face
in 1939 as compared with 93% in N. Staffs, 8 inN. Derbyshire
and. Nottinghamshire, and 79% in S. Derby, Leicester, Lancashire
and. Cheshire. The proportion of coal mechanically cut in
S. Wales (26% in 1939) provided an even more dismal comparison
with the achievements of other fields. N. Staffs, for example,
machine-cut 95% of its sa]eable output, Northumberland. 9Z,
S. Derby and. Leiceatershire 89%, Scotland. 8c and N. De.t'by and
Notta. 8cZ. 2 As we have seen in Chapter 7, Part Two, there
were still further anomalies evident in the productivity returns
nbtained. within the S. %7aies Division itself. It was well-Iiown,
for example, that the low over-all productivity rating of the
pits in the Swansea (anthracite) Area was largely responsible
for the poor productivity showing of the S. Wales coalfield in
general. There were, however, within the anthraoit area it-
self, several units which compared well in terms of output-per-
manshift With steam-coal pits f'ther o the east and which
j,rovided sharp contr#zts to most other unite on the anthracite
field. Thus we find. that, in 1 94.8, though not a single anthracite
pit managed to break even - let alone make a profit - nevertheless,
colliers at the Oriliwyn No.3, Varteg and Mount mines managing
to produce around. I 7-	 per manshift: 3: cwt., more than
the average for the anthracite area as wbole26 az almost twice
25
as much pe ianshtft as their comrades managed. to produce at
G•elliceidri , Gwaum-ca-gurwen (East, Steer
	 d Laerdr pits),
Ammanlord and Fontyberem where the figures never reached or
exceeded 9 cwts., - a relatively meagre total which neverthe-
less looked flattering when compared with the 5 cwts., per man-
shift achieved at the Tareni artbracite mine in the same year.27
The relationship between productivity and. pit-sie in the Swansea
Area is set out in Table 4, p.26 , which lists (a) the eight
anthracite collieries with the highest productivity and (b) the
eight with the lowest durin9L7/8
It can be seen quite clearly that there are no hard and fast
sets of rules available to account for the disparities evident
in the productivity ratings - despite the fact that, on average,
the eight anthracite mines with the highest OMS were over one-
third as large again as the eight mines with the lowest OMS.
For included, in the top eight are two mines - Varteg and. Mount -
which were small even in comparison with those included in the
lower eight. Conversely, there are four mines in the lower
eight which bear comparison in size with four in the top eight:
East, Tareni, Gelltceidrim and Saron all had. manpower totals of
over 330.which is a figure only just below the average for
colliery manpower in the Swansea Area as a whole in 1947/48.
Tareni, East and Gelliceidrim were well above the average and
yet still managed to achieve OMS figures markedly lower than the
Area average of 1 2.6 cwt. There are a number of ways in which
it is possible to set about accounting for these &nomlies.
firstly, he geology of pits will, quite obviously, have a great
influence on the ecee with which coal can be got, and the anthracite
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zone, as we have seen earlier, was geologically,' a highly Un-
predictable and notoriously di sruped coalfield. Secondly,
efficient production is greatly depend.ent on a vast range of
primary considerations which are mainly centred around the avail-
ability of machinery and skilled labour. Thirdly, it is essential
that both machinery and labour, once procured, are maintained
in the best possible condition, for ramshackle machinery and old.
and. tired workmen are not conducive to the achievement of high
levels of output. Fourthly, it is essential, if indeed high out-
put is to be achieved, that eood. management and good workmanship
prevail without interruption from whatever source - be it short-
age of capital or poor industrial relations.
In the anthracite area; neither sophisticated machinery nor young
miners were readily available after 192+7. Indeed, this was
generally true right across the S. Wales coalf'ield. As late as
1957, only approximately 5 per cent. of the field's output was
obtained from fully mechanised faces,' whereas by 1967/68, this
percentage had. risen to 72.5% (i.e. 76.
	 in East Wales and.
69Q	 in West Wales).'8 In j9lj-6 the delegates at the Area NUM's
annual conference were informed that "Several power-loading
machines have been tried in this Division, but so far have not
been a conspicuous success. Conditions in S. Wales are different
to other coalfields, and. careful thought will have to be given to
29the type of machine to employ".
By May, f 914-7 k it seemed to many that a little too much "careful
thought" and not enough action was paralyzing development on the
fiold0 Even the NUM's Annual Report - the iiost optimistic of
28
documents - placed a question mark against the Coal Board's
apparent lack of concrete dve1opment proposals:
",.. the backwardness of the industry", it
argued, "is largely the legacy handed don to
the Divisional Coal Board from the ex-Coalowners.
"The efforts of the Board. in re-organising the
industry are mainly cinected with the projects
at Lianharan, Pfaldau, Cwm, Nantgarw, Mardy and
Cefu Coed Coliieriesb
Most of these undertakings involve the
utilisation of huge capital sums, but we feel
that the progress made at the other collieries
,,30is far from satisfactory
The position of developmcnt projects within the Anthracite Area
was non-existent apart from the Cefa Coed project and a series
of uncompleted plans. The Area NUM's Executive Council, sensing
a mood of dissatisfaction and frustration with this state of
affairs, announced that it was,
".... pressing for a comprehensive blueprint
of the intendod developments in this Division
over the next 5-10 years ) realising that the
road to survival in this coalfield rests upon
the complete re-organisation of the industry" ,31
It also rested upon the ability of the mining industry to retain
1t8 most vital and productive workers and to attract youngsters
who would, in turn, become the next generation of trained miners.
As early as 194-7, however, it was clear to everyone concerned that
there were great problems in this respect. The average age of the
S. Wales mining workforce was over 1F0 and rising, though nothing
like as quickly as it was to rise after the downturn in the demand.
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for coal during the late I 95Os. (See Fig. i 0) Contemporary
observers noted that there was taking place a dramatic decline
in the number of school-leavers making themselves available for
pit-work In the immediate post-war years:
Hprom the village school in the olden dayst,
notes Zweig in his study "Men in the Pt p" in
I 94 / 48, "out of roughly ninety lads who left
at least sicty or severiby went down the pit.
Now the number of lads who are leaving chool
ha fallen to fifty, and out of this number
three or four choose the pits, and these are
the least intelligent boys, whose fathers
32
can't fix theta up in other jobs".
The causes of this reluctance to enter mining as a career are not
difficult to fathor', Zweig lists some of the most potent:
8 1f other jobs are available", he writes,
'practica1iy no-one takes up mining, apart
frsm the very few who really feel a calling
for the mines. The fathers discourage their
Jada as much s possible, and. I often heard
voTs that thetr lads should never go down.
The fathers are frequently very bitter
about the pits, which have "sucked their
blood and twisted. their spine", and are
determined that at least their sons shall
he sparod. from the devouring arms of the
octopus. "They will. never get my lad", they
say, or "He is not going down, if I can help
it; I had enough of this in my life".33
such secitiinants of discouragement were accompanied by the know-
ledg€ that job prospects for youngsters Iii the mining towns were
a great deal brighter and more varied than they had been during the
.51
93Os. Many of the Royal Ordnance Factories were converted from
the production of ammunition to the production of a whole range
of consumer goods. The work was lighter than that encountered.
in the pits; it was performed in what were normally incomparably
more congenial surroundings and the earnings were as good. and
often better than those obtained by juveniles for pit work.
Low earnings comprised the greatest stumbling brock encountered
by management in it attempts, not only to attract youngsters
to the industry, but also to retain its most able employcos. At
the May, 1924.7 NUM Area Conference, the 3. Wales President,
Aif Davies, declared that th8 existing minimum wage of £5 per
week for underground workers and £4-I Os. for surface workers was
wholly ixiadequate35
A miner working below ground in S • Wales in 191+7 would. have re-
ceiied. an average gross wage of £6-i 2-i d.. per week and. a surface
workr £5--13-j1d.36 The wage system was based. on the needs of
an induatry wlich was manpower-intensive and. it revolved, con-
seuently, around a piecework system which was regulated. by pit
neotIations aEd which took account of local influences and. pit
peouliritios. It was posibie, therefore, for underground
viorkors in a consistently-seamed coalfield. to earn considerably
more than those working unpredictable and disrupted seams. Tbu,
underground workers in the Leicestor Area of the East Midlands
Division collected, average weekly earnings of over one-third again
higher than those collected by their counterparts in 3, Walee.
Fin. 11 below, illustrates the average Divisional weekly earnings
from 192+7 to 1957:
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NCB Annual Report, 1 91^7.
Equally inconsistent were the methods adopted. by different coal-
fields and colliery companies for calculating the payment of
piecework, "compensatory" awards and special bonuses. The onset
of nationalisation and the (earlier) consolidation of a single,
national	 union, gave encouragement 'to those within the
industry who wished to brIng some measure of order to this ex-
treme regionalism ar!d fragmentation. Pressure came, especially
from South Wales, for the principle of "Equal Pay for Equal Work",
but as David Gidwell has pointed out, the Coal Board had inherited
a situation where,
"Superimposed upon differences in ownership,
location, economic and. geoloica1 character of
coalfields and degree of mechanisation were local
differences in bargaining strength and differing
ideas about standards of work and. earnings.
There was no generally accepted idea of what
constituted a fair day's work or a fair day's pay".37
*
To many of those searching for the best methods of applying
"standard" rates for similar tasks on a national basis, it seemed
that the most likely catalyst for such a development would be
the impending widespread introduction of mechanized. mining tech-
nIques. This, so the argument ran, would force both managers
and men to review systems of job evaluation; for a miner operating,
let us say, a Meco Moore power-loader at a face in Scotland would,
theoretically, be required to perform virtually identical tasks
to those performed by a miner operating a similar machine in South
Wales. But, as we have seen, British coalmining remained rel-
ativeiy umochanised right up to the end. of the 1950s.. Indeed, as
late as 19G5/66, less than 57 per cent, of the total output of
S. Waics was power ]oaded and even that figure disguised the con-
3'f
tinuing backwardness of mechanisatiori in the Western (or anth-
racite) section of the field where only 51 .1 per cent. of total
output Was power-loaded as compared with 62.8 per cent, in the
Eastern (or steam-coal) section.38
The first big step towards regulating job values at national
level was not taken until 1 955 with the introduction of the
Dayage Agreement (the so-called "Black Book") but even this
failed to zpsrk off any revolutionary changes in the over-all
wages structure and, consequently, the piecework system prevailed.
more or less intact. It was not until the introduction of the
National Power Loading Agreement in 1966 that the replacement
occurred of pit and. district agreements and even then there was
no immediate introduction of a national rate of pay, only a
commitment that there would be one uniform national rate by
31 at December 1 971
Throughout the whole of the first decade of nationalisation,
therefore, the induztry continued to be plagued by the myriad
idiosyncrasies of a wages system which it had inherited, from its
former private masters. The pitbead. money wrangles which had.
occurred with such monotonous regularity before Vesting Day
oc9urred., with equal regularity after that date and served only
to emphasise to the workers involved how many important areas
of pit-life had emerged. virtually unaffected by the act of
nationalisation. It promoted within their minds a sense of
continuity which tended to militate against the sermons for
industrial iarmouiy whtch were being preached by the Labour
Government, the Minr3 Leaders and the National Coal Board.
3:)
The result was the creation within the South W&e NIJM of quite
remarkable tensions: colliery lodge quarrelled, one with another,
factions emerged inside individual lodges and, most significantly
perhaps, there occurred a new and vigorous growth of "combine
committees" of the pro-war typo which proceeded to set them-
selves up, often quite openly, as unofficial rivals to a union
leadership which, they felt, had become bound hand and mouth to
the coat-tails of the Labour government.
36
2, An Uncertain eginning
Administrative solutions to the labour disputes which occurred.
during the first years of public ownership were made no easier
toachieve by the political climate in which they were floated.
For these were also the years which witnessed the most speedy
development of the Cold. War with its resultant polarisation
within trade unions of factions pro- and anti- Soviet Union.
Such trends were especially significant inside the miners'
union where there was, of course, an important Communist in-
fluence.
For the best part of two years, the new Labour Government enjoyed.
an unprecedented measure of support from the British Cowmuist
Party. Indeed, Palms Dutt had gone so far as to describe the
Labour v ictoiy as "This glorious political leap forward.. . ."
By 1947 however, affections had. withered a good deal and a new
hostility crept into the air as old, suspicions and accusations
were or-ice more dusted off and. placed. on public display.
Within the National Union of Mineworkers, the new atmosphere
manifested itself most clearly in the controversy surrounding
Arthur Horr's unilateral defence of the French miners' strike
of OcVNov I 91i 8. His alleged crime was that he had, encouraged
the Frenchmen without first consulting his fellow NtJM Executive
members and that he had. done so because he was Lnore concerned
with supporting Moscow than with supportiig the decisions of his
union, Ho was condemned, not only 'by the press and the Government
for his pledge of support t the stri1ter, but also by his fellow
3?
Execuiives on the NTh1 the majority of whom were, of course,
lifelong supporters of the Labour Party and, by implication,
supporters of the Labour Covernment's foreign and economic
policies both of which were do3Igned, at the time of the French
strike, to conviDee the United states of Britain's pro-American
intentions and thereby to secure Marshall Aid for this country
The -overnment feared that the American hankers, with their
traditional hostility to organi aeci labour, wouid-interpret
British support of a Communist-led French miners' strike as
evidence of widespread political subversion inside some of
Britain' 8
 most powerful institutions - namely, her trade
homer described what he saw as the reasons for the subsequent
polarization of opinion within the NUM:
"In many ways", he wrote, "this incident over the
French strike crystallized the differences which
had ecLated between me and my colleagues in the
Labour Party throughout my lifetime. It was not
just a question of my being a member of the
Communist Party. It was rather that I saw the
class struggle as something inevitable and I
could not believe that it was in the interests
of the miners or of the working class, whom we
as trade unionists represented, to make alliances
with the capitalists against our own people. I
saw the interference of the Americans, not only
the American Government but also the American
Federation of Labour, in the affairs of the
European trade unions as an attack on the working class'
In S. Wales, Homer's stronghold, the issue dragged out into the
open evidence of political schism within the lodges of the NUM -
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evidence which indicated a revival of the kind of open hoztiiity
betwcen Labour and Communist members which had last manifocted
itself during the first 20 months of the Second World War3
The public recriminations which accompanied this hostility
resembled the cut and thrust of the political witch-hunts which
were soon to follow in the Western democracies. Thus, as Homer
recorded, the right wing of the NUM were very quickto take up
his "anti-Marshall Aid" statements as evidence of a much larger
Communist-led plot to prevent the post-war recovery of Western
Europe: 4-4-
".,. the right wing believed that those of
us who opposed this policy were also opposing
the measures taken by the Labou1 aovernment to
improve conditions in the country and particularly
the measures taken to improve conditions in the
coalfields
The waves of "sectional" strikes, and. stay-downs which gained
lipetus during the early months of I 9i.8 were cited as examples
of a, deliberate and concerted. attempt by the Cominform to wreck
the achievements of the Labour Party and thus to totally discredit
the creed of Social Democracy. In a report prepared by the
Executive of the NUM in December, 194-8, for example, the organ-
isation declared that the NtJM
".... will strongly resent every attempt to
treat the British mine.workers as tools of the
46C ominf orm."
It is the aim of the following sections to show that the stri.kes
which occurred in S. '7als between late 194-7 and 1950 were no more
L
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the work of agents of the Corninform than were those which had
preceded them from 1 944 to 1 947, and that, on the contrary, those
accused of being the prime mining "agents" of the Cominform in
Britain (namely, Homer and the COP, members of the various miners'
executives) were, in fact, instrumental in coinbatting these much-
publicised. unofficial disputes, This .s not to argue however,
that changes had not occurred by 1948 in the attitude of the
C,?,, and of its individual members, towards the Labour Govern-
ment, for, quite obviously, they had. Relations between the two
unequal bodies had soured markedly - largely of course, as a
result of the Government's increasingly pro-American stance on
questions of foreign affairs. Neither is it to argue that in-
dividual Communists did not involve themselves as leaders of
unofficial strikes and girger groups on the coalfield. As King
Street moved quickly away from the foot of Labour's bed, where
it had sat fawning but never quite managing to clamber between
the sheets during the post-i 94 .5 honeymoon, so Communists within
the NUM felt themselves increasingly less constrained to hide
their frustration with the terms of the post-war industrial
"truce". Newspapers and radio began to talk of "minority move-
mens" and. "subversive&', and nowhere did the media and, the Right-
wing trade union leaders find more numerous examples of such
organisstions and. individuals than on the South Wales coalfield.
The unofficial strikes and stay-downs which were to cause so
much heated comment in 1948 had. their immediate roots firmly
entangled around problems which had been apparent both to mine-
workers and. management since the outbreak of the Second. World War.
They centred, firstly, on the obvious and critical need to cent-
10
ra]Jze end rationalize produition methods arid. systems of payment,
and, secondly, on the conflicts which arose as miners felt them-
selves unable to respond adequately to the calls for increased
productivity made upon them by government, management and. UflIOfle
In addition, outbreaks of industrial strife were made even more
likely from the middle of 19 2+7 onwards by the wides'ead presence
amongst the worldorce of a sense of hostility and disappointment
concerning the structure and composition of the new Coal Board.
with its alleged lack of imaginative managerial change and its
"top-heavy' and undemocratic administration.
In December, 192+6, shortly before Vesting Day, S. \ales miners
meeting at a special conference in Cardiff, declared a vote of
"no confidence" in the Chairman and Vice Chairman of their
Regional Coal Board, Lieut. General Sir A. G-odwin--Austen and
Mr.	 Aeron-Thoinas respectively. A resolution to this effect
went forward to the NUN national executive from the S. Wales NU
Area executive council. 2+7 In the same week, D.A. Hann, Director
of Production of Powell Duffryn, resigned his recent appointment
as production director of the South Western (i.e. S. Wales and
West Country) Coal Board and thus delivered the second of two
heavy blows at the prototype hetrt of the new administration.
Hann's decision was in line with the Coal Owners' last-minute
policy of non-cooperation with the emerging Coal Board - a
policy which threatened to rob the Board of the coalfield's best-
known, if not best-loved executive engineers and industrial
directors. In the event, the Coal Board was probably saved a
good deal of the opprobrium which would have accornpaned the
appointment of member of the Hann family to the highest of the
directorial positions, for the name Hnnn was synonymous with the
title "Powell Duffryn", and there were already too many Area
Representative posts occupied by ex-Powell Duffryn agents for the
liking of a good many NU1vI members.
The motion of "no-confidence" in the new Chairman and Vice
Chairman promised little in the way of harmonious labour re3ations
in the future however. Godwin-Austen, especially, was generally
considered both by existing management and workforce on the coal-
field to be almost entirely unsuited to the tasks which soon were
to be set before him. Bill Paynter, later President of the S.
Wales miners, described him a8
some kind of general who had spent all
his time in the Himalayas climbing mountains.
Either him or his father had a mountain named
after him. He had no mining background and
we all considered that he 1cew nothing about
coalmiiiug" .
Aeron-Thoatas, on the other hand, was a prominent coal-mine owner
and timber merchant from the G-wendraeth Valley, probably more
acceptable as a Vice Chairman than was his superior as Chairman,
but a man whose appointment was nevertheless viewed with a distinct
lack of enthusiasm by the Area NUM. Matters were little improved
when the Coal Board, searching around. for a replacement for Douglas
Harm, appointed a Yorkshirewan, T.3. Chariton, as Director of
Production. Chariton was to receive what was generally believed
(by Bill Paynter and others) to have boea the highest salary of
any Director of Production on any of the Divisional Boards in
Creat Britain50- a fact whieh would probably have irked both his
1^2
subordinates and urion opposites lesa had he not been, in Paynter's
words, "too l.zy to spit". Indeed, the Divisions]. Board generally,
soon earned the reputation of being "top-heavy" - a charge which
was levelled at it regularly by the workforce for the next couple
of years. In May, 1947, for instance, the S. Wales Area office
of the NTJM issued a statement to its members to the effect that
there was no justification f or complaints
from 11 miners' lodges that the Coal Boar& was
being overloaded with appointments and that jobs
were being found. for superfluous people .... what
was happening was that technicians and other key
men already in. the employment of colliery units
were being appointed to the centralised organ-
isation, but in. most cases they were doing the
same work as they had been doing all along."
The union had. been persuaded. into adopting such a conciliatory
line only after a 'eat deal of coaxing by Homer and Lawther52
and. there was never, during odwin-Austen's period as Chairman
of the Divisional NCB, much conviction in the cooperative state-
ments issued by the Miners' Executive. By June, 191^7, the Divisional
NITh's Executive Council expressed. ".... dissatisfaction and. dis-
appointment with the administration of the S. Wales Divisional
Coal Board" and decided to institute an "immediate enquiry through
the miners' lodges" into "fundamental matters of administration".
The Council also objected to the appointment of Iestyn Williams,
the former spokesman and negotiator of the Coalowners, as Chief
53Executive Officer of the Labour Relations Department of the NCB.
The very fact, however, that the NUM Executive felt itself con-
strained. in the first place to issue a statement condemning those
arnontst the union's members who publicly criticised the riew)y-
created. managerial structures indicates just how eaL'nestly the
Executive approached its new relationship with the NCB. It also
indicates that the Executive members were aware of the risks
associated with this new relationship. The self-inflicted
burdens of "responsibility" were heavier than many of them had
imagined. Any resentment generated amongst the rank-and-file
by the nature of the Coal Board's appointments or by allegations
of the creation of "jobs for the boys" was aggravated by the
teething problems faced by the nevv administration as it attempted
to impose upon the coalfield novel systems of centralised organ-
isation of production and. manpower as well as to make operative
to everyone' s satisfaction the Five Day Week. The old problems
associated with wages, conditions and production were not banished
from the pits with bold. strokes of NU4 /NCB pens. On the contrary,
despite marked improveuienta in certain important sectors, in
others ;he proble3]s appeared to multiply as new joint agreementa
were brought jute force and the new possibilities associated with
centraliseci administration began to provoke open debate within the
industry. For example, whole world'orces seem to have become aware
after I 91,.7 of such issues as that which centred upon the allocation -
of material resources inside the ithustry as a whole. The workmen
of G-elli.ceidrim colliery in the Amman Valley, for example,
announced in May, j9)+7 that their mine was "starved of adequate
equipment" and. that as a result it was suffering retarded pro-
duction. 51+ Th13 claim was to prove only the first of a spate of
such protests on the coalfield., the effects of which continued to
reverberate even into the late 1970s, maintaining an atmosphere of
uocertinty and insecurity amongst both lower management and
J4J4
workers. The comparatively low rate of investment by the Board
in its Welsh pits added fuel to suspicions, widely held. amongst
managers and men alike, on the coalfield., that S. Wales was being
"starved" of capital and machines, not only because of the tech-
nical and organisational problems involved in winning mineral from
difficult seams, but also in retaliation for the continuously
"militant" line adopted by the coalfield in the past.55
$uch allegations became popular currency at a time of particularly
severe crisis for the Coal Board and. the union. In May of 194-7.
the NUM made an agreement with the NCB for the change-over to
the five day week, without loss of pay, on the under&tanding that
the union would cooperate with the employers to	 promote
every possible and reasonable means of ensuring that the maximum
output of coal is produce." 6 The union specifically pledged
itself to cooperate with the management in persuading the worcers
to accept re-assessments of work which would. mean in many cases
cutting down the number of men required for a particular piece
of work. The union undertook that it would ".,.. not countenance
any restricliop of effort by workmen resulting in failure to
perform the work so
The dangers of an agreement which bound the union to help the
employers bring pressure on its own members were obvious. There
is, however, much evidence to show that the miners' executive
went into it without fully realising what thoy were accepting.
Attemping to explain this apparent "lapse" (in the most charitable
fashion poibl) one could. surmise that it resulted at least
partly from a temporary lack of contact between the members and
'if)
the Eeoutive due to the recent changeover from a federation of
county associations to a centralised national union. In addition,
it was almost certainly due to the close tie-up between the
national officials of the union and. the Attlee government, which,
in the opinion of ome miners, 58 resulted in the former imagining
that it was their job to give orders to their members rather than
take them. A comment in the "Manchester G-uirdian" at the time
of the Grimethorpe strike highlighted this "problem":
The Union leaders took a great risk in giving the
Government the assurances they did without being
sure that the miners were really willing to attend
regularly and to do a full shift's work. It will
not do to put all the blame on a minority of 'bad'
miners. A little slacking has to be taken into
account in any calculation. Either the union
officials misjudged the temper of their men or
they did not do as much as they knew to be
necessary to explain what the five-day week meant.
This failure is not surprising. The NTJL' constant
concern with the handling of national policy in
Downing Street and Whitehall has left its leaders
with little time for the details of affairs in
the pits s... The Union will have to make a bold.
effort now to regain the full confidence of the
miners. Like the National Coal Board it will
not do that unless it can restore the close touch
with local problems that has to some extent been
lost by it conversion to a centralised organisation".59
*
The spectacle of NUM leaders denouncing their own members in
terms that the former coalownerz would, have shied away from
became comrnonplaoe. Lawther, the NU1 E'esident, told the Grime-
thorpe strikers, for example, that they were "acting as criminals
at this time of the nation's peril".° He actually invited the
1# U
Coal Board to prosecute: "Let there issue summonses against these
men, no matter how many there may be. I would say that even
though there were 100,000 on striko". 	 Arthur Homer was
quoted as regarding the G-r:methorpe strikers arid others like
them as ".... an alien force" and argued that they should be
treated. as as enemy of th true interests of the majority of
the miners in this country" •62 A letter published by the
i1y Worker" pointed out how closely Homer's phrases resembled
those which the Communists used to denounce J.H. Thomas a couple
of decades earlier,
Though this is not the place to discuss the merits of the claims
forwarded by the strikers of Grimethorpe, it is nevertheless well
worth restating some of the facts of the dispute - as they were
understood by those on strike. The following statement by a
Daily Herald reporter outlined the main complaints:
"The real point of their grievance", it read, "seems
to be that in the general reorganisation of work
underground involved by the change, men may be put
on to other joha at which they earn less money.
A joint committee of miners delegates and. rep-
rssentatives of the Coal Board decided on the in-
creased stint. The -rimethorpo men complain now
that they had no representative on this joint com-
mittee, and that the decision to increase the stint
came as a bombshell .... They also complain that
the divisional Coal Board officials are the same
officials they had before the Government took over".
The grievances were further underlined by a "Dail y Mirror" report
which (typically) sq.ueezcd. every last drop of huma: drama out of
the situation: "How they hate the Divisional Officers of the Boards"
J.7
it exclaimed, "i cars, big office3, big titles but they don't
go clown the mines"
"One miner remarked /What do these ***' know about it? They
couldn't get themselves enough coal to boil an egg". 6 Homer, in
his autobiography, summed up the reasons for the bitterness of
the Grimethorpe dispute in the following way:
"Tue inevitable grievances, which had been- kept
in. perspective, because the men saw the overall
advantages of nationalization, came to the fore-
,, 66front
Here were all the ingredients fox' a stew of internecine conflict:
on the one hand, a small army of NUM officers enthuàiaztic to
show the British public and the world what a success a major
nationalized industry could "be made to be; on the other hand,
an impatient but often eloquent clutch of rank-and-filers who
were apparently unwilling to accept promises of an eventual
deliverance to the promised land of high wages and. lightened
tasks, The same recipe was evident on the S. Wales coalfield
whore, by August, 194.7, the Miners' Executive deemed it necessary
to issue a public statement reaffirming the wholehearted support
of the Area NUM for the endeavours of the Coal Board:
"The South Wales executive council decided
unanimously to pledge its fullest support and
the cooperation of all the miners in the S.
Wales area in whatever steps may be decided
upon as the most effective means of ensuring
immediately a substantial increasein coal
67production".
Despite the grand promises pledged on behalf of all of the coal-
/ 3
field' a rriners however, a stay-down strike occurred within two
days of their publication. In the two months prior to their pub-
licatioi, unofficial strikes had. disrupted production at the
collieries of Pwllbach, Abercynon Itisca, Marine and Lla:ibradach.
The Pwllbach and Marine disputes are especially interesting in
this context because they were directly related to combined
attempts by the NCB and NUM to introduce controversial schemes
designed to boost production.
The Pwllbach strike was the first to occur in the previously
much-troubled Swansea Valley since Vesting Day, six months earlier.
The strikers were objecting to the introduction by the Board of
a scherre whereby new entrants to the industry would be trained
by working positions at the coal face which, the strikers alleged,
were previously worked by regular miners. This, they argued,
constituted a threat to their ubiquitous Seniority Rule and was-
thus viewed as being little more than an attempt by management
to destroy "custom and practice" by slipping-in reform under the
68back door.
At the Marine colliery near Ebbw Vale, nearly one and a half
thousand miners struck work on July 2nd., as a protest against
the deduction of bonuses from the pay of men judged not to have
worked diligently. The men refused to return until the bonuses
had. been paid and the strike lasted for five days, 69 This dispute,
like that at Pwlibach, illustrates the difficulties with which
the NCB/1'WM were confronted when they attempted to fulfill
u+v(.
pledges of the kind, issued by the NUM Exec in August. Here, at
Marine, the workfore had quite clearly formulated its -
149
theories as to wbat constituted, or did not constitute, diligeut"
effort. Fe issues were to create more bitterness during the
subsequent decade than this one, for the nature of coalmining
itself in South Wales militated against the blanket imposition
of any standard scale against which work might be assessed ob-
jectively as "good" or HbadI. As we have seen, the geological
idiosyncracies of the Welsh seams could. entail considerable
disparities in the earning potentials of men of equal productive
ability working at the same face. In the place of such a scale
there existed literally hundreds of varieties of special payments
for working in excessively damp, difficult or dangerous places
where production was likely to be impedcd. These special pay-
ments were very often awarded at the discretion of an overan,
$eert
timekeeper, under-manager or manager and, as we haven Chapters
3 and, 4. , they frequently were held back either as punitive measures
or for purposes of financial retrenchment. The Marine workforce
attributed to similar motivation the measures adopted by their
manager. It was,f these miners were stating their refusal to
believe that management could ever change its spots, and theirs
was not an isolated statement; there were a great many amongst
the coalficld'z workforce who reared that a surrender of traditional
righs" and customs would result, not in the fraternal industrial
embrace promised by the combined tribunes of the NUWNGB, but in
a managerial bear-hug which would, effectively sap away the mine-
worker's bargaining power.
The sentiments expressed at Marine were in stark contrast to the
mood of extreme optimism and triumph which pervaded the coalfield' s
first post-nationalisation union conference. Few t that Summer
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gethering could ever have perceived a more solid vision of a
socialist Britain than at that moment, thou&h what form that
'oia1is" would take was a matter for the keenest speculation.
Within trade union circles at least, the visionaries were app-
arently mesmerised by the prospect of a proliferation of
Morrisoziinn committees which would shuttle industry towards the
socialist paradise with the expertise of London Transport. The
National Coa3 Board was itself held up at the Conference as an
exampie of administrative and democratic excellence fully cap-
able of taking its place in the vanguard of the gradualist
struggle
'Nationalisat ion of the Mining Industry", delegates
were informed, "is a complete transference from
private ownership to public ownership. It is the
abolition of the system of exploitation of labour
and of social needs to personal and private gain.
In pace of these evils has been established a
system whereby a vital commodity is owned by and
produced f or lhe direct benefit of the people,
and under conditions of employment which would not
be possible under previous ownership".70
No hint was given that the phrase ".... for the direct benefit
of the people", could, and of course did, mean ".... for the
direct benefit of private industry" as well as for the rest of
that undefined, body, the "people". Indeed, very little was made
of the distinct probability that profits from the unpaid labour
of miners might still fincttheir way into the pockets of the
capitalist class as result of the Board's declared intention
of selling what was essentially underpriced coal to the rest of
British industry - thereby shoving-up private profit margins at
the exponse of income from coal sales.' And surprisingly little,
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also, was made of the fact that the NCB was obliged to pay
interest on the bonds given the old owners as compensation or
purohased by new investors. Indeed, the "Annual Report" reserved
j.t main energies for the happy task of eulogising the new spirit
of industrial democracy which would, it predicted, abolish the
sienat ion and enmity which had characterised work and labour
eatons within th industry for so many years. Nationalisation,
declared the authors of the Report, 	 -
"..'. will establish proper relationships between
those responsible for management at the collieries
and the men employed. All the material improve-
merLt which re so vitally necessary will in them-
e'ives not give the desired results unless the
human relationship is satisfactory. This can be
brought about only by the recognition of authority,
x'ighta, responsibilities and just treatment one to
the other, in a spirit of mutual trust and. con-
fidence in carxyin out a common purpose.
videnoe to hand already indicates encouraging
of improved relationships being exercised
in many directions, and this is particularly app-
eciated in connection with negotiations with the
anc Diviione). Coal Boards. Whilst
tioris have to be examined on their merits,
nd points of view may be at variance, our ex-
peri.enee is that in endeavouring to secure agree-
ment, we are able to do so in an atmosphere more
who3.esomo and helpful than ever obtained under the
034 roime.,,,
The security for the future lies in the face that
the industry is now established, on the basis of
socialist prtnoiples; that the necessary capital
wifl be available for reconstructing and re-
qpi; that conditions of employment will be
nttt'aotive, The Industry will be controlled and
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directed in a manner free from the inherent
Vices of private ownership, so that those eta-
played will thus be enabled to &ve freely the
best of their skill and experience, whether as
planners, technicians or workmen, in the knowledge
that they do so unhindered for the benefit cf the
country".72
Almost exactly ten years after the pubJication of this optimistic
passage, Bill Paynter was reported as informing the delegates
of the S. Wales Miners' Conference that
'.. ten years' nationalization had. shattered.
illusions that the workers would exercise a
decisive control in running the industry.
Nationalisation changed the form of control for
the better, but f amenta1lj ttxt	 trj
inained. a source of profit for the previous
owners and. big business generally. Participation
of the workers in control and direction of the
industry was non-existent, and consultation was
superficial and. largely window-dressing.
Miners' wages and conditions had not improved
to the measure that could be reasonably expected.
Nationalization had been deliberately used to
provide coal to big industry at lo prices to
enhance their profits. It had also been ex-
ploited by the State in meeting financial bur-
dens that legitimately were liabilities for the
Exchequer.
Nationalization is not an end. in itself, it is a
means to an end. Its role and. function today
reveals the "end" as being a cheap product for
capitalist industry to strengthen and perpetuate
capitalism".73
Any attempt to explain the reasons for this gradual d.isiilusioA-
went would have to start by observing that it began at the bottom -
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litersily at pit bottom and percolated upwards until it found
"official" expression through the incumbents of NIJM Headquarters,
Euton Road. This is not to argue that Homer and Paynter were
unaware, as union leaders, of its early ed.stence or that they
were insensitive to the contradictions which arose as the dis-
illusionment percolated through the workforce. There is, on the
contrary, ample evidence that they tried repeatedly and ener-
getically to come to terms with these problems bt that, in-
evitably, they found themselves unable to resolve them with any
lasting success.
Their tasks were made no easier by their personal political
affiliations. Both of them were forced to defend nationalisation
as long as its defence was agreed upon by a majority of the
national executive of their union and they faced, and sometimes
suffered, alienation from fellow Communists who aligned themselves
with the pit militants 1 expression of disillusionment. For Homer,
during the 1 94-7 controversy over his speech to the striking French
miners, the contradictions must have been especially painful.
After suffering the arrows of the militants since 1944 as a
result of his impeccably "responsible" behaviour as the major
propagandist for the cause of increased productivity, he found
himself the butt for a mass of criticism from his temporary and
grudging allies on the Rtght. At no time during the post-war
period, save perhaps during the worst years of colliery closures,
was a leading NTJ1( officer placed in such an invidious position as
was Homer during these months. It nevertheless must have afforded
him, as it should have afforded all subsequent observers, an Un-
rivalled insight into the sectional and confused nature of Britain's
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post-war Labour Movement. It must have served, a's O, to di8pel,
fox' any in whom it needed dispelling, the hac3meyed .mage of the
South Wales mining workforce as a single-minded proletarian army
united with touching simplicity behind its fiery and trusted
leaders.
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Chaper ll
Divided Weishmen: Marshall Aid and the Strikes of i947-50
"It is difficult to understand the psycholor
of the South Wales coalminer, who seems to cherish
a delusion that he is sole heir to a priceles
estate, and free to enjoy all the emoluments,
without much effort on his part".
"Colliery G-uardian", Editorial, 20.1 .i-9.
j • Some Problems with Social Democracy.
In May, 194-7, the Labour Member for Neath, D.J. Williams, reminded
the delegates at the Annual Conference of the S. Wales Miners that
the Labour G-overnment was as he put it	 with tremendous
problems". At the root of these problems, he argued, was the
desperate need of the country for plentiful supplies of coal:
"On the way we solve the coal problem depends the future of the
Labour Government and. the future of Democratic Socialism in
Br ita in"
The S'TNUM Annual Report and Agenda, which carried Williams' word.s
also carried the following resolution from the largest colliery
Lodge on the coalfield, that of Parc and Dare in the Rhondda.
It called upon Annual Conference to condemn the foreign policy
of the Labour Government, ".... as a result of which a large
peace-time Army is being retained for the protection of Imperialist
interests abroad. "We are of the opinion", it continued, "that it
would be sounder policy if these British workmen were demobilised.
and brought home to help in the economic reconstruction of our
country and in the establishment of a new social order. We are
-	
1. SWNUM., A.C.RI, 194-7, p. 57.
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convinced that we cannot have "Socialism in our Time" by the
importation of foreign labour, much of it pro-fascist in out-
2
This view was supported by a resolution from the Rhigos Lodge
which urged the S. Wales Area Council to ".... press upon the
NUM the need to call upon the TUC to convene a special conference
in order to review last year's decision to zuppot Bevin's foreign'
policy. In our opinion", the resolution continued, "the home
policy of the Government - including Nationalisation - will have
no meaning unless this disastrous policy is ended".3
Both resolutions communicated very clearly the increasing distaste
expressed by some of the coalfild's leading militants for the
Labour Government's apparent determination to align itself and
the country with the political and economic ambitions of the
U.S.A. In turn, this criticism drew upon its initiators fresh
condemnation from groups and agencies loyal to the Government
and its pro-American allies. Communists found themselves ' att-
acked once more, as "saboteurs" and potential wreckers of social
democracy. C.P. members were undoubtedly involved In the planning
and. drafting of resolutions critical of the Labour Government' s
foreign policy; the Parc and. Dare and Rhigos resolutions, for
example, were written and composed in a language which appeared,
•to loyal Labourites at least, to symbolize the Communists' in-
transigence and their lack of will to cooperate in any meaningful
sense. Indeed, the authors of the two resolutions were far from
being what might have been termed "ordinary" rank-and-filers.
Rhigos had long been known as a lodge with a penchant for issuing
2. Ibid., Res.3.
3. 1!4,
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].eft-wing resolutions and. Communists from other lodges joked
that the Parc-and-Dare men considered themselves "the conscience
of the coalfield".
The Parc-and-Dare lodge included upon it8 committee one former
International Brigader (G . eorge Baker who had. served in an anti-
tank company in Spain and. who was a lifelong nember of the Comm-
unist Party) arid at least four other Communists,- including William.
Whitehead. who was later to become President of the S. Wales NUM.
They were led. by Eddie Lloyd, known throughout the Rhondda as
the "Uncrowned King of Parc and, Dare" - a Communist who had.
played a leading role in the successful eradication of company
unionism from the Parc and Dare pits over a decade earlier.5
Similarly, the Rhigos Lodge included on its committee at least
one outstanding Communist and. ex-International Brigade volunteer,
Hywel Davey Yilliams, who was a close friend of one of S. Wales'
most renowned Communist propogand.ists, T.E. Nicholas, the poet
and. "Christian CommunistI.* With such authors it is hardly
surprising that resolutions expressing criticism of the Attlee
Covernment's "backsliding" (as they saw it) should. have gone f or-
ward to Conference. This is not to argue, however, that these
same authors were guilty of the charges made against them by
* Like Nicholas, H.D. Williams was also something of a "Christian
Communist" • He was the deacon of a chapel in Rhigos at which
Nicholas preached many lessons including one in November, 1957, on
the day upon which the world's first artificial satellite -. the
.Soviet "Sputnik" - had. been launched.. At the climax of hi oration,
it is recorded., Nicholas likened. the Sputnik to the Star of Bethlehem
- an analogy which waz received. with rapturous applause by the con-
gregation.
Vtilliams, though he had. volunteered. f or, and. been accepted. by, the
international Brigade, never saw active service in Spain. He reached
Paris on his way south only to be captul'ed. by the French police and.
deported M*1tI to Britain. (Hywel Francis unpublished. thesis,
"We].sh Mincra and. the Spanish Civil War").
1.. Recording of Bill Paynter, London, March, 1977.
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those on their political right. They were, on the contrary, far
from unwilling to cooperate with the officials of the Coal Board
and they argued that their resolu€ions were aimed at warning the
Labour Government of the danger which it faced of losing its
grass-roots support on the coalfield. should it continue to in.-.
stigate anti-Left policies. Nowhere was this better illustrated
than during the controversy which provoked the two resolutions
in question: namely that caused by the proposed-influx into
British collieries of refugee Polish mineworkers.
The scheme to introduce Poles had first been communicated with
any degree of urgency to the NUM leadership during the early
Summer of 191.6. The national E.C, of the union had, at first,
been very wary of the Government's proposals; Lawther, for ex-
ample, announced in late June of that year that the Ministry of
Fuel had approached the union to take in approximately 1 ,000
Poles, and that the executive had decided to postpone consider-
otion of the question until more information was available. He
expressed the hope that ".... industry was not so bereft of
enterprise that we must go forward to the day on which the only
British workers in the pits would be the gaffers".6
Even this lukewarm reception to the Government's proposals was
reached by a majority of only two on the executive council. One
of the members, G.E. Jones, expressing the minority view, asked.
if the union was so weak that it could not protect its members
against the influx of I ,000 Poles, and hi fellow council member,
Glyri Williams, went further and attempted to obtain from Lawther
a clear explanation of his position in regard to this and. other
6. C.C., 28.6.4.6.
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outstanding grievances. He demanded to know if the executive
were "disagreeing *ith the introduction of foreign workers on
principle or saying 'Give us our charter'" • He asked that the
Ministry's letter should be read.7
The letter, which was read, stated that definite proposals for
a large-scale influx could not be made for a xiionth or two, -
but that in the event of the numbers available and the needs of
the industry appearing 4e justify further steps to secure their
absorption in British mines, further consultation with the union
would be necessary before any decision was reached. The union's
Agreement to any larger-scale introduction of foreign labour
into the mines, said. Lawther, would be dependent on the satisfactory
outcome of the discussions then in progress with regard to the
five-day week, but he added that, "in the meantime and as a
matter of urgency, approximately 900 Poles .. must either be
placed in British mines within the next few weeks or go else-
where". He assured his Executive that the Ministry had under-
taken to instruct every Polish worker involved to join the NDM
and. that in the event of redundancy Polish workers would be the
"first to go" and. that no Polish workers would be introduced in
any pit without prior consultation and agreement.8
im Bowman, apparently disturbed at the haste with which the
whole question was being considered, warned Lawther and the
Executive that those who wanted to take in the Poles were "playing
with dynamite". Let them "see how many ydung men at the shaft
bottom, on haulage, on timber loading, (were) willing, under
.xiationalisation, to be trained and upgraded", he said. He was
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
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confident that there were thousands of men on the surface who
would be willing to go down the pits.9
Bowman's reading of the situation was a good deal nearer that ,pf
the majority of the workforce - especially as regards the miners
of S. Wales. By the Summer of '1 9)+6, shadows of the hungry 30' 3
appeared to be creeping once more across the Valleys. Speaking
at Aberaman in July, Homer declared that it was a "scandal"
that there were more than 75,000 unemployed at that moment in
S. Yales, ".... and a similar number in Scotland". The Grovemn_
ment's promise to establish ten new factories in S. Wales to
employ victims of pneumoconiosis had to be expedited, be said.
and added that, with the existing high rate of certification,
"many more than ten factories (would) be needed" • 1 0 He was
backed up a month later by a meeting of Welsh miners' leaders
and ¶elsh M.P' a at which a resolution was passed. expressing "the
strongest d.issatisfaction with the rate of progress (of factory
building) to date" 	 In September, the urban authorities of
am	 -
Aberdare, Mount Ash and Merthyr Tydfil Issued. a joint appeal to
the S Wales Council of Labour to ".... discuss the whole un-
employment problem in . Wales".2
This was hardly the most propitious moment upon which to attempt
the introduction into British pits of a large body of Polish
workers - the very image of which was clearly associated in the
.minda of many colliers with a potential army of "blacklegs" made
even more powerful than they might have bien by the prospect of
continue& high unemployment. The controversy growled on into the
eve of Vesting Day when it was publicly announced that George
9. Ibid., See also SffNUM., A.C.R., i97, Appendix XII, p.j35.
10. Ibid., 19.7.46. (c..)
11. Ibid., 23.8.46.
12. 4brthire Lender. 6.9.!6.
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Isaacs, Atlee's Minister of Labour, "expected" that union officials
would be prepared to accept 20,000 Poles for the mines if a five-
day working week for British miners was guaranteed by the foll-
owing May.13
The first Poles arrived for training at the Oakdale mining centre
in March, 1 947, and they were followed by a regular stream of their
countrymen throughout the Spring and Summer. Their reception by
local miners was mixed. It reflected itself in the Annual C0_
ference Agenda in May. Anti-Polish resolutions were opposed by
amendments welcoming the influx. These, in turn, were opposed
by counter-amendments; thus, a resolution from the Fernhill and
Cambrian Lodges of the Rhondda Valley which demanded "That the
S. Wales Area of the NUM oppose,the employment of Poles and dis-
placed persons in British Mines until such time as the Miners'
Charter has been implemented", was subjected to an amendment from
the traditionally less radical Combine of Tredegar (Mon.) Lodges
which suggested that Conference delete "oppose", insert "welcomes"
and delete all after "Mines" • This was countered by yet another
amendment from Cwm Cynon Lodge which served to harden the initial
Rhondda resolution by suggesting that it should stand intact ex-
cept for the deletion of all words after "Mines'.1
These differences were echoed within the coalfield' s administrative
Areas. In the Aberdare Valley, f or instance, the Lodge most 	 -
adamantly opposed to the influx of foreign labour was that of
one of its most productive pits, Tower, which was situated at
the northwestern boundary of the dry steam section of the field
and directly adjacent to the anthracite Section. The reasons for
13. C.G-., 20.1 2,16.
IL1-. SYi'flJL, A.C.R., 1es.28, Clause I plus Amendments.
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Tower's intransigence were complex. Underlying them all was a
shifting, brooding suspicion concerning management's motives.
It was a suspicion which, like the fears of a renewal of mass
unemployment, lingered on from the 1930s. After all, little at
the pit itself had changed since the pre-war years. The colliery's
Powell Duffryn-trained manager, .B. Barling, remained within
his old office - albeit with a new NCB insignia upon his door -
and he was responsible to an immediate superior ho was himself
a former Powell Duffryn Agent for the pits of the Area, G.S. Morgan.15
Lying heavily upon this basic suspicion were a host of grievances
and hostilities, the list of which reads like a recipe for an
arbitrator's nightmare. They comprised the inheritance of de-
cadesof anarchic pay structures and pricing anomalies - an in-
heritance made all the more unwelcome by the palpable failure of
nationalisation to instigate the kinds of immediate and funda-
mental changes which many amongst the rank-and-file -=i anticipated
regarding earnings, managerial techniques and extensions of in-
dustrial democracy. Such "details" were, however, largely ignored
both by the Government and the press which preferred, instead, to
interpret opposition to the Poles such as that displayed by the
Tower Lodge as indicating little more than tribal hostility.
The miners were chided for their parochialism - justifiably it
might have seemed to someone unfamiliar with the recent history
of Welsh coalmining - and wide publicity was given to a number of
cases of young Welshmen provoking dancehall fights with their
Polish counterparts. But the underlying causes had rather lesa
to do with parochialism than with a legacy of economic insecurity.
The convenient "racialist" theory does not hold up to examination.
15. Colliery Year Book & Coal Trades Review (C.Y.B.C.T.R.):
-	 Vols. I 94-6 and 1 94-7.
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For, putting aside for a moment the internationalist aspirations
and traditions of the South Wales miners' political and industrial
organisations, the Valleys had never been racially isolated - at
least, not the Valleys to the east of the Dulais. They had been
a veritable melting pot into which had gravitated Spaniards,
Chinese, Belgians, Irishmen, Italians, Scots and, above all in
terms of numbers, the English. Iii addition, the latter years of
the war had, seen the billeting within these communities of thou-
sands of American G.I' s, both black and white, arid, although
dancehall fights involving these newcomers abounded, the Americans
were never subjected to the kind of political hostility suffered
(initially at least) by the Poles.
The reasons for this are at oncq both simple and complex. To
begin with, the Americans were not perceived by the locals as con-
stituting a potential threat to jobs; (although they were seen as
a threat to local women - thus the dancehall fights) they came
equipped with seemingly boundless wealth and, if locals are to
be believed, easy-'going, though highly ostentatious, life-styles.
They were also, of course, Western Europe's potential liberators.
The Poles, on the other hand, arrived during one of Britain's
worst periods of rationing arid austerity and were, for the most
part, less well-off than were even the Welsh. They had. fled from
a defeated nation which was, at that moment, experiencing a second
occupation by their erstwhile liberators.
They were, nonetheless, the recipients of a great deal of public
sympathy arid, admiration, for had. not 200,000 of their countrymen
given away their lives in the bloody uprising at Warsaw just three
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years earlier? And the newcomers were, after all, industrial corn-
rad.es: miners like those whom they wished to work beside in the
Welsh pits.
A possible "political" explanation for their hostile reception
serves to supplement the vastly more important "economic" ex-
planation which will follow. It was provided by an Aberd.are
General Practiioner who, when asked about the local hostility,
recalled that it lasted only as long as it took the Welsh miners
to learn that the Poles could be as fine a set of workmates and
as solid a body of trade-unionists as any other on the coalfield..
The initial hostility, he declared, was the result of a suspicion
that some of the Poles were supporters of' the anti-Soviet Pole,
General Anders, and of his so-called "Polish Corps".1 6
Although subjective recollections of this nature are difficult,
if not impossible, to confirm some thirty years after the event,
it would explain the inclusion within the Rhondda resolution
(cited above) of the allegation that much of the imported. foreign
labour was "pro-fascist in outlook". It also goes some way towards
explaining the extraordinary response of the Aberdare public to
the news, in the Summer of 1 94.7, that one of the new Polish immi-
grants habeen brutally slain in an apparently motiveless knife
attack in the town's park.
Despite the sophisticated, not to say distinguished, investigations
of Fabian of the Yard, the case remained unsolve& and resulted in
an unprecedented blossoming of local theory and gossip regarding
the possible motives of the murderer. Of the dozens which sub-
16. RecordIng of Alistair Wilson, Aberd.are, April, 1977.
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sequently emerged, easily the most popular was a theory which
attributed the gruesome deed to a settling of old. political scores.
It was a theory which could. be , and was, modified endlessly to suit
the political complexion of its declaimer so that whilst certain
local individuals believed him to have been a Soviet agent, there
were others who were convinced that he was a bloodthirsty Polish
fascist.
Whether or not the murderer was, in fact, any one of these exotic
animals is not at issue here. What is important is our inter-
pretation of the public's response. We have to recognise that
the locals perceived of the Poles in a manner which took cognizance
•of recent Polish politics. Their overall "suspicion" of the immi-
grants was, in fact, firmly based. upon grounds other than racialism
and. parochialism. It was based; firstly, upon a long and bitter
industrial experience which tended to reject the prospect of
freely allowing the arrival upon the coalfield. of a potential
"blackleg" army and, secondly, upon a less important, but still
significant, revulsion towards the anti-Soviet sentiment which
was then circulating the more rarified regions of British political
life.
By the Summer of 194.7, however, most NUM officers appear to have
been won over to the "official" position of supporting the G-overn-
nient's plan to alleviate the pit manpower shortage with Poles.
Their union's executive had. accepted. the Government's promises
of swift implementation of the Miner's Charter and. of the Five
Day Week in particular. There were, however, Lodges which re-
maineci. implacably opposed to the idea and which were prepared,
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not only to reject the allegations of "racialism" levelled at them
in the press, but also to reject the advice of their ölected
leaders - including that of such long-trusted individuals as Dai
Dan Evans and Arthur Homer: both of whom were, of course, Comm-
unists, and both of whom initially were hostile to the Polish
scheme. Indeed, here was a classic prototype of the kind, of
internal union conflict which was to plague the industry for the
next decade. Like the conflicts which were to follow it, it tended
to cut right across political Party Lines. Thus, we find, rank-
and-file members of both the Labour ath Communist Part lea expressing
opinions at pit-level which were totally at odds with those off-
icially adopted by their elected Party leaders and which were fre-
quently at odd. with the declared policies of the NUM executive
which was itself normally made up of leading members of the Labour
and Communist Parties. The opposition to the Poles was a good
deal less dramatic than were several other, more publicised, con-
temporary industrial actions - notably the Grimethorpe dispute -
but it served, nonetheless, to highlight the continuing sense of
alienation experienced by large numbers of rank-and-filers from
their elected leaders.
At Tower Colliery, for example, the workforce rejected Dai Dan
Evans' advice (that the Lodge should, allow an influx of Polish
workers) on the grounds that "This would not benefit the miner
financially, and would not guarantee any increase in coal production",7
- a blanket assertion which disguised a much more complex set of
17. Aberdare Leader, 20.9.4-7.
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grievances peculiar in the first instance to To%ver, but r1ected
in similar claims by Lodges throughout the coalfield. A letter
to the local newspaper explained in detail the reasons for Tower's
of
intransigence, it provides US with a rare summary/the kinds of
continuing dissatisfactions and frustrations which, in some Areas,
were succeeding in souring the industrial atmosphere during the
early months of nationalization. The author was the Treasurer of
the Tower Lod,ge, D.W. Davies, a man described a being a "political
creature long before, and after, he was a trade unionist" ,1 8 A
Communist from 1 944. onwards, Davies wrote his letter in October
194.7, "Seriously concerned.", as he put it, "with our economic
plight and gravely perturbed. by our men rejecting the Poles". His
stated intention was to "... shed. some light on the causes under-
lying their action":19
"The policy of the Tory Governments between the
wars", he wrote "was to keep many workers on the
dole in order to use them as a weapon against the
employed. This had an especially bad reaction on
Tower men because there was no price list in op-
eration at the colliery. And. in consequence, the
scandalously lo wages were paid. for a very high
output. Bearing this in mind it is no wonder
that the price-list negotiated. a few years ago
was not very favourable to the men. The nine-foot
seam had been ruthlessly exploited with competitive
labour.
Geographically, Tower is situated. on the edge of
the anthracite coalfield, where relative to a
given output, wages are much higher.
Bitterness and a feeling of frustration exist as
a rcsult of this inequality.
18. Recording of Alistair Wilson, op. cit.
19. Aberdare Leader, 25.jO.4.7.
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Quite a good deal has been heard and. said about
modernisation and mechanisation, arid the concen-
tration of man-power at the most efficient pits,
etc., but I would stress this:
Here we have the absurd position of men leaving
the colliery with a high output per manshift to
go to collieries where there is a low output per
manshift, to earn higher wages Talk about the
dog in the manger and the horse?
I would most strongly disagree with any lowering
of standards in the "West" (i.e. the anthracite -
field) but surely our men at Tower should be on
a par with them. Fully aware that there is a
new wages structure for the industry, pending,
whereby, we shall have greater uniformity and
skill and effort are suitably rewarded. I am
.very much afraid that while the grass is growing
the horse is starving.
"(3) The geological conditions at Tower are very
good with a wonderful seam of coal being worked
and. the roof strata fairly satisfactory on the
whole. A5 a result of this, the proportion of
highly skilled labour in relation to unskilled
labour is not so pronounced as in collieries
where conditions are really bad. Such conditions
obtaining, it is possible, by enlarging "green"
or semi-skilled labour, to maintain a fairly
high output, although our own men are constantly
leaving. Perhaps the connection between the Tory
Policy of the inter-war years and. what now goes
on at Tower Colliery is apparent, and the men
are not allowed to appreciate thiz factor.
While not suggesting that this is a predetermined
policy, the result is the same, however, so can we
really wonder at the men using a weapon, though
reluctantly, which was denied them during the war.
From my own experience of j 6 year at Tower, the
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number of really good men that have signed on,
and then left through sheer discontent, is
astounding. But what causes greatest concern
, if anything, is that the trend is increasing.
How far the position can be relieved by a more
progressive approach remains to be seen.
But when the country is suffering from a grave
economic crisis, and coal is our very life-
blood then surely coal production policy should
be one of expansion, not a static or contzactive
one.
I personally believe that given a certain
reasonable degree of satisfaction (and thereby
halting the drift from Tower), the coal weekly
output could be increased to a great extent and
would only be limited by haulage difficulties.
Remove the discontent, upgrade our own men, and
1 feel that a great deal of ttgreentt labour (in-
cluding Poles) could be absorbed at Tower.
(4.) Perhaps one could dwell on the political
line regarding the Poles, but I would assert,
as I did at a general meeting at Hirwaun, that
it should be the duty of each and all of us
whenever necessary, to lead. them to our way of
democratic thought and life".20
20. Ibid.
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2. Problems of Tranaition Poles, Closures and the French Miners.
By the late Autumn of 1 94.7, public expression of anti-Polish
sentiment had largely subsided. This was not the case, however,
with the expression of dissatisfaction concerning the perpetuationê
of problems such as those highlighted by the Tower Treasurer's
letter. By Christmas, 194.7, It must have appeared to the local
officials of the Coal Board that, no matter in which direction
their labours took them, they could do no right in the eyes of the
coalfield's workforce. For they were accused, at one and the same
time, of dragging their feet on the questions of reform of work
practice, pay and conditions whilst instigating other changes
which were considered by sozile lodges to be too sweeping.
Thus, whilst Tower bemoaned what it regarded as a total lack of
meaningful change, 5,000 Monmouthshire miners struck work in late
October accusing the Board of applying the •operation of the 5-
Day week "too vigorously" and in such a way tht "privileges long
enjoyed" were being taken away from them. 	 The strike lasted
five days and the men returned barely in time to begin working
the newly-agreed Saturday shift of 6 hours. A crisis measure
designed by the Govornment with NtJM backing to overcome a severe
fuel shortage, this new shift was subjected to a mixed reception
by the coalfield's workfii'ci. There were a great many miners
who welcomed. it as a chance to boost their basic rates with additional
bonus. Others saw it as a betrayal of the long struggle to achieve
a-five-day week.
21. C.C. ii, 31.10.4.7.
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Once again, it proved impossible to separate industrial. con-
siderations from the political. The Government and the union
leaders argued that the Five-Day week was vital if Britain was to
survive a particularly harsh winter - let alone continue her
post-war economic reconstruction. To oppose such a cause was
to be identified with those shadowy and subversive elements who
wished the country, and the Labour Government , in particular, no
good.
Nothing, however, was further from reality. When the proposal
was put that a Saturday shift be worked in the pits of the
Aberdare Valley, the initial response was surprising. Of the
twelve pits involved, eight voted in favour of working the Sat-
urday shift and, of the four which voted against, the most vocal
was .Abercynon - a relatively large and productive pit whose workers
consistently had beaten their output target during the four months
prior to the ballot, They rejected their union's recommendation
that they accept the extra shift on the grounds that they saw
"no useful purpose (being) served by either extra work at the end
,,22
of each day or Saturday shifts • 	 In line with all other colliery
lodges, however, Abercynon accepted the majority coalfield. decision
and. began Saturday working. The practice did. not, nevertheless,
become a routine to be accepted passively. At Abercynon, and at
many other pits, it became a focus, or rather a vehicle, for the
expression of a whole range of existing grievances.
The Abercynon men, for example, used. their dissatisfaction with
the new arrangements to register their discontent with the auto-
22. Aberdare Leader, 25.10.4.7. The vote was taken at a meeting at
which there was a "large attendance" and at which the Lodge
Committee recomniended acceptance of the Area executive's re-
commendations. Abercynon had. never been known as a "militant"
pit. On the contrary, it was regarded by the tnicu's area officials
as being one of the least effective ot' the Powell Duffryn lcdes.
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oratic style of management which had continued, at the pit from its
recent Powell Duffryn past. 23 At Pare and. Dare colliery in the
-	 Rhondda, the Saturday shift was used with tremendous tactical
expertise by the Lodge Committee as a means of emphasising its
disgust with the new joint proposals for a pay increase being
floated by the Coal Board and. the NUM. The pit's 1,720 workers
struck in protest on the Tuesday (Nov. 26th), 'only to turn up
en masse, and anrid.st much publicity, the followiuig Saturday ann-
ouncing with a great deal of self-righteousness that they were
sacrificing their weekend. in order that they might make up for the
24.loss of output which had resulted from their midweek strike.
The Saturday shift issue took its place alongside a dozen other
main bones of contention which lay in an untidy heap at the feet
of the officials of the NCB and NUM. Most were leftovers from the
23. The Aberdare Lead,er reported that, on the morning of Friday,
Nov. 12+th, 194.7, a notice stating that there would be work for
all colliers on the next day, but work "only by invitation" in
the case of day wage men, both surface and underground. The
lodge committee argued that the notice was contrary to the
agreement reached at the area conference which had been held
to discuss the subject of Saturday work where it had been
agreed that all workmen were guaranteed their wages f or the
first and. second Saturdays of the month. The manager informed
the Lodge Secretary that he was "acting on instructions from
higher authority" and, when the day-wage men duly reported
for work the following morning, he invited a small number to
work and. turned. away some 200 others. A.L., 22.11 .2+7.
This action seems to have provoked. a considerable degree of
general dissatisfaction amongst the men. A previously
quiescent workforce, they appear, by December, to be-in the
forefront of militancy in the Aberdare group of pits. During
the first week of that month, they rejected the Board's -
NtJM's proposals for a wage increase on the grounds that it
yrQuld benefit some workers more than' it would others.
A.L., 6.12.4-7.
	
-
24.. C.G., 5.12.4-7.
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private days but were not nece2sarily treated as such. Like the
protests over the temporary abandonment of the five-day week, the
strikes and. go-slows provoked by unsuccessful wage claims, in .
-transigent managerial profiles, insufficient bonus payments and
the erosion of pit customs and. practices were condemned by the
G-overnment as the thoughtless acts of ungrateful individuals, or,
worse still, as conscious subversion on the part of certain
politically-motivated tendencies within the NUM.' It was this
latter allegation which caused most discomfort amongst the leader-
ship of the grouping most likely to have been cited. in this respect,
the Communist Party. Consequently, Arthur Homer went out of bia
way to disassociate himself and, his Party from such actions.
So much was this the case, that he came near, on several occasions,
to forfeiting much of the grass-roots adoration which, for so long,
he had enjoyed. on the coalfield.. It soon became obvious, in fact,
that although rank-and-file Communists were involved in these Un-
welcomed strikes and. go-slows, they were not necessarily the ex-
c].usive leaders. Par from being politically motivated, most
strikes were provoked by the miners' dissatisfaction with their
pay and conditions. They became political issues because every-
thing associated with the nationalised. industry was discussed in
the press and in Parliament in political terms. Everyone on the
left, inside and outside Parliament, revealed themselves as being
ultra sensitive on the issues and none were more sensitive than
the Communists who were attempting with some success to expand
their influence within the trade union movement as a whole.
Under no circumstances did they wish the general public to regard
them as a gang of "wreckers".
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The avenues of action open to them were limited, however, for if
King Street was to enable itself to maintain whatever was left
of its wartime image of "responsibility", it needed first to curb
the activities of the more strike prone amongst its rank-and-file
members. This posed a number of serious problems, in as much as
these members represented, very often, the Party's most vital
link with the mining workforce. What was more, they often owed
their popularity amongst the non-Communist worktorce to their 	 I
readiness to involve themselves in the leadership of unofficial
strikes and go-slows.
As we have seen earlier, this dilemma had been amongst the most
central to the Party in S. Wales since Arthur Homer had zied
the 1937 Coalfield Agreement. It had become intensified during
the war years and especially so after the invasion of the Soviet
Union in June, 194.1 • The winter of 1 94.7 merely pushed the problem
back into the limelight where it remained for the following three
decades. The paradoxes which it created were made doubly acute
by the fact that the winter of 1 94.7 witnessed, not only a marked
shirpening of local conflicts in Welsh pits but also the spectacle
afforded by a Labour C-overnment apparently keen to align itself
with the prime defender of world capitalism in the face of what
it perceived as a red threat from the East.
The winter brought with it a rash of stay-down strikes which were
piovoked by a wide range of grievances. It witnessed the first
stay-down directed against a proposed pit closure, (Maindy Colliery,..
late December and. again in February) as well as the first serious
post-war dispute at that old trouble centre, G-wauni-cae-gurwen. By
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February, the S. Wales Area of the NUM felt obliged to convene a
conference at which the unofficial actions were loudly condemned
as being responsible for the kinds of "sectional difficulties"
which in previous yeaz's had "allowed, the coalowners to divide and.
coquer9.2S The conference expressed its determination to prevent
a recurrence of the stoppages "at a period when the country is
passing through a serious crisist.26
The warning proved to be an effective one; the numbers of strikes
fell and the Spring brought with it a period of relative peace
within the industry. Trouble, when it occurred, was confined
largely to the anthracite area. Indeed, Gomer Evans, the NCB's
divisional labour director, told a conference of managers, miners'
representatives and officials of the Divisional NCB that there had
to be "big chances" in the anthracite area as there had been more
stoppages there, he alleged, than in the whole of the Division.
After listening to Evans and discussing his information, area
NUN officials issued a statement attributing low production to
bad, planning, lack of machinery, and in some instances to a "lack
of cooperation between worker a ath it manaer a .. .
unofficial strikes". 27 This assessment of the situation was al-
	 -
most certainly the correct one, for to over-emphasize the im-
portance of strikes would have been a serious mistake. The de-
lapidated, condition of many anthracite mines was common knowledge
and. there was much resentment concerning the apparent unwillingness
of the NCB to come to terms with this fact. Resolutions from the
Lodges criticising the NCB' s methods of administration were
25. Ibid., 27.2.48.
26. Ibid.
27. SINUM., Special Conference Reports, March j948.
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strongly represented amozt those which went forward to the Area
Conference of the NtJM in May28 at which the President of the
S.W.NUM, A]! Davies, alleged that many Welsh mines were "tech-
29
nically inefficient".
His remedies for this backwardness did. not please all of the
delegates however. He warned his audience that there would have
to be enforced closures of the most inefficient -pits and that
these would have to be offset by the payment of adequate compensation
to men made redundant or forced to travel long distances to work.3°
This admission by the union (that there was a valid case for pit
closures) provided observers with further proof, if they needed
it, that the miners' leaders were genuine when they expressed
their "cooperative" sentiments. It was accompanied by a demand.
for increased consultation between management and miners on questions
of technical reorganisation - an issue about which a great many
amongst the conference delegates felt strongly. Even here, how-
ever, their Communist President warned them that though they
knew that they were not being given enough information, they
nevertheless should refrain from adopting "an attitude of cynicism"
and fight, instead, "for the right to be treated as responsible
.31partners in the industry"..
These were not the words of an obvious subversive. Indeed., they
reflected the Communist Party's conciliatory line on the whole
question of industrial relations within the nationalised. coal
industry. Homer recalled in his- autobiography how much, he had
admired. the new Conl Board with its trade-union members:
28. C.G., i6.4..48.
29. SWNtJM., A.C.R., 194.8.
30. ibid.
51 • Ibid.
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"If I had become a member of the Board I don't
think I should have done a better job for the
miners than Ebby Edwards, Walter Citrine, or Billy
S8les, or Jim Bowman. I might have reached the
point when as a member of the Board I had to do
something which I disbelieved, and I would then
have been obliged to throw up the job or break
my heart. It may seem a contradiction because
I supported the nationalization of the mines and
I believed that the scheme drawn up in 1945
was the only possible way of tackling the job at
the time. I am convinced that the men from the
trade union movement who went on to the Board,
men like Ebby Edwards, Citrine and Jim Bowman,, in
particular, did an amazingly good job. They made
possible agreements which not only put the mining
industry on its feet, but ensured that the miners
got the square deal that they deserved 32
S
Homer, along with the Moffatt brothers, was the C.P's most direct
lfrJc with the central executive of the miners' union and, despite
his somewhat renegade past - with its sins of "Homnerism", his
influence was undoubtedly very strong at King Street. 33
 It was at
least as strong as was Bill Paynter t s in later years, and. Paynter's
was sufficiently strong to cause th.e Part to call. ot tt
and-file militants when they were in full cry in the mid-fifties.
As we have seen, Homer believed that Nationalisation, despite the
fact. that it was occurring within the context of a capitalist
society, was nevertheless a progressive move in the construction
of a Socialist Society in Britain. His view was shared. by a great
many others amongst the industry's rank and. file. And there, in
all certainty, lies the key to understanding the peculiar nature
of the conflicts and tensions which built up during the late I 940' a
32. A. Homer, op.cit., pp. 182-183.
33. Recording of Bill Paynter, London, arch 1977.
B Paynter, "My Generation", p. 132.
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and. early '50s.
There existed an obvious paradox between coalminirig's nationalised
image and. its everyday reality which, in turn, produced what might
best be termed "double think" amongst a great many of the coal-
field's miners. Often fiercely proud of their newly-nationalised.
status, they nevertheless found it impossible to overcome, o
even to modify, a great many of their old reflex actions when con.-
fronted with managerial initiatives. Consequently, strikes and.
go-slows occurred which were provoked. by issues which 	 ear& to
outside observers as relatively trivial in nature. It is im-
portant to note that the "outsjd.erz" in this case can be taken
to mean all those not directly involved in the dispute or in
disputes like it; this category could., and. did, include officials
both of the Coal Board and the NIJM as well as the Government and.
the media.
The criticism and tensions which resulted were amplified by the
Government, Coal Board and media during the harsh winter of I 91.7/
198. Much publicity was devoted, in particular, to the events
which surrounded the conflict at that old anthracite trouble-
centre, Cwauri-cae-gurwen. The pits of Cwaun-cae-gurwen were the
most strike-prone on the coalfield. 35 They had been throughout
the 1930s and were to remain so during most of the first decade
of nationalisation. The strikes and go-slows which occurred. there
during this later period. came to epitomize what the officials,
both of the NCB arid. NUM, regarded as the most sectionalist and
destructive of rank-and-file industrial actions. Consequently,
the Civaun-cae-gurwen workforce found. itself the target for regular
35. See, above, Chpt.7, Table I ,	 for the strike-records of pits in the
Gwaun-cae-gurwen area, 1 927-39. The pits to look for are Steer, Maerdy,
East, Cwmgorse, Cwmllynfell and Gelliceidrim; the ffrt fo..r being
most associated pith G.c.g. itself.
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attacks from the more "responsible" sections of its own Area union
as well as from the officials of the Coal Board., In the face of
this criticism, the workforce's alleged intransigence in its de-
fence of custom and practice became notorious and its apparent un-
willingness, or inability, to toe the official union line earned.
it a reputation as being a haven of latter-day Welsh Luddism.
The history of the workforce's drawn-out conflict with the Coal
Board can be seen, however, as constituting a compressed history
of the coalfield as a whole after the First World War. Having
survived the inter-war depression in surprisingly good. condition,
the Cwaun-cae-gurwen lodges were, in many ways, one of the more
obvious of the remaining bastions of that "synd.icalist" spirit
which had been so evident on certain parts of the coalfield until
the traumatic defeats of the I 2Os. Like the private coalowners
before them, the Coal Board objected to the workforce's attitudes
and. practices and sought to overcome them. The members of the
Board enjoyed a distinct advantage over their private predecessors
in this respect however, in as much as they received the support,
rather than the opposition 1
 of the miners' union which was itself
extremely unhappy with the situation at C-waun-cae-gurwen after
194.7. The executive of the union was dedicated to the construction
of an united and disciplined organisation of the kind which had.
no place within its ranks for such maverick lodges as those which
represented the Cwaun-cae-gurwen men.
Sited near the sources of the Afan and Clydach rivers, the mines
previously had. been owned by the Amalgamated Anthracite combine
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and. their lodges had. formed a highly militant arid, active section
of the LA. Workmen' s Combine Committee. The first year following
nationalisation had proved however, to be a relatively quiet one
as far as labour relations at the mines was concerned.. A stay-
down at the nearby Gelliceidrim drift in August, j97, brought
no significant response from the Cwaun-cae-gurwen lodges and it
was not until early February, 194 .8, that a serious stoppage occurred
at any of the four mines in question.* The February strike in-
volved I ,490 miners from the East and Steer pits and was calLeci
in sympathy with the }aerdy men who had. been transferred to these
two pits when their own had. been closed. by the Coal Board. which
planned to work the Maerdy coal from Steer.
Though short-lived, the dispute appears to have sparked off a
whole chain of strikes, most of which took place in the nearby
Swansea Valley in support of a lengthy stay-in strike at Tarerii
where the men were demanding that the NCB should not interfere
with custom and practice ... "particularly in relation to wages,
nor interfere with managerial administration" ,36
In May, I ,600 miners employed at the Steer, East and. Maerdy mines,
Cwaun-cae-gurwen, returned. to work after a two.d.ay strike called
in protest against a pronouncement that house-coal allocations
to compensate men formerly employed at the recently-closed Maerdy
pit would be cut. (By May, Maerdy was worked. only by a salvage
and. maintenance crew). They returned only after an undertaking
* The strictly Gwaun-cae-gurwen mines were those of Maerdy, East,
Steer and. Cwmgorse, thowh nearby Cwmllynfell and Gelliccidrim
often acted in unison with them.
36. C.G., j3.2.4.8. See, also, Chpt. 8 above, for a similar
dispute at Tarenl.
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had been given by an CB official that negot.ations on house-coal
allocations to the sick and aged miners of Meerdy would be reopened.
This was a theme which was to remain central to the Cwaum-cae-
gurwen troubles. A high rate of pneuzn000niosis victims in the
locality and a high accident rate generally across the anthracite
area ensured that the question of compensation payments was never
far from the men's minds. Their resolve - that-justice must be
done in this respect - undoubtedly received macabre nourishment
from the news, issued the following month, that of the 1^,383 new
cases of pneumoconiosis registered in Britain during the previous
twelve months, 3,765 had been registered in South Wales.37
Both the Coal Board and the Union argued however, that such
questions should be dealt with through normal channels of neg-
otiation and they condemned the G-waun-cae-gurven strikers for
displaying an extreme unwillingness to cooperate in. utilizing the
proper negotiated proceed.ures. In mid-June, the Coal Board warned
the anthracite miners in general of the acute need for sustained
production. The Board alleged that it had been ".... well known
that there have been some grave losses on anthracite fox' some
years, some putting it as high as £2 to £3 a ton in some places".38
It was claimed that virtually no pit in the area was making a pro-
fit and the anthracite miners were told bluntly that they were
"a drag on the rest of the field., .... largely responsible for the
national loss .... on the first year of nationalization".39
37. Ibid., 18.6,48.
38. Ibid., 25.6.4.8.
39. bid..
82
The Board made it clear that it was highly reluctant to sink
£20 million-worth of new mines in the area until it was sure of
better cooperation from the workforce. The NtJM responded by
calling a special conference at which the problems of the an-
thracite field were discussed at length. It was decided to re-
commend that ways be found to improve the economic position of
all of the collieries in question by reviewing a whole range of
customs and practices which the union executive-believed were
retarding the efficiency of production. The executive issued
a clear warning to its members that only by raising 	 tior
would it prove possible to avoid widespread mine closures.
This constituted the most unequivocal of the union's statements
concerning its attitude towards restrictive practices. It is
evident however, that the union executive was itself divided over
the issues: as distinguished a member as Dai Dan Evans, for
example, remained for a long time unconvinced of the merits of
the case f or dismantling many of the old customs and practices
which were operated in the upper-Swansea Valley from whence he had.
been elected. Though a Communist himself, and an enthusiastic
supporter of the princiile of nationalisation, he yet held back
from attacking the so-called "sectionalists" as vociferously as
had some of his comrades on the executive. His reticence was
only temporary, however, and the executive succeeded in conununi-
cat ing to the rank-and-file an image of unanimous opposition to
restrictive practices.°
0. Recording of Bill Paynter, London, March 1977.
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For its part, the NOB prosecuted. those whom it considered guilty
of practising "ca'canny" and rewarded those who displayed the
most Stakhanovite tendencies. Thusjthe space of eight days at
the end of June, three Cemneithin miners were charged with re-
stricting their output by 30 to 4-0 per cent at their place of
work and. two Pontypridd miners were awarded money prizes f or
having cut and. filled over 50 tons each during the previous working
LI
week.
At a national level, Ebby Edwards, the Board's labour relations
member and ex-NUM G-eneral Secretary, asked all Divisional Boards
for detailed evidence of all restrictive practices that were still
being carried. out ".... in spite of the clauses in the five-day
week agreement that they should be given up"
	 Edwards was a
member of a committee set up
	 with the NUM in June
to investigate reasons why restrictive practices continued. The
publicity which surrounded its formation was eclipsed however,
by a controversy which threatened. to boil over and. to stain the
NUM's public image of itself as representing a model of trade
union responsibility and disciplined power.
It manifested itself most clearly at the NUM's Margate Conference
in August, 1 948, when it became clear that there was widespread
discontent with the level of industrial democracy achieved inside
the nationalised. industry. A large number of resolutions dealing
with this theme were tabled. So seriously did the miners' ]eaders
44. C.G., 9.7.48. The Pontypridd. men were awarded their prizes on
the stage of the Odeon Cinema in Cardiff by the city's Lord Mayor.
42. Ibid., 6.8.48.
approach this problem that one observer declared that the demand
for an extension of "workers power" had. come to represent a p083-
ib].e "substitute" for cash advancements.
Despite the fact that the policy of the Labour Party, the TUG and.
the NUM had hitherto been that nationalised industries should be
controlled by independent boards containing a due proportion of
members nominated by the trade unions, but that they should. act
as individuals and. not as direct representatives of the unions,
the executive of the NUM was forced to move a resolution that,
as workers' participation can only be
achieved by a radical change in the composition
of the machinery at all levels," there should
be a provision for "greater representation from
the Labour and. trade-union movement"
In the course of his Presidential address however, Will Lawther
declared that the function of the union in the coal industry should
be "to remain free and independent", adding that they did. not
"subscribe to the doctrine that either the union or the officials
should be at one and the same time part of the structure for running
and owning the industry" .4-
There as obviously some considerable confusion here. Lawther's
	 -
analysis, in the words of the Collier y C-uardian' a editor, sounded.
like "a voice from the past" 4-6 and, indeed, the NIJM President later
implied that perhaps the events of the two years prior to the
Margate conrerence had required a change of attitude. 4.7 A Colliery
4.3. C.C. . Editorial, 13.8.1.8.
41g.. NUM Annual Conference Report, 191+8.
4.5. Ibid., "Fresidential Address".
4.6. C.G-. Editorial, 13.8.2+8.
7. Ibid.	 -
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uardian editorial made the most of this confusion by declaring
that neither the union nor the general public must forget that
"for the greater part of this century the mining
unions preached the doctrine of "the mines for
the miners". Nevertheless the fundamental prin-
ciple that wages and prices must run in harness,
even where the State owns an industry, seems to
-	
impose some checks upon uncompromising ambition
and rapacity, just as it imposes increased re-
sponsibilities upon the unions to promote high
production and assist in the abolition of practices
which militate against it
Here was summarised a very basic contradiction and one wkic)i remained
unsolved even in the mind of the NUM's chief officer. It was
patently clear that the NIJM had neither thought through, nor
adequately discussed in public, the questions surrounding the
nature of its relationship with the Coal Board. This is, un-
doubtedly, an important reason for the existence of so many obvious
disparities in the behaviour of various sections of S. Wales miners
in their dealings with nationalized management. A8 we have seen,
different groups of workers had. differing levels of expectation.
The "co-operative" line of the NTJM might have been acceptable to
the previously disorganized and largely dispirited workers of, say,
the Rhyinney and. Merthyr Valleys but that did not mean that it was
acceptable to the men of G-waun-cae-gurwen who had inherited a
legacy of relatively extensive job control. To them the controversy
over industrial democracy was, in a barely disguised sense, central
to their conflict with the Coal Board and the executive of the NtTh(.
For it could be argued that what the union described as "section-
alisin" was, in fact, a degree of local job control and trade union
-	 8. Ibid.
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autonomy which both the Coal Board and. the NUM executive found
unacceptable. It was an example of the old trade-union problem
of how best to subordinate local organisation to national organ-
isation - a problem greatly complicated after 194-6/4-7 'by the
hybrid nature of the relationship which was instituted between
the NUM and the NCB.
Anthracite miners looked eastwards and noted ho favourably their
own positions compared (in terms of wages and task-requirements)
with those of their brothers in the dry-steam and bituminous
areas. They could be forgiven for suspecting that, should they
surrender their old defences upon the orders of an executive which
obviously was confused over the nature of its proper role in a
nationalised industry, that they too, might soon find themselves
reduced to a level of industrial subservience comparable to that
which they suspected to be in existence amongst the former em-
ployees of the Powell Duffryn company.
By October 194-8, the G-waun-cae-gurwen (G'.o.g.) men were back in
the news, following their refusal to utilize appropriate channels
for the settling of local disputes. Their behaviour contrasted
dramatically with that of the Rhondda miners who, at the sane time
as the G-waun-cae-gurwen men were issuing threats, endorsed a
recent decision of a coalfield conference to work every other
Saturday and to do "all possible to increase production".4-9
* See, for example, the Tower Lodge Treasurer' a letter, pp. 67-69
which compared the unhappy position of the dry-steam coal miner with
that of his anthracite neighbour.
49. Ibid., 28.10.48.
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In mid-October about I ,050 miners (out of I ,608) employed at the
Steer and. East pits, Gwaun-cae-gurwen tendered 14 days' strike
notices owing to a proposed revision of a price list. It was
alleged that by so doing they had been "disloyal to an award of
umpires to whom was submitted a claim by the Regional Coal Board.
for a revision of the list"	 The Regional Coal Board, commenting
on the men's attitude, declared that pieceworkers, f or many years,
had enjoyed exceptional wages which often had been entirely un-
related to their effort, and it insisted on a revision of the
price list in order to ensure that wages paid were commensurate
with the work performed. The anthracite coalfield, it claimed,
had. been working at a serious economic loss and. the Board was
convinced that one way of reducing this loss lay in the revision
of price lists at certain pits in the Area:
"In not accepting the award of the umpires and
in handing in notices the men are violating the
whole principle of conciliation in the coalfield
and. rendering the machinery of industrial relation-
ship ineffective".
It is quite clear that it was the Coal Board's intention either
to bump up production on the assumption that the Gwaun-cae-gurwen
men would not countenance a reduction in their take-home pay or
else to reduce that pay if producbion remained at its existing level.
Either way, it constituted a very definite attack upon the standards
which had. been achieved by the men under their previous contracts
with Amalgamated Anthracite and would. almost certainly have con-
firmed their worst fears concerning the pdssibility that they might
have their earnings reduced to a level similar to that suffered by
50. Ibid.
51 • Ibid.
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their steam-coal colleagues to the east.
At the end of October, the Regional Coal Board announced its
intention to shut clown the Steer and East pits. It alleged that
during the week prior to its reaching its decision, production
at the two pits had declined from the "intolerably low" figure of
i .67 cwt. of saleable coal per inanshift to 6.5 cwt. per man and
it went on to ztress that both pits had been running at a heavy
loss since Vesting Day and earlier. The cost of wages alonc at
the pits during the 18 months prior to October had been 68s., a
ton, compared with a realisation of 58s. Id., a ton of the sale-
52
able coal produced.	 They, the Divisional Board members, had,
they said, given repeated warnings of the consequences which would
arrive from the lack of any material improvement and they had
"reluctantly come to the conclusion in view of
the most recent events that the operations at
Cwaun-cae-gurwen are imposing an impossible
burden on the industry as a whole and are con-
trary to the best interests of those engaged in
it and the community at large."53
The Coal Board made special mention of the fact that its three
umpires, after 'very wide and extensive deliberations, came up with
an award which established a basis of wage rates which would
"permit the men to earn good wages for reasonable effort" • In the
past, it was noted,
52. NCR Annual Returns and Accounts, 194.7, 1948. This represents
a very big loss, though not startling when compared with the loss
per ton for the South Wales coalfield as a whole in 1947. For
the 12 months, Jan-Dec., 194.7, the 3.oss was 9s. 7d., per ton
overall, and for the same 12 months in 946 the loss was 1s. 9d.,
per ton overall. The loss at G.c.g. appears to have remained
large when that of the rest of the field improved.
53. C.G., 4.11.4.8.
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"a system of allowances supplementary to piece-
rates had operated, which enabled most colliers
to receive as much as, or up to, £5 per week
irrespective of the work done, in addition to
earnings related to the tonnage handled.54
-The new wage rates substituted for those piece-
rates and allowances over-all rates which have
been approved in other collieries with similar
seams and conditions and which enable men to
earn good wages of between 4-Os., and 50s., a
shift per day f or reasonable effort".55
The Coal Board' a ultimatun was ba.ke& u b ar
	 tt
dation from the SWNUM that the G-waun-cae-gurwen strike notices be
withdrawn. On Monday; Nov. 7th, however, I ,050 Steer and East
employees struck work, the men having refused to accept their
executive's adice. In retaliation, the executive announced their
refusal to intervene in the dispute - despite the Board's closure
of the pits - until the men expressed a readiness to return to
work and to accept the umpires' award.
Within a matter of days, Cwaun-cae-gurwen witnessed the arrival
of four miners' M.P's, including James Griffiths, the Labour
Minister of National Insurance, all of whom urged the strikers
to accept their union's recommendations. They were successful
in as much as the massed meeting of strikers agreed to hold a
54-. This compares with average gross weekly earnings for all working
below in S. Wales in 194-8 of £8. NCB Annual Returns & Accounts, l91-8.
55. Although face-workers' earnings are not available in NCB returns
before 1952, the estimate of "4-Os and 50s" does seem a little
generous. The average gross earnings per manshift at the face
in 1 952 were )^5/8d. The 50s quote probably reflects the higher
•	 earning capacity of colliers in the anthracite field as compared
with the steam-coal area.
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secret ballot on the 1 7th of November. The result was a clear,
though not overwhelming, decision to return to work - or at least,
to implore the Coal Board to re-open the mines.*
At once, al]. of the decisive negotiatory power slipped away from
the Lodge committees of East and Steer and. fell into the laps of
the Cardiff-based miners' executive. For, although the main bene-
factors of the ballot result were the members of the Coal Board,
the miners' executive had demonstrated that they could counter-
act even the most "sectionalist" indiscipline on the coalfield..
The strike-leaders at Cwaun-cae-gurwen had suffered a defeat and.
found. that they were now dependent upon the negotiatory skills
of their central executive to win for them the best possible terms
for a resumption of work.
By early December, those terms were announced and the mines re-
opened. A great deal of stress was placed upon the need to trans-
form the idiosyncratic methods of payment at the pits into systems
compatible with those operating elsewhere, although it was also
emphasised that the pits would only reopen if workmen agreed to
"submit to the discipline of the management and carry out all
reasonable requests in the course of operations" and if it was
agreed that all restrictive practices be abolished and that the
five-day week be "practised in all respects". 6
 In late January,
* The result of the secret ballot was as follows:
For the withdrawal of strike notices:
	 .665 votes
Against the withdrawal of strike notices: 485 votes. C.G., 25.11 .118.
56. The other conditions were a follows:
(a) That the umpires' award be accepted in respect of' the conveyor
method of working.
b) That joint application be made to the umpires to decide prices.
c) All contract and special rates to continue as before.
ci) All colliers must equip themselves with a full set of tools.
SVNTJM 1inutes of Executive Council, 1948.
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the miners of East and Steer were publicly accused by the Board
of not sticking to bheir re-opening agreement; output per manshift
was down to 9.9 cwt., at East and )+.9cwt., at Steer A new closure
threat brought a promise from the men that they would "revert to
normal working" ,5 but few amongst the membership of either the
Coal Boar1. or the miners' executive could have retained much faith
in such a promise.
The temporary closure of Gi7aun-cae-gurwen brought with it a host
of theories which sought to explain the Board's action in polit-
ical terms. The mines located in that area were repeatedly re-
ferred to in newspapers as "stormcentres" of unofficial industrial
action and. it was widely felt that the Board would be far iappier,
from both a financial and a managerial point of view, to see the
pits closed. Identical theories were used to explain the Board's
proposed closure of Tareni Colliery in the Swansea Valley. In
both cases, the closures were interpreted as constituting
"punishment" for the political sins of these anthracite workers.
It is an interpretation which has entered the militant miner's
vocabulary and is used. to support the widespread allegation that,
because of its reputation as a haven for left-wingers and un-
official strikers, the whole coalfield has been systematically
*
Ustarveall of investment by the Coal Board.
This is, in many ways, a crude and inaccurate analysis and one
which is employed both by men and management but for widely diff-
* Tareni, unlike Steer and. East, closed permanently on February
4-tb, 194-9. Steer remained open (despite temporary "punishment"
closures) until February, 1959 and East (despite temporary
"punishment" closures) until October, 1 962/6.
57. C.G., 27.1.4.9.
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ering purposes. T}ie men cite it as proof of the way in which
the Coal Board and successive Governments have sought to destroy
their most effective centres of trade-union power; the managers
cite it as proof that the decline of the South Wales coalfield
is due in great part to the misdeeds of its industrial and po-
litical activists. Used either way, it constitutes a powerful
and resilient argument and one which warrants 'careful analysis.
As early as November, 19147, loud complaints began to emanate
from the workforce over the lack of adequate mining equipment
and personnel. At a mass meeting of I ,800 miners at Bridgend,
for example, a protest was lodged concerning what was described
as "sabotage" (on the part of Coal Loar o icials o r.ae
Government's attempts to increase coal production. Their griev-
ances centred upon an alleged ]ack of surface workers, repairers,
fitters and personnel responsible for safety during the voluntary
Saturday shifts.58 Two months later, the stay-down strikers at
Maindy Colliery blamed the proposed closure of their pit on the
fact that they and their colleagues had been starved of equip-
ment.
A less obvious protest in this direction was made during the
following July at Elliots Colliery in the Rhymaey Valley when
I ,200 miners were made idle because of a strike by 62 colliers
over the fact that one of theni had found that the padlock of his
tool bar had been broken - hardly, at first sight, a direct result
of the lack of Coal Board investment in is Welsh, pits. But the
incident concealcd a deep-seated resentment which, the men con-
idered, had unjustly been ignored by the Coal Board.
58. Western tvoil, 8.11 ,J7.
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Bill Paynter, who at that time was the Miners' Agent for the
Rhyirney, persuaded the strikers to return to work only after he
-	 publicly had made it clear that the problem of tools was an acute
one in all pits. '.Torkmen, he said, were compelled to purchase
their own and if these tools were lost or stolen then it was up
to the men to replace them. The cost of a set he reckoned to be
around .CL., which was roughly the average gross weekly wage for
an underground worker. Modern mining, he explained, made it
imperative that underground workmen be mobile, and. it was not
always practicable to carry heavy tools. Consequently, men
frequently were finding that their tool bars had been opened in
their absence and the tools mislaid or broken. New tools had to
be bought or the old ones repaired; either way it entailed con-
sid.erable expense, and Faynter argued that the only practical
solution would be f or the al Board to be responsible for providing
all workmen' a tools and for maintaining them under proper super-
vision. 59 He received wide support, for no fewer than thirteen
lodges had. urged, in a joint resolution at the Area annual con-
Lerence, that tools, clothing for protective purposes and explosives
should be provided free of cost to the mine workers.
The Board's alleged skimping on these relatively small expen-
ditures was interpreted by the workforce as indicating a more
general relirtance on the part of their employer to invest in
the reconstruction of the South Wales coalfield. In August, 1948,
Homer articulated this interpretation when he appealed to the
Coal Board to put its plans for reorganisation before the union.
59. C.G., 2.7.1+8.
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Ec- claimed that he and. his members were dissatisfied with the
speed of reorganisatiori and argued that the time for "alibis and
excuses" was passed. Unless reorganisation was proceeded with
quickly, he continued, the miners' union would disclaim res-
ponsibility for continued losses:
"If reorganisation is held up for political
or other reasons", he warned, ".... the•
financial responsibility must be upon the
shoulders of those who make the decisions.60
When the plans were announced however, they proved extremely uncori-
genial to many angst the anthracite xers. k1ost
the Board. announced that Tareni and a number of other "trouble-
some" pits in that Area should close as part of the general re-
organi sati on.
Tareni had. long been unsure of its fate. By January, 194.9, it
employed. just 300 men with its production workers concentrated.
on one remaining conveyor face. Management cited. ventilation
difficulties as constituting the main reason why two more faces
could. not be opened. Tareni had been scheduled for reorganisation
long before nationalisation and. about £250,000 had. been spent on
development, most of it having gone in wages. Its coal seams
slipped away badly and general geological difficulties made the
original scheme for redevelopment apparently unworkable, so much
so in fact, that the main seam would. have to be tapped from another
direction. There was however, abundant high grade anthracite in
60. Ibid., 20.8.48; see, also, Aberdare Leader, 21 .8.1^8: Homer
declared that mines had been allowed. to fall into a "shameful
technical condition" and he condenned those who, as he put it,
sought to so]ve this problem by creating a new pool of unem-
ployed which might be used to aid. the "archaic" solution of
wa ge-cutting.
6i . c.c.., 6.1.4.9.
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the pit and. it was this, more than any other single consideration;
which caused the NU1 to adopt a policy of advocating major re-
organisation in order that the pit's output could be revived once
again. There was however, another consideration which could not
be ignored and that was the widespread worry in many of the mining
areas of S. Wales (and especially in the Swansea Valley) con-
cerning the employment situation and the whole future of the coal
industry in the light of plans f or large-scale colliery closures..
The Tareni closure announcement provoked the calling of a con-
ference of local authorities from neighbouring communities to
discuss the position with representatives of anthracite miners'
lodges. Similar meetings took 1ace in 'oer8are where the town
council had gone as far as ending a delegation to London to meet
the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, Mr. G-eorge
Beicher, to discuss the growing problem of unempioyment.62 Aberdare,
like the Swansea Valley, was feeling the effects of the first of
many post-nat ionalisat ion closures.6
As early as the first two years of nationalisation, the NUM ex-
ecutive was made aware of the paradoxical position in which it
found itself in relation to pit closures. Pledged to cooperate 	 -
in reorganizing the industry, it nevertheless proved impossible
for the union to ignore the fact that there existed. widespread.
62. The deputation was extremely dissatisfied with their reception
by Belcher. Councillor Sam Wilcox reported that members of the
deputation, having travelled 200 miles to put forward Aberdare's
case, were granted only hour by Beleher himself, who talked
for half an hour - "as if he knew Aberdare better than they did" -
"If he had. talked less, we could have told. hint a lot, for we
were not a meek and. mild deputation". Aberdare Leader, J+.9.1f8.
63. In j91+8, the Aberdare Valley lost Cwmneol Colliery; in,19 1+9 it
lost Cwm Cynon, Werfa Dare and Penrhiwceiber No. 3.
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fear within the mining communities that the closures might be
heralding a return of mass-unemployment. The union's executive
was confronted regularly withpetitions and deputations pleading
the case of one or other of the collieries on the closure list.
For their part, the elected officers examined each case with ex-
treme care. They were fully aware of the fact that, of all of
the gloomy shadows hanging over the coalf-ield.T, none caused as
much trepidation amongst the mining cominunities. as the prospect
of unemployment. If the union's membership tended to drainatise
this particular situation somewhat, it was perfectly understandable
in the light of its pre-war experience.
The miners' executive therefore, began to oppose closures wherever
there was the slightest possibility that jobs might profitably
be saved. In thiz respect, they were often at variance with their
counterparts on the Coal Board who favoured a much more radical
approach. The proposed closure of Tareni was a case in point,
in as much as the Board advocated a complete shut-down whilst the
union favoured developing new points of access to proven reserves
of high-grade anthracite. And although the union's opposition to
complete closure lacked any great conviction, it nevertheless
provided the Tareni rank-and-filers with a legitimate article of
defence which they proceeded to develop into a cohesive argument
for the need for the application of imagination and daring by the
coal planners.
A Colliery
 Cuardi editorial commented that thia was a typical
example of the apparent inability of the S. Wales' coalminer to
come to terms with reality: the closure of Tareni, it reported,
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".... has been obstructed by the workmen by every
means in their power. Notwithstanding a strong
demand for Welsh anthracite from all parts of the
world, the position of the industry has been a
hapless one for many years. Profits have been
low and costs extravagant, largely the result, it
must be admitted, of egregious mismanagement
rather than of natural difficulties. 	 In 194.7
the Swansea area made a loss of 22s. 6d, on every
ton of coal sold. At some of the pits the losses
were as high as £10 to £12 per
The Regional Survey Report in I 94.6 considered that the position
in the anthracite area clearly called for a full and detailed
examination into the ways and means of working and development
on an economic basis. A salient factor was that the majority of
the collieries had been in pro4uction f or periods varying from
4-0 to 1 00 years and the Committee stated that urgent and drastic
measures needed to be taken to bring these collieries into line
with recent improvements in practice for the economical working
of their remaining reserves.66
Few changes had taken place by the end of 19 14-8 (indeed, the Board
had closed only three anthracite mines in the first two years of
public ownership) but, in January, 1 94-9, it was proposed. that at
least twelve pits in the area should close - a decision which
provoked the local authorities to take up arms and to demand the
alternative course of reconstruction. The editor of the Colliery
Guardian_observed how significant it was that Alf Davies, the
64. An interesting admission this, in the light of the C.G's many
previous defences of' the Amalgamated Anthracite Company and.
of its chairman, Szarvasy.
65. C.G. ., 20.1 .49.
66. Regional Survey Report, 194.6, op. cit.
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Communist President of the S, Wales miners', had gone so far as to
declare that "30 of the l2 anthracite pits should be shut
The choice which faced the Board was a difficult one. It could
choose either to push ahead with its rational1sng plans and, in
so doing, to sweep aside local objections, or else it could. adopt
what might best be called a "defeatist" attitude which contented
itself with a low pitch of efficiency rather than risk an imm-
ediate return to pre-war-style unemployment.
The question of closing down uneconomic pits and utilizing the
man-power so released in more profitable undertakings became
increasingly urgent as the Board' s development plans matured.
It cropped up in other coalfields less embarrassed financially
than S. Wales. In Lanarkshire, for example, several thousand
pitworkers and their families found their sources of employment
closed and responded by moving to fresh areas. The miners'
union was forced, in such situations, to fulfil its previous
but
promises concerning cooperation with the Coal Board,
	 it was
one thing for leaders like Aif Davies to voice "pro'essive"
4fla
theories regarding the need for colliery rationalisation, 4
quite another to convince dozens of mining communities that they
should pull up their roots and move to wherever the manpower
shortage existed in more productive mines.
It was not, of course, a new problem. The whole period after 1920
- had. seen marked changes in the attitude of the entrepreneur to- 	 -
wards the unprofitable unthrtaking. It had long been the case
that it was not necessarily profit and loss which provided the
67. C.C., 20.1,149.
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test by which it was decided-that a mine remained open or closed.
Various inter-war marketing schemes made it possible to guarantee
a minimum profit to the poor undertaking, in order, it was argued,
to assure to the successful undertaking an additional margin of
profit.
Under nationalisation, the problem had acquired a new aspect.
It seemed. imperative that the Board should. make an over-all
profit, but an even more important objective was increased pro-
duction. Once again, there were many influential voices prompting
indecisive Board members as to the best means of achieving these
objectives. The editor of the CollIery auardIan remarked con-
fidently that .... "With a secure financial position", the Board
could "solve both problems by weeding out the unprofitable unit
and. concentrating effort upon new undertakings in which the coal
can be won at a lower tonnage cost". The loss of capital involved.
could, he argued, be covered by the gains received from increased
productivity.68
He was also very forthright in his advice to the Board as to how
its members should regard the protest strikes of the soon-to-be
displaced rank-and-file at the collieries in question:
"The association of the unofficial strike with
these basic discussions is a dangerous portent.
It is all the more menacing when, instead of being
aimed at the extraction of higher wages from a
thriving public or semi-public service, it is
employed. as a means of draining blood from a
moribund carcass, a not unfair description of
S. Wales coaluiining at the present tim&'.6
68. Ibid..
69. Ibid.
¼
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The carcass refused to revive, no matter how many inquiries poked
around in it and no matter how many indignant articles were written
about it. At Steer pit, Cwaun-cae-gurwen, for example, a comparison
was made between 'effort and wages" for the Holiday Pay Week
(Bull Week) for I 948 and 1 949 - the one week during the year
in which it was unlikely that ca'canriy would be employed during
production. It was found tEat, although the overall 0MB had
dropped by almost 3, the 0MB at the coalface Shad dropped by
only a fraction. The explanation was a simple one: namely,
that well over a third of the number of skilled colliers working
at the coal-face in 1948 had left by the Summer of 1949, whilst
the numbers of workers employed on "non rothicti'e"	 t t
pit had remained fairly constant. The number of collier-shifts
worked had therefore dropped whilst the number of shifts worked
by others underground had increased.
What was particularly worrying about this situation was the fact
that it had worsened as a result of the Coal Board's reorganisation
of Steer, (this took place during the early months of 1949).
Colliers appear simply to have left the pit rather than face an
inevitable decrease in earnings - and., indeed, the decrease was
a considerable one for all grades of workers below ground:
1O1
Coxnparison between effort and wages for the Holiday Pay Week
LBull vee for I 92+8 and I 94-9
1 6th July 1 94-9
Number of Colliers	 207
Number of Others Underground	 326
Number of Surface
692
Number of Collier Shifts 	 939
Number of Others u/c. Shifts	 1 787
C-ross Output	 2119
	
tons
OviS Colliers	 4-5.1 cwts
OMS Colliers & other U/C.
	15.5 cwts
OMS Colliers Surface only
	
2+7.2 cwts
July 1 94-8
.362
328
1 80
870
1752
i 688
5440
3973 tons
4-5.3 cwts
23.-i cwts
78.2 cwts
Overall OS
Average Wage
Colliers
and Others U/c.
Surface
11.69 cwts
3W4-
35/9
21/Li.
i6.6 cwt
54/3
50/7
23/li
--Comparison -obtained from undated, typed sheet found in the
Gwaun-cae-gurwen Correspondence Envelope; Coalfield. Collection,
University of Swansea.
The differences in average wages were as follows:
	
Colliers	 15s.11d.. per shift
Colliers & Other U/c.	 14s.IOd. per shift
	
Surface	 f2s. 7d. per shift 70
70. The document contained the warning that, "Overall effort decreased
from 3,440 tons (23.1 cwts) to 2,119 tons (15.5 cwts) and the change in
number of colliers, with daywage near similar, plus Heading and. Stalls on
ca-canny must be kept in mind. "Same evidence must be taken note of when
approaching average wages. Figures for colliers contain (sio) Heading
and. Stalls on
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Although the average wages per manshift for faceworkers across the
coalfield as a whole are not available, those for all workers
below ground are, and a comparison of those obtaining at Steer
with the coalfield average shows quite clearly that, even though
it was "Bull Week" at Steer, potential earnings at that pit were
comparatively high until reorganisation:
Coalfield Aver71
I 948 Colliers & Other IJ/G.
 31 S. I 0.14.d.
I 949 Colliers & Others u/G 33s. 0.28..
Steer Average
(Bull Week)
50s. 78..
35s. 9d.
Taking into account the fact that the Steer wages for 19L4 9 were
the result of Bull Week efforts, the decline in attraction of
coalface work at the pit f or a• healthy and productive collier
becomes startlingly obvious. It is also obvious that reorgan-
isation had worsened, rather than improved, an already poor
productivity record. Few, if any, comparisons of this sort are
available for other reorganised. pits at this time - a great pity,
for it would 'be exceedingly interesting to see if the Steer ex-
perience is repeated elsewhere; for what appeared to happen at
that pit was that a fundamentally unproductive system of work
and. payment was modified rather than transformed - a crucial
difference in terms of the way in which the Board's motives were
perceived by the anthracite workforce which was well aware of the
rich deposits of anthracite coal lying within the catchment areas
of both the Gwaun-cae-gurwen and Tareni collieries. The cost of
transformation would, of course, have been a great deal higher
• than would that of making limited modifications, and it is very
73 • NCB Annual Report end Accounts, 1 948/49.
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possible that the Board's reluctance to pour capital into pits with
such unsatisfactory records of labour relations was interpreted
(rightly) by the workforces as constituting a £1itiCal decision.
This interpretation was reinforced in August, 19)^9, when the
Board, apparently frustrated by further go-slows and. ca'canny
at Steer, closed the pit for a further eighteen months.
The Board chose also to close Gelliceid.rim colliery at nearby
Ammanford. after a deliberate go-slow policy had resulted in a
steady decrease in production. The l-OO miners thus made re-
dundant were not offered alternative jobs at other pits - a de-
veloprnent which was not unnaturally interpreted by some as meaning
that the Board did not wishelliceid.rim "troublemakers" to up-
set labour relations at other anthracite mines.72
Gelliceidrim reopened in late August and 350 miners were informed
that they would be "reabsorbed" back into the pit in stages over
the following nine weeks. The NCB and NUM announced jointly
that the colliery would reopen on a new mechanised basis. The
attempts at isolating the Gelliceidrim workers from neighbouring
pits was repeated during and after August at Steer. Of the 700
workmen formerly employed at that pit, few, if any, were offered
positions in other collieries. 200 of them were sent by the
Ministry of Labour to other types of work in the area, including
labouring. 73 The Board's action can be interpreted in two ways:
either it had no vacancies for skilled miners in other pits (the
accuracy of this would depend very much upon precise localities
72. C.G.., i9.5.)^9.
73. Ibid., 3.11 .L.9.
and times) or else it was aware that, at some later date, it
would re-open the colliery and would thus need a reserve work-
force.
There are probably, elements of truth in both explanations but
it is undoubtedly the case that it was the latter which held most
attraction for the men themselves and for their sympathisers at
other collieries. 7 They saw themselves as being "punished" for
their militancy - an interpretation which assumed that the Coal
Board recognised them as being in the vanguard of unofficial
opposition to what the Steer and Gelliceidrim men saw as mana-
gerial attempts to diminish the power of the union at the place
of work.
Such interpretations were, even at their point of creation, often
highly emotive and very much dependent upon the economic, if not
political, perspective of those doing the interpreting. The
accounts which survive, therefore, are not surprisingly, of an
extremely partisan nature. Separate events and incidents have
congealed together to form an impressionistic whole: the closure
bf Tareni became interwoven with the events surrounding the
closure of Steer and East. Low productivity was explained away
by offhand references to the unwillingness of the Board. to in-
vest in new techniques for mining in these difficult seams. The
unwillingness or inability of the Board to re-allocate the work-
forces of Steer and G-elliceidrim became examples of managerial
attempts to "pick-off" the more militant workforoes, and. so  on
and so forth. The role of the NUM varied with the situation and.
the interpretation. Thus, at Tarc-ni, its support for the men was
74. Recording of Evan John, Glais, June i976.
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a case of "too Uttle, too late"; at Steer and. Gelliceidrim, the
N1J officials were accused by many of being "collaborators" and,
indeed, the over-all impression which one gains from these events
is that the workforces considered that the central executive was
tying itself too closely to the Board. by adhering as strictly
as it did to its declared policy of providing maximum cooperation
in all matters affecting reorganisation.
What emerged, in other words, was a version of a series of highly
complicated developments which depended. at least as much upon
preconceived political and industrial perspectives as it did pon
accurate and cool observation. The new developments were tailored
to fit an old. pattern and the process was made that much easier
by the fact that so little had. changed in terms of managerial
porsonnei and industrial practice since the instigation of public
ownership.
These problems of transition - as they might euphemistically
be called. - were bj n.e uiean. 1tmtte. te
they were very much in evidence in the dry-steam and bituminous
areas to the east and they also affected leaders of the calibre
of Homer.
No one in the higher echelons of the NUM had responded to the
Coal Board's request for cooperation more energetically than he
had, but sri incident which occurred in Paris on October 12th,
1 948, threatened his good works with the stigma of insincerity
and. opportunism in as much as it appeared that Homer was willing
to cooperate with the Coal Board and. with the Labour &ovemnment
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only for as long as it suited the British Communist Party (of
which he was a member) to do so. The controversy began when
Homer, who was by this time, the C-eneral Secretary of the
National Union of Mineworkers, attended the congress in Paris of
the Communist-dominated French G-eneral Confederation of Labour.
Whilst Homer was travelling to the conference, the French miners
struck work and immediately received the verbal support of the
S. Wales miners' executive which passed a resolution "expressing
solidarity with the French miners in their present struggle and
protesting against the export of coal from this country to France
while the miners are on strike".75
Addressing the French conference, Homer said that no British
miner would want to speak against the French miners' strike.
Miners in England who were aware of the conditions facing French
miners would, he argued, be ready to support their action for they
would have done the same thing had they had. to suffer similar
76
conditions.	 He then addressed those amongst the critics of
the French miners who interpreted the strike in political terms:
"In 1926 it was declared that the British
coal strike was not an economic strike but
a political strike. The people who said that
were wrong, as they are wrong i saying that
the French miners are striking for political
ends..."
and he went on, somewhat xrrsteriously, to comment that Soviet
support for the French miners' strike inj9i18 had found an earlier
parallel in Britain in 1926 when the U.S.S.R. had sent more than
75. Dj3y Worker, 12.10.B
76. C.G., 21 .iO.l-8.
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£j ,000,000 to support British miners during their strike.77
Homer's gesture of support was immediately repudiated by the
President of the NUM, Will Lawther, and the members of the S.
Wales Miners' executive found themselves similarly criticized
by a number of Lodges.
Will Lawther defended the NUM's policy of coopration with the
Coal Board by reminding his members that the 1921 and 1926
strikes had ended in defeat for the British mix,ars and t.by bad
been forced to accept lower wages and longer hours. The demo-
cratic method of settling industrial disputes by conciliation
and arbitration that bad been adopted since L926 ized proved
superior, he argued, and hi advice to the French miners was to
adopt similar tactics and, not follow the methods advocated by
the Communists. He added later that it was because he did not
want the French miners to be gulled. by resolutions passed by
certain British areas (S. Wales and Scotland) into thinking that
they were to get support from British miners that he thought it
was his "plain and honourable duty", both to the French and
British miners, to let them know the "terrible truth", that
these resolutions of suppoz't were meaningless. Driving the
knife deeper into Homer and his left-wing supporters in the
coalfields, Lawther added that Homer's action in assuring French
strikers of British support was to be considered by the executive
of the NIJM. Homer, he alleged, had been sent to Paris as a
fraternal delegate and it was expected that any statement made
by him g ould be in line with NUM policy.78
77. C.G., 2i.t0.l8.
78. Ibid.
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Homer, in Paris, reaffirmed his position and told reporters
that he was a Communist and. that nothing would change him from
that position. He was a Communist when he was elected secretary
of the NUM and his position would be decided by the miners.
International working class solidarity, he said,was more im-
portant than his position and he emphasised this by alleging that
he had had. two offers to become a member of the Coal Board at
a salary of £5,000 per year. 79 	-
Homer's speech signalled the start of an extraordinary public
debate between the Communist groupings within the NUM and their
Labour counterparts. What is immediately surprising is that
Homer - "that miniature Machiavelli", as the editor of the
Colliery Guardian dubbed him - chose to stake his popularity
with the British miners upon so frail an issue. In his auto-
biography he claims that it was because he was distressed at
the way in which the British Trade Union Movement, and the NTJM
in particular, had chosen to support right-wing European trade
union organisations, 	 cngst t'e.ti tre. i
a breakaway, anti-Communist group of unions set up in opposition
to the C.G.T. and including amongst its ranks a miners' section
to which the executive of the NUM decided. to hand over £5,000.
He recalls that
"At that time we were in the old. building
of the Seamen's Union .... So when I made my
protest I waved my arm around. the room and I
said, 'It was in this very building that
Havelock Wilaon gave tbn thousand pounds to
79. Ibid.
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Spencer, to form scab unions in Nottingham
and. b, Wales, and heie you are doing the same
thing to the French miners" 80
Homer alleged that he heard, shortly before he made his French
speech, that there had taken place talks between British Trade
Union leaders and General Marshall, the American Foreign
Secretary, and it was these talks, he believed, which caused.
Lawther to condemn the French miners' strike. - Arriving back
in London, he recalls that he was met
"by an army of reporters, photographers and
press cameras. I really let myself go and told.
them what I thought about the whole business.
I said. that there were people preparing for war
and thought it would be very Inconvenient to
imprison me if, at that time, I was in the
position of General Secretary of the Miners'
Union. I suggested that the British miners
would find themselves under similar attacks to
those in France and I added that there were
certain circles in Britain who would like to
return control of the coal industry into the
hands of divisional dictators, instead of the
divisional boards which had. been set up under
,82the Nationalisation Act'
This was an extraordinary statement to make and it is unclear as
to how it was that he managed. to piece together sufficient in-
formation to allow him to make it. He appears to have had. no
doubt that these "dictatorships" were being floated as serious
proposals:	 -
80. A. Homer, 0p.cit., pp.18k-185	 ________
Bj. Ibid., p.
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ttThey all denied it at the time", he wrote
later, "but the truth came out when Alfred
Robens, the successor to Jim Bowman as Chair-
man of the Board, addressed the Press Gallery.
He, of all people, announced his support for
de-centralisation. It is one thing to ensure
that officers at district level have power to
take decisions, but I fear that this is the
thin end of the wedge to set cne district
against another".83
His allegations had split wide open the packaged image of "unity"
which surrounded the elected leadership of the NUM. A special
committee was set up to investigate his allegations and a
delegate conference called in South Wales to test hi support
in his old stronghold. Predictably, both events turned, into
dogfights between Communists and. Labourites. 	 In . Wales,
Homer experienced the indignity of finding himself censored
by lodge delegates at the Gory Hall - despite the fact that his
Communist supporters (including six of the thirteen members of
the S. Wales' Miners' executive) had. gone to considerable lengths
to marshall pro-Homer support. Labour took the day as they
almost always did when the political chips were down.85
83. A. Homer, op. cit., p. 186.
84.. The sub-committee set up to prepare a statement on the
union's policy consisted of Abe Moffat, president of the
Scottish miners, a Communist; Sam Watson, Durham, vice-
chairman of the Labour Party; mnest Jones, Yorkshire, Labour;
Will Arthur, S. Vales, Labour; and Joe Kitta, Derby.
Lawther, Homer and Bowman, the NU viôe-president, were
ex-officic members of all such sub-committees.
Source: N1J1 lxecutive Council Minutes, 194-8.
85. Recording of Bill Paynter, London, March 1977.
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At a meeting of the IDM executive on November 30th a point-by-
point reply was issued by the special committee in answer to
Homer's statements. It had been accepted by a majority on the
executive of j8 to 7 and copies of the report sent to all miners'
lodges. Its contents emphasised the hostility which existed be-
tween 1-lomner and the majority of his colleagues in the NTJM
executive. 1-us plea that his Paris and London airport statements
were made in a personal capacity were brushed aside with the
comment that the executive had no interest in Homer's statements
except if they were made in hi capacity as secretary of the NUM.
His charges that NUM officials and the G-overnment were trying to
get rid of him were refuted and strong objection was taken to his
use of the first person singular in the remarks which he had
made concerning the negotiatory achievements of the NUM since
I 9)^7. In a concluding section the report stated that the NIJM
would strongly resent every attempt to treat the British mine-
workers as tools of the Cominform.8
The body of the report is worth examining in detail in as much
as it tells us a good deal about the way in which the executive
viewed its relationship with the Labour G-overnmerit and the Coal
Board as well with Its G-eneral Secretary.
It countered. Homer's allegation that British coal was being
used, to break the French miners' strike by pointing out that
imports of coal into France from Poland
"were likely to have a far greater rejudicial
effect on the situation in France than imports
from the United Kingdom. Of the total solid
-	 86. NUM Executive Council Minutes, 192+8.
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fuel imports into France during the period
January-June, j948,	 came from this country,
whilst ii% came from Poland. During the period
July-September only t was .mported from this
country, but imports from Poland remained at
between 1Q and ii%. During the period of the
strike, however, Poland actually increased its
-exports to France to a level which was higher
than at any time during the year 1948. During
the first month of the strike, i.e., October,
the imports of coal and briquettes into France
from Poland represented more than 15 of the
total; the imports from the U.K., however, were
only 4.4 of the total".87
With a great deal of justification, the report explainei this
anomctly in political terms:
"Did the Communist leadrs of the French C.G.T.
and the Communist Party in this country, in
seeking support f or the French strike .... make
a strategical error in concerning themselves
with the comparatively small amount of imports
from this country instead of making their app-
eals to the Polish miners? The committee believe
not. The French and British Communist Parties
are far more concerned with creating the greatest
possible amount of confusion and. chaos with a
view to sabotaging the efforts of the Governments
of Western Europe towards recovery than they are
88
with the conditions of French mine workers".
After pointing out that it would be quite wrong to regard the
French strike as a strike aimed at improiing the. standards of
French miners, the committee developed the argument that the
87. Thid.
88. Ibi3.
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strike was part of the Communist's efforts to weaken the Marshall
Plan. If Homer was so concerned with the plight of the French
miners, it argued, why then was he not equally concerned with
the dismal plight of their comrades in Poland where underground
workers were alleged to work a 4.5 hour week f or an average wage
of £3 and where
"thousands of German prisoners of war (wre)
employed for 8 or 9 hours each day without pay,
their only consolation being that they receive(d)
full army rations, which (were) considerably
higher than the rations of Polish civilians".89
The main part of the report concluded with a statement of union
policy which recorded that
"It is to the credit of the Labour Government
that, within six months cf assuming office, it
introduced a Parliamentary measure, the object
of which was to transfer the coal mining industry
to public ownership. The details of the scheme
embodied in the Parliamentary Bill were in full
accord with the scheme which had. been drafted
by representatives of the NU1V, the TUC and the
Labour Party prior to the election".9°
It went on to record how the union had agreed to offer complete
cooperation in return for the promise of implementation of the
so-called Miners' Charter and how, by the end of 1948, the Govern-
ment and. the Coal Board had done much to fulfil that promise:
"Through the recognised pmoceedure of negotiations
within the industry we have obtained, at a cost to
the industry of more than £65 million per annum,
- the following reforms and improvements since the
appointment of the National Coal Board:
89. Ibid., their emphasis.
90. Ibid.
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"A five-day working week.
Substantially increased wages.
Increased overtime rates.
A scheme for supplementary compensation payments.
Statutory holiday payments.
Improved welfare facilities (including maintenance
of pithead. baths) and improved medical services.
Improved training facilities and an extension of
technical education facilities.
"We submit that never before in the history of the
industry have such advances been made in the stan-
dards of workers over such a short period .... and
although .... the NCB has introduced new machinery
to the value of not less than £20 million, the
greatest possible effort on the part of every work-
man is necessary (to aid major reorganization of
the industry and. thus to help implement the remaining
reforms of the Charter)".
The report went on to stress the vital importance to the nation
of increased coal production and it utilized Homer's own words
to.do O. It stated that the Labour movement had
"accepted the principle that nationalized, industries
must be financially self-reliant: the nationalized
industry must, to use the words of Mr. Horrier, "pay
for itself in the long run"; any suggestion of its
being subsidised "is inconceivable".... The logic
of that argument has, until recent weeks, been
accepted by the Communist Party which now seeks to
place a brake on production.
"In an attempt to incite the membership of the union
to sabotage the efforts of the Covemnment towards
recovery, the Communist Party claims that the
Govemnment's policy of higher productibn, a policy
which is backed by the TUG as well as the NtJM, is
opposed to the best interests of the workera
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"It is a simple economic fact that the living
standards of the people must, in the long run,
be governed by the rate of production. You
cannot enjoy more wealth than you are prepared
to produce. Why should it be wrong, therefore,
for us, f or the TUC and for the Labour Govern-
ment, to exhort our people to produce more? ....
Increased production is an investment and a
guarantee that the living standards•of the
mining community will be maintained and improved
as the general economic difficulties are eased".
As a parting shot, the report reiterated the fact that the NUM,
affiliated as it was to the Labour Party, had
"rejected, as recently as 19)+6, any suggestion
that the Communist Party should be accepted as
an affiliated body of the Labour Party".
Homer, and the Left on the ntional executive, took a severe
battering. They complained, at the time, and even more-so later,'
that Lawther and the Right had been "bought off" by the financial
promises of C'eneral Marshall but such complaints only reflected
the growing antagonism evident in Communist circles generally
for what the members perceived as a marked shift to the right
in Labour Party policies. As early as December, 1947, Harry
Pollitt delivered a special report to the Executive of the British
Communist Party which declared:
"When the world is clearly divided. into an
imperialist and an anti imperialist camp, with
a Labour G'overnment as an active partner in the
imperialist camp, and carrying through a capitalist
solution of the crisis, it is necesary that important
changes in the policy of the Communist Party to
92
meet this situation should be made."
91 • A. Homer, op. cit., pp. 186-187; W. Paynter, "My G'eneration"
pp. 124-125.
92. Labour Monthly, XXIX, p. 323: Quoted in H. Felling, op. cit., p. 142.
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As Henry Felling notes, among the changes was to be the
"abandonment of Communist support for increased
production. This policy, which had been 'absolutely
correct' in the past, would now 'only result in
traUing behind the Government's reactionary policy'.
With these words Pollitt steered the party firmly
into a policy almost as sectarian as that of
'Class Against Class' in 1929-32".
The TUC responded with various appeals to the major unions to
"Defend Democracy" 94.
 and suitable cries of "witch-hunt" rose
from the ranks of Communist Trade Unionists right across the
country. Few "witches" were burned within the miners' union,
however, despite the publicity given to the rift within, the ex-
ecutive. A slightly more frigid atmosphere may have descended
upon union meetings but it seejns to have had little effect upon
the intimate relationships which had. long existed between omm-
unists and non-Communists within the S. 'Iales N1Th'I and indeed,
within the NUM in general. Bill Faynter, for example, recalls
that Homer and Lawther remained firm drinking partners even
during the most acrimonious periods of their public argument.
At pit level, there was much the same response - despite the
occasional example of a particularly well-defined Labour Lodge
going out of its way to censure Homer for one of his more out-
spoken observations on Labour policy. For his part, Homer be-
trayed few signs of wishing to repent. Instead., he did. what he
always did. when in trouble - he listened with more sensitivity
than any amongst his fellow executive members to the most general
93. Ibid., p. 14.2.
94.. The title of the TUG statement to the unions inviting them to
consider whether they should take action to prevent Communists
from occupying key union posts and from acting as union dele-
gates. H. Felling, op. cit., p. 154..
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grievances of miners in the coalfield.s and then proceeded to
articulate those grievances as no-one else could (or would).
By doing so, he inevitably succeeded in identifying himself with
rank-and-file opinion and. thus managed to hold tenaciously to that
central body of union support which he might otherwise so easily
have lost in the mist of Party sectarianism.
Speaking at Aberfan in June, 192+9 for example, he seizedupon
some recent managerial statements concerning an alleged. lack
of effort by the workforce and. used. them brilliantly to outline
a whole list of ongoing grievances. Replying to the Coal Board
chiefs arid colliery managers who had made the allegations at a
managers conference in Cardiff, he remarked. that it had. becoae
"easy to discern a change in the open attitude of Coal Board
leaders and. managers", 95
 He rhecalled that one of the Coal Board's
production members, Sir Eric Young, had alleged that managers
were "not in a position to make any more concessions to the miners",
and accused some of them of having "worked out a scientific scheme
to avoid work and be as well off as if they worked full time",
while Dr. William Reid, production member of the Scottish
Regional Board, had declared that the present bonus shift had
been a failure and as a result, he had said, the Board could not
secure a fair day's work. He was, he said, "missing the traditions"
of the old mining companies to "spur men on" and he was backed up
by a •colliery manager who had declared at the Cardiff conference
that someone had to be found to say "No" to the continuing demands
of the mineworkers. One of them, Homer alleged, had even said it
was time to abandon ' 1 soft psyciholody" and, calling for more
95. C.G•.., 7.7.4-9
118
authority, had. "callously" said. "You may have a few strikes,
but let the colliery managers get over that - they solved the
strikes in the old. days".6
"Who are these people?" asked Homer. Sir Eric Young was the
man responsible for production and. Dr. Wm. Reid. was the son of
Sir Charles Reid..97
"They are men paid higher salaries than miners
because of their sidil in technique in coal
production and. for their ability to manage men.
But are attacks on the miners the best way to
go about it? Their statenents, if' true, are a
measure of their own failure. Why do they
come into the open with these attacks now?
Is it because the Genera]. Election is in the
air, are they looking fr a Tory victory?
Are they seeking to establish that they are
tough men who should be given control if full
employment passes away and we see unemployment
which will be the inevitable result of the re-
turn of a Tory Government to power?"
Were they, he asked, banking on unemployment to retrieve lost
power? Leaving the question hang, he answered it rhetorically
by observing that Sir Eric Young had. said. that he had. made his
statements "believing that the press was not present at the
eetjflgt• "That", observed. Homer, "only makes it worse".
96. Ibid.
97. Charles Carlow Reid.: former wartime director of production,
Ministry of Fuel and. Power, formerly . General Manager and
Director, Fife Coal Company Limited, Chairman of the 191.,.5
Ministry of Fuel and Power Report on the Technical Advisory
Committee on Coal Mining. HMSO Cmi. 6610.
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They could. forgive Dr. ?Iin. Reid: tt] is his father's voice that
is speaking". Sir Charles Reid. had
away from the Coal Board to work against
its policy; the son does it from within. Is
thia the way to secure amicable relations?
Is this the way of cooperation in the interests
of that higher production of which the nation
stands in such need?"
The colliery managers, admitted Homer, had salary complaints,
but why blame the miners for their failure? He cited figures
to prove that production had increased. q'iIte. 	 ceciL
98the previous half-year and argued that absenteeism had d..ropped.,
not increased. He hammered home this point by examining the
complaints which had been made concerning an alleged increase
in involuntary absenteeism:
"For face workers, in 1948, it was 6.o and
this year to date it had. been 8.02%, while for
all workers it had gone up from 11 to 12.53%.
98. He argued that, in the 23 weeks to June 11th, deep-mined.
output was 90,457,500 tons and. open case production
5,3Z,4,200 tons, a total of 95,807,700 tons. The increase
in deep-mined output for the first half of 1949 had been
2,356,200 tons over the total for the same period in I 94d -
an increase of 2.6%. OMS at the coalface during the first
half of 1949 had been 3 cwt., as against 2.91 cwt., the
previous year, and over-all output had been 23 cwt., against
22 cwt., in 1948. The increase of over 5 million tons had
been achieved despite the fact that the effective number
of face workers had fallen from the 1948 level of 271 ,000
to 270,000 and all workers had, gone down from 676,700 to
663,100; the effective shifts worked in 194-9 had been
4.90 as against 4.86 in 194-8 and. shifts by all workers had.
advanced from 5.14 to 5.20. Miners, he argued, were thus
working not only more shifts, but producing more with a
lower volume of labour. "Yhy not give them credit f or that'p'
Colliery Guardian, 23.6.49.
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Sir Eric Young complains that this is due to
miners who sustain winor accidents having worked
out a scientific scheme to go on compensation and
get allowances and tax repayments which leave
them as well off as if they worked five or six
shifts a week
Homer suggested that this might be due to the fact that men who
were previously injured were forced by sheer economic circumstances
to return to work before they were fit, whereas under present
social service improvements they were able to secure reasonable
sustenance to enable them to make themselves properly fit before
going back to the mines. Surely, he argued, that was in the
interests not only of the health of the miner but also of the
nation, Fit men were the most efficient and. he thought that a
great case could be made for financial anxiety being removed from
the mind, of a sick and injure& man.
The greater danger to the nation's fuel supplies, he warned,
was lack of manpower
"The country should note the words of those who
are, by their indiscretions, discouraging men
from filling the ranks - the Youngs and the Reids
who come out with open criticisms". 	 -
For, he argued, it was in.the light of this discouraging manpower 	 -
situation that the leaders of the men sought so hard to improve
the conditions of the industry that they might attract and hold
men:	 "So far, we have had to negotiate and. fight for reforms",
but he and his fellow executive members did not seek, as they
were accused, "to make the miner the ariBtocrat of labour"; they
sought only to achieve reforms which would attract sufficient
labour in a period of full employment.. The miners, he argued,
j 2
were "ready and eager to continue wholehearted cooperation with
the Coal Board", but they would seek to "eliminate all those who
fail to develop and apply new techniques in management in keeping
with the new age, and who yearn to return to the impetus of the
traditions of the past". The time had come, he told his audience,
for the nation to say to the miners and the nationaliaed industries,
"You have done well despite the enemies of nationallsation within
the gate• Those who yearned after the past vere "futile
ignoramuses". The miners and their leaders would correct their
faults and those of the NCB, but they would "never return to the
bad old days".99
aood popularist stuff it may have been, but such speeches indicate
just how thoroughly the spell of nationalisation had been broken.
The contrast between this abrasive attack upon the "Old Gang"
and Homer's recent pleas f or Stakhanovite efforts from his
membership could hardly be greater. The pleas became razer as
the attacks grew in number. The changes were made obvious at
the NtJM's Annual Conference in July, 1919, where a clearly de-
fi split emerged over several important issues. It was a split
which sheared mainly along political lines and which left the
Communist-influenced areas of South Wales and Scotland ranged
against the "Labourite" rest. Sir William Lawther (for he had
been knighted by this time - presumably as a result of his pat-
riotic stand on the Marshall Aid issue) set the tone of the con-
ference by declaring that the miners should accept the fact that
they must produce more coal or accept a reduced standard of living.
No word-spinning, he said, would get over that problem:
99. Ibid.
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"Je have to make a break with sheer political
opportunism in dealing with the problem that
confronts us", he said. "1 have no doubt it
would be very popular to put up a series of
demands without caring how they could be ob-
tained. I prefer to take what I believe to be
the honest way of indicating that your efforts
and good behaviour are of more consequence than
any sparring for the moon".
He condemned unofficial stoppages by claiming that they had
"brought more joy to our political, opponents than if they had.
won every by-election they lost".1 00
He emphasised the indebtedness, as he saw it, of the miners to
the Coal Board; they had done more f or the miners than had ever
been done before. The great majority of the miners faced up to
their responsibilities, he claimed; it was up to them to teach
the minority. Asking the miners to be honest in their criticisms
of the Board in rejecting some of the union'.s recent demands,
he stated that they had accepted the principle that the revenue
of a nationalised industry must, in the long run, be sufficient
to cover all costa and charges.1
This was obviously directed as much at Hornex' and the Left on the
executive as it was at the dissident "minority" to which Lawther
referred. A curiously defeatist speech, in as much as it implied.
that the NU1t' a demands on the Board were unjustified, it brought
forth a reply from South Vales and Scotland which declared in no
uncertain terms that questions concerning' profitability and. wage
allocations were by no means as cut and dried as Lawther was
100. NUM., Annual Conference Report, 194.9
lOt. Ibid.
j23
making out. It precipitated the biggest clash of the conference,°2
The Welsh and Scottish delegates had intended putting forward
resolutions which expressed concern at the policy of the Board in
determining that no further increase should be made in prices or
a subsidy sought for the industry. The resolution from S. fales
originally called for a reduction, suspension or spread-over of
compensation to former owners, and demanded that wages and
conditions should be the first charge. Scotland had advocated,
in its resolution, a readjustment of compensation and a sub-
stantial reduction in interest.
The executive announced that it would oppose these resolutions
and a more cautiously worded one was passed instructing the ex-
ecutive in conjunction with t1e TUG and the executive of the
Labour Party to consider the effects of the present policy and
to examine the possibilities of review. Aif Davies, the Welsh
miners' president, declared, that his members did. not intend to
depart from the accepted. principle of compensation, but Abe
Moffat, the Scottish president, who moved the amended composite
resolution, declared that total compensation payments with which
the industry would be shackled, including yet undecided compen-
sation for ancilliaries, would. cost £Z.00 million in an industry
which had been
"brought to the verge of ruin by private enter-
prise .... kre any of us so optimistic as to
believe that with that heavy burden it is poss-
i'ble to make this industry a financial success
in its present situation?" he asked. "If we are
going to solve this problem we shall need not a
102. Ibid.
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board of technicians or administrators
but a board. of magicians" •1 03
It was shortly after Davies and Mof fat had. thrown this particular
spanner into the cooperative machine that Herbert Morrison rose
to his feet and exhorted the miners "to lay the ghost of past
grievances" and appealed to them for more "team-work" between
the miners and the Board and said that unless a fresh start were
made the miners would be "unhappy for nothing, and the rust of
the nation would. be betrayed". A new spirit was needed, he
declared, or socialisation, of itself, would. fail. 1ore important
than the physical reorganisation of the industry, he argued, was
the transformation of men's minds.
"Men must go to t'ue ofttoe, to t
conscious that they are working for the nation".1
He was followed to the rostrum the following day by Viscount
Hyndley, former P.D. director and. Chairman of the National Coal
Board, who urged the miners to increase production and cut down
costs - sentiments which were shared by the next "name" speaker,
Hugh C-aitskell, who asked f or "a holiday from blaming other people
and finding alibis for ourselves". He asked "How can any of us
defend those who, week after week, are content to work four shifts
only?" and, referring to the criticisms made against management
by Homer and others, he argued that,
"Though some, perhaps quite a lot of managers,
are opposed to nationalisation, this does not
mean that they will not do their job properly.
On the contrary, I am convinced that the over-
whelming majority have accepted the fact that
nationalisation has come to stay and. want to
make a success of their jobs both for personal
105
reasons ann because they are loyal to the industry".
103. Ibid.
104.. Ibid.
1 05.
	
argot lleinemann, "Coal Must Come First"; prepared for the Labour
Reareh Depatrmt ("Questions of the Day' No.2), London, i94.8.
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Gaitskell's confidence was not shared, however; by a great many
of the coalfield's Labour voters. The workforce's distrust of
management did not cease overnight, any more than did those un-
official strikes criticised by Lawther. Indeed, events upon the
3, Wales coalfield during the next twelve months indicate that
these tendencies were stimulated, rather than subdued, by the
debate at the Conference rostrum. Unofficial strikes and go-
slows proliferated - despite the pleas and warnings of Govern-
merit officials and union leaders. And it was actions such as
these which lent a remarkable air of continuity to industrial
relations on the field. They were provoked by familiar griev-
ances: price list disagreements, alleged incursions into custom
and. practice, allowances withdrawn, bad conditions and refusals
to do alternative work: grievances which warrant close examin-
ation, not merely because thej continued to be expressed years
after the introduction of public ownership, but because they were
used as a foci for a much wider range of dissatisfactions - amongst
the foremost of which was a display of general mistrust by large
sections of the workforce towards the kinds of "reorganisation"
measures which had been welcomed with such enthusiasm by the
union's elected leaders.
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3. Pit Problems.
Whilst the public slanging matches between Lawther and Homer
captured. the newspaper headlines, the dissatisfied rumblings
from the pits were largely ignored - despite the fact that Homer
undoubtedly interpreted them as signifying widespread support
for his belated criticisms of the overly-cosy relationship
existing between the G-overnment, the Coal Board and. the union.
But opposition amongst the workforce to the Board's policies
(especially those concerned with reorganization) is a difficult
thing to gauge for it is necessary first to differentiate between
workers striking or "going-slow" over a long-term grievance (or
a grievance which has arisen independent of reorganisat ion pro-
-cedure) and workers striking over a grievance as a means of
registering their dissatisfaction with the terms of reorganisation
per se. Sometimes, for example, it is obvious that although
members of a givet workforce may have been in favour of reorgan-
isation in principle, they nevertheless opposed a particular
feature of it when they perceived that feature as constituting
a possible threat either to their earnings capacity or to recog-
nised.'custom and practice at their pit.
To define such a strike as 	 rather than "political"
is to lift the event out of its historical context for, by the
joint reckoning of the Coal Board and. the miners' union, all strikes
within the nationalized industry were political in as much as they
involved the strikers in arriving at a conscious 'decision to ignore
recognised. channels of conciliation and. arbitration. At least
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one Communist observer argued at the time that such unofficial
strikes as these were no less than the inarticulate expression
of rank-and-file frustration with the shortfalls of industrial
democracy inside the pits and the divisional and national board.-
rooms. 1 06
Such an interpretation appears somewhat generous, however, when
the strikes in question are examined closely. Most were "section-
alist" in character; that is, they were perpetrated usually by a
relatively small number of workers (in a particular face or road-
way) whose action would often succeed in disrupting production in
the rest of the pit. In turn, these strikes sometIme provoked
a "tit-for-tat" response from those miners in other parts of the
pit who found their earnings impaired through enforced lay-off s.
Clearly, there is no obvious link between this kind, of strike and
the allegedly democratic aspirations attributed to the militants
by left-wing observers. Such an interpretation would appear, at
first glance, to be a false one: a simple economic grievance
dressed up in political wolf's clothing.
But if, in fact, the outward character of the unofficial strikes
appeared non-political, the same could not be said for their spirit.
It was variously described by those who condemned the strikes as
4anarchic, subversive and communist, and it found its most clear
mode of expression in the revived Unofficial Movement and so-
cafled Minority Movements which, by the early 50s, had prospered
106. W. Paynter, op.cit,, p.l3O
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to such a degree that they were al].eged. by at least one miners'
president to have posed a serious threat to the unity of the
South Wales Miners' Union itself° 7 In other words, the un-
official strikes were symptomatic of a rnalais which caused a good
deal more disquiet in the minds of Labour leaders than did the
mere frequency of the strikes themselves. It led them to suspect
that amongst the ranks of miners there were many who were pro-
foundly disappointed with the new achievements nd still others
who were prepared to act as if no change whatsoever had occurred -
as if it were Powell Duffryn proper, and not ex-Powell Duffryn
agents, running the South Wales coal industry.
The strikes were seen, therefore, as constituting a barely dis-
guised public criticism of one hugely important aspect of what
was portrayed as the most spetacular British socialist advance
of the 20th century and the wrath of those who had helped secure
that advance was great indeed; for it appeared almost as if they
considered that it was they and not the Coal Board suffering
criticisn. Thej co	 c.ate& a s.te v	 -
each unofficial strike had been a lunip of anthracite thrown at
them by those very same hands which they themselves had so lately
liberated from private exploitation.
The Incidence of Strikes
The National Coal Board Annual Report includes a section entitled
1'Estimated Tonnage lost through Disputest' which includes figures
for each coalfield-area of the British Isles. By adding these
estimated tonnages-lost to the total tonnages actually produced
we arrive at the total which, it was estimated, should have been
107. lbid,
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produced in any year.
The Estimated Tonnage lost through Disputes can then be measured
as a percentage of this total. The result is a kind of "Aggra-
vation' t chart which, when graphed up, illustrates the frequency
and seriousness of disputes - as they affected coal production -
from nationalization onwards.
The following charts graph out the percentage tonnage lost through
disputes for all the areas under the jurisdiction of the NCB
from i94.6/27 to i973/71. They are based upon percentages-lost
calculated from NCB Annual Reports. The coalfield's percentage-
lost columns are as follows:
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The total estimated tonnages lost through disputes between 1947
and. I 973/7L for the country as a whole is shown in Fig. 1, below,
and for individual areas, in Figs. 2-jO, below, pp.i2.Ut
The patterns of serious disputes (as far as these disputes affected
production) displayed in the following graphs varies quite drama-
tically from area to area. Compare, for instance, the relative
calm of the line describing the percentage tonnage-lost in the
East Midlands area o Northern area with that of Yorkshire,
Scotland, or South Wales. Not only is the line continuously
pitched lower in the East Midlands and Northern areas, but it is
also evident that when disruptions did occur, as in 1950, 1956,
1961 and 1966,167 in the East Midlands, they had much less effect
upon output than similar, sometimes parallel, stoppages and other
disputes in Yorkshire, Scotland, and South Wales.
Along with Kent, these three areas have constantly been the source
of the most serious disruptions to production for the Board.. In
the year 1957, the areas of Scotland, Yorkshire and South Wales
employed 4% of the coal industry's manpower, produced 43% of
the total saleable output, were responsible for 8 of strikes
and restrictions and 83% of tonnage lost through such actions
1 08during that year.
This had been the pattern from the first months of nationalisation.
In 1947, Yorkshire and South Wales, along with Scotland, were
singled out in the Board.' s first Annual Report for special con-
demnation.1
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid., 1948.
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19)48 saw a 'eat many small disputes, mainly in Scotland and
Yorkshire, over the re-assessment of tasks which resulted from
the imposition of the Five Day Week, over questions of gradings
amongst lower officials, and because of alleged "uprooting" of
certain production workers from their usual places of work as
a result of the imposition of reorganization schemes.°
The I 914-9 dispute over "Concessionary Coal" temporarily shifted
the centre of attention to the Lancashire field, but disputes
involving "oncost" workers in Scotland, and disruptive action
by Yorkshire members of the breakaway Colliery Winders'
Association ensured that tonnage-lost totals in both areas re-
mained consistently high." The 1 951 Annual Report ca1cu1ate.
that Scotland, Yorkshire and South Wales accounted, between them,
for 85 of the tonnage lost d'uring that year. This figure rose
to 907 in 1952 - most disruptions arising from disputes con-
cerning pay and conditions for under-officials, and. the York-
shire Colliery W inders' Association's attempts to obtain parity
with winders in other Divisions. The Annual Report for 1 952
blamed "Ten areas" within the Districts of Scotland, Yorkshire
and South Wales for causing vastly disproportionate losses of
tonnage through disputes. Four were situated in Yorkshire, three
in Scotland, and three in South Wales.
The relatively high loss of tonnage incurred in 1955 resulted
mainly from a dispute concerning piece-rates and allowances paid
to fillers at the face. It began at Markham Main Colliery, and.
in the Doncaster area in general; it became a question of whether
110. Ibid., j9L,9.
111. Ibid., 1961.
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unconstitutional action should be allowed to supersede the agreed
conciliation proce-dure laid, down by the Board. Eighty thousand.
men became involved in the dispute, and the loss of tonnage ex-
ceeded three millions for the first time since nationalisation.
1956 was also a year of relatively high loss - caused mainly by
unofficial action started by officials in the East Midlands
area but which soon spread north to Yorkshire and west to Lan-
cashire and South hales. The years 1957 to 1961 were relatively
peaceful when compared with 1955. In 1961 there was a drop in
estimated tonnage-lost through disputes in South Wales, (where
1960 had been a high year for losses), but there was an increase
in Scotland and a very large increase in Yorkshire where 69
collieries took part in widespread stoppages over the question
of pieceworkers' price lists. 61 ,300 men became involved in the
dispute nationally, and 804.,000 tons were lost out of a national
total for the year of over two million tons.112
The variation in loss-percentages from field. to field is illus-
trated by the graph movements during the years 1963/64., '64/65
and '65/66. For whilst both the Scottish and. Yorkshire 'lost'
totals fe.11 during '614/65, South Wales achieved a new post-
nationalisation "high". On the national chart (Fig. 'i), 1965/66
looks a relatively quiet year, but it might be seen as the year
in which the National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies
and Shotfirers (NACODS) replaced the rank and, file (if only temp-
orarily) as the "dispute leaders" of the 'coal industry.	 -
112. C.C., 20.1.4.9.
I 1.4.
The 1 965/66 trouble began at Deep Duffryn colliery in South WaleS -
after an incident involving some disagreement over the use of
"foul language" being exchanged between a member of NACODS and.
a mining apprentice. The NPCODS members struck work, causing
.31 ,000 men to be made wholly or partly idle, and 5OO,OOO
tons of coal to be lost. The total losses for the year ran to
almost one million two hundred thousand tons - half a million
tons less than the results of the disputes which occurred the
following year when an official ban by NACODS on weekend working
and an inter-union dispute between the Yorkshire Winding Engirig-
men's Association and the NUM pushed up the estimated-tonnage-
lost total to its highest point f or almost five years.
There then followed two years of relative peace, during which
time the tonnages-lost fell to their lowest point since national-
isation. The National Power-Loading A'eement was signed in
June 1966, and by the end of March, 1968, the agreement applied
to 8c of all mechanized faces.
There were no major disputes during the year with the lowest
'losses' on record - 1968/69; indeed, it appears as if the work-
force was gathering its breath for the dramatic five years which
were to follow. The specific causes of these disputes are set
out, below, in Table 2 and Figure 11 ( pp .14.5-146 ). Not sur-
prisingly, problems concerned with payment dominate the picture.
They account f or the highest number of stoppages as well as for
the largest loss of tonnage. it is interesting, however, to note
that the numbers of stoppages caused by disputes concerning
methods of working and colliery organisation, (number 5 category
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in Table 2) whilst riot precipitating such a loss of tonnage as
wage disputes were, nevertheless, very high and. continued to be
so even during the fifth year of nationalisation. This indicates,
clearly, that the problems experienced by the "private" munagers,
when they attempted to modify and rationalise production methods,
continued to dog similar efforts by nationalised management. Attempts at
ratioziajisation caused problems which were compounded by the often-suspicious
and antagonistic response of large sections of the workforceto
the introduction of the 5-Day Week, or, rather, to the anonilies
created by its introduction. Allied. to this are three other
listed catagories: that concerned with disputes provoked by
the re-grading of jobs which occurred. as a result of the nation-
alisation of production methods, and those concerned with changes
in the allocation of allowances, bonuses and. concessionary coal.
Added. together, the tonnage lost through these "reorganisation"
disputes totalled 2,322,900 - a figure a good deal closer to
that provoked by disputes of payment than would appear by a listing
of its fragmented. constituents. In S. Wales, the loss of prod-
uction stemming from reorganisat ion was especially high. The
editor of theCol:Uery Guardi pn complained for example, in
January, 1949, that attempts at reorganisation had been met in
some cases by sit-down strikes - "the most foolish of all modes
of resistance", - and. he quoted the example of a strike at
Bedwas colliery where 2,000 miners downed tools over a grievance
concerning re-grading and. promotion:
148
"The men objected because the manager promoted
two men to carry out development work without
asking for nominations from the workmen. This
-	 is a usørpation of the functions of management
which cannot be tolerated, even if we should
have been prepared f or such developments by
the joint committee system. But the folly
becomes all the more stark when we find that
the striking miners are callously inô.itferent
to the fact that their own future is being
seriously prejudiced by the stoppage of
ventilation and repair work, owing to the
deliberate withdrawal of the safety
It was qiite obvious, even as early as 1 94 .9, that such responses
were not going to disappear simply of their own accord, for the
source of provocation - "reorganisation" - was likely to become
more, rather than less, troublesome as the question of closing
down uneconomic pits and utilising the man-power so released in
more profitable undertakings became increasingly urgent as the
Board.' s development plans matured.
Reorganisation of work-methods, work-places and systems of payment
were not the only developments to arouse the workforoe's antagonism,
however. The men's sense of 'ievance on these scores was further
aggravated by their jaundiced view of developments within the
organisation of Coal Board management. Old suspicions were re-
vived. in 194.9 concerning the alleged practice amongst management
of creating "jobs for the boys". At Fernhill Colliery in the
Rhondda, for example, the Lodge Committee publicly criticized
the number of inspection officials of the Regional Coal Board.
and. declared that there was a duplication of managerial tasks
113. Rhondia Leader, 24,3.49.
14.9
with the result they alleged, that costs were being inflated
and that this was detrimental to moves by the miners themselves
to secure the cost-of-living bonus. At the time of the allegation,
March, 1 91+9, Fernhil]. employed I ,1 50 men and efforts were made
by the Lodge to secure the support of miners in the Upper Rhondcla
in a proposal to tender strike notices in protest against the
growth of the numbers of officialz.h1 There developed at the
mine a grouping amongst the men which became khown as the "Anti—
Spiv Movement" - an organization which appears, somewhat para-
doxically, to have devoted most of its energies to castigating
what it saw a a surfeit of mines inspectors,h15 although this
obsession with such an unlikely target almost certainly indicates
the men' s surprise at sighting more than one inspector at a
time - such had been the rarity of the species prior to the
Second World War.
Neither were the men alone in their criticisms of the organisation
of the Coal Board. Colliery managers too, were dismayed at the
apparent lack of concern amongst higher managerial echelons for
the financial plight of local management. One spokesman of the
British Association of Colliery Managers informed the S. Wales
branch of the organization that the "niggardly" attitude of the
NCB had caused a deterioration in the relationship with the
Association:
1114.. Ibid., 31.3.4.9.
115. C.C., 3i.3.+9.
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"It is difficult to explain where the NCB
are going", he said. "We are suffering from
the Old. Gang mentality and also from the new
bureaucracy. I think it is entirely wrong to
be squabbling and haggling over the manage-
ment's wage ratestl.h16
The alleged increase in high-managerial bure&.icracy threatened
to sour even the relationship which existed between the Board
and the miners' elected leaders. There was a feeling prevalent
that the Board was becoming remote and insensitive - that its
officers were becoming too much identified with monolithic,
national considerations. Thus, in April 1949, the Executive
Council of the S. Vales NUM condemned. the NCB' a decision to ban
aged and infirm ex-miners from picking over coal and odd timber
on slag-heaps: a concession 'that the miners had had from the
coalowners for 50 years.117 On a much larger scale, the 3. Wales
NUM Annual Conference condemned. the Board's "arrogant and high-
handed." approach to the delicate problem of coalfield reorgan-
isatiori - especially in respect of the anthracite area.h18
Within the pits, the strains imposed by reorganisation manifested
- themselves in many different guises. At Ferrihill in January 194.9,
f or example, 34. miners began a restriction of output as a result
of their dissatisfaction with the existing price list. The action
was not,however, motivated purely by straightforward financial
considerations. Problems with reorganisation were very evident.
116. SWNTJM, E.C. Minutes, April, 194.9.
117. SWNU1v, A.C.R., 194-9.
118. Letter, dated 29.1.4-9, from Jones toW. Arthur;
SWNT.Th1 Correspondence TJCS.
The NUM Agent for the Rhondda District, Jack Jones, informed
his Area Union's secretary, Will Arthur, that the action stemmed.
from a complaint of long standing. The men, he said, had res-
ponded to the MJl's request that they work on a yardage, rather
than a tonnage, basis and that their Lodge Committee had put
forward a proposal that they be paid 2/3d., a yard at 3' 0".
The management offered i/7d., but amended the offer to give the
same as obtained at the Cambrian Colliery further down the Valley,
i.e., 1/9d. Eventually, the workmen came down to 1/1Ojd., but
the Board continued to refuse and, as a compromise, the men
announced that they would accept the price 11' there was a 	 sim
Section payment at 3' ,,119
Jones added that during the period of negotiation,
•••, in fact, from the commencement, the workmen
were deprived of a lucrative item of standing cogs
in the job. In addition flats of extra length were
introduced. Each time I spoke to the workmen
about the reduced output, they contended the coal
is stiff, holes bored for firing, and many of
their numbers are used to carry timber and other
,,120
—jobs, and the reduction is not so great as alleged
Similar complications attended the onset of a dispute at the
Cambrian Colliery in the same valley during August. Will Arthur
was informed that 32 men were carrying on a "go-slow" at the pit
and. promptly ordered Jack Jones to sort it out and. persuade the
'ien to resume full production. Jones' report was highly critical
119. Ibid. The problem was resolved when the Board upped its
off er to 1/lOd.
120. Letter, dated 25.849, Jones to Arthur; SWNUM Corr., UCS.
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of the approach adopted by the Cambrian management - despite an
admission on his part that the 32 colliers could indeed have in-
creased their output. He reported that he had. visited the coal
face in question and discovered that the Bute Conveyor Hand Cut
Price List had not operated "for years, certainly before (he)
took office in 194.2". The Price List gave 2/5d., per ton Large
121
Coal.	 He recalled that the workmen on the face in question
(,yn Pace) had. each been given £1 per week all9wance on the List
and. any abnormalities had 'been met with additional allowances
and. any "Guaranteed. Wage Payable". The workmen whom he inter-
viewed contended that this method of payment had prevailed for
the previous three years on "Y" and. for five years before that
on another face. But,
"On July 29th the manager gave the Leader of the
Conveyor a written notice that after 14
. days the
allowances were to cease and. the men paid. on the
basis of the Price List. The following day the
Manager goes away on Holidays. I personally get
a letter from the labour officer saying it was
his intention of visiting the Bute Seam on Monday,
August 22nd., the first day after his return from
a fortnight's holiday.
The Lodge officials protested against the visit
as they had. not concluded. local negotiations
with the Manager, which could not be concluded.
until the manager returned" •1 22
The Lodge officials met the manager on August, 15th, but failed
to persuade him to suspend his intention of reverting to the
Price List. It was from that day that the "go-slow" began.
121. Ibid.
1 22. Letter, dated 3.1 2.4.9 from Jack Jones to W.M. Arthur;
University College, Swansea.
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Jones endeavoured to get the management to place the men of the
"Y" conveyor in a similar position to the men of the other three
conveyors of the Bute seam where workmen were paid. 25/- or 26/-
for five tons per shift with an allowance of approximately )4/-
a ton above or below the five. He reported that the old Price
List had not operated in any of these faces and that he was con-
vinced. that if the "Y" men were given the same treatment as others
working on the Seam, that the dispute would be overcome. He
emphasised that, in his opinion,
11y" position is being used by the management
to break up a position that has prevailed for years,
and. (management) are now invoking a Price List that
has been dead for years. If there was justification
in making any variations it should be done f or the
whole of the Seam, and not a section of it
"1 am satisfied", he continued, that "it is the
intention of the management to break up the
supplemented payments, bring back the old. list, or
force a break up of the Pooling system in favour of
a yardage principle.
"However, the way the NCB is dealing with it, gives
no possibility of control to the Lodge officials or
myself, as no section of men in one section of a
seam will tolerate being treated differently from
the rest, in similar conditions" •1 23
Jones' report conveys very well the sense of tension which fre-
queni.y crept into such local disputes. It emanated from a mutual
suspicion and from an obvious reluctance, both by men and manage-
ment, to give credence to the claims of those politicians, union
1 23. Letter, dated 1 .11 .1-9., from Jack Jones to W.M. Arthur;
University College, Swansea.
leaders and Board members that the coal industry was, by I 914.9k
one cooperative body in which management and. men worked for a
common purpose. It was a suspicion and reluctance which could
manifest itself in displays of bloody-mindedness, stubborness
and defensive arrogance. Pit managers especially, seemed Un-
willing to countenance anything which they considered a poss-
ible case of their employees poaching upon their authoritative
preserves. Thus, for example, a stoppage of work occurred at
the Maritime Colliery in the Rhondda in December, 191 9 when men
of the pit's 'A' District alleged that there had been insufficient
dust suppression on a morning shift. The Miners' Agent reported
that he had met the Colliery manager, agent and Labour Officer
on Saturday December 3rd, and that he discovered that on the
previous Thursday morning the Lodge representatives had suggested
that in order that the threat'of a stoppage (which subsequently
occurred) might be averted that the workmen on the "dry" face
proceed to work and that two Lodge representatives should stay
in the "A" face to observe the dust (a provision catered for
under Section j 6 of the Joint Agreement). When the suggestion
was made, reported the Agent,
".... the Manager replied that some people were
after an easy shift, and that he was not given
reasonable notice. Later, when it was too late
he did agree to the suggestionH.1
Incidents of a similar nature occurred in Tylerstown No. 9 Colliery
12k. Letter, dated 30.11.49., from Bill Eaynter to W.M. Arthur;
University College, Swansea.
I 5L.
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(25.1 0.49)1 2 Groesfaen Colliery (3.i1 49)126 Fernhill No.4
(28.12.49)127 arid Ystalyfera Colliery (23 .1 2.49)128. At Ystalyfera,
the Miners' Agent, Trevor James, reported that, having met the
Lodge Committee and workmen involved in the dispute and. following
an inspection of the coal-face in question it appeared to him
that
".... the Management (had) taken advantage of the
young workmen on thi8 face; he has exploited their
lack of knowledge in the application of axi iternised
Price List. This greeness is also in evidence in
their relations with each other on the face. I
found a Double Unit referred to as those on the
right and those on the left and. there was much in
this distinction that was of advantage to Manage-
ment. I requested the 1Vorkmen to elect a new
Captain and to recognise in this person their own
interests. This was done and I am hopeful that
relations will improve" •1 29
In a letter to the NCB's Area Labour Officer, Trevor James alleged
that the root of Ystalyfera's troubles was to be found in an un-
fortunate continuity of industrial relations practices which dated
from the earliest days of nationalisation and beyond.
"At the Colliery", he wrote "I was informed by the
Morning Shift Overman that loss of output on the
date in question was caused by failure to correctly
adjust the tension and following a turn over. This
reply was given in a straightforward manner to my
question .... and it was given to me in the hearing
of Lodge Officials.
1 25. Letter dated 2.1 .50 from Jack Jones to W.M.Arthur, University
College, Swansea.
j26. Letter dated 5.1 .50 from Trevor Jones to LM. Arthur, University
College, Swansea.
f 27. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Letter (h) dated 5.1.50 from Trevor Jones toW.T. Bees, University
College, Swansea.
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"If what the Workmen say is true then there is
an abnormal loss of output at this pit due to
breakages. And in saying this I am not losing
sight of the attitude of Management in refusing
to pay WaitingTime. It may well be an attempt
to conceal the real causes for loss of output from
higher management. Such an attitude would be in
keeping with past practices in this anthracite
district. Over the years labour relations have
been used. indiscriminately to explain away
output and cost figures.
"The organisation on this face calls for serious
130attention".
Pushing the matter further, James recommended to the NUM Area
Labour Officer that a list of "mis-management" practices att-
ributed. to the Ystalyfera "Y" Conveyor be submitted to Ebby
Ediards on the National Coal Board
"as a typical example of the role played. by
certain parts of Management in this difficult
period. You will recall that he expressed a
desire to be kept informed of incidents where
Management have acted. unreasonably
The reverse side of the coin was marked by miners' stubborness
and intransigence in the face of proposed changes to production
methods. For every "green" face, such as that at Ystalyfera,
there were many others manned by hardened, experienced teams who
instinctively suspected. all managerial initiatives as posing
potential threats to earnings and to existing customs and. prac-
130. Letter dated 3.1 .50 from W.J. Saddler (NCB Labour Director) to
W. Arthur, University College, Swansea.
131. Letter dated. 6.; .50 from Pal Mainwaring to W. Arthur, University
College, Swansea.
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tices. Such teams appear, for example, to have worked the seams
of the Duffryn Rhondda Colliery - a traditionally militant pit
which was situated in the Afan Valley.
In the first ten months of 1 950 Duffryn Rhondda witnessed five
stoppages important enough to be reported to the Area Labour
Director of the NCB, W.J. Saddler. A close examination of each
of them indicates that there occurred a growth of rank-and-file
confidence in its own ability to take on and defeat the pit's
management - despite the obvious reluctance of the miners'
elected Agents to support them in their unconstitutional actions.
In January, 1950 for example, men working in the pit's 2 Feet
Seam returned home after stating their dissatisfaction with allow-
ances. The day previously, (January 2nd), the men working on
the "J" Face, 6 Feet Seam, had. done the same thing and caused
an estimated loss of 180 tons of coal. 132
 The Miners' Agent
for the district, Tal Mainwaring, settled the disputes but re-
ported that he was
".... afraid that in this case the NCB will claim
Damages because in the iast number of cases I have
had the claims squashed, and it appears that the
men are taking advantage of that and the least
dispute about allowances on the Face, they walk out.133
During the following August, a stoppage occurred in the pit's
A1bext Hills District when 3 men came out because management
132. Letter dated 214..8.50 from Tal Mainwaring to W. Arthur,
University College, Swansea.
133. Letter dated 11 .9.50 from Tal Mainwàring to\V. Arthur,
University College, Swansea.
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refused to allow them to work in their own place unless they put
up lOft. rings instead of' 8ft. They were joined in sympathy by
a further 23 men on the morning shift but work was resumed by
all the following night. Mainwaring reported that the dispute
ax' ose
"because of lack of tact, both on the
Management's part and the workmens, which
could have been settled at the Face".34
Just over a fortnight later, the West Level and Cynon District
teams at the Colliery began a restriction of output provoked by
a general dissatisfaction with wages and,'once again, Mainwaring
persuaded the men to resume normal working. On this occasion how-
ever, his report provides a little more insightinto the state
of labour relations at the pit:
"In this case, like others", he wrote, "the
fault lies more on the shoulders of the Management
than on the workmen. The Manager and Production
General Manager and the Labour Officer were met
some weeks ago where they promised that once the
Manager had agreed to meet the Lodge Officers
with disputes, that these meetings must not be
cancelled.
"Here again the Manager having agreed to meet
on the Monday prior to the alleged go-slow,
-	 cancelled the meeting because of other business.
It appears that the Manager is compelled. to attend
innumerable meetings arranged by the Coal Board,
which have no relationship to the production of
coal, such as Education meetings, Welfare meetings,
Lectures upon new development, and things which
should have been dealt with by people_who are well
paid to listen to their own voicesI.1)S
13Z. Letter dated 6.10.50 from W.J. Saddler toW. A2'thur,
University Col1ge, Swansea.
135. Letter dated 11.10.50 from Tal Mainwaring to W. Arthur,
University College, Svansea.
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One month later, the men of the Albert Hills District began a
o-alow which was provoked by alleged dusty conditions and which
resulted in an estimated immediate loss of 2lO tons of coai.6
Mainwaring's report on this occasion however, contained none of
the sympathy which was evident in his analysis of the September
incident. Instead, he provides material which goes some way
towards vindicating the popular managerial assertion, that it
was the workforce's intransigence in the face of industrial
rationalization, rather than mis-management, which was primarily
responsible for much of the relatively poor showing of the South
Wales coal industry.
"Unfortunately", he wrote, "this is a case where
because of the alteration in the method of work
the Colliers seem to be reluctant to agree with
it. - In the past it has been customary to split
the face in two, one half working on the night
shift and the other half on the morning shift.
The Management, in view of the fact of the need
for heavy packing and also turning over the
Conveyors did not have much time to do this when
there was a morning and a night shift working on
the face.
"They improved the headings so as to give suff-
icient clearance so they put all the men to work
on the face on one shift, the morning shift.
This is more economical, better for safety, and
-	 for the cycle of operations, but anyhow the men
now argue that there is more dust, whereas out
of about 20 tests or more, only on one occasion
has the dust exceeded the minimum laid down for
safety.
136. Letter dated 23.1 0.50 from G-omer Evans (for NCB Labour Director)
to W. Arthur, University College, Swansea.
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"It is a case oe non-cooperation which we are
trying to break down. Further, I have arranged
with the Labour Officer and the Lodge Committee
that a cutter should be put in the face and this
was agreed to by myself and the Lodge Officers and
some of the Colliers involved, with the concession
of 3d., per square yard, irrespective of whether
the section is 6' or 7', so this means giving
away about d., per ton for the cutter.
"Since this was agreed to, we have c1ifficilty
again in getting these Colliers to accept the
introduction of the cutter, and the problem of
dust in Duffryn Rhondda, like other collieries
is caused by Pneumatic picks more than anything else.
"With a cutter cutting wet and also with infusion,
this will abolish the dust by over 5(. I regret
to say that our chaps are taking unkindly to
changes for their own good, but nevertheless I
am making it plain to £hem that the Collieries
are run for all the men, and not only for the Colliers" .
Mainwaring's final swipe at the colliers' display of "sectionalism"
indicates how seriously this problem was taken by the union's
full-time officials. The vast majority of recorded stoppages
involved, colliers, (fe-workers and other production workers)
and. their relationship with other groups of workers below ground -
and with other face-working teams for that matter - frequently
left a great deal to be desired. For example, shortly after the
Duffi'yn Rhondda "dust" go-slow, colliers cutting on top of a
bunker in the Bute Seam of Cambrian No. Colliery, "Y" Conveyor,
137. Letter dated 9.1 .50 from Trevor Evans to W.T. Rees;
University College, Swansea.
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walked 'out of the pit afleging dissatisfaction with the Price
List.138
 The real reason for their walk-out was more coam],icated
however, for it was subsequently reported by the Miners' Agent
that the issue arose because of the desire of the men on the "Y"
face to accept a revision of the Yardage Price List, but the men
on the Tonnage Faces would not allow them .... "So the strike
was a protest against the action of the Tonnage Men", reported
the Agent - failing, for some reason, to mention the fact that
the strike represented a small, if perverse, trj.umph for manage-
ment in as much as the Cambrian colliers had become divided over
the same question of payment which the Agent had, previously des-
cribed as constituting a managerial device for driving a wedge
between the face-working teams. (See above, pp. 151-154-).
$prin1ed. amongst these disjutes, were others concerned with
more personal, and sometimes even physical, clashes. At Cwmose
Colliery in January 1950 fo example, 21 face-workers walked away
from the mine's Itf It Conveyor as a
"form of protestation against the attitude of the
Fireman on that face, Mr. Ken Rees, who continually
causes unnecessary friction by his refusal to
recognise the opinion of the face captain on the
question of "Waiting Time" and. of his practice to
reduce the number of hours to be paid below the
figure agreed upon at the face during measurement etc."39
An incident of more serious proportions took place on the same
day at Clenrhondda Colliery where men working at the 4-ft. Conveyor
138. Jones reported that the overman later expressed. "his deep regret
over the incident. The workman did. the same, and. shook hands ....
It was an inident, in my mind, that could have been dealt with
and finished within the face".
Letter from Jones to W. Arthur, dated 7.1 .50; SWN1JM Corres. U.C.
Swansea.
139. Letter, dated 9.1 .50 from Trevor Jones to W.T. Rees; Swansea.
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stopped work in protest oier an alleged attack by an Overman upon
a workman after the latter had used "bad. language" at him.
The Miners' Agent, Jack Jones, investigated the incident and
reported that he had no doubt that the workman
".... used. the language and that the overman
struck him first, but evidence revealed that
the under-manager, acting manager, and workmen,
had. to pull the workman off the overman who was
lying over the conveyor when it was in motio'.°
Such excesses of indiscipline seem to have been relatively rare,
however - unlike examples of "non-violent" indiscipline, the
most fragrant examples of which were to be found, predictably,
at Gwaun-cae-gurwen where one suspects that managers walked. in
constant fear of showing thefr faces at the wrong time - such
was the propensity of that workforce to strike with speed and
impunity. Commenting, for example, upon a restriction of output
by men working the "C" Face, Lower Vein, f East Pit, Gwaun-cae-
gurwen, during October 1950, the Area Assistant Labour Director
of the NCB reported. that his Area Officers alleged that the
workmen on this face had. been deliberately
"erecting their props just as they care to and
never in a straight line, and the Colliery Manager
cannot accept any responsibility for poor workman-
ship when there prevails a complete lack of dis-
cipline amongst the workmen.
"Daring the joint inspection of this face in
February 1950" he continued., "a collier was found.
fast asleep and was prosecuted.. On the same day
iJ.O. C.C-., 13.4.50. Speech given by Mr. Dan Williams.
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another collier was sent out because he refused
to erect a prop acco'ding to the instructions of
the Fireman. On the same day, the Group Agent,
when going around the Face, was told to "go and
take a dose of opium".
"On June 1 7th 1 950 , the men on this face demanded
the Manager to withdraw the cutter and to restore
to hand-got methods. In this respect, when the
Face was hand-got the OMS was 42 cwts., and with
the machine cut face the output has been 6 cwts.,
and it is not appreciated why the men want to
restore to hand-got methods.
"The Lodge Committee at East Pit have agreed with
the Management that the men can fill 6 tons of coal
per shift. The output we are getting from the
workmen is less than half that amount.
"I make this statement to show that the men are
not realising their responsibilities under the
Five-Day-Week Agreement and we ask you to see if
something can be done in order to restore normal
output in this Conveyor Face".'4.
The more vocal amongst the ranks of colliery managers had very
definite ideas as to the best means of eradicating such anarchic
behaviour from the coalfield. At a managers' conference in Cardiff
one such individual declared that every colliery manager should
aim at carrying out his duties "fearlessly" and should make a
"special effort" to "produce the highest possible output per man-
shift' at the lowest possible cost". He believed that if colliery
managers were given the opportunity to manage the collieries
"without frustration and interference, and with much more coop-
eration and consultation", the mining industry would "prove to
14.1. Letter, dated 10.11 .50 from Assistant Labour Director NCB
Assistant Labour Director to W. Arthur, SWNUM Corr., UCS.
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the community "that it was worthy of being recognisea as the most
important industry in the country." "Colliery managers", he argued,
"Must take a stand and protest" whenever they came across any
action which tended to interfere with colliery management, or any
action which might be brought to their notice whereby there was
a "tendency to sidestep authority", or whenever they learned of
"some sort of investigation" being conducted without their knoN-
ledge or consultation. He concluded, by emphasising that, in his
opinion, unless colliery managers showed that they were deter-
mined to protect their prestige there was a danger that they
would lost their identity .... and the position of the colliery
manager would become "insignificant" •1
Fears of a possible re-ascendancy of such hawkish sentiments
amongst managers tended to compound still further the dilemma
in which the elected leadership of the S. Wales NtJM found itself
during the latter part of 1950. It was as if they, the Executive
Council, were perched upon an unstable plank over a yawning
chasm. At opposite ends of this plank were the union's "militants"
and the hawkish managers. Both were doing their utmost, as the
Executive Council saw it, to shift the plank and to topple the
elected members from their positions of relative safety. For,
as the year passed, it became increasingly clear that there was
a growing impatience with the negotiated procedures for settling
disputes. Unofficial strikes proliferated across the coalfield.
a,
142. C.G., 13.4.50. Speech given by Dan Williams.
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The large numbers of lower-paid amongst the mineworkers were
increasingly vocal in expressing their dissatisfaction and frus-
tration with their relative inability to strike effectively -
a situation which was seized upon by some of the more militant
lodges as a means of challenging the apparent inertia of the
"cooperating" union executive. In July, almost five thousand
miners from the pits of Fernhill and the Dulais Valley took,
or threatened to take, industrial action a a pr9test against
the NCB's refusal to increase the wages of the lower_paid.1)
By November, there were clear signs that a successful revival
ws underway of unofficial rank-and-file organisations based
once more, upon the structures of the old combine committees
and calling themselves "minority movements" ,144
None of these developments helped. calm the fears and doubts of
disgruntled pit managers. Consultation and cooperation between
them and their opposites on the Lodge Committees could only
achieve consistent harmony if discipline existed within the
miners' union. If sectionalism prevailed and it became obvious
that the union's elected leadership was unable to control its
own members, then, the managers asserted, they would have to
take independent measures to restore order and discipline. That
would inevitably mean booting out of the pit premises a great
many of the more vulnerable and tentative of the "co-operative"
and. "democratic" proposals and schemes for extending power-sharing
within the industry. The more enlightened amongst the union's
11+3. C.G., 6.7.50.
144. Ibid., I 6.ii .50.
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leaders saw clearly that such developments threatened to curtail,
not only the unity of the NUM, but also whatever influences and.
job controls it wielded within the pits and administrative Areas.
The leaders found. it no easy task, however, to counteract the
popular tendency of large sections of the unionts membership
to adopt unconstitutional means of redressing 'their grievances.
The years 1 951 to 1 9514. bore witness to this. Thy sew what
amounted to an "institutionalisation" of rank-and-file militancy
and unofficial leadership in the form of' the so-called Shakespeare
Hotel Movement. They saw also fresh and determined attempts
by the elected leadership of the NUM to come to terms with these
developments.
The conflict highlighted many'of the shortcomings of the joint-
Disputes Agreements which Homer had been party to in i96-1-7.
If the unofficial movements achieved little else, they at least
challenged the more facile of popular assumptions concerning the
usefulness of compulsory arbitration in situations such as those
described earlier in this section. The rigid application of
much of the paraphernalia surrounding labour relations was
faqilitatec3. neither by the nature of coalmining practice and
payment in the early 1950s, nor by the workforce's inheritance
of an industrial and political lore which refused. to contemplate
the abandonment of traditional definitions of "them' and. "us".
As the examples of pit conflicts cited. above illustrate, it was
not enough to alter the ground-rules governing the way the game
was played. Much more remained to be done to alter the state of
the ground itself.
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Charter 1 2
Unofficial Leadership: orders from the_Shakespeare Hotel.
".... I was going around everywhere,
speaking for the Werntarw issue. We had a few
more issues too, but that was the most itaportant
one. When Paynter made a slash to say that the
decisions were made in Cardiff and not in the
Shakespeare
wanted to know who was running the union.
Was it the Executive or was it the boys from
the Shakespeare". 1	-
Evan, John, ex-chairman of
the Shakespeare Hotel group,
interviewed by Hywel Francis.
The Werntarw issue posed a great many unwelcomed problems for
the Miners' Executive during the first half of 1 951 • Consistent
with their pledge to aid the Coal Board in its rationalisation
measures, the union's elected leaders had allowed themselves
to be convinced by the Board that Werntarw should close and its
workforce be deployed at more efficient pits such as that at
L].ariharan. However, neither the Werntarw Lodge Committee nor
large numbers of the coalfield' a workforce agreed. Unofficial
aoundings were made by the Lodge's popular and well-known sec-
retary, Frank Hayward, to test the strength of support for
Werntarw amongst other lodge committees.
1. Transcript held at S.W. Miners' Library, Swansea. Werntarw,
near Pencoed, is close to Bridgend. on the southern, central
rim of the coalfield.
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The results must have pleased him, for the issue was taken up
by, amongst others, the Shakespeare Hotel Group - the most power-
fu]. and. substantial of all of the unofficial groupings. It saw
the campaign to keep Werntarw open as constituting an excellent
vehicle upon which to mount its opposition to the declared policy
of the union' s elected leadership - a policy which it regarded
as overly-co--operative and "appeasing".
The group was so named. because it convened. its meetings at the
hostelry of that name in Neath. Its size seems to have varied
from time to time and issue to issue, but Its core was provided.
by delegates from Lodges in the Swansea and Dulais Valleys, others
from pits of the old Amalgamated Anthracite Combine Committee,
and. frequently, delegates representing Lodges in the Maesteg,
2
Aberdare and Rhondda Areas to the east.
In June 1 951, the Werntarw conflict came to a head. 87 men from
the pit were transferred by the Board. to Llanharan colliery as
an obvious gesture of intent to run-down Werntarw's workforce
completely. Emergency meetings were held in Neath and a total
of fortyfive thousand men struck work in mines situated as far
east a the Taff and. as far west as the Gwendraeth. The Board
backed. down and. issued. a declaration to the effect that Werntarw
would. remain open. It remained so until j9614..
The Swansea Valley unofficial grouping of lodge delegates con-
tained. within its ranks many who had played leading roles in
the activities of the pre-war combine committees. The grouping
2. Evan John - Hywel Francis Interview, op. cit., pp. 3637.
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used the old 'Yestern Iistrict combine committee structure as a
model upon which to base its own activities. Its initial leader-
ship depended heavily upon Communist Party members who happened
to hold prominent positions upon various lodge committees.3
The grouping very soon shook off the old restrictions of pit
ownership and geography which had limited the scope of the old
combine committees and embraced groupings and issues from other
parts of the coalfield:
"We went further than the Swansea Valley",
explained one ex-leader of the Shakespeare Hotel
roup, "because Werntarw became in.volved	 I
So we moved over to the Shakespeare in Neath as
our headquarters because we were spreading now
see.... I was the Chairman and Aeron Bevan
was the Secretary.4
"Iore were coming in and we were sending invites
out .... Ye had the Rhondda boys coming down to
us and all now see. It was because of the threat
to Werntarw; that's when Paynter was coming in
now because we had on call 45,000 miners
"Dulais Valley, Swansea Valley, the Rhondda, the
Aberdare boys were coming in
"I remember going up to Parc and Dare to speak,
Eddie Lloyd and Tom Evans: he was on the Exec-
utive, were involved and we were calling them in.
And we reached the stage when the Werntarw issue
came, I remember the Haywards coming down to stay
in our house .... and stopping there the night
3. Recording of Even John, Ciais, June t976. Recording of Em].yn
Williams ( president SWNu), Cardiff, May 1977.
4. Even John recording, op. cit., both were members of the Comm-
unit Party; Evan John was chairman of Clydach Merthyr lodge
and Aeron Bevan chairman of Pwllbach lo.dge - both mines sit-
uated in or about the Swansea Valley.
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and we were going around and, we wore at such a
stage that we organised a strike, see
"Well, we were giving the orders now. I was going
around all of the collieries: up in G-ilfach Goch
appealing to the men to support us - "We must stop
the closure of Werntarw", and, all that see. And.
we were successful. 'Ve had a sympathetic hearing
everywhere that we were going. We did all West
Wales and up to G-ilach Gooh and all around there
see .... Tower and Tirherbert were ' supportLng us.
We were a powerful group".
Shortly after the Executive' s backdown on the Werntarw issue,
the Labour Government was replaced by the first post-war Con-
servative Government • It was a development which furth'er corn-
plicated. the relationship between the NU1I and the NCB. The latter
now came to be viewed by some'miners and their leaders as con-
stituting little more than a body which existed primarily to
execute Conservative economic policy. The miners' elected.
leaders found themselves confronted, with the task of justifying
to their members the continuation of a policy of cooperation with
the Board. - despite the fact that ultimate financial control of
the industry had passed into the hands of the miners' traditional
political enemies. From the Autumn of 1951 onwards, there began
adiscernable cooling-off of the relationship which existed be-
tween the members of the South Wales miners' executive and their
opposite numbers on the Divisional Board. By December, for ex-
ample, the Board. found itself disappointed with the response of
the workforce to a proposed pay offer whi'ch had been agreed after
negotiations with the miners' national leaders. A coalfield.
' ballot accepted. the offer by 49, 250 votes to 26,000 against, but
6. Ibid.
it was stressed by the S. Wales Area leaders that most of the
ballot results were accompanied by expressions of discontent over
the increased differential which henceforward would accumulate
between the minimum wage of men working below and above the stir-
face. Much disappointment was expressed also over the announce-
ment that the miners would not be receiving a second week's
holiday with pay during the following summer •
Although both of these issues Involved all of Britain's coalfields,
it was In S. Wales that the discontent expressed itself most
loudly. The reason for this is almost certainly to be found
amongst the activities of the so-called "unofficials". They
seized upon these grievances and delighted in using them as arrows
with which they sought to damage what they denounced as the
.
"collaborationist" policies of the NUN executive.
Evan John, one of the leaders of the Shakespeare Hotel group,
for example, recalls setting out to embarrass .A.lf Davies and
Bill Paynter at coalfield conferences by tabling repeated questions
concerning the executive's relationship with the Board in the
light of a Conservative Government holding the purse-strings.8
December, 1 951, proved particularly hectic f or Paynter, newly-
elected as the president of the S. Wales miners. Besides the
taunts which emerged from the 8hakespeare Hotel, he faced problems
with organised uiiofficial actions emanating from two of the most,
important and militant of Rhondda pits: Fernhill and Parc and Dare.
7. C.G-., 27.12.51.
8. Evan John interview, .op.cit.
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The disputes at these pits were symptomatic of a much larger
malais which assumed the form of an increasing reluctance amongst
the coalfield.'s workforce to sanction the kinds of cooperative
gestures which its elected leaders had made towards the Labour
Government and. the Coal Board since 192+7.
At the Parc and Dare complex, over 2,500 men struck work,
ostensibly in protest against the arrangements for overtime
working at the pit. The timing of the strike however, indicates
that it was more than this; that it was, in fact, an expression
of the Lodge's distaste f or the continuation of overtime working
now that a Conservative Government had been returned to power.
This interpretation is strengthened when one recalls that Parc
and. Dare distinguished itself as a lodge which had shown extreme
S
reluctance to strike during the earlier years of nationalisation
when the Lodge Committee had perceived its role as being one
which involved, not only representing its members' interests,
but also providing the coalfield with a lead in respect of dis-
playing a willingness and enthusiasm to promote "production for
socialism" by working weekends and long periods of overtime.9
9. See, above, Chapter 1, pp. 11-12.
Delegates representing 28,000 miners in two areas of the
NIThI (Swansea and. Neath) passed. a resolution of protest at
Swansea on Saturday, November 2nd, against the declaration
made by the General Council of the TUC that they would.
work amicably with the new Government. The resolution
criticised the Council for making the statement without
prior consultation with the "rank-and-file" and. the various
organisationa thereof and deprecated the action taken,
"particularly having regard to the experience with the
Conservatives in 1921 and. 1926 ,.,." The National Executive
of the NUM was to be asked to confirm the resolution and.
send. it to the General Council of the TUC.
"?eztern Mail", 4. .11 .51
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Further north, at the head of Rhondda Fawr trouble at Fernhill
threatened to involve 30,000 of the field's 100,000 miners in
strike action over the issue of summonses by the Coal Board
against six Fernhill miners whom the Board alleged indulged in
a go-slow movement which caused an estimated loss of production
of £)fO,000.1 0
The strike threat was called off only after discussions at a
national level, persuaded the Board to postpone the summonses
so that the whole question of claims for breach of contract
could be subject to renewed discussions in London. A delegate
conference in Cardiff resolved that the union should not coun-
tenance further fines and. that the Coal Board should not ex-
ercise the right it possessed under the Master and Servant Act
to take proceedings.11 It had. been the case, until February
1 951, that a system of voluntary fines had operated on the coal-
field in respect of. breaches of contract,• but this arrangement
was terminated by the decision of a miners' conference which
aeed that it should be left to Area managers to effect "token"
settlements with miners who admitted breaches.
No one was admitting anything at Fernhill, however. The pit's
workforce had issued strike notices in emulation of the success-
fu]. action taken some two months earlier by 800 Ogilvie colliers
in Rhymney Fach which had resulted in a back-down by the Coal
Board. over its threat to prosecute 31. of the pit's workmen for
striking for four days and for going-slow for seven weeks after
10. Rhondda Leader,, 6,i 2.51.
11 • SWNUM E.C. Minutes and Special Conference Reports (ECM & 3cR)
December 1 951.
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wards.1 2
The Fernhill matter was resolved shortly before Christmas as
a result of an appeal to the Board by a deputation of the pit's
minors, They declared that productivity results had improved
during the weeks immediately prior to their visit and that the
Board should contribute to efforts to cool-off the situation
by withdrawing the summonses.13 -Amidst much pulicity, the
Board made what was termed a "Christmas Eve Gesture"; the sumni-
onses were withdrawn ....
"Bearing in mind the spirit of the season and
desire that the retiring Divisional Chairman,
Mr. G.R. Aerori-Thomas, should leave without such
a problem unresolved, Mr. John Shenton, the Area
General Manager, and his executive agreed to let
the claims cirop"t'
There may have been a good many within the Rhondda who accepted
the Board's gesture with thanks and. admiration, but if there
were, they did not make themselves heard. After barely a month
of relative industrial peace, it was the militants who once again
captured the limelight.
Meeting in the first week of January, the miners of the Parc and
Dare Lodge decided that they would not work the voluntary Saturday
shift. Their reasons this time centred upon the Government's
12. C.C., 18.10.51; the NCB claimed £10,621 damages. The Ogilvie
strike notices were withdrawn only after assurances were
given that an out-of-court settlement would be made with the
34. colliers.
13. Rhondda Leader, 3.1.52.
14. C.G-., 3.1.52.
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proposed cuts in social spending - the so-called "But ler cuts"
which were interpreted by many on the Left as signalling an
intention to dismantle the Welfare State. The Lodge Committee
asked f or support and received it; slowly at first but soon
gathering considerable momentum so that by late February over
30,000 miners were refusing to work the Saturday shift. 15 Once
again, it was men of the Dulais Valley - members of the so-
called "Minority Movement" - who provided the ir4tial support
for the Zthondda strikers. 314.00 of them gave fourteen days
notice as a protest against the economy cuts and linked the
gesture with another of their grievances concerning the decision
by S. Wales bus companies to abolish workmen's fares - a decision
which was to cause an inordinate number of disputes upon the
field and one which was seen by many miners as constituting a
wage cut: such was the wides 'pread dependence of miners upon
public transport since the instigation of colliery reorganization
and the mass run-down in production during the I 93Q•1 6
Both protests were condemned by the Miners' Executive as offering
an unwarranted challenge to the official leadership. Such con-
demnations appear to have had little effect however, upon any
of the unofficial groupings. By mid-February, delegates repre-
senting 1+2 lodges met at the Shakespeare and announced that,
pending the delegate conference which was to be held later that
month, the lodges (representing some 30-1+0,000 miners) were to
15. The Colliery Guardian placed the figure at 4.0,000 (21 .2.52),
the Daily Worker at 30,000.
16. See, below, p.186-i88.
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maintain their ban on Saturday working. They also decided to
tender fourteen days notice in protest against the recent abol-
ition of workmen's bus fares.7
Paynter and his executive made it plain that they wou:Ld not
"countenance direct industrial action to express grievances
over the Coverninent's economy measures in the social servicest,18
- a resolution which was modified considerably at the coalfield.
delegate conference in late February.
The conference was held at the Cory Ball in Cardiff and it w-ft-
nesseJ the first setback for Paynter's new xeoutive which had
tabled a recommendation that there should take place a one-day
demonstration of protests against the cuts. The recommendation
warned the Government of the "danger of industrial unrest if
attacks on the living standards of the people are persisted in".9
The recommendation was rejected, albeit narrowly, because, as one
reporter put it, it did not go far enough. 2° The mood. of the
meeting, if not the actual vote, was one permeated by obvious
hostility towards the Tory measures and by a widespread suspicion
that opposition to the cuts should not be left solely in the hands
of the Parliamentary Labour Party:
"Speakers who called f or action were in a
majority during today's conference ....",
reported one observer. "Only a handful put
forward the lines that all action should be
through Parliament"
17. Neath Guardian 21.2.52.
18. SVNUM., E.C.M., Februy 1952.
19. C.G., 6.3.52.
20. Daily Vorker, 28.2,52
2%. Ibid.
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The wording and. emphasis (upon industrial action) of this report
says a greet deal about the political attitude of some of the
leading actors in this controversy. It appeared in the pages
of the Daily Worker, the editor of which must have been as confused
by the events in S. Wales as were many of the miners. It was a
confusion which had. its roots, as did. so many other confusions
on the field, in the old. geographical divisions of political and.
industrial opinion. And. it was compounded by the fracture which
so often separated Labourite union activists from their Comrn-
unist brothers.
For by 1952, the CPGB had reverted, as Henry Pelling describes
•	 H	 .	 •	 ,, 22it to the sectarianism of twenty years before •	 Links witn
the Labour Left had been severely curtailed and there had becn,
since 19)4-7, a tendency within the party to abandon those exten-
sions of inner-party democracy which had. been introduced during
the later years of the war:
••,, perhaps most significantly, in 1952 it was
decided. that the rank-and-file no longer needed
the right to 'take part in the formulation of party
policy', and for this was substituted the much more
limited right to 'take part in the discussion' of
,23
policy'
The South Wales Miners' Union was undoubtediy amongst the most
democratic of all union groupings. The executive was a lay ex-
ecutive and its contacts with the rank-and-file were both solid
and sensitive. Delegate conferences occurred with extraordinary
frequency and were empowered to discuss and act upon any business
which they deemed. worthy of their attention.
22. H. Pelling, op. cit., p. 160
23. Ibid.
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The contrast betreea the democratic practices of this union and.
those of the political organisation to which some of its most
gifted activists belonged was obvious. Because of its lay nature,
the executive of the Miners' Union could claim firstly that the
existence of unofficial committees and "leaderships", of the
kind so beloved by the post-1948 CPC-B, constituted nothing less
than a refusal by Communist miners to act in a democratic and
constitutional fashion. Such undemocratic behaviour was linked
with the kinds of sectarian activity so often condemned in the
past by elected union officials - both Communist and non-Comm-
unist. Most unofficial strikes involved relatively small groups
of workers - particularly those who worked at the face or on
vital haulage jobs. These were the workers with most bargaining
power hut they were not, automatically, the workers with most
regard for the declared aims nd principles of their union.
For those aims and principles were, in theory at least, concerned.
with improving the lot of all of the union's membership and,
over and above that, with aiding the establishment of a socialist
society in Britain.
In the eyes of most executive members, sectional militancy and
unofficial action was anathema to those aims. Their experiences
during the I 930s had taught them that the maintenance of "unity"
was of primary importance, but by 1952, "unity" was a cause no
longer in favour amongst the leadership of the CPG .B which, by
that date, was arguing that virtually all militancy was good
militancy and. that any strike was better than no .strike at all.
The Party's line was, in other words, more or less identical to
that against which Homer had fought from 1 929-1 931 and it is
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perhaps paradoxical that it was another leading Communist, Bill
Paynter, who provided the most effective opposition to it two
decades later.
The reasons why it proved to be Morner and. Paynter, and not one
of a number of talented anti-Communist miners' leaders, who pro-
vided this opposition are simple. Neither men could be compared.
even remotely with those amongst the Party's leadership who dis-
tinguished. themselves more by their slavish adherence to Dutt's
version of Moscow than to any display of political insight or
understanding. Both, during their lifetimes, fell foul of the
Party's leadership and both did so because of the nature of their
relationships with, and insight into, the communities and organ-
izations of the S. Wales miners. Unlike their political masters
in King Street, both Homer and Paynter were aware of the unique
part played by the miners' union in the everyday life of the
coaJ.field. They understood that it was no mere anonymous con-
glomeration of dispersed factory branches of the type which so
often has been subject to manipulation by a few powerful and
central bureaucrats.
It was an organisation with limited, tight, geographical boun-
daries. It was inextricably linked with the close communities
from which it drew its members. And. its struggle to nurture and.
maintain its characteristic unity of purpose had been long and
hard and had. involved. over-coming threats from its own Right-wing
as well as those emanating from its Left.
	 Its -elected leaders
24.. i.e., the SV(MF struggle against the so-called Company Unionists
or "nonpols"; see, above, Part One.
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were not about to squander on political adventurism - of the kind
advocated by its Left sectarians - the prizes which it had won
as a result of its struggles during the previous two decades.
This was not always easy for outsiders to comprehend. The po-
litical theoreticians in King Street and Transport House were
as often mystified by the actions and statements of the S. Wales
lay-executive as political commentators and historians have been
since. Whilst the latter have tended to apply ianket categor-
izations and generalizations which cover the coalfield's work-
force with the mantle of Moscow, (deepest hack-red) the theor-
eticians bemoaned what they interpreted as frequent lapses of
Party loyalty: Labourites voting in union elections for Comm-
unists arid. Communists disciplining their anti-Labour activists.
In a recent interview upon the topic of confused loyalties, Bill
Paynter sought to explain botti. his and Merrier' s attitudes in the
following way:
.... whether we were right or wrong; in those
situations our first loyalty went to the trade union
and not to the political party. Now that can be wrong
in some people's views I suppose. But I don't know,
I think it' a part of the way you are bloody reared.
I had. to face that many times".
You were put on the spot you mean?"
"#ell yes. If you're put on the spot what do you do?
Do you make the pronouncement that you may be urged
to make by the Communist Party or do you look at it
purely from the standpoint of the interest of the
trade union? I had to take a stand on the National
Executive many times contrary to th views that were
,,25being put by the Party
25. Recording of Bill Paynter, London, March1977.
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Overwhelming loyalty to the union was not a simple, unambiguous
virtue, however. Loyalty meant different things to different
men and even to different areas within the coalfield. The geo-
graphical and political fractures referred to earlier determined
in large measure the quality of support offered by a given work-
force to the elected leadership. The differences are most ob-
vious when one examines the propensity of Lodges to strike Un-
officially or when one compares the nature of the subject matter
chosen by Lodges as being of sufficient import to warrant the
drafting and submission of resolutions prior to annual conferences.
Much of the preceding work in this thesis, for example, has
been preoccupied with examining issues and events which centred
upon a relatively small number of collieries. For, despite the
fact that in 19)+7 there were ome 200 collieries in operation,
the same names reappear, time and again, in strike lists, news-
paper reports, NCB and NUM inquiries into go-slows and other
forms of disruption. Generally speaking, they belonged to pits
which were clustered in the upper-Swansea Valley, in both Rhond.da
Valleys, in the Dulais Valley, at the top end of the Aberdare
Valley and, most obviously of all, around Gwaun-cae-gurwen.
This is not to say that other pits did 	 witness strikes also.
The pits of Maesteg and the Garw and lower Aberdare Valleys were
rather "prone", as were others in the Rhymney and Taff, but it
is possible to draw a number of remarkably clear divisions across
a map of the coalfield.. The first' would include most of the
eastern field, from Pontypool westwards t; Merthyr Tydf ii. It
would encompass an area characterised more by the relative quiescence
i8
of its pit's workforces (relative to theS. Wales coalfield,
though not necessarily to those of Great Britain generally)
than by the sporadic militancy of a number of its Lodges.26
This area was generally associated with the political "right-
wing" of the S. Wales NIJM and its delegates could usually be
counted upon to vote solidly behind 	 motions at con-
27for once a.
The second division would include most of the central and western
sections of the field, including, in particular, the valleys
named above: the Rhondda, Dulais and Swansea as well as Gwaun-
cae-gurwen, the upper-Aberdare, Maesteg, Afan, Garw and Neath
Valleys. It was ,i this area that the Left strongholds were to be
located: at pits such as Parc and Dare, Fernhill, Ferndale,
Cambrian, G-lenrhondda, ardy, Onllwyn, Seven Sisters, Cefn Coed,
Clydach Merthyr, Pwllbach, Steer and East. This was the area
within which the pre-nationalisation combine committees had. most
effectively consolidated their positions and from which the
"unofficials" drew the bulk of their support.
When asked to explain the differences between the two areas,
Bill Paynter emphasised what he referred to as the contrasting
qualities of leadership available to the rank-and-file in the
eastern and western sections of the field. The miners of Mon-
mouthahire and the east, he declared, lacked a recent tradition
of electing the type of brilliant local leader relatively common
26. Most obviously, Bedwas, Nine Mile Point, Oakdale, Risca,
Marine, the Blaenawon Pits and Merthyr Vale.
27. Recording of Evan John, op. cit.: Recording of David. Francis,
Swansea, April 1978
S
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in the west - men like A.J. Cook, Noah Ablett, Jack Hughes, Homer,
the young Jim Griffiths and Dai Dan Evans. He emphasised the
enduring and consistent loyalty in the eastern pits to the de-
clared policies of the Labour Party. It was a loyalty which app-
ears to have manifested itself in a less straightforward fashion
in the valleys to the west of the Taff. There it became tinged
and. subverted by "united-frontism" of the kind nurtured and en-
couraged by an indigenous and influential Communist presence.
Indeed, the eastern field comprised the nearest thing in South
Wales to a "safe-area" for anti-Communists. Paynter recalled,
for example, that as a known Communist,
".... it was on very rare occasions that, when I
was President in S. Wales, that t "ent intc t
Monmouthshire coalfield or, indeed, as National
Secretary, went into certain other coalfields of
Britain; like Yorkshire for instance - not easy
unless you were invited and the tendency was in
certain places not to invite known Communists
with the result that you didn't get the same fer-
ment taking place in Monmouthshire that you did
in the rest of the coalfield".28
This "ferment" was by no means universal in the pits to the west
of the Taff however, and when it appeared its character tended
to vary from pit to pit and from area to area, Indeed, it is
possible to subdivide this, the western half of the field, into
two, smaller, areas: the steam coal (eastern) sector and the
anthracite west. It is a sub-division which owes its existence
as much to the differing political characteristics of the two
areas as it does to geological and technological considerations.
28. Recording of Bill Paynter, op. cit.
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The miners of the central steam area - at least, those amongst
them who bothered to evaluate the characteristics of their coil-
eagues were prone to consider the anthracite miners as being some-
what clannish and parochial in outlook. This view was formulated
largely as a result of the enforced journeys made westwards in
search of work by miners from the depressed valleys of Merthyr
and Aberdare. It arose chiefly from a kind of culture-shock
which the steam-coal men suffered as they attempted to adjust
to the different methods of working, associating arid organizing
which obtained in the anthracite pits. Some of them had worked
only in large "cosmopolitan" mines which recruited their work-
4.forces from relatively wide catchment areas. Most had live&ln,
or near to, three towns renowned for their almost exotic social
I$mi: Dowlais, Merthyr and Aberdare. The anthracite villages
into which they travelled maywell have seemed rural, if not
parochial, in comparison.
As early as 1 936, 542 workers from Merthyr and 420 workers from
Aberdare were travelling westwards to C-lynneath - a journey of
12 miles each way in the case of the Merthyr men and 10 miles
each way in the case of those from Aberdare. 89 workers from
Dowlais, Merthyr and Aberdare travelled even further afield to
Onliwyn and Banwen in the Dulais Valley (i7 miles from Merthyr).29
The total number of men travelling daily from the eastern comin-
unities to the mines of the Neath and Dulais valleys in 1 936
was 1,154. and, many of them were miners who had worked previously
in the pits of Powell Duffryn or in those belonging to the Llewellyn
family - pits in which, as we have seen in Part One, the mere
29; The Second Industrial Survey of South Wales, op. cit.,
Vol III, p. 31.
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continuance of trade unionism had been threatened and in which
there survived only the most meae enthusiasm for risking jobs
and wages f or the sake of union principles. The atmosphere which
they encountered amongst the anthracite miners was quite different
and it was a difference which was amplified, moreover, by the
length of time spent travelling back and forth to work. The
problems and social effects of significantly increased travelling
warrant a full chapter in themselves; there is space here, only
to mention some of the more obvious, including a reduction of
leisure time. increased physical strain and significant deductions
from the weekly wage packet. Commenting upon these problems,
Bert Coombes wrote in 1 939:
(travelling to work) has become a recognised
thing today. There are good facilities now - double-
decker buses and train services - to bring the two
thousand and more men who come into this valley to work.
(The Neath Valley) They come from a radius of eighteen
miles, and pay up to nine shillings a week in fares.
If there is no work for them when they arrive, they
must return home by some method. They get no pay for
that day, but have to pay for the ride. I have 1own
this happen once a week, and sometimes twice, over a
period of four months. This travelling means that
they are in their dirty clothes f or an hour and a half
extra at the end of the shift, while in the winter
they get nothing to warm them from early morning until
-	 evening.
"There is another side to this travelling to work.
The officials often prefer to engage men from a dis-
tance because these men are difficult to organise.
They must hurry to their conveyances, and cannot attend
a meeting or anything that concerns the work. If they
are paid a shilling or two short in their money it will
not pay them to come and see about it. If the committee
Iare local men - as it is afe to assume they must
be - then the outsiders do not know them well,
and feel that they distrust them because they are
living near the colliery and the officials.
"These outsiders are compelled to pay towards
institutions that they cannot use, and have to
allow deductions from their pay for welfare schemes,
bands, nursing services, etc., that they live too
far from to enjoy. They are brought from the
streets of towns like Merthyr and Dowlai or
Aberavon, and taken to work in an area that is
beautiful in comparison - except the spot where
the collieries are built. They have to contribube
to the building of sports grounds, parics anà. uI'o-
raries, yet every evening they are taken past them
to their drab hoea, with no chance of getting
enjoyment from these facilities, and every week
,30they must pay the bus fare out of their small wages'.
The effects of this kind of travelling then, could be extremely
complex and the problems which they threw up were compounded by
the differing standards of trade union organisation obtaining
within the two areas. As was stated earlier, these differences
manifested themselves most strikingly to those men who travelled
daily across the geological boundary separating the steam-coal
and anthracite coal pits.
One such miner, G-lyn Williams, a Merthyr man who had worked,
originally, in the steam coal pits of Pentrebach and Troed-y-rhiw
in the Merthyr Valley before travelling west in i935 to work at
the anthracite Empire Colliery in the upper Vale of Neath, re-
called how different things were in his new workplace:
30. Bert Coombes, op. cit., pp. 166-167.
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"My experience of trade-union men in those days
(in Merthyr) was one of having great respect for
them, because of the struggle they were waging just
to retain the Federation. But if they spoke out of
turn they were no different to you or I. I'm sure
that a lot of the men were working and suffering
intimidation: I remember going to the manager
in a Merthyr colliery on one occasion with a com-
plaint, and not receiving satisfaction t told him
I'd tel]. the Federation organizer Idris Evans about
it; "Tell who the hell you like" he said, "and
you'd better be careful about what you're saying.."
That was the threat; what I thought was my defence -
the union-well, it was no defence at all. But when
I went to Glynneath mind, it was entirely different;
if, for instance, I hadn't been a Federation member
in Merthyr .... it would have cost me, when I went
to Glynneath, a pound to join. If you didn't have
the money they'd give you time to pay it, but they'd
make sure you paid. a pound to join. Once you was in
you felt confident, you had. people who were prepared
to stand together, the whole colliery was together,
it was a different attitude altogether".
G-lyn Williams felt that the primary reason for the strength of
the union in the anthracite area lay in the fact that the demand
for anthracite coal had kept more or less ahead of supplies,
unlike the glut conditions which generally had prevailed in the
steam-coal areas. The anthracite mine owners were readier to
compromise in order that smooth production be maintained. He
also referred to a residual militancy in the workers of the
anthracite area, and their determination to defend their conditions
and practices:
31. a
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"From the outset, the anthracite miners were
sufficiently militant enough to ensure that
conditions were good and should remain good.
When my father went down Glynneath to work, some
time before me, directly after the 1926 Strike,
the men in Glynneath would be throwing stones
at the people from Merthyr, they didn't want
them there, they were jealous of their con-
d.itions .... they knew of the conditions in
Merthyr and Aberdare, they didn't want these
people to come in because, unfortunately, they
had no confidence in them. But the people from
Merthyr and Aberdare had to take strong action
and stick it out because they had to get jobs,
they wanted work. Of course, they fell in
line and retained a good strong trade union".32
Various theories prevail within the mining communities on both
sides of the geological divide, as well as within the research
departments of universities, as to why there seems to have existed
amongst anthracite miners a higher propensity to resort to un-
official action to solve their grievances than there existed
amongst the miners of the steam-coal valleys to the east.
These theories usually revolve, In the minds of miners and cx-
miners at least, around two central themes: the "closeness" and
inward-facing nature of the anthracite pit villages; and the diff-
erence in the quality and political beliefs of the miners' leaders
in the two areas.
32
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To these must be added two allied themes - both of which are
popular foci for discussion, if not for publication, by academic
researchers. The first is concerned with the traditional influence
of pit size and the size of the various workforces; the second is
concerned with the, influence of property status - miners owning
their own houses - upon workers in the two main areas.
Since the first two theories may be considered somewhat more
nebulous, or more difficult to "quantify", than the second pair,
it seems logical to tackle the latter first in the hope that an
examination of them might cast some light upon the first two.
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The influence of pit size.
In Chapter 10, (pp. 2-36	 , above), it was pointed out that the
average anthracite colliery was smaller, in terms of manpower,
than those of the central and eastern collieries and that its
output, though on a par with the collieries of Monmouthshire,
was also smaller than the collieries of the central area. The
differences are quite marked if a comparison is made between the
average size of the steam-coal collieries of the Aberdare area,
immediately to the east of the anthracite boundary, and the
collieries of the anthracite field itself. The average man-
power in an Aberdare mine in 194.6 was 527, in an autwacite tin€
it was 350. An Abordare mine produced, on average, an annual
output per employee of 270 tons; an anthracite mine, just below
200 tons per employee.33
These statistics have a direct bearing upon two popular supp-
ositions regarding the relative natures of trade union organ-
ization within the steam and anthracite sectors. The first
supposes that it was easier to organize and sustain effective
trade unionism within a small and tightly knit workforce than
it was to do so within a large and often "cosmopolitan't work-
force of the type common in the central field. The second
supposes that the owners of these small mines were often them-
selves "small owners" and therefore more vulnerable to industrial
33. Chapter 10, pp. 2-36.
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action by their employees than were the owners of the big
eastern pit
Much evidence was available to support both suppositions. The
weakest lodges on the coalfield included amongst their number
several whose memberships were recruited from a wide catchment
area. Bill Paynter attributed to this factor many of the diff-
iculties which he encountered when trying to strengthen the
union' a organisation at the Bargoed. and Efliots collieries in
the Rhymney Area. Like Coombes, he spoke of the problem of over-
coming the diminished. sense of cowaumel solid.rit which apparentl
existed amongst the workforces of these pits 	 and. it would have
needed. little insight to equate thisiminution with the relative
weakness of the Rhymney lodges when they were compared, not only
with the lodges of parts of tie anthracite area, but also with
those of pits located at the "blind", northern ends of the central
3L.. e.g., "It is difficult to give a satisfactory explanation for
such sustained antagonism; (in the anthracite pits) the hard
coal miners were extremely loyal to their union and it is ps-
ible that the comradeship existing in these small pits encouraged
unity in opposing authority or in fighting alleged injustices
Those collieries, located along the edge of the upland moors in a
particularly arid setting, had been originally controlled by
local tradespeople. The close personal link between men and
owners, and the increasing demand for the high quality Anthracite
coal of the locality prompted the managements to accede to ex-
cessive demands for allowances and privileges. When the Amal-
gamated Anthracite combine later acquired these undertakings
and attempted. to eliminate the non-economic working practices
there was continual strife".
W.J. Anthony-Jones, op. cit., p. 84.
35. Recording of Bill Paynter, op. cit.
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valleys - pits like Fernhill, Blaengarw, Glyncorrwg and Maerdy
(before it was closed for almost a decade and a half in 1933).
For these too, were relatively closed communities with no through
roads; (or else through roads which had been constructed only
as late as the I 930s), a topographical feature which tended to
grant these villages a greater degree of isolation and, perhaps
self-sufficiency, than obtained in the towns and villages down-
stream.
Bill Paynter recalled, for example, that although he was a Rhcndda
miners' official at the time, he was yet made to feel unwelcome
by the Fernhill colliery lodge committee when he offered his
services on behalf of the South Wales executive during the record.-
breaking Fernhill stay-down strike of 1 936. The committee members
were, he explained, "an indejend.ent lot", determined to carry
the stay-down to a successful conclusion - preferably without
having to accept the aid of "outsid.er&'.3°
A similar reputation for militant independence was associated
with the lodge located at Maerdy, at the head of the smaller
Rhondda Valley. It had been expelled from the SW1F in i929, con-
victed of the sin of providing financial support for a Communist
parliamentary candidate (Homer) against the orders of the Fed.-
eration executive which was pledged to support only Labour can-
didates.37
The geographical similarities were limited however, to topographical
features, for the Fernhifl and Maerdy workforces were drawn mainly
36. Ibid.
-	
37. A. Homer, op it pp.IO8 — IO. -
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from differing types of catchment areas. As David Smith has
illustrated in his perceptive account of the social and political
relationships which obtained in Mardy, there existed in that
large village a highly developed and cohesive communal identity
which was largely absent amongst the miners working at Fernhill
for the simple reason that "Fernhill" itself consisted of a
couple of rows of terraced cottages, the old Blaenrhondda Farm
and a scattering of mine entrances, shafts and -surface con-
stl'uctions. The Fernhill workforce was recruited from a whole
string of towns and villages lying danstream of the pits. In
1937 for example, it was calculated that some 200 men were
travelling daily the '10 - 12 miles north to Blaenrhondda from
Yztrath'hondda and Tonypandy38 . No one however, travelled north
up the smaller fork of the Rhondda Valley to find work at the
Mardy collieries, the owning company of which was ban1'upt by 1933.
Mar&y and its pits, which had provided work for upwards of 3,500
men until 1 926, was described in 1937 as an unemployment "black
spot". After the early I 930s, its "little Moscow" reputation
was justified solely upon extra-industrial, political, grounds:
its economic bargaining power having been wiped out by market
depression.39
Comparisons between other such "blind-end" pits will produce
similarly contrasting features, but these should not be allowed
to disguise the fact that pit location, or topography, played a
significant, if not crucial, role in helping to determine the
38. The Second. Industrial Survey of S. Vales, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 153
39. Ibid., p. 152; also, W.J. Anthony-Jones, op. cit., Appendix H,
Table 2.
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industrial tactics adopted by individual workforces. In the central
sector of the field, for example, miners working the pits located
at the "blind-ends" of the C-arw and Ogmore Valleys struck work
more often than did those working in pits located in the valleys
if 0
all around them.
Looked at within the widest possible coalfield perspective however,
it becomes clear that the "blind-end" pattern is only one of a
4
whole range of dominant variables governing industrial action and
that it blends in closely with certain patterns concerned with
mine o'bmership and popular political persuasion. Anthony-Jones
has pointed out that, despite the fact that between 1927 and 1939
some 350 collieries were open for varying periods in S. Wales,
only 1if8 of these experienced any strikes outside of the 1 931
Coalfield Strike:
"70 per cent of the strikes occurred at 60 collieries,
and the miners at 77 collieries were responsible for
86 per cent of the total man-shifts lost through
labour disputes"
He also points out that,
",,., of the strikes resulting in a complete
cessation of work at a colliery, one half took
place in the Anthracite sector as did one-third
of the partial colliery stoppages on the coal-
field".
If we disregard, for the moment, these strike-prone anthracite
pits, we find that we are left with a relatively small number of
strike-prone steam and bituminous pitz.	 Of those in this cate-
gory which were located in the central sector and which experienced
znore than five strikes each, ten could be described as "blind-end."
4-0. V.J. Anthony-Jones, op. cit., Map One; & Appendix E. Table 1.
4-i . Ibid., p. 83.
42. IbId., Appendix H: Table 2.
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pits and eight were situated in other topographical locations.
Table I below, charts those pits (of both types of location)
along with their owners and the numbers of workers employed in
1927 and j939 and the numbers of strikes which occurred at the
pits between 1927 and 1939:
Number of Strikes
9
9
7
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Table I
Collieries situated west of the Taff and east of the Neath which
experienced more than five strikes
1927 - 1939
(a) Collieries situated at or very near the "blind" heads of valleys.
Colliery
Glengarw
Wyndham
G1 enrhondda
Fernhill
International
Western
G.lync orrwg
G-arw
Trane
Ffaldau
Owners
Glenavon Garw
Gory Brothers
Glenavon Garw
Fernhill Collieries
International Coal
Ocean
North Rhondda Coil.
Ocean
Powell Duffry
Gory Brothers
Numbers Employed
1939	 1927
	
660	 660
1,150 1,450
	
680	 580
	1,510	 1,04-0
680 1,020
900 1 ,000
	
250	 110
	
750	 750
	
380	 650
600 1 ,250
Number of Strikes
13
10
10
10
8
8
7
6
6
6
(b) Collieries situated in cther topographical locations.
Colliery
C anibrian
Cwm (Llantwit)
Duffryn Rhondda
Bryn
Pen llyngwent
Pare
Bute Merthyr
Clamorgan
Owners
Powell Duffrv4
Powell Duffryn
Powell Duffz'yn
Baidwins
Gory Brothers
Ocean
Ocean (United Nat)
Powell Duffryn
Numbers Employed
	
1,100	 1,800
	
680	 920
954 1,000
(in
1947)
	
600	 700
	620	 680
i ,600 I ,200
	
200	 370
	
650	 720
7
7
6
6
6
1. Formerly owned by Welsh Associated Collieries.
2. Formerly owned by Great western Colliery.
3. Formerly owned by Ffaldau Collieries.
Information gathered from W.J. Anthony-Jones, op. cit.;
"Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory", 1947; and
a 2 inch O.S. Map of South Wales.
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The most remarkable feature of Table I is the comparatively
limited number of owners involved; of the eighteen pits listed,
fourteen belong to just four coal "combine" companies: Glenavon
Garw (2 pits), Cory (3 pits), Ocean and United National (4. pits)
and Powell Duffryn (5 pits). One other, Fernhill, was part of
the Sir John Beynon "ghost" combine 4.3
 and Bryn colliery was owned
by Bald.wins whose main financial interests lay in steel-making.
This left only two pits, International and G-lyncorrwg, which
could be said to have belonged to "small" owners.,
Another consistent feature of the pits listed is their size;
by 5: Vales standards, all of them, barring Trane, G-lyncorrwg
and Bute Merthyr, were large'pits. The average numbers employed.
in the central steam-coal area, it will be remembered, were as
follows:
Maesteg Area	 524. men per pit
Rhondda Area	 569 men per pit	 -
Aberd.a.re Area	 527 men per pit	 4.5
There was very little marked differential in size between the
workforce of the average "blindend" pit and. that of the average
pit listed. as being located elsewhere. (The sizes of workforces
varied considerably during the period. 1 927-1 939: see comparisons
of 1927 and. 1939 in Table One, above.) However, the variations
suffered by the pits listed. in Table Onoare consistent with
the variations suffered during the same period by pits right across
13. See Appendix Two.
1,4. See Chapter 7, Ftn. 24. for data concerning the ratio of
"combines" to "independents".
4.5. See Chapter 10, pp.
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the coalfield. Also, the variations almost never serve to shift
the listed pits out of their approximate size-category. Thus,
although Cambrian colliery suffered a loss of 700 jobs between
1927 and 1939, it nevertheless remained, by South Wales stan-
dards, a large - above average - sized undertaking. The varia-
tions suffered by the pits in list (a), Table One, are roughly
consistent to those suffered in list (b).
"Blind-enders" accounted for 21 of the central steam-coal sector's
70 operative pits (or working-groups of pits) in 1 91+6.46 A corn-
parison of these figures with those obtaining for 1973/71+ shows
that, of the central steam-coal sector's remaining 19 pits, 7
were "blind-ender&' - in other words, the proportion of 11 blind.-
enders" to all other pits in the sector had risen during the
first two and a half decades of nationalisation.47 The comparison
indicates that the "blind-end" pits held prospects for continuing
future production which were at least as bright as those of pits
situated in other types of locations in the central sector.
1+6. "Working groups" refers to geographical conglomerations of
pits, e.g. there were three Fernhill pits (Nos. 1, 2 and )^)
working more or less as a unit in 191+6. For present pur-
poses, this conglomeration is referred to as Fernhill Coil-
iery - i.e. one pit. The NCB listed, in 191+6, 25 working
collieries in the Maesteg Area (of which some 10 were
"blind-enders"), 27 in the Rhondda Area (some 8 "blind-
enders") and 1 8 in the Aberdare Area (some 3 "blind-enders").
Information from "Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory",
191+7.
47. 1946: "blind-enders" account for approximately 3 of all
sector's pits.
1973: "blind-ender&' account f or approximately 37 of all
sector's pits.
These figures exclude Mardy which was operative in 1973,
but not in 191+6.
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There is not enough information however, to prove that enhanced
or relatively secure employment prospects were sufficient to en-
courage the workforces of the "blind-end" pits to risk backing up
their demands with industrial action where, had they been working
in pits more v,1lneiable to closure, they might otherwise have
held back.
The "economic viability" of a pit is no easy thing to measure,
nor, when it is measured, is it consistent with standards of
"viability" as they are understood in other areas. Thus, if pits
were measured merely in terms of the O1iiS achieved by their work-
forces, then most pits which were considered "viable" in South
Wales would undoubtedly have appeared to any Nottingham coal
owner to be candidates for early closure. "Viability" can de-
pend, not only upon market outlets, productivity and efficiency,
it can also depend upon a pit's hidden potential - its untapped
reserves of coal.
These were some of the variables which the big private companies
naturally took into account during the I 930s. Like the Coal
Board after them, they were prepared to close or to reduce in
size large numbers of pits in which individual productivity was
relatively high but which were poor candidates for the investment
of large amounts of capital, owing to their limited reserves of
workable coal. The "militant" pits listed in Table I belonged,
for the most part, to big, "rationalising" companies like Powell
Duffryn - companies prone to weeding-out the less promising unita
which they acquired as they expanded. The large mines in their
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possession which remained i.n production by the late 19303 remained.
so for good economic reasons, not the least of which was the
promise contained within the pits' reserves. To suppose that
mineworkers were insensitive enough not to interpret large in-
vestment in their pits as an indication of their employers' in
tentions to continue production for a number of years following
would be to regard all miners as idiots.
The employees of the "blind-enders" would, undoubtedly, have been
aware of their relatively favoured position and it is hardly
fanciful to assume that, buoyed-up by such knowledge and all
else being equal, they would be more likely to risk participating
in industrial action than would workers who were confronted daily
with the gloomy prospect of the closure of their places of work.
Such an assumption would go some way towards explaining the
strike-proneness of the "blind-end" pits - all of which, with
the exception of -lengarw and Trane, survived the first twenty
*
years of public ownership.
Of the ten pits listed in Table I (a), however, only three poss-
eased productivity averages which were above the average for pits
in the central sector in j94-6/4-7:
It must, of course, be remembered. that the closure of
collieries after nationalisation - and. increasingly after
1958 - became complicated for the owners as a result,
firstly, of the immediate post-war fuel shortage and
secondly, as a result of the successive pledges which
wore given by central government that it vould prevent,
by the maintenance of full employment, a return to the
kind. oC social distress provoked by the closures and.
s)umps of the inter-war period.
1 85
239
275
	
+
297
	
+
229
250
270
	
+
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1 79
77
203
Table 2
The Approximate Average Annual Tonnage per Mineworker in I 946/4.7
(produced in those "blind-end" pits which experienced more than
five strikes during the period 1927 '- 1939)
Colliery
Glengarw
Wynd.ham
Glenrhondda
Fernhill
International
Western
Clyncorrwg
Garw
Trane
Ffaldau
Approx. Total
Annual Tonnage
I 94.6/47
1i3,500
220,000
145,000
350,000
112,400
225,000
1 70,000
1 27,500
60,000
20,000
Approx. Average
Annual Tonnage
per Mineworker
Above or Below
Central Sector
Average
(256.5 tons
per annum)
Mine
Closed.
1 959
1 966
1967
1970
1960
Table 2 calculated from returns in "Colliery Year Book and Coal
-Trades Directory", List of Coal Mines, 194-7.
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If an accurate measurement is to be made of the influence of
troubled- industrial relations upon production at these pits, then
such productivity figures as those included in Table 2 must be
examined within the geological and developmental context of
each pit at specific times. However, it Is possible to state
-	 that the figures in Table 2 add meat to widespread allegations
that there existed amongst the workers of the "blind-enders"
a tendency to fight harder in defence of their; existing powers
of' "job-control" (or "custom and practice") than was generally
possible at pits with less hopeful economic prospects. One
undermanager complained, for example, that as late as 1975, the
Lodge Committee of Fernhill was "obstinately" defending the con-
tinued practice by its members of the Seniority Rule - despite
the fact; that it was obvious that the continuation of this prac-
tice was one of the chief cat ses of the poor showing which Fern-
hill made when its productivity figures were compared with those
achieved by the miners of the non-"blind-ender", Tover Clliery,
to which Fernhill was physically linked as a production unit.
He explained. Pernhill's retention of the Seniority Rule as
stemming, not from any particular topographical feature, nor from
any variable concerned with pit size or production technique,
but from the subversive influence of "Communists .... like George
Roes ...." an influence which was, as he put it, "traditionally
more acceptable" in FerrthiU. than it was at Tower. 49 It is an
48. Recording of Brian Yilliams, Tower/Fernhill undermanager,
.Cwmdare, January 1977.
1+9. George Roes is now General Secretary of the SWNUL
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explanation which begs a number of important questions concerning
the adequacy of any attempt to explain away, in environmentally
deterministic terms, the decisions and actions of any particular
workforce. The case of Fernhill provides proof enough that it
is not sufficient to examine a map and thereby to assume that
because a pit is located at the head of a "blind" valley its
workforce wil]. necessarily have been recruited from the pit's
immediate vicinity and, moreover, that it would-have been a work-
force which was geographically sheltered from the same political
influences as those which played over the workforces of pits
further downstream. Indeed, at Fernhill it would appear that
the reverse was the truth - that far from serving to shelter
the workforee, the surrounding hillsides turned the political
gusts in upon themselves so that they penetrated every nook and
cranny of pit business. The Fernhili/Tower undermanager who
blamed the "Communists" for Fernhill' a poor performance explained
that such influences were largely absent from the Tower-side -
on account of the fact that Tower's "Communist militants" had
"probably beer. cleared •out", prior to nationalisation, by the
pit's old owners, Powell Duffryn.
Environmentally, there can have been few pits in S. Wales more
favourably located than was Tower to receive maximum exposure to
any political influences which may have drifted into the coalfield..
It was immediately adjacent to the anthracite sector, drew part
of its workforce from the Aberdare Valley and part from the Merthyr
Valley and yet its industrial relaticns record up to the early
1950s was distinguished only by the absence of serious confrontations.
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To attribute this to the open, or "cosmopolitan', make-up of
Tower's workforce, one would be forced to iguore the fact that
the Lodge of Tower's immediate neighbour (Tirherbert Colliery,
which drew its membership from the same catchment area as Tower)
enjoyed a reputation for efficiency and. organisation far more
distinguished than that enjoyed by the Tower Lodge. Yet Tir-
herbert had been subject to the same managerial techniques and
prctices as had Tower; both had been owned. by Powell Duffryn.
This "difference" appears to date back to the early 1930s when
there was a partially successful attempt to introduce a branch
of the S. ?iales Miners Industrial Union - the so-called. "non-
political" or "company" union - into Tower. Members of the Tir-
herbert Lodge viewed the development as an indication that manage-
ment were aware chat Tower contained considerable numbers of
empJoyees who were indifferent in their attitudes to trade union
matters. And, despite the fact that the Tower men overcame the
challenge posed. by company unionism, this impression survived
to a degree to which it conceivably could have helped determine,
albeit in a rather mysterious fashion, the type of miner who con-
sequently sought employment at the pit. They were, said one ex-
Tirherbert worker, ".... not always very up in union matters".5°
Shelving, for a moment, this subjective assessment, there are
two main alternative explanations for Tower's comparative
"quiescence". Firstly, it may have been the case that the pit's
managers succeeded in cultivating particularly friendly relation-
50. Recording of "Twai" Thomas, ex-Tower and Tirherbert r;iiner
and committee man, Hirwaun, March 1976. This generalisation
could hardly be accw'ately applied to the Tower-based. authors
of the pieces quoted earlier: Bob Condori, pp.383-38(Vol.One) and
D.W. Davies, pp. 67_69(Vol.Two).
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ships with their employees. This does not however, appear to
have been the case; an examination of the surviving correspon-
dence between Tower Lodge and. the Miners' Executive indicates
that there existed amongst the pit's rank-and-file a great deal
of animosity and frustration at the way in which Powell Duffryn
administered proceedings.51 There is no evidence however, of
there having taken place at the pit the kind of blatant purge of
active trade-unionists which occurred, for example at Powell
Duffz'yn' a C-adlys Colliery, three miles downstream of Tøwer.52
Secondly, earnings and conditions at the pit may have been of
a sufficiently high standard to promote contentment amongst
employees; though again, there seems to be little surviving evi-
dence to substantiate this supposition. Interviews with ex-
miners from Tower and Tirherbert indicate that earnings arid, con-
ditions at both pits differed little, one from another. Neither
were methods of production radically different: both pits em-
ployed mechanical cutters combined with hand-filling up until
the early I 950s.
Presented with such inconclusive evidence, it is necessary to
look elsewhere for possible reasons to explain the behaviour and
reputations of these workforces. The "anomalies" evident at
Pernhill, Tirherbert and Tower repeat themselves whenever com-
parisons are attempted of pits or groups of pits right-across the
coalfield. Almost nowhere is it possible to attribute a particular
workforce's brand of trade-unionism to some kind of introverted
51 • S'NMF Correspondence, Tower envelope, U.C.S.
52. See, above, Chapters 3 and Z..
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geographical isolationism.
We have seen how the "blind-end" pits attracted miners from fairly
distant communities; an examination of coalfield migration figures
emphasises that this tendency was common to most South Wales pits,
so much so in fact, that it becomes clear that by the 1930s, few
pits were recruiting their workforces from sizigle villages or
towns53 and that this was especially the case in the broad central
sector of the field.
By 1936, in every Exchange area within the coalfield, a con-
siderable proportion of' miners lived beyond walking distance
of their work. The numbers and percentages of those walking
or cycling to work, as compared with those who travelled by bus
or train in the broad central sector are shown in Table 3:
53e The Second Industrial Survey of South Wales, op. cit.
Vol. 3, Chapter 1.
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Table 3
Year: 1936
Exchange area in Numbers	 Per-	 Numbers	 Per-	 Total
which collieries Living in ceritage Travelling centage Working
are situated	 Vicinity	 to Work
Merthyr
Treharr is
Aberdare
Mountain Ash
Ferndale
Porbh
Pontypridd
Treorchy
Tonypandy
Cymmer
Maesteg
Neath
Resolven
i ,66o
2,314.
2,4.68
3,969
54.1
I ,788
2,330
3,238
2,792
I ,71 7
2,618
i ,875
I ,859
65.4.
72.8
32 • 66
76.4-9
72.04.
53.59
61 .73
56.20
84.26
57.85
86 • 7
4.5 • 87
60.8
878
865
2,218
I ,220
21 0
I ,54.8
I ,4-4-5
2,523
522
I ,251
401
2,211
I ,1 99
34.6
27.22
47.34.
23 • 51
27.96
46.41
38.27
4.3.8
1 5.74.
4.2.15
13.3
54.13
39.2
2,538
3,179
4,686
5,189
751
3,336
3,775
5.761
3,314
2,968
3,019
4,086
3,058
Total (Steam
etc. Area)	 56,951	 63.69	 32,481	 36.3-1	 89,432
Total (Anthracite
Area) 16,904	 63.j	 9,875	 36.9	 26,779
Source: computed from statistics supplied in "Second Industrial
Survey of S. dales", Vol. III, Chapter 1.
* In the Aberdare figures men and boys employed at the Powell
Duffryn Washery, power station and engineering works are excluded.
2i 0
The total number of miners travelling to work were probably even
higher than Table 3 suggests; possibly as high as )+5 - 50,000
in the ooa].field as a whole. 5 The increase in numbers tra y-
elling coincided, of course, with the overall adjustment in the
actual siting of major centres of production - an adjustment
- which, as we have seen in Chapter One, was provoked by the mar-
kot slump. In other words, great numbers of men were forced to
find work at non-local pits at a time of acute economic de-
pression and. job insecurity and at a time when the miners' union
was at its lowest ebb in terms of prestige and effectiveness.55
It is little wonder, then, that suspicion and even hostility
accompanied their arrival at their new pits. Questions were
asked: Did the Dowlais men bring with them the seeds of company
unionism? Did the Aberdare men transmit to the Aberpergwm miners
a despondency cultivated unde' years of Powell Duffryn manage-
ment? Did they bring with them trouble in the form of "Boishie"
agitators?
What occurred in the 1930s and ')0a was a great shuffle of the
workforce which was only temporarily interrupted by the war and
the post-war fuel shortage. Any insularity of outlook which may
have survived the events of 1925/26 at individual pits must surely
have suffered grievous assault during these decades. Within
the anthracite area - supposedly the most fertile ground for
the breeding of "isolationist" lodges - the tendency by the mid.-
'Thirties was towards the development of large collieries with
5. Ibid.
55. See, above, Part One.
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modern equipment. The Vale of Neath (in the east of the anth-
racite field) and the environs of Tumble (in the west of the
anthracite field) provided-the seams and the pits to which were
drawn men from smaller and more scattered mining units. Similarly,
in the Clydach area there was, during the 1930s, a progressive
increase in mining employment whilst further up the Swansea
Valley, in the area around Pontardawe, there was a steady de-
crease.
This ebb and flow of mining labour appears to have made little
or no difference however, to the near universal retention of
the Seniority Rule and other, pronounced, examples of custom
and. practice in the anthracIte pits. It was in these pits that
these particular forms of "job-control" survived longest in South
Wales, but there are few, if any, obvious explanations forthcoming
as to why this should be so. No explanations emerge, for ex-
ample, from any analyses one cares to make concerning the phy-
sical nature of the anthracite pits and communities. In Chapter
10, PP'226
 , it is argued that no watertight correlation
existed between pit size and efficiency of production, though
there existed a tendency for the larger pits to be amongst the
mont productive. A comparison of strike records and pit statis-
tics makes it equally clear that there was no direct correlation
between pit size and the prone-ness of workforces to strike.
Of the twenty anthracite mines which experienced more than five
strikes between 1 927 and 1 939, twelve possessed workforces more
numerous than the average for the anthracite area and eight were
of average size or smalier.6
56. Comparisons compiled by correlating Table 2, p.203(above) with Table 1,
appendix E, W.J. Anthony-Jones, op.cit. The average sizes of workt'orce,
are calculated from the returns listed in the "Colliery Year Book and
Coal Trades Directory" Vols. 1928, 1931, 1936, 1939 & i9.6. For the
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Of the twenty anthracite mines which experienced more than five
strikes between 1927 and 1939, twelve possessed workforces more
numerous than the average for the anthracite area and eight were
of average size or smaiier.6
There was, on the other hand, a more direct - though not Un-
expected - correlation between strike-proneness and low productivity:
Of the twenty most strike-prone anthracite pits listed, two
(Onllwyn and Abercrave/International) were counted amongst those
with the highest productivity records and five (Tareni, 1aerdy,
East, Celliceidrim and Ammanforci) were amongst those with the
lowest.
Virtually no correlation exists, however, between the anthracite
workforce's strike prone-ness and the location and size of its
mining communities. The communities of the eastern part of the
anthracite field for example, resembled the communities of the
mid-steam-coal valleys in appearance more closely than they did
the communities of the valleys to the west. The rows of company-
built terraced housing in the Dulais Valley present a very diff-
erent pi'ospect to the more spacious, frontier-like clusters of
owner-occupied "villas" and spec-built semis of the Upper Amman
and Twrch Valleys to the west.
56. Comparisons compiled by correlating Table 2, p. 203(above)
with Table I , appendix E, W.J. Anthony-Jones, op. cit. The
average sizes of workforces are calculated from the returns
listed in the "Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory"
Vols. 1928, 1 931, 1 936, 1939 and i946. or the purposes of
this comparison, the Abererave crid International collieries
are counted as one productive unit.
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The valleys of the Tawe, Clydach, Amman and Gwendraeth rivers
supported as wide a range of communities as was to be found
anywhere on the coalfield. Pontardawe and Clydach, f or example,
were large enough to be called towns and both contained established
metal-working industries as did a number of other anthracite-
- mining communities. Liandybie, Tumble and Porityberem had been,
until the turn of the century, little more than agricultural
villages situated in the rolling countryside of south-eastern
Carmarthenshire, whilst Ystradgynlais, Seven Sisters and. Cwaun-
cae-gurwen had mushroomed from mere scatterings of farmhouses
into industrial settlements of considerable dimensions.
The topographical locations of ztrike-rorie 'pits 'ui'e
as were the sizes and types of communities. Tareni, for example,
was located halfway up the populous Tawe (Swansea) Valley at
Godre'r graig and recruited its workforce from the towns of
Ystalyfera (to the north) and. Pontardawe (to the south). The
Givaun-cae-gurwen mines, located on the watersheds of the Clydach,
Twrch and Amman rivers, drew their workforces, not only from the
village itself but from nearby G-arnant and. Brynamxnan, and, further
afield, from the upper Swansea Valley and from Ammanford.57
Brynhenllys Colliery, on the other hand, enjoyed a strike record
second only to that of Tareni but was located in the largely
uninhabited northern arm of the Twrch Valley and. drew its work-
force almost exclusively from the villages of Cwmllynfell and
Upper-Cwmtwrch.
'57. The Second. Industrial Survey of South Wales, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 192.
214.
The correlations obtaining in the anthracite field. between, on
the one hand, a pit's size, productivity and location, and on
the other, the propensity of its workforce to take strike action,
were perhaps even less predictable than were those which obtained
in the steam-coal field. In the latter, it was at least possible
to assume that an economically buoyant "blind-end" pit would
be marginally more strike-prone than would a pit with less
promising economic prospects located say, halfway down an econ-
omicafly depressed valley. As we shall see in Chapter 1 3, how-
ever, anthracite militancy had little to do with economic pros-
pects and. even less to do with topographical location.
The other popular "explanation" for the h1 mncIaence of str!ices
in this area - the allegedly high rate of house ownership58 -
is examined in the following section in terms of its relationship
with the state of house ownership right across the coalfield.
58. This was a principal explanation employed as late as April,
1978, for example, by Roy Davies at the Liafur-irYales TtJC
Weekend. School in his paper, "Anthracite Miners".
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Miners Owning their Own_Homes
The correlation between home ownership and the propensity of
the owner to take industrial action is a complex one. The in-
cidence of miners owning their homes varies quite dramatically
from area to area. This is clearly illustrated in Table 1., p. 26
where the percentage of mining home-ownership is seen to be as
low as 5% in the Rhondda and as high as 6cY in.kmmanford to the
west. Both were militant areas. On the other hand, although
4.5% of Rhymney miners owned their own houses, they were rela-
tively quiescent in matters concerning industrial re1ations
unlike the miners of Neath and its environ where oiz2y5 j'ere
owner-occupiers but where "unofficial" militancy reached its
most sophisticated post-war form.
S
Similarly, areas with roughly equal percentages of miners who
owned their own residences managed, nevertheless, to house work-
forces which expressed their grievances and demands in very
different ways. Thus, we discover that the workers who belonged
to the "moderate" Lodges of the Gelligaer pits (Ogilvie, Groesfaen,
Bargoed, Elliot, Brittania and Penalita) contained amongst their
ranks the same percentage of owner-occupiers as was found amongst
the moz'e vocal and militant ranks of their Rhondda brethren.
(See Table .)
There are instances where the correlation is more obvious however.
An unwary researcher might, for example, seize with relish upon
the comparison afforded by Pontardawe and Merthyr. Pontardawe,
with it urnaatchably strike-prone pits at Gwaun-cae-gurwen and
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Tareni, registered a very high 5O7 owner-occupation of mining
residences in I 91f5 whilst the downtrodden Lodges of Merthyr
represented a workforce, only 5 of which owned their own houses.
Taken in isolation, one could argue a case which would seek to
prove that the higher the percentage of owner-occupation, the
more independent from the influence of company management were
the owner-workers and the more ready were they; as a result, to
back up their industrial demands with strike action. This is an
argument posed quite often by ex-miners as it fits in nicely with
the popular theory that a major contributing factor to ineffective
trade unionism was the tied cottage or company-owned resIdence.
The most effective challenge to this theory is offered by juxt-
aposing the style of industrial relations favoured by the anth-
racite miners of the Neath area - most of whom rented their houses -
with the relative quiescence of the hooie-owning miners of Rhymney.
The theory's best defence, on the other hand, is supplied by the
fact that home ownership was highest amongst three of the best-
organised districts in the coalfield; the anthracite areas around
Ystradgynlais, Pontardawe and Amaanford.. ut here again, the
Neath anthracite miners provide an exception to the rule, for
they too, were extremely well-organized.
The largest employer of mining labour in the Neath Rural District
up until nationalisation was the Evans and Bevan mining company
whose operations centred upon the Dulais Valley. Amongst colliery
companies which owned large numbers of houses, Evans and Bevan-
owned a higher proportion of their employee's residences than any
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other company. (See Table 5, PP. 217-218). Table 6, below, lists
those central and. western companies in order of ownership priority,
i.e., the top of the list being occupied by the company which
owned the highest proportion of its employees' residences (of
those companies which owned large numbers of houses).
Table 6
The Proportion of Company Employees' Housing which was owned
yThe Company in 1945
Company Number of men
employed as at
19.3.4.5.
(APPRoxnATE
GEQGRAWflCL
PosrrrON IN
FIELD)
Number of houses
owned by company
occupied by miners
employed by the
Evans & Bevan Ltd.
Tredegar Iron & Coal Ltd.
Blaenavon Co. Ltd.
Ferrthill Coils. Ltd.
Partridge Jones & John Paton
Powell Duffryn
Lancaster' Steam Coal
Ocean & United Nat.
Amalgamated Anthracite
3,256
6, 52Z4
i ,844.
I ,263
9,874
34,740
2,900
11 ,540
12,338
VEST
EAST
EAST
CENTRAL
EAST
CENI'RAL
EAST
CENTRAL
WEST
.537
941
281
159
780
2,731
226
352
281
Of the companies listed in Table 6, Evans & Bevan, Fernhill,
Ocean and Amalgamated Anthracite each employed a workfore with
a traditionally high propensity to strike or to take other forms
of industrial action in backing up its demands. Yet none of these
companies displays any marked similarity in terms of its potential
ability to influence its employees by means of extra-industrial
pressures as landlords.
Source: Ministry of Fuel and Power, Regional
Survey Report, 19k6.
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It is important to point out however, that the Evans & Bevan
company was almost unique in its position as an important housing
landlord on the anthracite field. Table 6 illustrates this very
clearly, for the company's only serious rival in this respect
was the Amalgamated Anthracite company whose proportionally
small number of owned residences was scattered across a relatively
wide area of the western field. The houses owned by Evans &
Bovan, on the other hand, were for the greatet part situated
within the communities of the Dulais Valley.
Any comparison of this nature would have to take such complex-
ities into account - complexities which would be compounded still
further by the problems posed by having to come to terms with
the enormous variety of relationship existing between employer
and employed, or landlord and tenant, within these communities.
The employees of Evans & Bevan, for example, do not seem to
have regarded their employers in the same light as the Amalga-
mated Anthracite employees regarded theirs. For although the
Evans & Bevan company had over the years swallowed up a number
of rival coal concerns in the Dulais Valley (see Appendix 2)
and. although it ranked amongst the largest of Welsh companies,
its employees long continued to identify it as a "family busines&'.59
Amalgamated Anthracite, on the other hand, was a company controlled
by iidividuals who appeared to their employees as being increa-
singly remote from the actual business of mining; more akin, in
59. Recording of John Powell, ex-Onliwyn & Banwen miner, Rhigos,
December 1 977. See, also, Chris Evans, "A Social and
Industrial History of' Seven Sisters", Cardiff I 9ôLi..
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fact, to the controllers of the great companies which operated
to the east, like Powell Duffryn,60
Not so Evans & Bevan. To the end, they nurtured within the comm-
unities of the Dulais Valley an image of themselves as benevolent
paternalists: hard but fair taskmasters who appear to have
identified closely with the communal sense of pride and ach-
ievement which accompanied the business of mir4ng in this valley
as in most other valleys.
Despite these differences, however, rank-and-file militancy in
the Dulais Valley rarely lagged behind that obtaining in the
areas controlled by the Amalgamated Anthracite company. Indeed,
one is tempted, almost, to argue that the trade union conscious-
ness of the Dulais workmen wa sharpened, rather than dulled,
by the high incidence of company-owned housing. Using Marxist
rhetoric, it could be argued that the employers controlled not
only the exploitation of their employees' labour power but that
they extended th:is control into non-industrial spheres and that,
in doing so, they multiplied greatly the number of instances
cus*I
where	 links might be forged in the minds of the employees
between previously unrelated grievances and the employer/landlord.
In such a situation, bad company-housing and high rents could
well exacerbate unrest caused by low wages. But company houses
in the Dulais Valley appear to have compared favourably with
60. See Appendix 2.
6i. Recording of John Powell, op. cit., Chriz Evans, op. cit.
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those owned by colliery companies in other valleys - as did the
rents and the wages.03 One is forced to look elsewhere, in the
case of the employees of Evans & Bevan, to account for their
propensity to take industrial action.
Similar problems arise if one attempts to compare the influence
upon the workforce of colliery-owned housing in the central
(steam) district. For example, both the Fernhili and Glengarw
companies employed workforces which, during the 1930s and '4.Os,
had displayed formidable resolution in their defence of trade
union rights and in their promotion of improved conditions and
wages. The workforcez of both companies were roughly equal in
size, but the numbeJ of houses owned by the Fernhill company
and rented by Fernhill workers was proportionally well over twice
that number owned by G-lengarw and rented by C-lengarw worker
Both workforces displayed a higher propensity to strike hoeer,
than did the employees of the Cardiff Colliery company at
Llanbradach and those of Baidwins' company at Aberbaiden and Port
Talbot - despite the face that both the Cardiff and Bald.wins'
companies owned and rented to their employees far fewer houses
than did the Fernhill and G-lengarw companies.
Conversely, although the Ocean company owned and rented to its
employees far fewer houses (proportionally as well as numerically)
than did Powell Duffryn to its employees, the Ocean workforce
62. Ministry of Fuel & Power, Regional Survey Report, 194-6:
Appendix VII, pp. 21 6-21 7.
63. Recording of John Powell, op. cit., and David Francis, op. cit;
Chris Evans op. cit.
6. See Table 5, p. 2j7. "G-lengarw" is a shortened version of
Glenavon G-arw.
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nevertheless enjoyed the kind of deserved reputation f or effective
trade urjionism largely denied to the workers of Powell Duffryn.
But, as we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the reasons for the
relative "quiescence" of the Powell Duffryn workers had little
to do with house ownership but a great deal to do with the re-
pressive industrial practices adopted by Powell Duffryn manage-
ment during a period of acute economic depression.
The inconsistencies which arise from these comparisons indicate
that there are no simple correlations to be drawn between, on
the one hand, the propensity of workforces to adopt strike action
and on the other, the sizes and locations of their pits, their
rates of work-productivity and their status as house-holders.
If the Ithymney miner was less prone to revert to strike action
than was his Dulai Valley cdunter part, it was due more to the
particular nature of the industrial legacy which he inherited.
from the I 930s, than it was to any chance combination of pit
statistics and. map references. For, whilst the relative stab-
ility of the anthracite coal market had enabled the Dulais Valley
miner to retain use of such proven defences as that provided by
the Seniority Rule, the Rhymney miner had suffered the twin
burdens of mass unemployment and Powell Duffryn management -
- a combination which served to stunt the growth of even the most
"constitutional" forms of trade union activity; so much so, in
fact, that it tended to focus the hopes of the Rhymney miner more
upon the possibilities of obtaining relief from his predicament
through parliamentary legislation than upon the -possibilities
of obtaining relief through the actions of his union. This was
clearly illistrated, time and again curing the decade following
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the election of the first post-war Labour overriment. At coalfield
delegate conferences, it invariably would be the representatives
of the Rhymney and Monmouthshire Lodges who would provide the
backbone of support for "Labourite" resolutions and the most
consistent opposition to resolutions drafted by those amongst
the Communists who sought to embarrass the Labour G-overnment
and the G-overnment'8 most loyal supporters on the mineworkers'
executive.
Parliamentarianism never achieved such primazy amongst the an-
thracite miners. Relatively stable employment and the continued
existence of the Seniority Rule helped maintain their confidence
in the Lodge (though not neessaa'ily in the union) and there
persisted amongst them beliefs and assumptions which were more
akin to syndicalisai than to scial democracy. Bill Paynter,
recalling the many skirmishes which he fought out with the Un-
official leaders of the anthracite Lodges during his presidency,
stressed the role played in that part of the coalfield by the
most celebrated advocate of what might best be termed "South
Wales syndicalism", Nun Nicholas: native of Clydach, conscientious
objector, anarchist, long-time Daren Colliery checkweighman and
NCLC teacher:
one of the influences on Lodge leadership,
especially amongst those who had attended classes,
• was Nun Nicholas. Dai Dan Evans (and. others) att-
ended. his classes and Iaiew him very well. He was
a teacher who poured contempt upon political in-
stitutions. To a very large extent, the essence
of iis teaching .... was syndicalist: power was
with the masses, power was with the industrial
workers in the trade union movement .... To a very
22
large extent, I would, say that the outlook in the
anthracite field ... was influenced by that kind of
teaching and they saw their industrial power as the
real power - in relation to the employers and in
relation to the State
Dan, who was one of Nun Nicholas's students,
described Parliament as a "sewerbed". They despised
Parliament; they did not regard it as a source of
power and to some extent they are very correct in
that I believe".6
Paynter attributed to this "syndicalism" two tendencies which dis-
tinguished the anthracite miners from the greá't majority of their
brothers to the east. The first was the more obvious of the two:
namely, an extraordinarily stubborn resolve to defend pit custom
and practice - a resolve which grew out of' a desire to maintain as
much "job-control" as was possible at the point of production. The
second was a corollary of the first. It argued that the consistency
and persistence of this resolve - especially after the election of
the first post-war Labour Government and the subsequent national-
isation of the mines - constituted a clear indication of the absence
amongst anthracite Lodges of the kind, of unerring loyalty to the
Labour Party which so often characterised the political behaviour
of a great many of the eastern Lod.ges.
65. Recording of Bill Paynter, London, March 1977.
* Paynter was quick to add, however, that in his opinion,
when you come into the field of custom and practice you -
are leaving politics ... It's part of a way of life; it's al-
most like a principle of religion and particularly in the an-
- thracite. I'll go as far as saying that, in my opinion, a lot
of their attitudes to custom and practice became a sort of
fetish attitude ... You couldn't justify it in relation to the
changes that were taking place in the industry (during the I 950s)
and, indeed, they had' to modify it". Recorded in London, March 1977.
It is important to add here, that this alleged "deficiency" of' concern
for the politics of Westminster was sometimes interpreted by the "politicos"
of the central lodges as proof of the parochialism of anthracite pit politics
This attitude was echoed recently (Dec. 1978) at a
coalfield conference, organised to discuss the proposed closures of the Deep
Duffryn and Fernhill collieries. During a long, rambling and generally irr-
elevant speech by an anthracite delegate, a young left-wing committee man fro
the Rhondda's Mardy lodge turned to a fraternal delegate, Dr. Hywel Francis
and asked, "Jhere'z this bloke from?" Francis replied "Cwmtwrch".
"Aye", said the Mardy man, "and.his politics are bloody Cwrntwrch too
the old
	
(aunty in 1elsh)
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This "independence" continued after the fall of the Labour Gov-
ernment and reflected itself in the marked antipathy which mili-
tant anthracite Lodges displayed towards the TUC's line of
"peaceful-coexistence" with Churchill's Government. Their local
target was Paynter's South Wales Miners' Executive which found
itself in the unenviable position of having to carry-out the
directives passed down to it by Lawther's pro-TUC National Ex-
ecutive. Paynter, for his part, emphasised, time and again,
the need. for "unity" amongst all S. Wales miners; but to many
of the anthracite militants (and, increasingly in the early
1950s, to many of the steam-coal militants) "unity" did. not en-
compass the forfeiture of pit customs and practices and the
closureØ of collieries - even when such gestures were part and
parcel of their union's policy of making concrete its support
for the TUC's line of ttpeace±u_oexjsteflcet with the Conser-
vatives.
The relative political "independence" implicit within many of
the unofficial stoppages and "alternative leaderships" organised
by the anthracite militants provided a rallying point for large
numbers of those upon the coalfield who discovered that "peaceful
coexistence" stuck in their craws. We have seen, for example,, how
the Shakespeare Motel group managed to forestall the Coal Board's
planned closure of Wern Tarw Colliery and how the unofficial
movements of the Dulais and lower-Swansea Valleys appeared in-
creasingly ready to lend their services to disputes in the central
steam-coal sector. The winter of 1951/52 saw unofficial strikers
at Fernhill approach the Shakespeare Motel group Vor support and
receive it. 66 Another Rhondda Lodge, Parc & Dare, received sun-
66. Sea, above, p. 'Y75.
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ilar support from the so-called "Dulais Valley Minority Move-
ment" during a strike directed against the Conservative Govern-
ment's cuts in public spending in February, 1952.67 These in-
cidents were merely two of the more serious to occur during a
winter of disruption which brought little comfort to the ad.-
vocates of the union's official policies of cooperation.
The Spring of 1952 however, saw a temporary lull in the activities
of the unofficial groupings. Saturday shift-working continued
uninterrupted in the coalfield until May when a custom and prac-
tice dispute at the Bwllf a pits provoked a sympathy strike by
some 5,000 .Aberdare Valley miners and the threat of further supp-
ortive action by 3,500 of their Dulais Valley brethren who declared
their readiness to strike ".... unless the local union executive
68
supports the men at Bwllf a".
The miners' executive duly negotiated with the Board and the
latter backed down on the disputed principle; the Dulais threats
were withdrawn and. 5,000 miners returned. to work. The showd.oin
did little to boost the confidence of the executive; indeed, it
provoked its members to issue a fresh series of declarations
condemning a whole range of unofficial actions and special crit-
ioism was reserved f or the continuing existence of organisations
such as that centred upon the Shakespeare Hotel. Paynter, at a
hastily organised Coalfield Delegate Conference, persuaded his
members to order that such organisation "disband immediately".
67. Ibid., p.17J#
68. C.C., 8.5.52.
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One observer, reporting upon the Conference, reminded his readers
that these organisations had been active in the boycott of Sat-
urday work and that ".... much political agitation lies behind
them' 69
Not content merely with issuing condemnations however, Bill Paynter
employed a tactic which (as we have seen) both he and Homer had
used previously and with some success. It inyolved out manouv-
ering the "unofficials" by publicly advocating demands and claims
far-reaching enough to define both himself and his elected Exec-
utive Committee as "militant" in comparison with executives from
other areas of the country. Moreover, he chose the claims very
carefully before publicising them for, inevitably, they served
to provide a contrast to the often-sectarian claims of the coal-
field's unofficial strikers. Thus it was that Paynter, was
early on associated with efforts to secure a wholesale re-grading
of positions and tasks below ground and with efforts to intro-
duce a simplified day-wage payments system which would nullify
the divisive and harmful effects which piece-working tended to
inflict upon workforce unity. In late 1vay, for example, he told
an audience of Bargoed. miners that S. Wales would not be satis-
fied with putting forward a demand for an increase of Li per week
as had been advocated by the union's national executive. The
miners, he argued, had suffered a reduction of 12/- a week in
real wages since I 9)+7 and he warned that the
"period of peaceful progress is coming to an
end .... we are now facing a situation in which
we have to defend the improvements and reforms
secured in the last four or five year&'.7°
69. Ibid., 15.5.52.
70. '(estern Mail, 25.5.52.
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Many miners, he alleged, were being obliged to work overtime
"to get a living wage"and were losing the social benefit of the
five day week. Moving on to deal with what he referred to as
"recent criticisms" concerning the use of the industrial weapon
f or political aims, he informed his audience that such tactics
were "nothing new": trade unions had always engaged in some
form of industrial actions for political objectis, he said,
because so many reforms were dependent upon legislation. But
he went on to warn his audience that that did not mean the union
should. suddenly embark upon strikes - despite the fact that the
membership was entitled to call upon the trade unions to deter-
mine a poliQy of resistance to any government actions which had
the effect of depressing the standard of living or hindering
vital reforms.71
His plea for "constitutional militancy" was received with uneven
enthusiasm however, for whilst the previously "silent" majority
tended to remain consistently silent, the only response forth-.
coming from .Aberdare was another unofficial strike: this one
provoked by the announcement of increased bus fares.
More than 2,000 miners at the Tower, Tirherbert and Bwllfa coil-
ieries stayed out for over a fortnight and so obvious was the
groundswell of sympathy for them that the executive had no choice
but to offer promises of support. The editor of the "Collier y-
.. ardian", commenting upon the dispute, declared that
71 • Ibid.
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"There is much underground discontent in this
coalfield, with agitators seeking a "showdown"
end, unfortunately, the miners' leaders are
siding with the malcontents. A delegate con-
ference at Porthoawl last week delivered an
that unless the grievance over
subsidised fares is resolved in a fortnight
the conference will be recalled to consider
"more effective steps" to press the demand
for an all-round maximum transport cost of 5/-
72
a
The habit of striking unofficially in support of almost every
kind of demand was infectious. Within seven days of the ending
of the "busfares" stoppage, a strike by 39 firemen and overmen
I
dissatisfied with a wage offer made to NACODS by the Divisional
Board, brought Fernhill and Genrhondda to a halt. The strike
spread the following day to 25 pits and, although only about 350
firemen and overman were involvei in the unofficial action, it
caused management to lay off some 5,500 miners.73
Once again, the strikers achieved their objective; they returned
to work only after the Board promised "prompt and meaningful"
negotiations. The lessons of their actions were not lost upon
the rest of the workforce; in mid-September a thinly-veiled strike
threat went forward to the National Executive of the NUM from the
Swansea and Neath areas of the S. Jales miners. They were pro-
testing against the decision of the TUG General Council to enter
into a "contract" of wage restraint with the Conservative Govern-
ment. Their protest alleged that the General Council had committed
the miners to this agreement without the authority of the union's
1.''	 A)	 C)
r.	 .U•, i'^.'..)
73. Western Mail, 49.8.52.
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membership - despite the fact that the miners' delegates at the
TIJC were parties to the decision.
The case of the Swansea and Neath. miners was a weak one. As part
of a democratic trade union they were fully aware that they were
subject to the decisions of the union's elected leaders, and
those leaders had expressed their support f or the conciliatory
line adopted by the TUC. The Swansea and Neath protest can
hardly have been a serious attempt at influencing the policy
of the NtJM' a leadership; it was much more by way of a warning that
the militants of the Western field were extremely unhappy with
the course of political events generally and especially so with
the apparent lack of progress made by the N1J Executive to un-
prove wages, to bring an end to the Saturday shift and to erad-
icat	 the necessity for excessive overtime working.
In late October, the resentment bubbled to the surface. A joint
communique was issued by the revived "Splinter Movements" 7 of
nine Dulais Valley lodges and the three Cambrian Combine lodges
at Clydach Vale. It announced a boycott of Saturday work in
protest against the rejection by the Coal Board of the Miners'
Executive's demand f or an extra 30/- per week f or its day-wage
members, The communique, and the revival of the Movements which
issued it, were denounced by the Executive as comprising a
"menace to industrial peacet,7 It was a denunciation which
impressed few of the "revivalists". They organised a meeting
-	 74. . C.G., 6.11 .52.
75. .i.bid.
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at the Shakespeare at which delegates representing some 26,000
miners agreed to recommend the banning of all overtime working
until the 30/- wage increase was granted.6
Within a week, some 2 pit 5, including nine in the Ithondda and
Aberdare areas, six in the Neath, eight in the Maesteg and. one
in the Swansea area, were engaged in the boycótt of the Saturday
shift, overtime working and some forms of piecework. By the zecond.
week in November, the boycott had been modified and whLlst the
ban on Saturday coalfilling continued, it was agreed to allow
overtime and pieceworking to operate as normally. On November
8th, 22 pits were reported to be implementing the Saturday ban.
The actual method used to spread the action from pit to pit was
the distribution of unofficial circulars. 77 It is recorded, for
example, in the Minute Book of the Parc & Dare Lodge, that
"A circular was received from the Fernhill and
Glenrhondda Joint Lodges soliciting support in
their fight against the rejection of the 30/-
increase by the reference Tribunal •,••78
The pits which initially imposed the ban were concentrated in the
central and western-central sectors of the coalfield: eight were
located in the Maesteg Area, six in the Neath Area, four in the
Rhondda, three in Aberdare and one in the Swansea Area. 79 By
76. Ibid.
77. The sources of the circulars which arrived at Parc & Dare were
named as the "Neath Joint Lodges", the "Rhondda Joint Lodges"
and the "Upper Rhondda wages Campaign Committee". Parc & Dare
Lodge Minutes, 15.11 .52, U.C.S.
78. Ibid., 22
-23.11 .52. U.C.S.
79. Vestexn Wail, 8.11 .52.
2.51
November 1 5th it was reported that 55 pits were not working the
Saturday shift (96 were) but that of these, only 20 were publicly
stating their reason as being the rejection of the pay award.
Once again, these were concentrated in the "left-wing", central
sector of the field and the pits named were those with long
histories of harbouring political radicals: they were, in the
Rhondda: Pare and Dare, lenrhondda, Cambrian, Brittanic,
Tymawr, C-elli and Fernhill; in the Maesteg Area: Ffaldau,
Penllyngwent, Werntarw and St. Johns; in Aberdare: Tower, Tir-
herbert and Rhigos; in the Swansea and Neath Areas: Morlais,
Daren, Dillwyn and Crynant.80
These lodges rejected the resolutions drawn up at a delegate
conference (called a week earlier by the S. Wales Miners' Exec-
utive Council) which sought to bring an end to the Saturday boy-
cott. Pare and Dare for example, after being informed by their
Lodge's industrial delegate, Rufus Roderick, that the conference
had been ".... historic in the annals of the S • Wales coalfield",
and that feelings there had been ".... of a very high character",
nevertheless decided to reject the conference's resolutions and
to substitute for them an alternative set of resolutions which
recommended a continuance (or reintroduction) of the bans imposed.
- upon the Saturday shift nd upon overtime and piecework, and an
insistence that, in future, no wage claims should go forward for
compulsory arbitration by the National Tribunal.81
80. Ibid., 15.11 .52. Cwmcarn - a pit in the lower Ebbw Valley in
Monmouthshire was also named amongst those imposing a specific
Saturday ban.
81 . Parc & Dare Lodge Minutes, op.cit., 9.11 ,52.
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A general meeting of the Parc and Dare workmen decided, in add-
ition, to tie in this action in support of their wage claim with
a further demand concerning the arrangements whereby a miner
who worked his full five shifts in one week was paid an add-
itional shift's payment by way of a bonus. The NtJM's proposals
on this topic "did not go far enough" for the Parc and Dare men
who expressed the opinion that a man should not lose the whole
of his bonus if he missed one shift in a week (as per the NUM's
proposals) but that he should lose only one-fifth of that bonus.82
In support of these resolutions, the Parc and Dare Lodge Committee
decided immediately to post pickets at the mine entrances in
order that any workman who had not heard of the decisions of the
83G-eneral Meeting be inrormed. 	 A rota was drawn up, independent
of the pit's management, listing which safety workers and maintenance
84.
men would be allowed to descend the shafts at weekends.	 In
addition to this, the Lodge organised the pooling of all earnings
over and above the basic underground rate of £7-O-6d., in order
that an equal share-out of bonus earnings might take place for
85the duration of the ban.	 Deputations were sent to solicit support
at other Lodges and delegates from Parc and Dare were invited to
attend an "Inter-Valley Joint Lodges Meeting" which was held at
the Shakespeare Hotel in Neath on November 28th.86
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84.. Ibid., 12.11 .52.
85. Ibid., 16.ii .52 arid. 19.11 .52.
86. Ibid., 23-26 .ii .52.
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Faced with such highly organised and determined opposition,
Paynter responded by granting the request of the militant Lodges
that a further delegate conference be called in order that the
protests be amplified by combined action of Lodges right across
the coalfield. For their part, the Rhondda men voted to end their
boycott in lieu of the conference, adding, as they did so, a
public reminder that they were being "forced" to resume working
the Saturday shift in order that they might enable themselves
to earn a wage sufficient to meet the increased financial demands
67which accompanied the approach of Christmas.
The conference, held. on December 15th, resolved that efforts be
made to persuade other British coalfields to join S. Wales in
tendering 1Z- days' notices terminating all contracts with the
NCB ".... to enforce the demand f or an immediate increase in
wages for all day-wage men". 88 At a further coalfield delegate
conference, held on December 30th, it was reported that the Miners'
national leaders had. shown little enthusiasm for any form of
industrial action in support of the wage claim. Rufus Roderick
informed the Parc and Dare Lodge that ".... there had been a
complete retreat by the National Executive on the question".8
The NeE.C. had, in fact, advocated the "intensification" of their
talks with the Coal Board for new National Rates for day-wagemen -
a recommendation which the Parc and. Dare Lodge rejected in favour
of pressing on with the tendering of strike notices. 90
 The South
Wales Miners' Executive met, late in January, 1953, and was in-
87. Western Mail, 1 .1 2.52.
8. Ibid., 16.1 2.52.i9. Pare and Dare Lodge Minutes, 31 .1 2.52.
90. Ibid.
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formed by Payriter of the attitude of the NEC towards the possible
use of industrial action in support of the wage claim. The NEC,
he informed them, had abandoned the idea of the immediate in-
stitution of a new wages structure f or the coal industry and. had
decided instead, to proceed with a claim for an immediate increase
in wages for all daywage men.
Paynter, like Homer before him, had. long cherished the idea of
introducing into the industry a revised wages structure which
would standardise rates of payment for identical tasks performed
below ground in pits in all of the country's Divisions. Such an
innovation would, he believed, overcome the t &rie.ie to'uards
"sectionalism" which the Diisional differences encouraged
Not all of the members of the NEC shared his enthusiasm for the
idea however. In those Divisions, like Nottinghamshire and Derby-.
shire, where potential and actual bonus earnings were relatively
high, there existed an understandable reticence to instigate a
"stand-still" in earnings in order that other, less favourably
placed, miners might catch up. The miners of Nottinghamshire,
for example, had provided ample evidence, less than three' decades
earlier, of their limited willingness to suffer iielshmen pleading
"national solidarity"; likewise, the face-workers of Northumberland.
and Cumberland., earning, as they did in 1953, an average of 61/44.,
per manshift, must have felt at least a degree of suspicion con-
cerning the S. Wales proposals when they learned that the average
faceworker in the latter coalfield. earned just 1 4.8/- per rnanshift.92
91 . S;TNtJM E.C. Minutes, 28.1 
.53.
92. NCB Annual Report and Accounts, 1954.
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Paynter's proposals were not merely a reflection of the wage
frustration of those who elected him however, for S. rales had
a long and honourable tradition of leading the way in national
campaigns to secure a guaranteed living wage for workers employed
on non-piece rate contracts. The results are clearly illustrated
below, in Table 7 which lists the approximate average earnings for
the three general grades of mineworker employed by each Division
in 1953. (Also listed are the differences in earnings per man-
shift between faceworkers (who generally were employed upon
piecework) and the grouping known as "all underground" (which
includes face-workers, as well as haulage and repairmen etc.,
in its calculations) and. the differences in earnings between "all
underground" and all those working upon the surface).
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Since before the First World War, there had been repeated efforts
by the Miners' union in S. Wales to reduce differentials in earnings
between varying grades of workers. It was, after all, in the
union's best interests to do so, since it is clear that union
solidarity received little encouragement from a wages system
which divided the workforce by blessing pieceworkers with rel-
atively high earnings and day-wage men with earnings which were
often little above those needed to maintain the merest subsistence.
Faceworkers' earnings had not been allowed to "run away" from
those of other grades of workers to the extent to which they had
in, say, the East Midlands, Northumberland or Kent. This is
clearly illustrated, below in Figures 1 - 8 which chart the
Earnings per Manshift and Average Weekly Earnings for selected
Divisions from 1 94-7-i 974-.
It is possible to attribute a part of the relatively low earnings
of S. Wales faceworkers to geological and technical determinants:
difficult seams, lack of advanced power cutting and loading mach-
inery, etc., but, as we have seen, these were not the determinants
favoured by the coalowners, the Coal Board and the G-overnment for
explaining away low productivity in S. Wales. Restrictive prac-
tices and conscious lack of effort on the part of the miners were
the reasons most often quoted in these quarters.
The truth undoubtedly lies somewhere between the two extremes.
Bill Paynter recalled that it was not uncommon in some of the cen-
tral and western pits for the Lodge Committees to set bonus "norms"
and to order that any bonuses earned over and above those norms
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cLutOmatically be donated to the Lodges' funds - a state of affairs
hardly conducive to the promotion of a high incidence of over-
time working. 93 The readiness of the Parc and Dare men to pool
their bonus earnings during the Saturday work boycott of 1953-54.
was a variation of this practice and it is difficult to interpret
their action as signifying anything other than their possessing
a highly developed sense of trade union solidarity.
Faceworkers formed as high a percentage of the coalfield's work-
force as was to be found in any of the country's coalfields (see Table 8)
Table
Faceworks as a Percentage of Other G-rades Employed in 1950
Division
Faceworkers as a	 Faceworkers as a
percentage of total percentage of total
numbers, employed	 numbers employed
by Division (1950)
	
below ground by Division (1950)
Scotland
	
4.3.0
	
54-.0
Northi/d & Durham	 4.0.0
	
52.0
Yorkshire	 37.0
	
4.8.0
North West
	 37.0	 4.8.0
East Midlands	 4.0.0
	
51.0
West Midlands	 34.. 0
	
4.6.0
South Wales	 4.2.0
	
53.0
Icent
	 38.0
	
4.8.0
Source: NCB Annual Report and Accounts, 1 965/66:
calculated from Table 35, p.60.
93. Recording of Bill Painter, London, March1977.
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and, as we have seen earlier, their unofficial stoppages and go-
slows accounted for the overwhelming majority of such occurrances
in South Wales. They had been accused, justifiably, of nurturing
and perpetuating "sectionalism!' - even after the twin achievements
of nationalisatjon and the consolidation of a National Union of
Mineworkers. Yet here they were, in the winter of 1953-51+, die-
playing an almost altruistic solidarity with their less fortunate
comrades. Why was it that they chose this deman&, and not one
financially closer to their hearts, upon which to make a public
demonstration?
The reason is quite simple. The Shakespeare Hotel Croup and its
affiliates were led by political radicals, by Communists like
*
Even John and Left-wing Labourites like Emlyn Williams. They
resented the "sectarian" tag vith which they found themselves
adorned and they seized upon the Daywage issue as a means of
counteracting the slur. They genuinely were in favour of the
erosion of wage differentials and vehemently opposed to the reg-
ular working of the Saturday shift - a practice which, as far as
they were concerned, constituted little more than a retreat from
the cherished principle of the Five Day Week. In this respect,
they were quite close to their most formidable union opponent,
Bill Paynter. But, as a member of the N.E.C., Paynter's choice
of action was infinitely more limited than was theirs. Under-
standing this, they acted accordingly. They resolved that if
Paynter found himself unable to work openly against the policies
of the N.E.C., then they would do it for him. After all, there
was abundant evidence of the existence of widespread support for
* Now President of the S. Wales miners.
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the Daywage claim: the S. Wales Executive was plagued with
Lodge demands for strike action9 and large sections of the
workforce (including the faceworkers) had proven themselves ready
and. willing to make considerable financial sacrifices to ensure
the success of any action which they considered worthwhile.
Paynter's response was an equivocal one. True to past form, he
opposed any mention of unofficial action - partipularly if that
action was organised by "renegades" such as those at the Shake-
speare Hotel. He also expressed a dislike for the tactic employed:
the boycott of overtime. It could, after all, be rendered me gn-
ingless in those pits where overtime opportunities were normally
scarce or inconsistent. Nevertheless, the pressure of events
left him with no choice other than to offer to the S. Wales
membership a clear and. militant lead on the question. A failure
to do so might have entailed an eclipse of the Executive by the
unofficial groupings.
But Paynter was also under pressure - from his fellow N.E.C.
members and from the Coal Board - to subdue his more militant
Lodges. On January 28th, for example, he informed the S. Wales
Executive that the S. Wales and Scottish coalfields had been
lectured "very seriously" on the conduct of their members during
the preceding months:
9)... There were calls for strike action even from 1onmouthshire
lodges. The Arrail Griff in lodge, for example, demanded
the tendering of notices as early as the second week of the
New Year. SWNUM E.C. Minutes, 13.1 .53.
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"It was pointed out that tremendous quantities
of coal had been lost in both these Divisions
due to actions taken by the workmen over this
wages question.
"However, after very long discussions with the
Board they undertook to consider our request for
an immediate increase in wages f or all daywage
men, and finally offered 8d. per day for all
adult daywagemen with a proportionate increase
for juveniles.
"The N.E.C. considered this offer and decided
unanimously to reject it and to proceed to the
C-overnment seeking an interview to discuss this
question"
The "interview" produced an increase of ).,d, per shift in the
Board's offer - an increase which a majority of the Union's N.E.C.
duly recommended its members to accept. It was put to the ballot
in S. Wales after Paynter, in a fighting speech, had declared
that the coalfield was opposed to the national conference re-
commendation and that this attitude had been endorsed at a pre-
vious delegate conference in S. Wales where the feeling was
clearly expressed, ".... that if we are to bargain with the Coal
Board for a continuation of the Saturday shift beyond April, we
want more for it than 1/- a shift",96
His position was massively endorsed by the ballot which, by
69,950 votes to 4,800 rejected the N.E.C,'s recommendation. A
spokesman f or the S. Wales Executive declared that,
95. s;rnui E.C, Minutes, 28.1 .53.
96. C.C., 5.2.53.
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"South Walts thinks we should make a demand
for 2/6, or 1 5/- a week increase. 1e do not
think it good enough to barter a continuation
of Saturday work for d. a shift, that is the
difference between the 8d. offered by the Board,
and the 1/- suggested by the union. We do not
think the union is going far enough".97
Once again however, it soon became abundantly clear that even this
overwhelming endorsement of the "militant" line was insufficient
to disguise the continuing existence of political tensions within
the South Wales union - tensions which were provoked, not only
by the "unofficials" persistent sniping at the Area Executive
Committee, but also by the ongoing animosity which continued to
manifest itself between card-carrying Communists and Labourites.
These tensions were linked bythe fact that the Communists were
inectricably identified with the leadership of the unofficial
'oupings - so much so, that loyal Labourites tended to read.
political subversion into each and every one of the "unofficials"'
actions. Neither side los an opportunity to sli' a punch into
the ribs of their opponents and the wages dispute provideá an
excellent venue for battle.
The unofficials were, after all, criticising the whole approach
of the parliamentary Labour Party as well as that adopted by the
national leadership of the trade union movement. They tended,
in open debate, to link the "collaborating" policies favoured
by Labour and the TUG with a whole host of reactionary shibboleths,
including Britain's involvement in the Korean War and her
"imperialistic" suppression of nationalists and revolutionaries
97. Ibid., 12.2.53.
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in Kenya, Malaya and British Guyana. Indeed, the minutes of the
coalfield's known Left-wing Lodges are shot-through with con-
demnations of Labour's tacit support for (or, rather, lack of
vigorous opposition against) the Tories' fawning pro-Americanism
and their continued insistence upon defending a senile British
98
empire.
One of the unofficial groupings' most able public apologists was
Dick Beamish, Area executive member, sometimes fellow-traveller,
and Chairman of the Abercrave Lodge; in February 1953, he launched
a typical attack upon the policies of the Labour Party and the
TUG. At an Area delegate conf'ere.nce 1-Lic\- ostensibly was
voted to discussing the wage claim, he insisted upon attacking
British foreign policy and, in so doing, in drawing upon himself
4
a welter of counter-criticism from Frank James, a loyal and long-
standing defender of the Parliamentary Labour Party and an official
of the National Colliery Lodge in R.hondda Fach. Beamish's crit-
icisms of the TUG' s support of wage-restraint were, he said,
'.... inconsistent with the NUM's present policy". It was such
criticisms, declared James, which gave a lead to the National
Reference Tribunal to turn down the union's wage claims, and he
went on to attack Beamish's criticism of Britain's conduct over-
seas, alleging that they were
".... largely in opposition to the declared policy
of the Movement" and that the country's foreign
policy ".... arose largely from the action taken by
the Eastern Nations at meetings of the United Nations
and oit of their foreign policy".99
98. See, especially, the Pare & Dare lodge minutes.
99. S7NEJ11 E.G. Minutes, 2.2.53.
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This political division manifested itself in the eastern sector
of the field, in January and. February, when Ness Edwards, M.P.
for Caerphilly,1t30 warned a meeting at Tirphil in the "loyal"
Rhymney Valley that it was time that the
.... loyal members of the union stamped
on these reactionaries who functioned. behind
wild, irresponsible revolutionary cloaks and.
who, perhaps unconsciously, were doing their
best to destroy nationalisation.1
He quickly followed this up with an attack upon those miners who
disregarded their "social obligations", reminding his audience that,
"Those of us who condemned. the capitalist
coalowners for taking out of the economy more
than they put in should be the first to condemn
that minority which, by their irresponsibility,
follow the old coalowners' policy. It is with
regret that we have to learn that exploitation
of the many by the few was not abolished. when
the nation took over the coal industry. Any
worker failing to pull his reasonable weight
in a nationalised industry is exploiting his
fellow workers in principle just as much as the
coalowners d1d' • And he remInd.eã. them that,
despite all that had been done ".... to secure
rational improvement, a minority still play the
fool and still disregard their social and moral
obligations and. bring disrespect on their in-
dustry and. their fellow workers. Unless we all
endeavour to put in as much as we take out there
can be no hope for human progress. In our hurried
efforts to change the economic organisation we
have failed to realise the need for change in
,102individual attitudes'
100. Former Labour Postmaster General and ex-miners' agent for
the Rhymney.
101. C.G., 22.1 .53.
.,rY)	 fl-	 iO D'
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Offence was taken at Edwards' remarks by the Lodge Committees of
Bedwas and G-roesfaen, two of the Rhymney Valley's best organised
*
Lodges. They demanded Edwards' resignation as a Miners' M.P. -
despite the fact that Edwards had been amongst those full-time
organisers who had. been entrusted by the SWMF, during the mid.-
'Thirties, with the unenviable task of aiding the very same
Bedwas militants (who were now attacking him) in their efforts
'to eradicate Company Unionism at the pit.103 After declaring
that he had no intention of being deterred, "by a threat of po-
litical intimidation", he addressed a meeting at Penailta Colliery,
a traditional Labour stronghold where he claimeã that the "over-
whelming majority" of the miners' M.P's supported his recent
criticisms and that he had received the "full backing" of the
1O1.president and vice president of the NIThI before he made them.
He informed his audience that the position had become
so serious, both economically and politically,
that it was necessary that straight talking should
be done. To have remained silent while the interests
of the S. \Vales miners were in serious danger was to
betray not only the miners but nationalisation as weii ,1 OS
For hiz pains, he was rewarded with the unanimous support" of the
Penailta Lodge and he was able to watch the Bedwas and Groesfaen
criticisms die quiet deaths.
* The Bedwas Lodge contained amongst its members several Comm-
unists and a large number of seasoned .militants - all of whom
had taken part in the bitter and violent campaign to rid the
pit of Company Unionism in the mid-I 930s.
• 103. This was eagerly pointed out by the Western Mail, 21-22.2.53.
and 2.3.53.
1O4. It is interesting to note that he does not make it clear
whether he received the support of the G-eneral Secretary of
the NU11, the Communist Arthur Homer. C.G-., 5.3.53,
105. Ibid.
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It was this intensity of support for the Labour Party which
brought a temporary solution to the Saturday Work issue and which,
in doing so, allowed the S. Wales Executive a much-needed respite
from the continuous sniping of the "unofficiala". In early March,
the NTJ Executive Committee agreed by a large majority to con-
tinue Saturday working and issued the following resolution by
way of an explanation:
"The National Executive Committee of the NUM
resents the subtle attempt by the Tory Party to
destroy nationalisation, consciously creating
bitterness within the mining industry, to weaken
cooperation between the Union and the NCB. The
joint efforts now being made by the NCB and the
NUM to increase production, to improve efficiency,
to strengthen cooperation, to work additional
voluntary shifts on Saturdays, will be under-
mined by the new attempt of the Tories to decry
nationalisation, and will weaken the efforts
being made to build up our national economy".10
This followed the publicity given to the demands of a number of
Conservative M.P's that a public inquiry be held to investigate
4
the administration and efficiency of the British coal in$ustry.
It was a demand which provoked a meeting at Ystradmynach of lodge
delegates representing some 21,000 mineworkers in the hymney
and Merthyr areas to express publicly their "full support" for
the N.E.C's resolution and their sentiments were echoed a week
later at a Coalfield Delegate Conference at Porthcawl where it
was announced that,
106. NUM E.C. Minutes, j2.3.53.
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"This Conference warns the Tory Party to keep
its hands off Nationalisation of the coalmining
industry. Any attempt to decentralize this in-
dustry, which would mean a reversal to District
wage arrangements prevailing in the inter-war
years and in this coalfield give daywage rates
which would have to be supplemented to bring them
up to a bare subsistence level, will be resisted
by every means possible. This Conference declares
that the solution of the problem of this industry
by cuts in wages is ended f or all time."107
By April, Paynter felt able, once again, to associate himself
openly with a joint NIJM/NCB plea to the S. Wales miners to boost
108
production.	 At the Area Annual Conference in May he made it
clear in his Report that the Coal Board's reluctance to increase
wages and to instigate a new wages structte was due as much to
the "uncertainties" created by- the unofficial boycott of Saturday
working and the "decline in productivity and efficiency, and the
increase in strikes and go-slows" as it was to any inbred mana-
gerial reluctance to increase wages without a struggle.1 09 The
assembled delegates received his Report with no undue agitation
and the Conference passed off relatively peacefully, the delegates
being happy f or the most part, to sit back and enjoy a ritual
bout of Tory bashing which was executed with particular vehemence
that May. Paynter, f or example, declared that
"There can be no doubt that the policy of the
Tory G-overnment aggravates the position consider-
ably. The practical elimination of food subsidies;
the inroads made into our social and welfare services
107. SIINtJM LC. Minutes, 23.3.53.
j08. It took the form of a joint letter signed by the chairman of
the NCB, 1-Iouldsworth; the chairman of the South Western NCB,
Rees; the General Secretary of the NUM, Homer, and the
President of the S. Wales miners, Paynter.
109. SWNTJM,, Annual Conference Report and Agenda, 1953, p. 2.
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by this Government has substantially lowered
the standard of life of the people of this country ....
"The most important task confronting the Union in
the immediate future is to press for the return of
a government to power that will introduce legis-
lation which will serve the best interests of
the workers and their families".110
Bathed in this non-sectarian light, the Conference proved itself
inconducive to wild political infighting. A Penailta resolution
attacking the use of Union funds for political purposes other
than those directly to the benefit of the Labour Party had pro-
mised fireworks but fizzled out beThre t'No "opposition" ameid-
ments, inspired by Communists at the Pare and Dare and Abererave
Lodges,couj.d be tested against it.111
.
Summing-up at the end of the Conference, Paynter perpetuated the
conciliatory atmosphere by attributing much of the record total
of coal lost through stoppages and restrictions during the previous
j2 months 112 to "provocation" by management and officials. And
he declared that, in a large number of cases, men left their
places of work in protest against delays in the supply of material
or clearance. He went on to criticise the way in which "massive
American investment in West German coal and steel" was, once
again, allowing the Germans a degree -of "efficiency-supremacy"
and. .encouraging the spread of American-lest German economic dom-
ination. Britain, he declared, must trade with the Socialist
countries,1' 3
110. Ibid., pp . 25-26.
111 • Periallia were persuaded by the E,C. to withdraw their res-
olution. A.C.R. and Agenda, p. 16, Clause 10.
112. 385,000 tons, the highest loss since nationalisation.
113. C.(., 114.5.53.
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Sticking to his theme of industrial efficiency and expansion,
he went on to outline the sorry plight of many pits in S. Wales.
They had, he declared, "been neglected and. starved of capital
equipment for the past 30 years". No new shafts had. been sunk
and the existing mines "have had their resources wantonly diss-
ipated by the old co'lovrners". The best seams had been largely
exploited, he said, and long-term plans had taken up most of
the time of the planning staff of the NCB so that little or no
attention had been paid to improving collieries from which out-
puts were to be obtained during the following five years. The
capital allocation under the NCB's Coal Plan - £102.7 million
over 16 years - could, he said, ".... really be all spent in the
anthracite ooa].field alone". He ended by making it clear that
he was not at variance with the aims and objectives of the
leaders of the unofficial grupings; he just did not approve of
their methods. He was not defending the working of overtime.
"Ifteessant over-time working", he declared, "was a health hazard
11i.
and a social injustice".
Paynter succeeded. in pleasing almost everyone. His call, earlier
in the Conference, f or the return of a Labour &overnment had
been supplemented, f or the sake of his fellow Communists, by a
demand that Britain trade with the Eastern powers. Men worried
about the possibilities of closure of their run-down pits were
offered the comfort of understanding that it was management, and
not they, themselves, who were responsible for the run-down.
11 24. Ibid.
2(4
Even the more strike-prone amongst the delegates were spared the
rod and comforted instead by having it officially confirmed that
most strikes were provoked by managerial intransigence. Whatever
detailed response the speech may have had, it undoubtedly con-
tributed to the maintenance of what might best be termed a
"truce" between the LC. and the unofficial groupings during
the Summer which followed.
Part Four
The Disjpearing Milleniuin
Chapter 1 3	 Speeches at the Pithead Baths
Chapter 1L.	 Old Div iiona & New Alliances
Chapter 15	 Conclusion
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Chapter 1 3
- apeeches at the Pithead Baths
During July, 1 953, the Conservative C-overnment played a consider-
able part in warding off inter-union conflict on the coalfield
by announcing its refusal to extend Section 62 of the National
Insurance Act. This meant that some 3,000 partly disabled and
unemployed miners stood to lose from between £1 - £2 per week
since Section 62 provided for extended unemployment benefit
after the end of the statutory period of payment. Its ending
meant that the men affected would be transferred to the National
Assistance Board where they would be subject to a !eans Test.
Virtually no other issue could have been so calculated to induce
a sense of outrage amongst the membership of the NU11. Paynter
responded by calling a Coalfield. Delegate Conference at which
there were witnessed remat'kable setes o 	 tel'
nct the least of which was the enthusiastic reception given to
a fighting speech by that sworn enemy of' the "unofficials", Ness
Edwards. He declared that the Tory G-overnment was endeavouring
".... to foist piecemeal upon the people of this country its old
policies", and his words were echoed by a great many other speakers
who railed vehemently against the G-overnment's action. 1 Paynter
made it clear that he "welcomed the spirit of revolt which had
been expressed in the conference ...." and., for a moment, it must
have seemed to the "unofficials" that their desire for a strike
1. SVNUM, E.G. Minutes, Area Delegate Conference (A.D.C.) 25.7.53.
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which would "shake-up" the union' s national leadership was on
the cards. But Paynter chose that moment to lay before them a
fragment of his political philosophy:
"Vie have to recognise the fact", he reminded them,
"that to use industrial power for political pur-
poses is one of the highest forms of struggle of
the working class movement.
"The next step following is to the barricades ....
and. he did not believe that the miners should take a decision of
that kind, "... without very serious thought and preparation".
He urged the Conference to reject, for the moment, the loud
clamour f or the tendering of 11,. days' strike notices and to back,
instead., the reso]ution of the Executive Council (which condemned
Lscontinuarce of Section 62). Such a course of action, he
ied, could be combined with other forms of protests, such
street demonstrations and. coalfield petitions, to "encourage
the maximum degree of hatred of the Tories and their policy, and
ultimately win such support in this coalfield and in the country
generally as to sweep them out of office.
"To use the biggest weapon in our army at this
stage of the struggle", he warned his audience,
would result "in a serious anti-climax".
The Conference overwhelmingly carried the resolution of the Exec-
.2
ut,.ve Council.
Thi& sense of possessing a common determination to oust from power
the traditional class enemy tended to have little or no effect,
however, upon day to day relationships between men, management and.
2. Ibid.
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union representatives at pit-level. Strikes and go-slows occurred
with their usual frequency and. the leadership of the NUM and NCB
displayed their usual inability to prevent them happening. In
July, the Area E.G. of the union undertook to examine the causes
of stoppages which occurred on the coalfield during that month.
It was decided to circularise the Lodges urging them to forward
to the Central Office detailed accounts of the circumstances
-
which ledthe stoppages taking place.
Very little response was forthcoming anô. the 	 was fcrcei to
issue a summarised account of that which they already knew.
"During this month", they announc&,
took place in the coalfield, most of which could
not be defended by the Union.
"In some instances the.daywagemen struck work
in protest against the action of pieceworkers
in stopping the previous day
a.... this was symptomatic of the sharp divisions
which are developing in the coalfield. on this issue".3
At a special Coalfield Delegate Conference called to discuss the
- problem, Paynter warned his audience that there had been so many
S
unofficial stoppages in South Wales, Scotland and Yorkshire that
the NCB was considering bringing back prosecutions for breaches
of. contract. He declared that he was
"very much concerned and, in fact, alarmed at the
lack of Trade Union consciousness prevailing on
the coalfield in this matter".
.3. Ibid., 22.9.53.
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He reminded the del€gates that the union had pledged itself to
give full cooperation to the Board in their efforts to raise
productivity and he
".... appreciated that there were other factors
militating against the unity of the membership,
naniely, the differentials which prevail between
the conditions of employment of surface and under-
ground workers. The wage differentials
threatened to divide sharply this Organization
in this Area.
"These differences", he warned them, "are being
exploited by the Colliery Managers", but he was
of the view that, "as an Organisation", the
members "should endeavour to minimise these diff-
erences" and behave ii such a manner as not to aggravate
them. Most of the Stoppages and restrictions which took place
on the coalfield were, he claimed,
.... in connection with the terms and contracts
of pieceworkers, who earn money much in excess
of that paid to daywage workers above and below
ground."
"Further, these actions are undertaken by our
members without consultation with representatives
of the Union at any level ...."
He expressed serious alarm that, if this policy was allowed to
- continue unrestricted, it would lead to the "disintegration of
this Organization at a time when we will need it the most ....",
for, he argued, there could be no doubt that the days of "obtaining
concessions without struggle" were at an end: "The Awards of the
National Reference Tribunal and the National Arbitration Tribunal
in other industries merely underline this: fact" and he wound up
his speech by stating that the policy of hi Executive Council
was to endeavour to avoid this "disintegratIon and the cancer
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which was developing in the Organisation".
The Conference unanimously accepted his report but the signi-
ficance of their acceptance must have been diminished somewhat
by the words of a delegate from a relatively "loyal" Lodge,
.Aberpergwm, who stated that, whilst he
".... appreciated the position as put by the
E.C.", he nevertheless wished to remind them
"that there were problems on the coalfield.
which call for speedy solutions
In other words, it was the same old problem: How was it possible
to convince angry miners that they should abide by negotiated
proceedures and thereby lengthen the time it would take to resolve
a dispute which they might otherwise resolve quickly merely by
striking in the time-honoured fashion unto which they had been
reared? The colliery Lodge Committee which had most first-hand
experience of this problem during 1 953 was almost certainly that
at Caerau at the northern, "blind-end" of the Maezteg (Llynfi)
Valley. At a Lodge Committee meeting in late June, for example,
the Secretary recorded that the colliers of the Pitt
District had agreed to go-slow for the week commencing June 22nd.
He told the Committee that the pit's manager had informed him
that, in 1952, a quarter of a million pounds had been lost at
Caèrau Colliery and that in 1953 the position was even worse.
The NCB, he claimed, were no longer prepared to "po1r money down
the drain". Forewarned, the Committee resolved unanimously to ad-
vise the "W.R." colliers to refrain from carrying out their de-
cision to go Ca' canny.6
4. Ibid.
5. Ibia.
6. Caerau CoUery Lodge Minutes, Committee Meeting (CM)
21 .6.53; U.C.$.
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The advice was not heeded. The go-slow was instigated and such
was its effect that the Lodge Secretary reported, four days later,
that "considerable bad feeling exists at the colliery following
upon the W.R. dispute". 7 A mass meeting was called for the foll-
owing Sunday to discuss the situation and its implications for
the future of the pit. Addressing the assembled miners, the
Lodge Secretary "dealt with the extreme dfffiulty being exper-
lenced when colliers walk out, and the consequent division be-
tween themselves and the day-wage men". He urged the meeting to
"avoid walk-out and ca' canny and so give our established machinery
a fair chance to function". After a lengthy discussion, the
meeting resolved to accept the Secretary's recommendation and a
pledge was taken 's.... not to walk out in future and gb ca'canriy..."
In early October however, 26daerau colliers walked out over a
price list disagreement and caused some 850 of their workmates to
strike in sympathy with them, 9 At a mass meeting of the Lodge
just five days after the initial walk-out, the Miners' Agent for
the Maesteg Area, Tal Mainwaring, persuaded the men to return
and to refrain from the use of ca'canny. They agreed and the
lodge committee issued a statement to the effect that any future
action which involved the use of
u eatcanny or walking out without full consultation
with lodge officials, and fuU use made of the est-
ablished machinery" would not be tolerated and it was
made clear that any such action would not "secure
the attention of the Organisation, since it tends
to create a division between colliers and day-wage
7. Ibid., 25.6.53.
8. Ibid., Mass Meeting (YM), 28.6.53.
9. C.G., 8.10.53.
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men, and in a time of changed economic and
political conditions, would completely destroy
our Organisation, and thereby leave us wide
open for attacks upon our standard. of living".'°
Even such resolute promises of Lodge discipline as these did. not
prevent similar incidents occurring at Caerau with remarkable
regularity during the following five years. 11 The "disease",
as Paynter referred to it, seems however, to have been endemic
only at certain collieries and not at others. Its outbreaks
seem mainly to nave been confined to Lodges where "militants"
were in plentiful supply but where the Lodge Committees did. not
exert over their memberships the kind of discipline which was to
be found at traditional Communist strongholds like Parc and Dare,
or indeed, at pits where the Lodge Committees were dominated by
active and articulate advocaths of the policies of the Labour
Party.
Caerau and Parc and Dare were Lodges which represented two very
different models of trade union organisation. A comparison of their
Lodge Minute Books (both of which are remarkably copious and
informative) reveals some quite startling differences in the re-
lationships which existed at these pits between the Lodge Comm-
ittees and their rank-and-f i]e.
The Parc and Dare Minutes communicate a sense of the Lodge Comm-
ittee being always firmly in control of virtually every facet of
the. workmen's side of pit business. The pages are cluttered with
tO. Caerau C.L.M., MM., 11 .10.53.
11. Indeed, if we move forward to January 1958, we find, recorded
in the Minute Book, an identical series of events provoking an
identical response from the lodge committee and its supporters.
Caerau C.L.M., MM., 14.1 .58 and 15.1 .58.
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details of disputes settled, go-slows prevented, deputations being
received. and so on. Those of Caerau, on the other hand, seem
fraught with the continuous promise of unofficial walk-outs and.
go-slows. The Committee men frequently are forced to issue
appeals to their members; threats of closure are purposely and.
repeatedly dragged. out and there is present a sense of general
indiscipline which one never encounters within the pages of the
Parc and Dare Minutes.	 -
The other, quite startling, contrast is the absence within the
Caerau pages of references to contemporary political controversies,
and especially to those concerned with internatioral affairs.
Hardly a page of the Pare and. Dare Minutes ±s without its mention
of Kenya, Malaya, British Guyana, Korea, the world-wide encroach-
ment of American economic andThiilitary influence, or demands that
China be allowed into the United Nations and West Germany pre-
vented from re-arming. The political influences upon the Committee
of its Communist and Left-Labour members is everywhere evident.
One senses that they consider the Lodge an important and vital
platform for political, as well as industrial, debate. And one
gains a similar impression from the Minute Books of the Labour-
dominated Lodges to the east. There, one encounters Lodges which
not only conduct their union business in an efficient and dis-
ciplined fashion, but which readily communicate a sense of concern
that the Communists from the central and. western sectors are
"kept in hand" •1 2
12. This is especially evident in the kninute books of the
Penailta Lodge, 1951-1958; U.C.S.
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Expressed differently, there appears to have been a "tightness"
of discipline and arganisation amongst those lodges which, over
a long period, displayed. evidence of there operating amongst their
ranks men who recognised, and emphasised the links existing between
politics and trade unionism. For such men, the Lodge became much
more than a vehicle with which they could occasionally secure
certain financial objectives and. a degree of job security. For
them, it became a symbol of the ability of the vorking class to
organise itself in a disciplined and effective fashion. Indeed,
for many of the Communists especially, it assumed a position of
extraordinary political importance in as much as it was the closest
they came to holding positions of real administrative power. And,
once they had. attained those positions, they generally attempted
to execute their duties as efficiently and conscientiously as
they were able, for they recognised, that if they were to advance
themselves within the Union, there was little point in them app-
earing as "wild men" or as invididuals who were known to command
little respect inside their Lodges. They had to be seen to be
doing the business and doing it properly.
Not all- of the Communists who figured in Lodge politics were of
this type. Some remained inveterate "rank-and-filers" or"C ommitt ee-
Men" who, if they could. manage it, would hold no truck with the
more blatant compromises of principle forced upon their position-.
seeking comrades. Still others found themselves with no choice
other than to remain as Committee Men, their talents having been
eclipsed by some brighter luminary or louder voice, cr their way -
repeatedly blocked by resolute Labour opposition. Such men as
these frequently were to be found amongst the leaderships of the
27j
unofficial groupings but they bore less resemblance to the
"average" unofficial striker than did. the most disciplined mem-
ber of an Eastern Valleys Lodge.	 -
Their influence is obvious, f or example, within the agendas of
the union's coalfield annual conferences. Year after year, it
was the Lodges to which they were attached which forwarded the
sophisticated critiques of the Labour Party's a].1.eged political
or criticisms of the Government' a pro-
Americanism. For example, the voice of one such Communist, Evan
John, is clearly discernable in the following re.w.2ztion which
his Lodge forwarded to Conference in j953:
"In the cultural field America has nothing to
offer us, other than racial discrimination, a
literature well below the standards to which we
are accustomed in Britain, and. a political demo-
cracy which reeks of gangsterism.13
Such resolutions, and those which most coherently opposed them
tended invariably, to emerge from efficient and. well-disciplined
Lodges which sometimes were dominated by Communists, sometimes by
Labourites. They tended far less frequently to emerge from those
Lodges which were famous f or their sectional strike-proneness -
like the Lodges of G-waun-cae-gurwen or, for that matter, those
of the greater part of the anthracite field.14.
13. S?1NUM Annual Agenda and Report; May, 1953. The resolution was
moved by the Clydach Merthyr Lodge (of which Evan John was the
Chairman) and..seconded by the Diliwyn Lodge of the Dulais
Valley. It carried. SWNT.Th E.C. Minutes 11-13.5.53.
14. . There were of course, exceptions. The pits of the Dulais and
Lower Sflansea Valleys, as well as those at Abercrave and Morlais,
were generally as prolific in their output of political res-
olutions as were most Lodges in the central and western sectors
of the steam-coal field. See, Chapter 12,	 for an earlieL'
discussion of anthracite pit politics.
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These latter types were the lodges which most worried Paynter
and executive council for, within them, trade union discipline
tended to remain as constant as do the shadows of clouds across
windswept hillsides. It was an indiscipline which contrasted
strongly with the extraordinary loyalty which many of these same
lodge memberships displayed towards their own codes of custom and
practice. This contrast was especially marked amongst the younger
anthracite miners who appear to have concerned themselves with pit
matters to the virtual exclusion of wider union matters. The
president of Youth Representatives of the SWNUM alleged that
these individuals displayed little more than an "appalling apathy"
towards trade union affairs.15
He alleged that less than half of the S. Wales miners' lodges
had youth representatives upo1 their committee and that this
"lack of interest" arose "out of the period of relative prosperity
we have experienced in recent years". Somewhat paradoxically how-
ever, the Conference of Youth Representatives, after listening to
its President's allegations, passed a resolution urging that the
adult rate of wages be paid to 1 8 year-old miners whose minimum
rate was almost £2 per week lower than that received by a miner
at 21 1 6
"Apathy caused by high earnings" was also the diagnosis put forward
by another active Lodge official, Frank James, a staunch Labour
man from the National Colliery in the Rhondda. He complained that
15. C.C., 12.11 .53. The Youth President was E. Scrivans.
16. Ibid., Minimum wage underground in 1953 : 21 and over £7 6 65.
18-21
	
£5 8 6d.
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it was
",,,, not easy to generate support .... amongst
themen in this coalfield .... The main enemy of
the miners at present is their own apathy.
"This is due to the high average weekly wage
earned by them by working excessive overtime".
He cited cases at his own Lodge where men were working "the full
21,- hours" of overtime in one week. "This supplementation of
wages by overtime earnings", he declared, "was a bad thing for the
trade-union and for the miners".1
It was with this threat to the union itself in mind that Paynter
and the Executive Council stepped up their pressure for an all-
round. wage increase and for the instigation of a comprehensive
new Wages-Structure which would replace the anarchic system of
piece-rate payments and reduce drastically hours worked. as over-
time.
Paynter addressed the Conference of Youth Representatives in
November, 1 953, and. assured them that he and his colleagues would
do all in their power to halt the "Tory Offensive" against the
living standards of the working class and that they would 's. fight
to recover by wage increases, the economic position held by the
miners in 1 947 .	 At an Area Delegate Conference during the
same month, he claimed that the C-overnment had "decided. to del-
iberately precipitate a wage crisis in this country" and he warned
that ".... the wages earned in overtime in this industry are not
17. S1VNtJM E.C. Minutes, A.B.C. 30.11 .53.
18. C.., 19.11.53.
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to be a substitute for the payment of a living wage to our members
for the five normal shift&'.19 The Conference passed a resolution
urging the Government and the Coal Board to expedite a decision
on the miners' wage claim and to investigate the question of
relative prices charged to industrial consumers. Dai Dan Evans,
the 1ice-President, informed the press that,
"If this industry is to be a service tc other
industries the wages of the miners should not be
based on the economics of the industry. We are
selling coal too cheaply to certain big industrial
concerns and as a result we cannot meet the wages
20
of the miners".
Calls for strike action and the resumption of the boycott on
Satur-day working were proposed as a means of enforcing the union' a
criticisms and delegates joi2ed Dal Dan Evans in expressing their
"anger" over the supply of "subsidised coal" to leading industrial-
ists: the profitability of the nationalised. coal industry, claimed
one Ferndale delegate, was being "deliberately restricted to off-
set wage claims by the miners and. to enhance the profits of the
great industrial monopolies".
A spokesman for the Executive Council explained that, since nation-
alisation, the industry had made a gross profit of £115.7 millions,
but that it still carried an accumulated net loss of £1 2.7 millions.
Of the gross profit, £9J.,.. millions had gone in interest repayments
and in the form of interim income to the old coal owners; Lii 
.5
millions to profit tax - despite an accumulated deficit and £8.7
	-.
millions spent on imported coal which was subsequently sold at a
19. SW1IUM, B.C. Minutes, A.D.C., 30.11 .53.
20. C.C., 26.11.53.
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oss. In other words, claimed the spokesman, the gross profit
had been a.... swallowed up by these impositions uron the industry
by Government poiiciesI.21
In mid-December, Homer joined the chorus of protest. He told a
Monmouthshire audience that "discontent" would be rife upon the
coalfield unless the wage claims were settled quickly and he
added that miners should not have to work on Sat-urdays to earn a
"living wage .... they have fought too long for a five-day week
not to enjoy it", 22
 His words were echoed by Paynter at a dozen
or more different venues during the following two months. At
Treharris he warned of "widespread action in this and other coal-
fields" if the Board did not admit the miners' claim in full. He
was certain, he added, that the agreement to continue Saturday
work would not be renewed as it was
now widely recognised by all sections of
the men that organised overtime work and the
earnings that accrued (were) an obstacle to ob-
taming a living wage for a normal week's work.
It (was) for this reason that a demand. to end
Saturday work (was) being more widely pressed than ever".23
At a delegate conference in Cardiff in January, the assembled
delegates voiced their opposition to the Coal Board's offer of
increases of 7/6d. and 8/6d. per week for surface and underground
men Despecively. Despite the fact that the offer was tied to a
productivity deal, the N.E.C. recommended its acceptance, though
with no great enthusiasm. Paynter rejected this advice quite firmly
22. Ibid., 2L12.53.
23, Ibid., 21.i.54.
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and. agued that the delegates should follow his example. In
voting against acceptance, he said, South Wales would be making
it clear to the public that the proposed new Minimum of £6 15s.,
and £7 15s., a week was not a living wage and that the coalfield
"objected in principle to the strings the Coal
Board have attatched to the offer, namely that
there should be a continuation of the Saturday
work agreement and cooperation to improve prod-
uction by 2j this year".
He explained that, in his opinion, any productivity deal must,
of necessity, be a "matter of policy to be decided by the union
quite independently of any wage settlement. Our
people fear that it will mean tying us to some
form of sliding scale related to production to
which we object in principle".
In the national ballot which followed however, Paynter discovered
that a majority of his members apparently were content with the
N.E.C's wages proposals and with working long periods of overtime.
The results in S. Walea were not dramatically different to those
cast in the English fields on the wages issue, although there
was a much more forthright minority vote against extending the
aturday Work Agreements in S. Wales than in most other coalfields.
The national vote in favour of acceptance of the N.E.C's recomm-
*
end.ations was 542,000; that against, 221 ,000.
24. . SWNUM, E.C. Minuted, A.D.C., 25.1 .54..
* Votes cast in S. Wales on the N.E.C's re-
commendation concerning the wages proposals:
Votes cast in S. Wales on the N.E.C's recom-
mendation to accept a further period of the
extended working hours agreement:
STh1JM, E.C. Minutes, 9.2.54..
55,150 FOR
20,950 AGAINST
4.7,700 FOR
31 ,200 AGAINST
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Sir William Lawther informed the public that he and his Executive
had. promised to cooperate with the Board in an effort to secure
a 25 increase in production and he added that they had undertaken
25to continue Saturday working until April 1955, at the earliest.
The S. Wales vote emphasised. the problem which Paynter faced
whenever he attempted faithfully to echo coalfield feeling upon
any controversial topic. In the run-up to the ballot, the loudest
and most persistent noises had. been made by the delegates of the
"Left" Lodges - working both through official and unofficial
channels - but when it came to the vote, the "silent maorit"
rallied behind the orthodox Labouritea and won t)e day 1' or e
N.E.C. - despite the stirring speeches of' Paynter, vans and.
;yill Whitehead against acceptance.* The problems posed to anyone
seeking to represent such a ciivid.ed workforoe would have been
formidable enough, but for Paynter they were compounded, as they
had. been for Homer, by his membership of the Communist Party
and by the existence of the powerful unofficial groupings in
which fellow Communists were playing leading roles. To have
identified himself too closely with the positions taken by the
pro-N.E.C. spokesmen of the Labourite majority would obviously
have alienated him still further from the "unofficials" and. from
the line of the Party of' which he was a member. On the other hand,
25. C.G., 11.2.51+.
* The "Leftists", e.g. those at Parc and. Dare, complained, bitterly
over the fact that the ballot was a postal ballot as opposed. to a
pit-head ballot. This, they felt, rendered the membership more
susceptible to succumbing to pro-Agreement Dropaganda on the radio
and in the press. Pare and Dare Lodge Minutes, 21 .2.51+.
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the result of the ballot indicated clearly that, whenever he chose
to identify himself too closely with the "Leftists", he almost
always ran the risk of forfeiting his credibility as a leader who
could claim that he was capable of reflecting and representing
the demands and aspirations of the whole coalfield and not just
of its more militant and articulate members.
Recognising th vulnerability of his position, Paynter was forced.
to agree, shortly after the ballot, to a number of Coal Board
proposals which threatened still further his already strained
working relationship with the "unofficials". He agreed, for
example, to allow a joint NUMJNCB working party to investigate
the "contradictory reports" which had emerged from the Parc and
Dare pit during a so-called "Efficiency Campaign" which had been
conducted on the coalfield. diring the previous year. The Pare
and Dare Lodge Committee was accused by Divisional Management of
allowing certain restrictions of output to take place within the
colliery comDlex - an accusation which the Committee refuted but
which stung it sufficiently to cause it to recommend to a general
meeting of its members that no sectional action should be taken
during the following month. The meeting accepted the recornm-
endation only after a "rather lengthy discussion", which seems
to indicate that there may have been more to the Coal Board.'s
allegations than the Lodge Committee was willing to acknowledge
in public. 26
 The incident provides an indication of the depth to
which the Communists were shaken by the result of the postal
ballot. Pare and Dare was one of' the mot powerful Lodges on
26. Parc and. Dare Lodge Minutes, 21 .2.5k.
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the coaJ.field; had it chosen to do so, it could undoubtedly have
called upon its long-standing unofficial allies (Fernhill, Glen-
rhondda, the Lodges of the Dulais Valley, etc.), to take sympathetic
action in opposition to the investigation. But it chose not to.
Instead, it rallied to Paynter's side, as if recognising that
the time was ripe for a re-grouping of the coalfield's left-wing
militants rather than for a confrontation which might well have
resulted in them suffering a further set-back ctt the hands of
the union's pro-N.E.C. elements.
The union's Left-wing bad not been alone in appreciating the
lessons provided by the February ballot however, for the Coal
Board, too, recognised the implications of the rebuff which the
Left-militants had suffered and it chose the moment to renew its
public attacks upon the "unof'ficials" and their apologists on
the miners' executive. During early March, for example, the
Chairman of the S. Western Divisional Coal Boa'd, D.M. Rees,
-	 visited one of the coalfield's most strike-prone pits, Caerau,
and issued a warning, as he oeneà. the ccfLtier'f s
baths, against the dangers presented by unofficial strikers.
He claimed that since Vesting Day there had taken place 21 stopp-
ages at Caerau, including five during the previous twelve months:
"1 am loth to say this", he declared, "but I have
to tell you that if this sort of thing persists
the Board will be forced to take steps which will,
in the long run, only hurt the people engaged in
the industry".
The best way the miners could show their áppreciat ion of the new
amenities, he said, was to make every effort to increase output
	 -
27a, the colliery.
-	 27. C.C-., 11.3.52..
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A similar plea wa made to the men of Celyen South colliery by 	 -
the deputy Labour Director of the S. Western Coal Board during
the opening ceremony of their pithead baths one week later. He
alleged that "one in three men" at Celynen South had been filling
"rubbish" instead of coal during the month previously. Making
a plea for more effective cooperation, he made a rhetorical and
somewhat obvious statement, declaring that there were ".... only
two kinds of men in the mine .... the men and the management",
and that, het.veen them, they could produce the results that
were needed. 28 Such sentiments were to be expressed with mounting
frequency during the following 1 2 months. Indeed, the pithead.
bath opening ceremony came to be recognised both by management
and union as presenting an ideal opportunity for the dissemination
of their particular brands of propaganda. And rightly so, for
whilst management could lay claim to having provided the new
amenity, the union could use the opportunity to invoke poignant
images of past generations of mineworkers who were denied by
their profiteering masters even this most basic industrial facility.29
It was wages rather than the virtues of industrial cooperation
which provided the main topic at the South Wales Miners' Annual
Conference in May 19514- however. In his Report, Paynter declared
28. Ibid., 18.5.51+. £he speaker was WJ. Saddler, ex-G-eneral
Secretary of the S/INUM and an alleged authority of the filling
of rubbish.
29. By May 19514-, the statistics of pit-head bath construction was
as follows:
Total number of baths completed prior to Vesting Day
	 1+9
Total 'number of baths completed since Vesting Day 	 28
Total Number of baths under construction:
	
214.
Total number of baths in planning stage
	 19
Total	 120
"In addition, 18 baths are programmed at present. When all of
the above schemes are completed, provision will have been made
for approximately 98,000 men" • SiNUM Annual Conference Report,
-	
-	 May l95,-, p. hO.
28
that, although a settlement had been accepted, its effect would
be, in his view at least, temporary and he added that a new de-
mand would be "probable" in 1 954/55. 30 He recounted the dis-
cussions which the union had had with the Board concerning the
selling-price of coal and its relationship to miners' wages. In
the course of the discussions, he declared, the Board had ack-
nowledged that certain coals were being sold below their costs
of production.
These were, in the main, smalls, coking coals, low volatile
steams and anthracites: in other words, the coals mined pre-
dominantly in South Wales. Price adjustments were in the pipe-
line, but the projected increase in earnings which they would
realise (some £2 millions) would not be available f or wage in-
creases. He informed the delegates that the income was already
ear-marked to meet the cost of new safety measures which the
union had pressed for, including non-inflammatory belting, stone-
dust packs and a staff training college.
The Board, said Paynter, was "very disturbed" at trends in the
Coal Trade. It was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain
an entry to the European Market as the Schu.man plan developed.
The U.S.A. was increasingly able to sell coals of equal quality
to ours at £j per ton less than our prices. Denmark, he alleged,
was already taking coal from the U.S.A. on this basis. In addition,
coal was meeting a new competitor, residual oil, which was "as
formidable as Hydro-electricity". In short, he informed them,
30. Ibid., p. 1.
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the Board was arguing that, in a world of increasing coal pro-
duction, there was taking place a relative contraction in the
available markets and, that these "growing difficulties" would
be aggravated still further by any attempt to transfer the cost
of wage increases to the price of coal. Paynter emphasised how-
ever, that the union did not consider that the Board's case warr-
anted the kinds of losses in real earnings whtch the miners had
suffered since 1947 and he argued that what was -needed was a
complete overhaul of the wages structure, lamenting, as he did
so, that nothing had been done to instigate this process since
the previous Annual Conference of the natona1 union. Be re-
called that at that Conference, South Wales had tabled a reso-
lution calling for the "evaluation of emoluments" obtaining in
all of the country's Areas and for pledges from all NIJM Areas
to "facilitate the early settlement and introduction of the Wages
Structure" .
-	 He reported however, that when the resolution was considered at
the pre-Conference Meeting of the National Executive, there was
opposition from certain quarters" and that, 	 the in-
terests of maintaining unity", South Wales agreed that they would
go no further than to formally move the resolution and refer it
to the Executive Committee. He added that it was clear from this
experience that there was "still a need within the Union to get
agreement on principles to provide an accepted basis for continued
discussions with the Board".32
3j. Ibid., p. 5. The 'Wages Structure" meaning the proposed stan-
dardisation of wages by grade across all British coalfields
and the elimination of area differentials and anomalous piece-work.
32. Ibid.
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The S. Wales Executive received the unanimous backing of the
Conference for' their efforts and there were a number of vociferous
condemnations of those NUM Areas "too short-sighted" to appre-
ciate the value of a new Wages Structure. Numerous speakers went
on to denounce the continued existence of wide pay differentials
between piece-workers and daywage-men and no fewer than 1 2 Lodges
from all parts of the coalfield. signed a successful joint reso-
aution expressing concern at the inadequacy of surface workers'
wages. The conduct of the Conference delegates communicated an
air of solidarity and confidence sufficient enough to draw from
Paynter one of his most forceful Presidential speeches.
He began by warning the delegates that, in future, the union would
refuse its services to any body of' men who were seen to be ignoring
conciliation machinery and taking unofficial action. Briefly
echoing the theme which recently had been favoured by official
openers of pit-head baths, he reminded the men that there existed
sri urgent need. for less absenteeism and more clean coal, but he
quickly proceeded to treat the delegates to a clear-cut exposition
of a number of his most fundamental political tenets. He declared
that he would
".... always strenuously oppose those within the
Labour and trade union movements who advocate policies
• of 'restraint' on wages claims, collaboration with
employers to increase productivity by harder work
and longer hours, and the identity of interests be-
tween capital and labour
"We are paid wages f or the time we labour in pro-
duction and then buy back tile things we produce in
order to barely exist. It is this wage earning status
of the producers that makes over-production inevitable".
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Getting into his stride, he attacked what he considered to be a
ludicrous arrangement of priorities which existed within the coal
industry, where the former mine-owners were
".... guaranteed their £12 million or so a year
interest, in good years and had., before a penny
is available to improve wages and. conditions".
He went on to condemn the Government and the Coal Board for
refusing the miners' requests for information concerning the
prices at which coal was sold to industry. They kept it a secret,
he said, because it would "expose the way in which this nation-
alised industry is being milked. by big business". It was, he
declared, up to bhe miners' "great union" to change their position.
•But the fight could not be confined to the mining industry on its
own; "It must go along with the fight for Socialist nationalisation
of all the main industries". This, he argue, would. be  the only
guarantee to the workers that there would be full employment and.
that life would get "happier and. easier from year to year".33
This was a brave speech to make under the circumstances. Had he
so wished, he could have delivered. a text which would have served
as an inoffensive cosmetic, designed to disguise the union's in-
ternal political divisions. Instead, he chose to rub into the
faces of his political antagonists an aggressive and. eloquent
condemnation of the kind of "collaborationist" wages policy which
he believed would lead. inevitably to increased work-loads and.
spiralling productivity deals. This was typical of Paynter.
Time and again, one finds in his speeches an open socialist
commitment of a kind which leading trade-unionists tended in-
33. Ibid., "Presidential Address".
to
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creasingly to shrink away from during the early and mid-'Fifties.
He spurned the narrow visions which so often accompanied mere
wage-militancy and, as we have seen, he rarely missed an opport-
unity to remind those amongst his members who were prone to in-
dulge in sectional strikes of the potential danger which their
actions held for working class unity.
His speech was received with approbation by the' assembled dele-
gates and the 1954. Annual Conference ended with no obvious dis-
play of disunity within the miners' ranks. The more sensitive
aaongst observers would however, have spotted several of the old
political fractures lying just below the Conference's surface.
One indication of their existence was provided in the debate which
surrounded a Penal]ta Lodge resolution calling upon the G-overnment
".... transfer responsibility of all compensation
payments to the former owners from the mining in-
dustry to the Exchequer or Treasury Funds".34.
This was challenged by an amendment from the Rhigos Lodge which
argued that the resolution-should. read, simply, that, "This
Conference calls upon the Covernment to terminate the interest
paid to the former coalowner&'. 35 The Penailta resolution re-
flected the rather vague compromises being floated upon the subject
by interested Labour M.P's, at the time. The Rhigos amendment,
on the other hand, was undoubtedly much closer to the sense of
indignation which the subject had long provoked amongst very
- 34.. Ibid., "Agenda", p. 18. The resolution was seconded by the
Wyndharn Lodge.
35. Ibid., Amendment seconded by Onliwyn No. I Lodge.
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large sections of the coalfield's workforce - and, especially,
amongst the Communist sections. The proposers of the amendment,
Rhigos and their seconders, Onllwyn, were both recognised as
"Left-wing" Lodges, whereas Penalita epitomized the type of
"loyal-Labour" Lodge encountered throughout the eastern coalfield.
The amendment was carr5ed comfortably - an event which must have
provided welcome relief to those on the union's political. Left
who could still taste the sourness of the defeat which they had
suffered at the Wages Ballot months earlier.
In the pits themselves, however, the Conference d.eba.tes and.
speeches appear to have had little impact. Paynter's advocacy
of unity could not prevent another rash of unofficial strikes.
Even at Pare and Dare, for example, the lodge committee found it-
self struggling to contain sectionalist strikers. The lodge mm-
utes record that groups of colliers were walking out of the
2' 9" seam,
".... thereby creating disunity amongst the
members ...., which not only meant a serious
financial loss, but it placed the Coal Board in
an infinitely stronger position,-in the forth-
coming negotiations, regarding the 2' 9" Price
List. But the paramount factor was that sections
of workmen were tiolating Lodge decisions and
,,36principles, which could not be tolerated
At a General Meeting of Parc and Dare, workmen agreed "unanimously"
to reaffirm their Annual Meeting decision that
-	
",... no Sectional Action be taken, until the
matter is first discussed by a General Meeting of
the Lodge. Any section doing so would not have
the backing, service or protection of the Lodge
or the Union".37
-	 36. Parc and Dare Minutes, 22.5.54..
37. Ibid..
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Further down the ithondda Valley, a similar train of events pro-	 -
yoked, a serious dispute at the Lewis Merthyr Colliery where 82
miners were given dismissal notices because of a go-slow by 35
face-workers. The dismissed men included day-wage men who were
admitted by the Coal Board to have been innocent of any charge
of indulging in restrictive practices and who were laid-off
because the face-workers refused to abide by the pits mutually-
agreed arbitration proce,dure. The Finance Director of the
S. Western Coal Bcard, fr. A. Lindsay referred to the dispute
when opening the new pit-head baths at Nantgarw Colliery. It
was, he said,
"symptomatic of the extensive trouble (which was)
affecting the whole coalfield".
He claimed that S. Wales strikers had caused no less than three
quarters of the tota] estiinatd tonnage lost through disputes
nationally during the first six months of 1951 . These strikes
and go-slows were, f or the most part, confined to "certain pockets
of the coalfield" but, he declared, they had a debilitating over-
all effect upon the coalfield.'s productivity - a fct which was
causing the miners' union as uxe.i at'j a
	
'as
ment. Output per manshift in S. Wales, he claimed, was only
j8.4
. 
cwts., compared with 25.2 cwts., in other Divisions which
wexe, as a result, "carrying South Wales on their backs". There
was, he alleged, no "technical justification" for this "terrific
disparity". The wages of colliers under nationalisation had
"increased from 35/9d., per ton to 4-7/2d., per ton", an increase
which, he said, represented a yearly incre 'ase of £4.5 millions
and he went on to Jist some of the "innumerable improvements"
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which had occurred in the fields of welfare and pensions. To
bring themselves up to the productivity levels of miners in other
Divisior's, the men of S. Wales would, he said, have to effect
a "colossal" increase in output. For its part, the Coal Board
had. authorized capital expenditure in S. Wales of £60 millions
during the previous seven years. But, he declared, the Division
had been "physically able" to spend only £33 ziiillions. He did
not however, expand upon the reasons f or this under-expenditure.
He merely went on to state that, whilst the other Divisions had
cleared a profit of £72 millions during the previous seven years,
S. Wales had lost £54.5 millions; in other words, they had
"absorbed" 75% of the inland profits which the other Divisions
had mae.8
Appropriately enough, Paynter chose, as the venue for his reply
to Lindsay's allegations, a ceremony staged to open the new pit-
head baths at the rejuvenated Mardy cblliery into which had been
invested some £4 millions of Coal Board capital. The S. Wales
Miners' President declared that Lindsay's statements had been
"very unfortunate" and not calculated. to improve labour relations.
Referring to the allegation that there was no justification, on
technical grounds, f Or the disparity between S. Wales output and.
-that obtaining in the rest of the country, he said that, whilst
union leaders accepted responsibility for restrictions and sec-
tional strikes, the Joint Investigation made by the Board and.
the. union had revealed a very backward standard of technical eff-
iciency. The greater increase in production in , the pits of the
38. C.C-., 26.8.54.
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Midlands, he decjared, had been achieved mainly on the basis of
new power-loading equipment:
a.... in 1952", he said, "there were only i8
power-loaders in the S. Western Division and.
in 1 953 only 1 9, and they were responsible for
less than )^% of the total output".
He added that, since Vesting Day, the S. Western Division had
allowed the "grass to grow under its feet". Only during 1953/54.
had there been "any serious arid, effective attempt to reorganise
in higher technical efficiency",39
Paynter's allegations were xiswered some three weeks later by
the Production Director of the S. Western Division, r.
Morgan. At the opening of the Tirherbert and Tower Collieries'
pit-head baths, he said that he believed that low mechanisation
in South Wales was the result of a "backward attitude of mind"
towards machines on the part of the miner.40 Morgan's allegations
were backed up shortly afterwards by another Divisional Manager
who attacked what he termed the "minority" of mineworkers -
those who were ".... creating disorganisation entirely disprop-
ortionate to their numbers". They were, he said, ".... not doing
a fair day's work and ignoring the proper machinery to redress
grievances.4.1
39. C.G., 2.9.54. Mardy Colliery had, of course, been Arthur
Homer's old centre of operations and he attended the opening
ceremony where the manager of the pit presented him with a
silver tankard paid for by the workforce - a potent symbol,
indeed, of the way in which the relationships between manage-
ment and union had changed upon the coalfield since the
turbulent 1930s.
4.0. C.G., 23.9.54..
41. Ibid., 4-.11 .54-.
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A if to emphasise the validity of these analyses, Tirherbert
Colliery witnessed the first stay-down strike to have occurred
on the coalfield for six years. It happened just over a month
after the ceremony to mark the opening of the colliery's new pit-
head baths and some three weeks or so before the occurrence of
another stay-down, this time at the Glenrhondda Colliery, four
miles to the south of Tirherbert, in the "blind-end" of Rhondda
Fawr.
Both pits previously had held. reputations as the workplaces of
militant, but disciplined, Lodge members and. both strikes took
the coalfield somewhat by surprise. The Tirherbert stay-down
involved just eight miners who managed to make idle some 300 of
their workmates by refusing to surface for four days. Led by an
energetic one-time Coinmunist-urned Moral flearmer, Jack .Addiscott,
the stay-downers demanded the transfer of Tirherbert' a 29 year-
old. colliery manager, Jack Ellis, and. in support of their demand,
they listed a number of grievances concerning working conditions
and. haulage accidents which they alleged. had. taken place at t'.e
mine since Ellis's appointment. They declared, in addition,
that he had been responsible for a decline in productivity.
The Coal Board refuted all of the men' s claims; productivity,
itirias announced, had actually risen since Ellis's arrival and
the stay-down was denounced as "futile and output wasting".42
Bill Paynter arrived at the pit and. persuaded the men to call off
their action, though they refused to do so until after "stop-tap";
Paynter recalled. that the stay-downers had heard from the deputies
inspecting the mine that bets had been laid in the nearby village
42. Ibid., 11 .11 .54..
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of Hirwaun that they would be out for their Saturday-night drink
before the pubs closed:
"It was thought to be a safe bet, such were
the reputations of one or two of the leaders,
but it turned out a loser"1+3
The reasons for the stay-down were probably a good deal more
complex than those which received publicity. Contrary to the
Coal Board's denials, records show that production did indeed
fall during the two years in which Jack Ellis managed Tirherbert
(roughly from the Summer of 1 954. until the Summer of 1 956):
Table One
•	 Tirherbert Colliery Statistics, 1952-1958
1952	 1953	 1951^	 1955	 1956	 1957	 j958
w.J.	 w.J.	 w.J.	 J.	 J.	 I.J.	 I.J.Manager:	 THOMAS THOMAS THOMAS ELLIS ELLIS PHILLIPS PHILLIPS
Number of men
working below 337
ground
Number of men
-. -working above	 72^
ground
ANNUAL -
353	 333	 328	 320	 321	 i6i
78	 86	 86	 90	 89	 60
PRODUCTION	 202,000 1 95OOO 1 68poo i 6Joo I 4-IJJOO i 2^3p00 9i 20(ToNs)
Information gathered from "Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades
Review", Vols. 1952-1958
4-3. W. Paynter,	 op. c j f. , p. 115.
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flowever, Table One indicates clearly that production had been
falling since 1 952 - though the fall was more marked during the
year in which Ellis took over, 1954.. Coincidental with this fall
was a slight loss of manpower below ground and a corresponding
rise of manpower above ground; this in itself can hardly have
been conducive to improved, production although a subsequent
slight increase in numbers empldyecl both below and above ground
in 1 955-56 did nothing to prevent a further decline.
Ellis left Tirherbert for it neighbouring colliery, Tower, in
1956 and his arrival at his new it was greeted with a decline
in production similar to that suffered by Tirherbert:
Table Two
-	 Tower Colliery Statistics, 1954-1960
195 14.	1955	 956
Manager:
	 G-.REES G.REES G-.REES
At 95r	 35B	 \959
J.ELLIS J.ELLIS J.ELLIS J.ELLIS
Number of
men working
below
ground	 1060	 1071
Number of
men
workLng
above
ground	 170	 170
ANNUAL
PRODUCT ION
(ToNs)	 4.1 0000 430000
	
1066	 1080	 1180	 1133	 1054.
	
168	 170	 187
	
210	 220
383000	 2814-000 2964.76 31 7000 294.820
Information gathered from "Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades
Review", Vols. 1954-1960
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Once again however, it is impossible to tell if the big fall in
production during 1956 took place before, or during Ellis's
initial period as manager. None of these statistics are suff-
iciently detailed to support any case against Ellis's ability
as a manager; mines are not like car plants or bottle factories,
and production cannot be controlled to anything approaching the
same degree as obtains in most factories. There are, in every
coal mine (and especially so in the central and western mines
of S. Wales), literally hundreds of variables which can affect
the level of production. Chronology and old age are not the
least of these and, in 1951+-55, Tirherbert was beginning its
run-down (it closed in 1 958). Tower, on the other hand, was
undergoing large-scale changes, both in the methods and allo-
cation of production, during the period of Ellis's management.
The fact that Tower was stilloperating in 1978 may well be in-
terpreted as tribute enough to the man's ability.
Ellis himself held a reputation for bluntness and a tendency
towards authoritarianism. His nickname was "Sack 'em Jack" arid.
he was reputed to have been tutored in his craft by fellow auth-
oritarians in the employ of Powell Duffryn. At the time of the
Tirherbert stay-down he was 29: young for a manager and, no
doubt, he was aggressively ambitious. Tirherbert before his
arrival, had seen a rapid turnover of managers: he was the fourth
to arrive in the six years which had passed since the retirement
of P.C. Beale who had managed the pit for the previous seven
consecutive ycars. The only relatively setled institution at
Tirherbert at the time of his arrival was the workmen's Lodge.
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As we have seen earlier, (Chapter 12, pp.206-207) it was a Lodge
which was strong and effective enough to have provided a long-
term contrast with the somewhat weaker lodge at the neighbouring
Tower Colliery. The Tirherbert workmen's Committee contained
within its ranks men who had held active trade-union office since
before the Lock-out of 1 926. The mine itself was relatively
small and. the organisation was "tight".
	 The Committee men had,
as one ex-meraber recalled, "seen off" three managers since the
retirement of Beale and they had operated a ban on Saturday
working which had proved more effective and durable than at
almost any other pit on the coalfield. The ban had been organised
and operated in conjunction with elements of the Shakespeare
Hotel group and Tirherbert delegates had long been invo'ved in
several of these unofficial movements. The young Ellis then,
would have found himself faced with a formidable lodge committee
at a time when the militant "Left" on the coalfield was unsettled
and unhappy with the behaviour of the NTJM's national officers
and with the results obtained during wage negotiations. The
potential for some kind of "showdown" was self-evident and Ellis,
it seems, was not a man to back away from such a situation.
Long after the stay-down had ended and Tirherbert had closed,
several of the pit's ex-workmen sought to explain the meaning of
the strike in terms different to those cited by the NCB. It
occurred, they said, because they were "fed-up" with the way in
which their pit, and the coal industry in general, was being man-
aged. The mining bureaucracy had become "top-heavy" and manage-
me.nt "hadn't changed one bit" since before nationalisation. One
2,4. Recording of Jack Addiscott, Hirwaun, June 1 976;
Recording of Tommy How1is, Cadlys, June 1976.
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ex-Tjrherbert man wen.t as far as to admit that he and his work-
mates had expected that nationalisation would bring with it some
kind of "worker's control" within the industry. He referred
specifically to a train of events which had occurred some two
years previous to the 1954- stay-down. In August, 1952, it will
be.recalled, large sections of the S. Wales membership of the
National Association of Colliery Overmen and Deputies, staged
an unofficial strike which, in turn, caused the1ay-off of
thousands of miners - including those working at TirheDbert.
Distressed at the prospect of losing their wages, the men held
a mass meeting to coincide with a visit to the Area of the
miners' national president, Will Lawther. Setting the scene,
the ex-Tirherbert man recalled that things had been '.... quite
as bad under nationalisation" as they had previously. Asked
why, he explained "Well, it's obvious. The men who took over
after nationaljsation were the same men who
ran Powell Duffryns. Same officials and bosses
you had. If there was a change it was in the
unions. I remember Will Lawther, when the off-
icials were striking for money; the collieries
were closed and we tiad men who had passed their
"Papers" * and were capable of taking the colliery
over. Will Lawther the ax-Communist came up. I
was in the C.?. once remember. And we asked him
if we could take over the colliery - leave the
officials to strike as they liked and we'd run it.
"Well, this was supposed to be part of nation-
alisation, wasn't it? 'No fear boys, nothing
doing', he said. We were more or less locked
out and because the dispute was within the in-
dustry we weren't pulling unemployment benefit
* I.E. Ordinary miners who had taken and passed theoretical exam-
inations which would have entitled them, had they so wished, to apply
for jobs os colliery officials. Some even went as far as achieving
qualificatioa to the status 01' what might be termed "shadow" colliery
minagrs. They were inca who chose, however, to remain within the ranks
of the non-aaiaried - workforeo.
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"We had men who were capable of running the pit,
who had. passed their certificates: Addiscott in
Hirwaun was one who was with me. If we'd have
had. that breakthrough we'd have got rid of all
them ex-officials of the Powell Duffryn see.
That was the change that was wanted. see; every-
body's sore point it was then. 	 -
"I remember working as a kid when ther were men
of 70 working underground, with big beards.
'iVait 'till nationalisation comes', they'd say,
but they had a great disappointment, because what
did you have? Closures",
However much this sense of "disappointment" may have become ex-
aggerated as a causal factor over the intervening years, there
can he little doubt that its existence at Tirherbert can have
done nothing to sweeten the relationship which existed between
the Lodge and the pit's new manager a The ramifications of the
"disappointment" theory are enormous. It could. have been used. at
the time to excuse almost any unconstitutional action and most
probably was by those articulate enough to have done so. Rarely,
if ever, is it mentioned. in contemporary reports or accounts of
strikes and go-slows, however. It is one of those intangible
and unquantifiable factors which may even have remained the pri-
vate property of a small number of sensitive and lively minds,
manifesting itself only during times of relative crisis or con-
frontation with a hostile management. Conversely, it may have
been common property but expressed with that same lack of arti-
culation which characterised most worker' expression of their
brand of class-consciousness. Whichever may have been the case,
it cannot be dismissed lightly as a possible contributory factor
to the high strike race which obtained within this sector of the
4-5. Recording of Tommy Howells, op. cii.
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coalfield.
The lenrhondda stay-down which followed closely on the heels
of that at Tirherbert appears to have been a less complex affair.
)-OO miners were laid, off when 21 colliers refused to surface for
just over two days in support of a protest by one of their number
for payment which he allegedly lost when his piecework production
was interrupted due to the necessity to remove ome timber from
his place of work. 6 Whilst the strikers were still below ground,
the Coal Board sum'narily dismissed them on the grounds that they
were infringing the Coal }ines Regulations 'by staying below in
excess of statutory hours. It was subsequently reported that
the Board's use of this ploy "proved a shock" to the strikers
and that it served as warning to all others who might have 'oeen
planning the use of similar tactics.k7
The dismissed men were reinstated only after they had given an
undertaking that they would not resort to irregular action in
the future. The ffijflr5 union, it was reported, welcomed this
attempt by the Board to improve pit discipline. 8 The sense of
"disappointment" mentioned at Tirherbert was more in evidence
at a dispute which occurrcd in Cefn Coed - a mine in the Dulais
Valley - shortly after the Tirherbert stay-downs Once again,
the Lodge at Cefn Coed was a strong and effective one, deeply
involved in the Shakespeare Hotel movement and demonstratably
capable of controlling its own membership. Its industrial re-
lations record had been good and the strike caused as much surprise
to the Area Union and Divisional Management as had. those at Tir-
1^6. C.G., 2.12.51^.
14.7. Ibid.
4.8. ibId.
298
herbert and (1enrhondda,
At Cefn Coed it centred upon the use which the Coal Board were
making of private contractors inside the pit. A Wimpey's drivage
team was enlarging the shaft su.mp and, in doing so, arousing
resentment on account of the fact that it was "being sent shot-
firers or any other experts" whenever it required them. 4-9
 This,
it was alleged, was delaying work in other parts of the colliery.
and. was thereby reducing earnings. The Lodge Minute Book records
that,
"It was unanimously agreed that (the Committee)
notify the Lodge over the microphone, that any
member who works a part or whole &riift in this
drivage from next Monday onwards will lose all
seniority in Cefn Coed. as far as the Lodge is
concerned".50
This was not enough for some of those suffering shortages of
helpers and equipment at the coal face however, and. 500 men struck
work in support of two daywage miners who refused to obey a mana-
gerial order for them to work with the Wimpey' a team. "Outrage"
was expressed. that the nationalised Coal Board should continue to
allow private companies to reap profits from the coal industry,
and the Lodge Committee declared that, henceforward, none of the
pit's workforce would be prepared. to place themselves ".... at
the beck and call of Wimpey whatever the outcornet.S1 The local
Miners' Agent visited the pit and declared his distaste for the
way in which the Coal Board. was continuing to hire private con-
tractors. After recommending the strikers to return to work, he
stated that, in his opinion, ' es.. the Wimpey problem was much too
1
4-9. Cefn Coed Lodge Minutes, 10.11.54-., U,C.S.
50. Ibid.
ci -
	 Thi.	 7'1	 C.C-.. P,1251.
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big a problem f or one Lodge to doa]. with .... "It must", he said,
"be tackled by the Union", adding that "Preference in all depart-
ment&' had been given to "Vimpey by the Board.52
The question of the use of private contractors continues to pro-
voke anger in the pits, even in 1 978, but in 1 954-, at a pit so
closely identified (as was Cefn Coed) with an unofficial move-
ment whose general aims were to push the Miners' S Executive
wards", the issue must have served as an excellent focus for any
expression of disappointment which may have been provoked by the
alleged shortcomings of nationalisation. At the very least, it
helped perpetuate a widespread feeling that the transformation
from private to public owneiship was somehow incomplete. The
editor of the "Colliery C-uardian" referred to it in his sunLrnary
of labour relations on the coalfield during the 12 months ending
in December, 1954.:
"This coalfield has long been a hotbed of discontent
• under the old regime", he wrote, "and while consider-
able improvement has taken place in labour relations
they are still disturbed by two factors:
Ci) old animosities which die hard, and
(2) the failure of the younger miners of today 	 -
to appreciate fully the real extent of the improve-
ment in their status. To far too many miners the NCB
is the old coalowner in disguise and a fair target for
all sorts of grievances. Above all, the miners in
South Wales, where the bulk of Parliamentary seats
are held by miners' nominees, are over-politically
minded and have too often 'taken it out of the coal
industry' where grievances concerning them have no
direct relation to their employment".53
52. Cefn Coed Lodge Minutes, 1 7.11 .54-.
53. C.., 6.i .55.
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By the definition of theColliery guardian's editor, the hottest
spot on this "bed of discontent" would almost certainly have been
that most "over-politically minded" of South Wales communities,
the Rhondda, and in mid-January, the Coal Board's Area Manager
presented himself at one of the Rhond.da's most militant pits -
Fernhill - ostensibly to open the newly constructed pithead.
baths. He did not however, miss the opportunity of using the
platform afforded him to condemn what he calleti "pettiness and
go-slow policies". He recomzneMed that the rzñner5 ".ta t2i.s'
silliness and give the Board a fair crack of the whip". 54
 He
must have been disappointed with the response which 'his speech
provoked however, for less than two months later, I ,000 Fernhill
miners embarked upon a 10-day strike over a dispute concerning
management's plans for allocating workplaces at a mechanised. face
which was just being broughtinto production.
It was the kind of dispute which was subsequently to cause pro-
b].ems at most pits where men maintained a strong Seniority Rule.
The members of the Divisional Board, for their part, desired that
afl. of their new and very costly coal-faces be manned by the
fittest and most able amongst their employees; but this invariably
meant that contraventions of the Seniority Rule would occur,
simply because the most senior men at the point of production
were not necessarily the fittest and most able. At Fernhill,
the Lodge demanded that it retain the power to veto aiy allocations
of places which management cared to make and the strike was called
off only after a compromise had been reached which the Lodge con-
sid.ered satisfactory.
5)4..	 hondda Guardian, 13.1 .55.
301
Worried, perhaps, by the almost farcical way in which unofficial
strikes followed directly upon pit-head bath pep-talks by Coal
Board officials, the Chairman of the S. Western Divisional Board,
David M. Rees, chose as the venue for his next "state of the
coalfield." speech a far less risky platform. At the annual con-
ference of the S. Western Division of the British Association
of Colliery Managers, he informed his audience that in 195k- there
had taken place some "501 stoppages and 271k incidents of res-
triction of output" in the pits of South lales. 55 There was,
he said, a "non-cooperative state of mind" in evidence which
threatened to "set at naught the efforts of the NCB to re-
constitute the South Wales coalfield". He made it clear how-
ever, that he thought that this non-cooperation was by no means
exclusive to the mineworkers. Colliery officials too, (though 	 -
not managers) were guilty of partaking in 'strikes and ca'canny
and men accepting the minimum as the maximum of their effort".
Neither were bad labour relations attributable to any one side,
he argued; they could be "minimised. by diplomacy and immediate
attention to difficulties and grievances". He criticised what
he termed "under-enterprise" on the part of management in not
taking the full opportunity presented them to mechanise. Less
than 2,g of the I ,000 working districts in S. Wales had been mech-
anised, he informed them, and that was "an absurdly low percetaget,56
The response of speakers representing the Colliery Managers was
somewhat predictable. Their Divisional Chairman announced that
55. Causing, between them, an estimated loss of 1k-i 8,000 tons of
coal. C.G, 31 .3.55.
56. Ibid.
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at no time had there been a greater need for "team spirit" in
the Division than was needed in 1955. He added that he believed
that wherever the Coal Board encountered "difficulties" with its
labour force it should be prepared to "correct and discipline
both men and management"; he did not however, specify which form
of discipline he envisaged being meted out to errant managers.
Rees' a decision to publicise his doubts concer1ing the handling
of industrial relations is indicative of the mounting concern
which the strikes provoked at all levels within the indu1stry.
So-called. "tit-for-tat" strikes, which by 955 vere relatively
commonplace, proved particularly worrying both to Divisional
Management and the union's Area Executive. A typical "tit-for-tat"
occurred at Bargoed Colliery during early April and involved
some 700 workers. It began vhen colliers in one district of the
pit struck work over a wage demand. Colliers in three other
districts left their place in sympathy and, in doing so, caused
the lay-off of about 400 day-wage men who, having been sent home,
lost their weekly bonus shift. The colliers decided to resume
work the next day only to find that the day-wage men, "incensed"
at being made idle the day before, had decided they would strike
58
and. cause the colliers to be laid off.
The final weeks of April witnessed a spate of go-slows and strikes,
including a stay-down at Pentremawr. In one week alone, no fewer
than 25 collieries were affected by such actions, most of them
f or short periods of time only, but the results were sufficient
enough to cause S. Wales miners' leaders to admit that the atrnoa-
58. Ibid., 1L-.4.55.
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phere in the coalfield was now "worse than at any time since
nationalisation" and that they were largely helpless to alter
it since the strikes were "mostly over small grievances and.
customs". 59 At the Miners' Annual Conference in May, Paynter
zieported that a "serious deterioration" had taken place in the
industry. He reported that the "tremendous and abounding hood-
will evinced in the early days of nationalisation" had been corn-
pletely lost. The loss of confidence in the NCB, he said, was
"one of the intangibles in the present situation"; the Divisional
Coal Board and the union had reached "many points of agreement
in the diagnosis as to what is wrong" but he had to report that
"concrete remedies" still eluded them.60
He referred the delegates to the so-called "What's Wrong" invest-
igation which had been carried. out jointly by the union and the
Coal Board in the pits of the Rhond.da Valley. It had produced.
no new findings. Stoppages were attributed largely to piece-
workers and the methods used for assessing their earnings. Other
major causes of dispute were the payment of guaranteed wage claims
and. the awarding of special allowances for working in abnormal
places at the coalface. But the investigation concluded that
the attitude of the "dominant sections" of the workmen towards
the Coal Board had changed in recent years. This, it claimed,
was due largely to their experience in dealing with disputes at
the place of' work. They had found that they were "able to secure
redress of their just grievances in many instances by taking or
threatening to take action". They were thus able to solve their
59. Ibid., 21.14.55.
60. SV!NbM., E.G. Minutes, A.C.R., 9-11.5.55.
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difficulties in this manner "when the Lodge Committee had. failed.
in the first stage of the conciliation machinery". This, in turn,
tended. to bring the conciliation machinery into "disrepute".61
The Chairman of the Groesfaen Lodge of the western Rhymney Valley
spoke for a great many other Lodge Committee men when he informed
the Conference that, in his opinion, the E,C. should give
".... much more serious consideration to this
question than what is contained in this report.
Lodge Officers and Committee men are being
pilloried in the Lodges on these issues",
and. he was of the view that the Area Executive Council should
ease the problems faced by Lodge Officers by supplying-them with
clearer instructions as to which course of action they should
adopt in the event of "illegal" actions occurring at their pits.62
The General Secretary of the S. Wales Miners, BiliCrews, was less
pessimistic, however. He dismissed the epidemic of strikes as
constituting no more than a "passing phase" and. he announced.
that proposals were "under examination" to try and improve re-
lations. In the meantime, he argued, the problem was to "restore
faith in the conciliation machinery 63
Echoing the statements of the Divisional Coal Board's Chairman
concerning the lack of mechanisation in S. Wales, Paynter high-
lighted the comparative backwardness in this respect of South
Wales:
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid. The sfleaker was Arthur Owens.
63. Ibid.
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"In the East Midlands .... there 18 127,900 yards
of face worked. with a manpower of about 90,000
compared with j08,220 yards worked. by 98,000 in
S. Wales and the rest of the Division. The number
of conveyor transfer and loading points in the
East Midlands are one and a half times as many as
in the S. Western Division with a lesser number
of men. In coal getting equipment the ratio-is
2:j, Machines, like money, flowed to increasing
returns. The reverse was also true. Returns
would also be realised in direct proportion to
the machines or outside agencies which were in-
troduced into the Division".6
Thest? statistics, claimed Paynter, did. much to explain the
differences between the Divisional productive standards and. he
proceeded to explain how poorly, in terms of production achieve-
ment, was the single most pop.ilar piece of machinery in Welsh pits,
the pneumatic drill. He informed, the delegates that the Executive
took the "gloomy view" that
"in absence of new manpower, the belated results
of reorganisation schemes and the ang mining
population, there is not much chance of a radical
improvement in productive results in this and
other Divisions"
*
The good. intentions expressed at the Conference became submerged,
almost immediately, by a renewal of unofficial action in the pits
of Cwaun-cae-gurwen and. the Upper-Swansea Valley. Co-slow tactics
•	 by the miners of Pvrllbach Colliery provoked the Coal Board into
$ The Rhigos Lodge, for example, successfully proposed. a resolution
calling for the extension of mechanisation in order that the re-
ulting high productivity might facilitate the reduction of the
miners' working day to seven hours for an underground. worker and
seven and a half for a surfaco worker.' Annual Conference Agenda,
May, 1955, p. 8.
64. C.0	 5.555.
-	 65. Ibid.
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issuin.g dismissal notices to 200 of the 4.50 working there.
The Coal Board claimed that the men .nvolved had been producing
only I ,500 tons per week when the normal output was 2,500 tons.
The miners, on the other hand, complained that in one part of
the colliery - a part which had not been mechanised. - certain
concessionary payments had been withdrawn. 66 Output was increased
however, and the dismissal notices withdrawn.
Once again, Paynter reacted to these events by supplementing
his attack on unofficial actions with concrete proposals f or the
removal of what hø believed to be the root causes of the men's
dissatisfaction. He called for the immediate introduction of a
new Wages Structure and an accompanying increase in minimum
stand.ard. rates. He wanted the implementation of a seven hour
day, five days a week; the reorganisation of production on the
coalfield. and. the introduction of fundamental changes in the
"structure of nationalisation within the industry". Mining, he
said, could only function effectively if it was operated to
"assist in the realisation of the wider socialisation of ind.ustry".6
Like the "good intentions" expressed at the Annual Conference,
Paynter's proposals passed largely over the heads of the un-
official strikers. At the Steer and East Collieries in Gwaun-
cae-gurwen, for example, 1 50 "blameless" daywage workers were
dismissed because a go-slow by faceworkers meant that there was
insufficient coal f or them to deal with in the haulage and surface
66. Ibid., 12.5.55.
67. S7NtJM., E.C. Minutes, A.D.C., 6.5.55.
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sctions. Output per manshift in the anthracite area was reported
to be as low as 10 cwt. (overall) as against an average of 18 cwt.
in the coalfield. as a whole. There were anthracite pits where
miners were reported to be "taking it easy" and. not suffering
for it
"financially because in many pits they enjoy
special allowances given years ago for working
in difficult places, which may amount to a half-
shift bonus a day, and although conditions may
have changed, they resent any tampering with
these allowances which it has become a "custom"
,, 68
to pay
A d.aywage increase of i1/6d., per week was paid out on May 12th
and. was followed, almost immediately, by loud grumbles from
pieceworkers who were concernd. that their wage differentials were
being eroded. The outlook for improved industrial relations was
gloomier than ever, but the Coal Board and the union nevertheless
managed to extract a crumb of comfort from the developments at
Pwllbach colliery where output had. been increased as a result of
the Board' a threats to sack 200 miners. It was announced, after
the cessation of the go-slow, that the 0.LS. had increased from
an average of 9-15 cwts. per faceworker to an average of 80-90 owts.
per day. In promoting this increase, the Coal Board. and. the
union had. persuaded the men to make all efforts to continue their
"diligent trend of cooperation and. effort;
to discuz grievances constitutionally; to
assist management in the allocation of labour
-	 and task assessment; to discuss with managment
any miner not pulling his weight; to consider
the allocation of suitable men for specific
jobs; to flU clean coal and to accept a con-
tinuous examination of all factors affecting output".69
t3. C.G., 19.5.55.
Afl	 Il)id	 26.5.55k
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The list of concessions reads like the script of an old anthra-
cite coalowner's favourite dream. Never, even in the darkest
days of the inter-war depression, would the miners of Pwllbach
or, indeed, of any of the other "self-respecting" anthracite
Lodges, have contemplated relinquishing such advantages to their
employers. And. yet, there was also an inevitability about the
way in which the Coal Board's terms wcre forced upon Pwllbach.
Time and. the development of monopoly ownersl4p had caught up
with the pit's style of trade unionism, f or mighty as Amalgamated
Anthracite (Pwllbach's old owners) had been, they were light-
weights compared to the National Coal Board. To its new owners,
Pwllbach was little more than one of a number of unproductive
and troublesome anthracite pits. It was hardly as large as a
single district of almost any one of the Board's Midlands pits;
its only justification for continued existence was the fact that
it produced anthracite. And anthracite was in high demand.
It required little contemporary insight to interpret the major
post-nationalisation developments of mining organisation as in-
dicating the impending demise of the more troublesome of the
small mines. In May 1955, the Pwllbach militants caught a whiff
of their own mortality. With the kind of resignation which acc-
ompanies a sane acceptance of inevitable defeat, they slunk into
line and began subscribing to a code of discipline which, they
were sure, awaited all other anthracite militants who desired.
to remain in the employ of the Board. But not all militants
displayed such perception. There were others who looked. upon
Pwllbach' s "step-down" with the kind of disdain which Wellington
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might have reserved for a particularly bright platoon of ex-
uniemployed working men which had decided to retreat at a crucial
stage of the battle of Waterloo. Amongst the moat disdainful
of these were the militants of Brynhenilys Colliery, an anthracite
pit which was situated just two miles upstream of Pwllbach,
near the village of Cwmllynfell - hardly shouting distance, in
fact, from that citadel of potential industrial Kamikazz, Cwaun-
cae-gurwen.
On iugust 12th, 1955, the Divisional Coal oarô. issed. notices
terminating contracts to 1 93 Brynhenhlys miners who, according
to the Board, had. between them been responsible for the loss of
some £3.5 millions in lost production during 195170 "This
decision" said the Coal Board in an official statement,
"follows a period in which every opportunity
has been provided for the men to improve their
O.M.. but it has remained persistently low".
The problems of Brynhe!llya had been subject to NUWNCB discussion
since 1952 and. in June, 1955, Paynter issued a special plea to
the Board in which he promised the cooperation of the miners in
return f or continued production at the colliery. For their part,
the miners agreed to the following undertakings.
( j ) That there should be a reassessment of tasks.
(2) Every man would work a full shift.
(3) The best men would be selected for special work.
(4.) The men would undertake to use the machinery to settle
disputed cases.
(5) There would be no restrictions of effort pending the settle-
ment of disputes.
70. Ibid., 18.8.55.
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The management undertook to open two new production faces, the
potential output of which was 150 tons per day. (at an overall
O.!LS. 15j cwta.) The actual results achieved fell far short of
this, however. Between July 18th and. August 13th, the average
daily output was 66 tons; the Face O.M.S., 15.7 cwts. and the
Overall O.M.S. 7.4. owts. 71 Restrictive practices were reported.
as being initiated amongst the following grades: Colliers,
Borers, Roadworkers, Pipe Turners, Coal Cuttermen, Conveyor
Fitters, Supplies Men and. Screenmen. The colliery Manager was
reported. as having "made representations to the Lodge Committee
on j2 occasions in 21 days on the effect of these restrictive
practices and the future of the colliery". 72
 The Lodge Officials
claimed that they had done all in their powers to persuade the
men to respond to the agreed list of undertakings but they were
forced to admit (at a meeting with the Area E.C.) that they had
been unable to get the workmen at the pit to do so. The E.C.
concluded that there "appeared to be no sense of responsibility
as far as the workmen were concerned" and that it was apparent
that no effort had been made to operate the Agreement arrived at.73
Paynter reported that the union could "do no more to assist the
Brynhenllys workmen" and warned the Pwllbach and Gwaun-cae-gurwen
members that unless there was a sustained improvement, they too,
faced a similar fate:
"We have", he said, "failed to control our men,
and the lack of discipline at the Brynhenliys Colliery
was such that men wider all pretexts decided on going-
slow or walking-out".74.
71. SYNtJM., LC. Minutes, A.D.C., 26.8.55. Although this represented.
less than half of the potential output and. 0.M.S., it was a good
deal better than tho 2 cwa. O.M.S. achieved during June.
72. Ibid.
73. load.
74.. Ibid.
311
Iowoverj he warned the employers that the union was not prepared
"to do the dirty work for the Board". The union's function, he
informed them, was "to protect the workmen and not manage the
pits"
After a great deal of deliberation, the Area E.G. resolved that
they would. do nothing further to assist the Brynhenllyz workmen
as they "had. refused to assist themselves"; inreply to which,
the Brynhe,xiLlys Lodge delegates complained that they had. "fallen
down" because "a small minority" of the pit's worki'orce were not
prepared. to carry out Lodge policy and they stated that they
believed that they were being used as "whipping boys" and that
the fate which was meted out to them would be "meted out to ad-
jacent collieries in the very near future". They concluded by
stating that it was their belief that "weak management" lay at
the root of the colliery's problems.6
At a separate Area Conference convened by the E.G. to discuss
the Brynhenllys issue, a stormy debate ensued between, on the one
hand, those who suspected an NCB conspiracy to rid the industry
of its militants and, on the other, those who resented the way
in which certain members refused to budge in a direction which
might be helpful to the union. The Abercrave Lodge delegate,
for example, reckoned that the NCB'a action was "political":
a mo;e designed
"to work for a policy of unemployment, thereby
creating a surplus of labour whichcould. be  used
as a lever against the working class people who
wore out for a decent standard of living".
75. Ibid.
76 Ibid
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He was backed by the Seven Sisters delegate and by the delegate
from the big Penrhiwcheiber Lodge who declared that the union
was "running away from the problem" and that the Board, even
if it determined on closure, should find work for the dismissed
men in other pits. Agreeing with this analysis, the Lodge dde-
gate of Wyllie colliery in Monmouthahire stressed how "unhelpful"
weak management could be. On the other hand, a number of speakers
rose to back the E.C's line that if the union failed to recognise
and. combat indiscipline then it was avoiding "a most important
problem". They emphasised that there should be a sense of
responsibility evident amongst the members in carrying out
union policy.77
This analysis was given further support by the speech delivered
to the Conference by Trevor James the Miners' Agent for the Area
in which Brynhenhlys was s ! tuated. He claimed that the trouble
was not political. There was, he said, '.... no wage dispute.
In fact, the rates paid (at Brynhenilys) were 2O above those
paid in the rest of the coalfield".
Attacking the spirit which, as he saw it, had provoked the
Brynhe3illys closure threat, be declared that it was
-	
".... only by the workmen in the pits in the
area having a sense of responsibility that the
canker which exists there can be removed".
Supporting Trevor James's analysis, Paynter reminded his audience
that, with regard to the possible employment of Brynhenilys men
at other pits in the area, the prospects were made more bleak than
they might have been by the ver-y strict application of the Seniority
Rul€ in the anthracite sector.
77. Ibid.
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The colliery closed on August 27th; 1 93 men were dismissed for
"go-slow, indiscipline and refusal to cooperate with management".
No provision was made for finding alternative work f or the dis-
missed men and a public warning was issued by the Board to the
miners at Pwllbach, Cwmllynfell and Giaun-cae-gurwen to the effect
that they, too, were "under close examination". 78
 Within four
weeks, the Coal Board began the operation of dismantling Bryn-
henhlys - in defiance of a last minute rescue attempt by 20
anthracite Lodges who claimed that the Chairman of the S. Western
Divisional Coal Board had informed various M.P's and members of
local authorities that if output in other anthracite pits 'iaa
improved he would consider reopening Brynhenilys.
The twenty Lodges had sent a joint delegation to Cardiff seeking
an interview with the union's Area E.C., but Paynter and his
fellow Executive members refused it on the grounds that the whole
protest movement was allegedly organised. by unofficial joint comm-
ittees operating contrary to the constitution of the miners'
union. In addition, Paynter claimed that flees had informed him
that he'd made none of the statements to M.P's and local author-
itios which had been attributed to him.79
The "unofficials" found. that they were not able to muster the
kind of mass support for Brynhenilys which they had succeeded in
mustering for Wern Tarw four years earlier. What active support
there was, was confined almost entirely to the anthracite sector.
Throughout the rest of the field there was prevalent a feeling
that, distasteful though the closure was, the Brynherllys men
78. CG., 1.9.55.
79. Ibid., 22.9.55.
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nevertheless had 'asked for it' by their intransigent behaviour.
The Coal Board can have had little reason for rejoicing however,
for the closure appears to have had no immediate impact as a
disciplinary measure. Stoppages occurred within weeks at Cwmllyn-
fell, Bargoed, Abercrave and. Duffryn Rhondda; indeed, by November
it was becoming clear that 1955 would enter the records as having
experienced the highest incidence of strikes and restrictions
since Vesting Day, 1 94.7. The bulk of these actions took place
in the pits of the Neath, Maesteg and Rhondda Areas but, as Table
Three and Figure One illustrate, ( pp .3i5-,j6 )they were by nO
means confined. to these Areas. A comparison of the 1954. and. 1955
figures shows that all Areas, except those of Swansea and Aber-
dare, experienced increases of 10 or more.
Not surprisingly however, both the Miners' Executive and. the Coal.
Board. chose to concentrate their anti-strike propaganda upon the
worst-offending Areas. Strikes in November at Glyncorrwg, Pare
and Dare, Cwm Llantwit and Wyndham (all situated in the Rhond.da
and Maesteg Areas) persuaded 1-lorner that he should undertake a
mission of peace. He journeyed from London to Meesteg where he
addressed a gathering of local miners in an attempt to rally the
workforce behind. the flag of discipline and unity. His choice
of tactic surprised almost everyone. Instead, of berating his
audience as he might have done, he congratulated them on helping
to produce the highest O.M.S. achieved on the coalfield since
nationalisation. Emphasising the heroic nature of their achieve-
ment, he declared that they had done it, ".... despite acute
80. This is clearly communicated in the minutes of the Coalfield
Conference on Br>rnhenllys; SWNrJM, E.G. Minutes, A.D.C., 26.8.55.
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labour shortages" and ho advised the members of the Coal Board
that if they wished to retain the "loyalty" evident in this
effort, they should grant an immediate rise in wages. This,
he claimed, would not only cut back the numbers of strikes, but
would serve also to attract "miners zone who have been put off
by the images of mining inherited from their fathers' experiences
during the inter-war period".
More predictable tactics were employed by Paynter and. the Ex-
ecutive Committee in their efforte to force back into line the
militants of Pwflbach, Cwmflynfell and Cwaun-cae-gurwen. They
sent down to that troubled area the three Executive officers most
likely to receive a sympathetic hearing from the erring militants:
Dai Dan Evans, Trevor James and David Francis; all of them ex-
anthracite miners and all of them intimately familiar with the
baroque nature of anthracite customs and practices. The Coal
Board, for its part, refused to open the newly-constructed pit-
head. baths at Givaun-cae-gurwen until evidence was forthcoming
82
of an increase in O.M.S. and of an improvement in labour relations.
Instead, of improving the situation however, the Board's action
precipitated an emergency meeting of the Swansea District of the
NUM at which the assembled delegates voted in favour of handing-
in strike notices in support of the District's demand that the
baths be opened. immediately. The delegates laid the blame for
the area's unofficial strikes upon the "delays" which, they all-
eged, "were occasioned in the settlement of claims under the
Wages Structure", and they condemned a recent decision of the
Board to close the Ynysarwed Colliery in the Neath Valley.83
81. Western Mail, 13.12.55.
82 • SWIIJM E • C Minutes, 8.11 .55.
83. Ibid., 22.11 .55.
The NUM's team of
	
Evans, James and Francis,
managed however, to avert the threatened strike by persuading the
Gwauri-cae-gurwen men to toe the union line in return f or the
opening of their baths. Neither they, nor their fellow Executive
members were able to effect a change in the Coal Board's attitude
towards the closure of Ynysarwed however, although the Board
were persuaded to ensure that all of the displaced men were found
jobs at other pits.
Evans, James and Francis managed to initiate a -debate within several
of the anthracite Lodges as to the best means of maintaining dis-
cipline amongst Lodge membership. They appear to have been de-
termined to persuade the Lodge Committees that the E.C. would
find its efforts to instil some kind of order amongst militants
infinitely easier if the Lodges were prepared to take a harder
line with their own dissidents. In response, the Committee at
Mountain Colliery drew up a et of proposals which declared that
any workmen
".... who take part in unofficial stoppages or
are the cause of cessation of work in future shall
be dealt with by the Lodge to the extent of having
such workmen downgraded" 85
Similarly unequivocal proposals were not forthcoming from the
most strike-prone Lodges however; they appear to have been more
preoccupied at this time with lobbying the E.C. in an effort to
pressurize it into changing its decision t& support the character
(if not the size) of the wage claim being negotiated during No-
vember and December by the union's national leaders.
81k. C.C., 2Z..j1.55. The colliery closed on November 19th because of
the exhaustion of its main areas of production and because ex-
cessive geological difficulties prevented the opening up of new areas.
85. SWNUM E.C. Minutes, 6.12.55.
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It was a claim which was concerned mainly with the earnings re-
ceived by d.aywagemen and. it was made palpably clear, at a coal-
field delegate conference called to discuss the issue, that there
were many Lodges which were upset that pieceworkers apparently
were being excluded from the proposed claim. 86 Speakers rep-
resenting Lodges located as far east as Celynen South and as
far west as Seven Sisters expressed worries that such an exclusion
would create greater "disunity" amongst the rank-and-file than
existed even at that moment. 8
 The E.C's line was defended by
Paynter in a speech which seems to have dispelled most of the
delegates' worries. They endorsed their leader's analysis over-
whelmingly and. the matter might have rested there but f or a
speech by Dick Beamish, de]egate from the Abercrave Lodge, member
of the Area Executive Committee and. a powerful, though sometimes
inconsistent, public orator.
He informed the Conference that, whilzt he and his Lodge supported
the attempts of Paynter and the E.G. to instigate a new Wages
Structure which would replace the anarchy of piecework earnings,
they nevertheless were of the view that the policy pursued by the
union during the post-nationalisation years was responsible for
the "apathy and frustration" which, he said, was prevalent amongst
the workforce at that time. He went on to assure his fellow E.G.
members and the rest of the Conference that, whilst the Abercrave
86. The Wages Agreement, signed on February 23rd 1 956, gave a rise
of 2/d., per shift to daywagemen. It raised the minimum rate
for an underground daywage worker to £9 Os. 6d., and for a
surface dayisage worker to £8 Os. 6d. C.G., 23.2.56.
87. This view was expressed most forcefully by delegates from Risca,
Croesfaen, Penrhiwceiber, S. Celyeri, Naval, Cefn Coed, Ferndale,
Seven Sistei; Cwmcarn, Bedwas and Merthyr Vale.
SWNUM Minutes, 19.12.55.
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members were not apathetic concerning questions relating to their
wages and conciliations, they nevertheless were
".... extremely frustrated in view of the fact
that the Union fails to support its demands by
aggressive action".88
It was a speech which echoed the sentiments of a great many other
delegates who, though they conducted themselves as loyal trade
unionists, nevertheless admitted to feeling confused and stymied
by their Executivs's insistence upon cultivating an image for
the union which was "respectable" rather than "awesome" in char-
acter, Beamish's frustration could be compared to that which
might be felt by a weightlifter, trapped in a locked room, who
is ordered by his companions to pick the lock of a door which he
knows he could smash open with ease.
88. Ibid.
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Old Divisions and New Alliances
i . A Primer: the Cambrian Walk-out
By February 1 956, negotiations were in progress between Paynter
and the Coal Board concerning the revision of piecework rates in
South Wales. The miners' leader pointed out the serious impact
of the last two wage agreements on piecework incentives:
minimum rates for pieceworkers have, in
the main", he said, "increased by £2 9s. 6d.,
a week. This has meant for a large number of
pieceworkers that the incentive has been either
wholly removed or substantially reduced".1
At a delegate conference, the Executive informed the members
that, whereas twelve months prior to the conference the under-
ground minimum was £7 i.5s., per week - when actual earnings of
coalface workers in S. Wales was around £12 178., per week - it
now stood at £10 L-s. Gd., per week whilst 4average face earnings
had altered little because of the absence of any revisions of
piecerates. The effect of this upward trend of the minimum rate
was that it had done little to encourage higher levels of prod-.
uct ion,
".... for in most cases the coalface worker
already earns well above the minimum .... Piece-
workers see this narrowing of their differential
compared with daywagemen and are discontented
about it'.
I . SWNUM, E.C.M., A.D.C., 26.2.56.
2. Ibid.
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The joint negotiations, designed to remedy this discontent, pro-
ceeded too slowly for the Maesteg and Rhondda militants, however.
A strike at Caerau over the non-payment of the weekly shift bonus
to colliers' helpers tripped off a series of unofficial actions
by pieceworkers w1-ich culminated in a walk-out by some 2,000
miners employed at the Cambrian Collieries, scene of the famous
disturbances of 1910-11 and. renowned as one of the coalfield's
most efficient and disciplined lodges.	 -
The walk-out was provoked, by the decision of the collieries'
general manager to send. home 226 of those of his employees whom
he accused of having undertaken a "go-slow" in' protest against
the continuance of an out-dated price-list for pieceworkers.
After four days, the strikers voted to continue their strike
and. to enlarge it by seedng support from other Rhondda Lodges.
The Lodge Chairman, Mr. V. Morgan, claimed at Tonypandy on
March 28th that the strike was a means of protesting at the
NCB's unwillingness to increase pjecworke	 wages consequent
upon the new daywage agreement. His members, declared Morgan,
felt that it was
"unfair to expect a coal hewer to expend so much
more effort than a day-wage man engaged in the
various auxiliary tasks unless his rates of pay
were increased proportionately".3
Within five days, seven major Lodges, representing some 8,000
men, struck work in sympathy with the Cambrian pieceworkers.
3. C.G., 5.)^.56.
1g.. The Lodges were Coed. Ely, Pernhill, G-lenrhondda, Lewis Merthyr,
Naval, Tydraw and Tymawr. It is interesting to note that amongst
those usually militant Lodges which refrained from striking was
Pare & Dare: - the result, perhaps, of Paynter's influence upon his
fellow Communists who were influential on the Pare & Dare coimnittee?
The Lodge inutes doprovide the relevant information,
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The Chairman of the Divisional Coal Board, D.M. Rees, declared
the action "irresponsible" and added, rather mysteriously, that
it would. not be tolerated, for there had. ".... never been a
'differential' as such between the pay of day-wage men and
pieceworker a". With better attendance, he declared, pieceworkers
could improve their pay and he pointed out that at Cambrian
Collieries, for example, the average earningaof pieceworkers
per shift since 1949 had risen from 38/9d., to55/9d. 0ver
the same period, day-wage men's earnings had risen, he said,
from 114/6d., to 19/8d.5
Startling though the contrasts in earnings may have appeared,
Rees's moral appeal cut little ice with the pieceworkers. They
returned to work only after Paynter had informed them at a gen-..
oral meeting in Tonypand.y that negotiations were in progress
f or a new wage structure for piecew'orkers and that in the mean-
time they should exercise the trade union discipline for which
-	 they were justly famous. The strike shook the miners' president,
however, as must the speed. with which the other Rhondda lodges
responded to the Cambrian request for support. The whole op-
eration smacked of the organizational skills of an unofficial
committee and the Cambrian lodge was, of course, as well-versed.
as any on the coalfield. in the matter of constructing unofficial
committees of workmen. During the 1930s the rejuvenated Cambrian
Combine Committee had. formed the most effective and. cohesive of
all of the workmen's groupings inside the Powell Duffryn empire.6
5. C.G-., 12.4.56.
6. See, above. Part One, Chapter 4.
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The Cambrian stoppage was quickly followed by a stay-down at
Maerdy which rendered idle some 2,000 men 7 and by a complex wages
dispute at the Maesteg collieries of Coeant and Cwmdu where
over I ,000 struck work. These were large-scale stoppages and
they provided a sombre backdrop to the 1 956 Annual Area Confer-
ence at which the Executive Committee made its most concerted
effort since nationalisation to install some order and discipline
amongst the more strike-prone of the union's members. A special
section of the Annual Report was devoted, to the findings of a
joint NtJM/NGB investigative survey of unofficial stoppages and
it opened with a declaration to the effect that unofficial stop-
pages would
'.... probably be with us as long as mining operations
.continue in this country",
and it set out its conclusions in a tone which was not
overly-censorious, although it emphasised. that,
"In recent years .... this question has acquired a
most mischievous turn. Serious disunity has been
evinced in our ranks as a result of unilateral action
taken by small groups of men".
The report went on to point out that it would have been idle to
suggest that these men had no grievance:
"No man will willingly act in this way without
some cause. Sometimes it is not easy to find, an
adequate reason for such actions. However, we must
be cognisarit of the fact that it is always much
easier for men removed from the seat of oper-
ationa to be objective in their ana;Lysis of a
situation but it is xot quite so easy for men
who are constantly at the scene of operations".
7. Twenty two Maerdy miners stayed-down for i 6 hours to protest against the
velocity of the air which management ordered to be blown through the
2' 9fl face. Conditions at the face were damp and. it was impossible to
ecit there dririj th3 mid-shift break. C.G .. j9.1...56.
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In the same sympathetic vein, the Report's authors stressed that
although the actual stoppages often occurred over trivial matters,
they nevertheless were usually the results of whole series of
"irritations":
"So many factors of complexity intrude
themselves on the scene' that makes it difficult
of analysis and remeciye It 'iould be wrong for
either side in this industry to proclaim its
virtuosity in this connection. It would.be
doubly wrong for the Simon Pure pundits of
the press and the general public to pretend
that they have a solution in hand.
"In this extractive industry where conditions are
continuously changing, and so much iroisaticn
had to be adopted, it is extremely difficult to
apply ready-mad.e remedies".
Nevertheless, the Report emphasised that almost three-quarters
of one million tons had. been lost through strikes and restrictions
during 1 955 and it claimed that the loss had not been evenly spread
throughout the coalfield.: the vast majority of stoppages and re-
strictions had taken place "in a few collieries in each Area"
and. notably in the Areas of Maesteg, Rhondd.a and Neath. (see
Figure One, Chapter 13, p. 316) To deal with these "isolated
pockets" whose actions were "impairing the authority of the Union
at all levels", the Executive proposed that conciliation machinery
be improved with the aim of expediting settlement of disputes;
that the N.E.C. of the union should strive to speed up a new
wages structure for pieceworkers and. that in the meantime the
Area Executive should endeavour to improve price lists. The
standard and maintenance of equipment for mechanised. mining should.
be improved., "so as to reduce the number of disputes arising from
breakdowns" and the status of colliery managers should be improved,
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"in order that bhey may be able more effectively to deal with
disputes without recourse to their superiors". In return, the
Report suggested that managers adopt a more reasonable and sym-
pathetic attitude towards the complaints of the men and it went
on to argue that the Coal Board should undertake a campaign among
its technical staff in an endeavour to "secure a more widespread
understanding of the terms of industrial agreements entered into
between the Board and the Union". For its part, the Union should
undertake an
"intensive campaign to improve discipline in
it own ranks; that the miners be told that
the services of miners' agents and the executive
committee cannot be used. to resolve dIsputes in
the case of men who embark on unofficial action,
until they return to work"
As was the established pattern at previous conferences, few dele-
gates rose to question or oppose the E.C.'s proposals. They were
carried overwhelmingly after a discussion in which successive
speakers emphasised the discontent amongst piecerate-workers.
It was obvious to all present that the real test of the coalfield's
support for the executive's proposals would come during the months
which followed. In the meantime however, there were e number
of conference delegates, prominent members of the unofficial
groupings, who sought more devious means of forcing an open con-
frontation with the less "progressive" wing of the Area Executive.
Scattered amongst the Conference resolutions which criticised the
behaviour of the British Covernment in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and.
the Pacific atomic testing ranges was one from the Seven Sisters
Lodge which called upon conference to:
8. SWNUM, A.C.L, 1956, pp. 91.-97
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".... agree to put an end. to the policy now
pursued by the Labour Party, that is, of pro-
scribing other organisations that are consistently
fighting for peace and progress in the living
standards of the workers, We are of the view",
it continued, "that all organisations who oppose
the Tory Party and all that it stands f or,
should unite in order to remove them from power,
so that the Labour Movement can then go forward
to realise the aspirations of the pioneers of
Socialism". 9	-
The resolution provoked yet another scuffle in the Communist
Party's ongoing campaign for an end of the bans and proscriptions
which excluded. Communists from membership of the Labour Party.
Like most of the previous scuffles, it ended in defeat for the
Communists but it is doubtful if the resolution's proposers had
seriously considered winning in the first place. Having learned
from past experience that their social democratic opponents were
capable. of blocking anything which smacked of Communist heresy,
they were more likely intent upon isolating the Executive' s fore-
most Labourites in order that the latter might clearly be iden-
tified as belonging to that same camp from whence emerged (or so
the "unofficials" amongst the Communists claimed.) the dubious
creed of "industrial collaboration" and the stuitefying dullness
of trade union "constitutionalism".
It proved however, to be the Communists' last major opportunity
to taunt their Labour opponents in this fashion, for during the
9. Ibid., "Agenda", p. 14..
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following Autu they were to see their political credit whither
at an alarming rate as news arrived of the shattering events in
Poland and. Hungary. But those events lay in the future. For the
moment, they were able to sit back and listen as Paynter (who
was 300fl to allow his membership of the Communist Party to lapse)
informed the Annual Conference that "precipitate action" was
growing and weakening the union in its task of prosecuting the
fight for vital and major reforms. Any semblance of unity within
the miners' Lodges, he said had been "completely destroyed.' and
he went on to claim that elected. leadership was being ignored:
".... the general interest of the miners' union
organisation and. policy counted for nothing s
 the selfish
interest of the few being regarded as paramount".
Ho advised. the miners to "back the union and abandon unofficial
action" and. he emphasised the urgency of his plea by adding a
warning that the first signs were in evidence of a drop in the
demand for coal. There were, he said, large numbers of American
miners unemployed and he reminded the assembled delegates that
competition for diinishing markets was becoming more intense.10
Forewarned, the delegates returned to their pits and were faced.
with as many piecerate-induced problems as before the Conference
began. Once again, Paynter attempted to ease their worries by	 I
declaring that the S. Wales Miners' Union would proceed forth-
with with a claim for increased. wages to "effect the attack upon
real wages by the Tory Government arid, to
secure a substantially higher standard of
living for all miners and. their families"
iO. C.c., 3.5.56.
11. SNUM., A.D.C., Minutes, 4.5.56.
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His word.s had little effect. The month of May brought with it
major stoppages in the Amman, Dulais and Rhondda Valleys as well
as in the Maesteg Area, Towards the end of the second week,
the Divisional Coal Board announced that it was prepared no
longer to stand by and. watch as production was constantly inter-
rupted. by what it termed its three "Black Areas" •1 2 Its members
agreed that what was needed was some drastic urgery. The most
strike-prone of the coalfield's workforces, those of the East
and Steer pits at C-waun-cae--gurwen, were to be dismissed. By
this act, the Board hoped to cut its financial losses, rid it-
self of a most undisciplined set of employees and hcw the rBst
of the workforce that its warnings were more then empty rhetoric.
The controversy which the announcement provoked within the miners'
union was both serious and lcng-lasting. Small pits, like
Brynhezillys, had. already suffered similar fates and. it had. long
been apparent that the Board was prepared, if needs be, to drag
down a large and. powerful Lodge. Ccinciding, as it did, with
the first signs of the impending decline in the demand for coal,
the closure proved to be a significant turning point in labour
relations on the coalfiold. The thirteen years which followed
were to witness the most dramatic of aU of the declines yet
suffered by the South Wales mining industry and, as the industry
' declined, so too did. the collective self-confidence of the mine-
workers.
12. i.e., the Rhoncida, Maesteg and Neath areas.
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2. The Closure of East and Steer Pits, Cwaun-cae-'gurwen.
Delegates from all of the coalfield's Lodges gathered at the
windy seaside resort of Porthcawl on Monday, May 14.th, 1956, to
discuss the East and Steer closures. Paynter addressed the gath-
ering and described it as "one of the most serious" to have been
held in "the last 25 years". We informed the delegates that he
could not recall a time when a Conference had been convened to
consider the closure of a colliery allegedly bcause of labour
troubles. So serious were the implications of the Board's de-
oison, he said, that he had decided to ".... place before Con-
ference objectively the facts of this situation", and he proceeded
to give an outline of the events (leading up to the closures)
which, in the main, differed very little from that made public
by the Coal Board.
He reminded the delegates that there had been a long history of
trouble at East and Steer Collieries. Both had been closed in
i91 8 for a short time owing to retrictive practices; and in
j9l9, Steer was closed for a year and a half. In both cases,
reopenings were granted only when the men agreed that they would
cooperate with management in carrying out their allotted tasks.
	 *
In 1955, both pits were amongst those which previously had shown
unsatisfactory results and which therefore, had been made subject
to exatination by the joint NUM/NCB Investigating Committee.
It was found that, in 1955, no fewer than L4.7 stoppages or "go-
slows" had occurred at the two pits, and that If more had occurred
during the first four months of 1 956, culminating in an unofficial
strike (upon which the men had been engaged since April 21+th) in
support of two pit-bottom tram-shacklers from Steer whom the Board
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accused of pracbicing repeated ca canny. The strike had. spread
to eight other collieries in the Amman Valley although seven had
since returned to work in response to the advice of their local
union officials. Only Steer, East and Cwmgorse remained, out at
the time of the Conference.
The Miners' President pointed out that output per manshift at
these pits had. been consistently far below the average for the
Division as a whole and he alleged that the workforces had re-
fused to
"honour agreements made on their behalf
nor have they followed the advice of their
Union. They have not made use of their
conciliation machinery" . 3
The Divisional Board. members had declared. that they saw no sign
of improvement and. that, "aftr repeated trials over a period
of nearly ten years", they felt that they were "no longer just-
if ied" in continuing to work the East and. Steer pits.
Paynter laid a great deal of emphasis upon the Board's declaration
of regret:
"During the whole of this period", he said,
"the Board have been fully aware of the effect
of closure on the supply of coal and of the
social consequences for the men themselves and
the community dependent on the pits. They have,
therefore, only reached their decision after
the most careful consideration arid, with great regret".5
13. S;VNtJL, A.D.C.M., j4.5.56.
14-. Ibid.
15. Ibid..
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The shoekJ_ers' go-slow, which provoked, the Coal Board's decision,
was only the most recent of an exceedingly long list of simflar
actions tindertaken by the men at Steer and East. A typical ax-
ample of ca'canny, it is worth careful analysis, for it explains
much about the scenario within which it 'was possible for I ,065
men to enact 4.7 stoppages or go-slows in a single year.
Prior to the introduction of the Wages Structu'e f or daywage-men
in 1955, the ahacklers at Steer were in receipt of their normal
shift rates plus a i-shift allowance per shift for handling
tonnage ±12 exeess of the norirz. The East pit .shacklers, on the
other hand, were in receipt of the day rates in accordance with
the Conciliation Board Agreement f or an agreed norm, plus I d.,
per ton f or tonnages handled in excess of the norm. In both
instances, for the basic tonrfsge, these men were in receipt of
their five shjfts at the normal rates plus a bonus payment at
their shift rate, When the new Wages Structure was introduced
however, a dispute arose in respect of the assimilation of these
men. The Board's representatives contended. that they were day-
wage men and that they should be assimilated into their proper
grade and their wages consolidated in accordance with the pro-
visions of the new Wages Structure. The Lodge Committee however, 	 -
contended that the shacklers were piece-rate workers and sub-
mitted a claim along these lines to the National Joint Negotiating
Committee which, in turn, rejected it by ruling that the men were
daywage workers and should be paid. accordingly.
In the meantine, the Miners' Agent had met the Board's Area
Labour Officer and, in July 1955, an agreement had. been made
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whereby these men would be deemed to be piece-rate workers -
au agreement which was abrogated by the decision of the National
Negotiating Committee. Confronted with this confusion, the
shacklers at Steer became "extremely dissatisfied" and began
to go slow in January, 1 956. Management alleged that they
participated in this kind of action fifteen times during the
following four months.
As early as 194-8, both union and. management had recognised that
such problems as these were directly attributable to the anarchic
wage structure which obtained at the two pits. The Board members
alleged that the rate of wages bore little relation to the effort
of the men and therefore they desired that a "proper" wage truc-
ture be introduced at the collieries whereby the men would be
paid. "in accordance with theitems of work performed by them
in their piecework contracts or in their price lists". In add-
ition, the Board. members made it clear that they would endeavour
to take away from the daywage men those extra payments which
they received in excess of the rates contained in the Concil-
iation Board Agreement i 6
The work of transforming the wages structure was entrusted in
194-8 to three "umpires" who, after they had investigated existing
conditions, submitted a register of new rates and. price lists
which the miners of Steer and East refused to operate and which
consequently provoked. a series of go-slows. The union' a Area
Executive Committee found itself with no alternative but to
press the workmen to accept the terms of the findings as they
1 6. Ibid. See, also, Chapter 11, above.
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hed been made under the provisions of' the Conciliation Machinery.
Go-slows and strikes ensued, but, ultimately, the terms were
accepted with only minor adjustments.
The reopening of Steer after the closure of 191+9-50 was subject
to the men's acceptance of yet another list of strict terms which
had been drawn up after prolonged discussions between the Board
and the Union. Similar to that which was accepted by the Pwllbach
workforce, it cut deep into the layers of custom and practice1
17. The list was as follows:
"1. There should be a complete reassessment of tasks which must be
agreed by management and workmen before work is resumed.
2. Where a workman consistently fails to complete the allotted
-	 task, his contract of service shall be terminated by the man-
agement, subject to the right of appeal by the individual
under Conciliation procedure.
3. The price lists and Awards already made in respect of conveyor,
shif'ting, packing, road formation, water infusion and repairing
shall apply on resumption of work.
4.. All grades of labour not covered by the above price lists or
Awards shall be paid Conciliation Board rates.
5. All shift allowances and other forms of enhanced. payment pre-
viously made will be discontinued and no payment should be
made for the dual jobs performed during a shift by one individual,
except when covered by the Conciliation Board Agreement.
6. The workmen must agree to submit to the discipline of the man-
agement, that is, they will pledge themselves to comply with
all reasonable instructions given to them by the management
in the course of operations and the Workmen's representatives
will not support the case of any workmen who fail to do so.
7. The workmen will recognise the right of management to select
-	 men for special jobs.
8. The re-employment of labour must be done in such a manner as
not to reduce the output now obtained from collieries where
they are now employed."
Ibid.
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but it ushered in a period of (relative) industrial peace, the
like of which was experienced rarely at Givaun-cae-gurwen and
which lasted until 1 95) when the position began to drift back
to pre-j 94.8 conditions. The incidence of strikes and go-slows
increased considerably; "stints" were re-established1 8 and pro-
ductivity began to fall off.
Faynter, for one, did not attribute this drift entirely to a lack
of discipline amongst the workmen. He pointed out to the Porth-
cawl Conference in 1956 the fact that serious and difficult geo-
logical conditions obtained at the collieries anI that wmany
had been revealed in management. Like the members
of the Coal Board, however, he chose not to dwell upon these pro-
blems but concentrated, instead, upon the theme of labour relations.
His address to the delegatesresemhled. that which a coroner might
have delivered to the relatives of a recently deceased reprobate
whom they nevertheless had secretly loved for his outrageous ways
and. flamb*oyant disregard of authority. Miners' Agents, he said,
had addressed
mass meeting after mass meeting of the men
urging that a more balanced attitude be adopted
at the pit".
But all was to no effect. Like other anthracite Lodges, the
Steer and East men ".... did not avail themselves" of the opp-
ortunity to revise their systems of payment and chose, instead,
to reject the advice of the union's official and. to continue
"under the old. anarchic wage structure" ,19
18. The "stint", or "stent", in this case refers to the practice
amongst colliers of agreeing amongst themselves as to what
constituted a suitable shift' a work - say, for example, clearing
only a certain tonnage of coal - and refusing or conspiring to
do no more than that agreed amount.
j9. S\VNIJM., A.D.C.M., 14..5.56.
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The mthers' president went on to emphasise how ineffective the
tactic of "go-slowing" had become. He claimed that it had
failed to produce any results during the post-1953 period:
"After each instance of go-slow the workmen have returned to
work on their previous conditions"; and he declared that this was
true, not only of Cwaun-cae-gurwen, but also of all other coil-
ierios in South Wales. With the solemnity of an admonishing
coroner, he warned his audience that the sins and. excesses of
Steer and East were not lacking amongst those workforces which
survived; indeed, he went as far as to warn the delegetez of
the dangers of flirting with those agencies which, as he saw it,
had, done most to encourage the downfall of the twin Lodges,
namely the unofficial groups. such as that which drank and plotted
at the Shakespeare Hotel. The problem confronting the post-
mortem Conference was, he declared, that of roring for the
unIon "some measur€ of discipline and. loyalty to decisions by
it members", and. be ended his address by appealing to the dele-
gates "to be sober in their consideration and. contributions in
this very serious matter".
In compliance with their leader' a requests, subsequent speakers
said nothing outrageous - unless a comparison made by a Mr. Tom
Dutton could. thus be described; in supporting the case put by
Paynter, he declared. that the President was "placed in a similar
position to the Prime Minister in relation to the Commander Crabb
episode". 2° The Qwaun-cae-gurwen Lodge was not yet a headless
corpse, however, though it was indeed an acute embarrassment.
20. Ibid.
33 7•
Its Chairman and Secretary,21 not surprisingly, pleaded "bad
management" as the cause of the pits' troubles. They claimed
that colliery officials had not changed their attitudes since
the days of private ownership: the Lodge Chairman alleged, for
example, that management would
".... go behind the back of the lodge committee
and. concede allowances to men which they had re-
fused to the lodge committee across the table".
This, he claimed,
"under-mined the authority of the lodge committee
and the status of the Union at the pit, as men
were able to obtain better settlements by taking
their own actions than by reference of the dispute
to the Conciliation Machinery.
he said, "rose sharply during this
period and output fell in a corresponding manner".
Both the Chairman and Secretary claimed that productivity had
fallen
".... because of the physical conditions which
had been brought about by the policy of the
Board in seeking output at the expense of good
mining practice".
This was a complaint which surfaced time and again in dispute
reports and it is hardly surprising that it should do so. The
introduction of new working methods in pits where the retention
of custom and. practice was strong almost inevitably resulted in
conflict; not only because miners were physically displaced from
their working places, but also because older miners frequently
of
experienced a sense/attachment to the techniques with which they
were most familiar for winning the coal. Neither was thi merely
21 • W.H. Thomas and Cliff Harry, respectively.
338
a display of obstinate conservatism. There is ample evidence
which points to there having been tremendous technical diff-
iou].ties hampering the mechanization of the idiosyncratic seams
of many S. Wales pits: reports of machines sinking hopelessly
deep into the soft floors of anthracite faces; of machines re-
peatedly becoming entombed within the debris of roof falls in
"shallow" drifts like that at Tirherbert; and of machines rendered
useless because of frequent "wash-outs" in the seams of the central
and western sectors. 22
 There is, in addition, the allied and
more complex problem of assertaining the extent to which suco-
esaful mechanisation was hampered by the refusal of the Board to
invest sufficient capital in terms of the hardware necessary to
provide a consistent back-up to the relatively small numbers of
machines which were in service in the pits of S. Wales in 1956,
At East pit, for example, theLodge Chairman complained that there
existed a lack of supplies, '.... particularly in respect of the
MacLain tippler"; the clearance of coal at pit bottom was too
slow, he added, and there was a need for an automatic ram to push
out the empties from the cage and fot' a system r*1 iioXd tart
materials necessary for the pit's conveyor face. 23
 Similar de-
ficiencies were reported in the Area NUM's Annual Report f or 1956
22. At both the Steer and East pits, for example, the seams were
described by Pay-nter as "extremely difficult": "Considerable
clod overlays the (Big Vein) seam and it .... comes down in
huge stones making it difficult to clear the stints".
NUM (S.W.A.) Minutes: A.D.C., 14.5.56. p. 455
Good sources for information of this nature are
I • the "Mechanisation Journal For Management", published
monthly by the NCB, and
2. the Reports of the Inspectors of Mines.
(Both government and union inspectorates).
23. SWNUM., E.C. Minutes: A.D.C., 14.5.56.
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as obtaining in pits right across the coalfield. So obvious and.
frequent were they, in fact, that increasingly they came to be
explained away (as, indeed, was the backward overall position
of mechanization in S. Wales) as being the result of a "political"
decision by the Board to phase-out mining in coalfields known to
contain workforces which were particularly prone to take tex
treme" action in defence of their established custom and prac-
tice. No one at the Porthcawl "post-mortem" Crnference was under
any illusion however, that mechanization, or the la'ck of it,
constituted the main problem at Gwaun-cae-gurwen. Delegate afte:?
delegate stressed. the need for the ast and steer wor'kmen to
envelope themselves within the cloak of discipline offered them
by their elected Executive. Some speakers made no attempt to
disguise their impatience with the "prima-donna" attitudes ad-
opted by the dismissed workmeh. Mike Griffin, delegate of the strong
Penrhiwceiber Lodge of the Aberdare Valley, for example, said.
that although he supported the Executive's analysis of the Gwaun-
cae-gurwen situation, he was obliged to ask himself the question
as to why such occurrences took place "only in one part of this
coalfield.". There were, he said, men in every colliery who ad-
opted go-slows or took other forms of unofficial action, but the
mid-anthracite men were somehow different and. he ventured to
suggest that the situation which obtained at.Cwaun-cae-gurwen
was "symptomatic of a disease which has descended. upon the pits
in West Wales". He informed the delegates that his members in
Penrhiwceiber felt that the anthracite miners were being treated.
"more favourably than in other parts of the coalfield." and he
added that it was his opinion that "Men employed by the same em-
ployer should be treated in the same way throughout the coalfield.
and the men in the West had no right to expect anything different" .
Griffin, like many others in the sectors which lay to the east
of the anthracite, resented the fact that earnings in these sec-
tors lagged behind those of the West. He emphasised this with
an astute observation regarding the nature of the Union's pro-
posals f or revising the systems of payment to pieceworkers. He
said. that it made no sense to argue, as the union was doing in
1956, that what was needed was a revised piecework wage struc-
ture, for such an argument failed to take into account the wide
differentials which existed between the earnings of' pieceworkers
in the anthracite and non-anthracite sectors:
"A piecework structure", he remined his fellow
delegates, "would establish for men throughout
the coalfield. an equal wage for equal effort,
and if this were done then the men of West Wales
would secure a substantial reduction in the wages
paid to them, or the men in the other parts of
the coalfield. would. receive a substantial increase".
Griffin' & words amplified \e sense of immediacy wuiic'rx Paynter
had. long been struggling to impart to coalfield. audiences in his
advocacy of' more effective working solidarity which, as he saw it,
would develop naturally from the eradication of pieceworking
and. the substitution, in it place, of a uniform Wages Structure
covering all facets of pit work in all geographical Divisions.
Paynter responded at the Porthcawl Conference by announcing that
he was "pleased with the tone of the discussion" and with the
fact that the delegates had "realised the seriousness" of the
position. He went on to emphasise that the poac-riationalisation
24. Tha.d.
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gains which the union had. inede brought with them "responsibilities",
some of which entailed the need for large sections of the work-
force to engage in a radical re-assessment of some of their most
basic concepts concerning industrial relations. These "respon-
sibilities" were, in fact, the price to be paid for increased
control":
recent years", he said, the union" had taken
away from the Board the main punitive actions which
they previously took against workmen for such actions.
In the first place, we have established the uncon-
ditional minimum. Men are being paid the minimum
vTage in this coalfield despite the fact that they
perform very little work when they are going-slow.
he continued, "we have taken from the Board
by agreement with them their right to prosecute men
for-breaches of contract which means that the man is
guaranteed his wage and. also avoids punishment for
the breach which he commits..
ifl the circumstances, the only door open to manage-
ment is to terminate the contracts of the men if
they refuse to carry out the agreements between
the Board and. the Union. It could, therefore,
readily be uiiderstood as to why the Board is taking
,,25the action it is up and. down this coalfield
He argued that the union should concentrate on its "own deficiencies"
and endeavour to correct them "rather than look for the mote in
the other person' a eye"; although he reminded the delegates that
this did not preclude "constructive criticism" of the Board's
activities, provided that is, that the criticism was approached.
"intelligently". He dismissed the isolated calls for strike
action in support of the C-waun-cae-gurwen Lodez, arguing that
it would be impossible for the union to organise a strike '
issue for three reasons:
-	 25. Ibid.
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I • The position at Gwaun-cae-gurwen was largely indefen-
sible. The workmen at the collieries had refused to
give the union a platform to defend them.
2. To indulge in strike action on this issue, he argued,
would disunite the coalfield from top to bottom.
3. Strike action had not been used as a weapon in the
struggle in this coalfield for a q .urter of a century
and he was of the view that to engage in such action
would call for much patient explanation in S. gales
as a very large percentage of the union's membership
had not been involved in such a struggle before.
Instead, he advocated support for a series of negotiations which
he had instigated and which were designed to secure a reopening
of East and Steer He expressed a hope that the workmen of G-waun-
cae-gurwen would "respond to the call of the Conference and give
to the Area Executive Committee the platform to keep the collieries
in production". For its part, the Conference backed him unan-
ixaous].y and authorised. him to proceed in any way he deemed fit to
secure a continuation of work at the pits. Thus armed, he pro-
ceeded to Gwaun-cae-gurwen where, on Sunday April 20th, he add-
ressed a general meeting and reported that discussions with the
Board had indicated that there was a slight chance of saving the
collieries. He informed the men "bluntly" that they had placed
the union in the "most invidious position experienced over the last
quarter centuryt26 and, after a lengthy debate, the general meeting
acknowledged that there had, indeed, been serious indiscipline by
sections of workmen and that agreements and negotiating machinery
had been disregarded, leading to 2on-cooperat ion and low standards
of production. It was area, therefore, that the meeting should
26. SVJNtJM., E.C.M,, 24.5.56.
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instruct the Lodge Committee to im plement a 8et of decisions
which fulfilled their President's requirements. This included
a joint re-assessment of tasks, an automatic withdrawal of union
support for any workman who "refuses reasonably to undertake the
tasks jointly decided upon", and a provision whereby any work-
man who engaged in go-slows or strikes in defiance of the Lodge
Committee would be "withdrawn from their job and demoted for a
period of time to be determined by the lodge committee and. man-
agement" 27
During his subsequent discussions with the employers however,
Paynter was informed, "des pite áU .... pleadings", that the
Board would not accept the assurances of the East and Steer workers
and. the Board Members informed him that they considered. that any
assurances made on behalf of the G-waun-cae-gurwen men were not
wxth the paper on which they were written" 28
 Prolonged negc.-
tiations ensued which resulted in the Board issuing a statement
declaring that they were not prepared to withdraw the dismissal
notices, but would open one face in each pit and. jointly with
the Union establish a cycle of operations which would. raise face
and other standards to a satisfactory level. Once reasonable
standards were established to the satisfaction of both parties,
other faces in both pits would be progressively opened, on the
same conditions, until all the men had. been absorbed.29
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. NUM/NCB, South Western Division, epôrt of the Joint NIJM
and NCB Assessors on matters appertaining at East and. Steer
Collieries, Gwaun-cae-gurwen, Neath, September, 1956. U.C.S.
344
David Francis and G-lyn Williams, for the Union, and S.J. Skithnore
arid D.J. Llewellyn, for the NCB, were appointed as wnpires and
observers jointly charged with the work of examining customs
and practices and with re-assessing tasks at the collieries.
Later, they assumed the responsibility of ensuring that the actual
set tasks were being complied with and the recommendations imple-
mented.. ProdUctivity improved, though not bythe amount pre-
dicted by the Coal Board. The umpires confirmed many of the
technical arid geological difficulties which the workmen had
spoken of during the Forthcawl debate and it increasingly be-
came apparent that a great deal of capital investment was needed
to transform the pits into efficient productive units. Conse-
quently, equipment was obtained from other parts of the coal-
field and from the manufacturers. Workmen were sent to other
collieries to be trained as cutting machine operators and much
experimental work was accomplished with the cooperation of the
30
workmen and technicians.
The umpires emphasised in their reports that the conditions which
they encountered exposed a position riddled with cases of non-
cooperation, low standards, irregular working, lack of organ-
isation and a prevailing low level of morale - all of which,
apparently, had existed f or a long time. They reported that
neither the workmen nor officials had a proper conception of cyclic
30. Method study observers were brought in to study the surface
circuits and haulage problems. Lodge Officers and 1anagement
visited Bedwas Colliery to see pulsed influsion blasting in
operation and immediate action was taken to try out this pro-
cess at East & Steer. In addition, research work was stepped
up into problems associated with roof control, dust suppression
and. coal preparation.
Ibid., p. 11.
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working and the organisation and. discipline required to make
it a success. There was, they agreed, little wonder that the
Divisional Board's request for increased productivity and a
thorough, re-assessment of tasks should have highlighted so many
failures in colliery organisation, machinery, roof control and
"human relations". As a result of the joint actions by the Board
and Union, the umpires were able to report that improvements
came about "graduallf as problems were solved-and recommendations
implemented. By late August they observed that conditions on
many of the coal faces "bore little resemblance to those that
appertained. at the tinie of the first assessments
This level of union cooperation was extended even to the point
where it aided the dismantling of some of the most cherished
and "humane" of the mon's customs and practices, including the
system whereby face workers pooled their earnings in the East
Pit so that there was, on pay day, an equal shareout amongst all
men working at the coal face. The umpires recommended. that this
system should be replaced by one which required that the levels
of wages be based upon individual effort. Their recommendation
was implemented and. extended to cover similar practices amongst
other categories of workmen. Initially, it met with some oppo-
sition and, "in certain isolated cases", it provoked some kind
of undisclosed "arbitrary action" from the men, but the umpires
reported that this had been dealt with satisfactorily by Lodge
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Officials and Management.
31. Ibid., p. 12.
32. Ibid., p. •t1
36.
By late Summer, the Coal Board can have entertained little doubt
as to the honourable intentions of the Executive Committee of
the miners' union, for the latter's behaviour during the whole
of the C-waun-cae-gurwen crisis had. been both consistent and
totally cooperative. Not even Will Lawther or Arthur Deakin
could have proved themselves more amenable in that situation than
had Paynter. It appeared as if he was determined to prove to the
Board arid, to the public that, given half a chance, the union could
play a very great part in transforming the coal industry into an
efficient profit-making enterprise. But was this his aim in fact?
If it was, he certainly did not declare it in those terms.
His line throughout the crisis was a consistent one: namely,
that although there were apparent at G-waun-cae-gurwen abundant
examples of managerial and technical deficiencies, nevertheless,
the primary task of union members ws first to get their own
house in order and only secondly to make what he termed "con-
structive criticisms" of existing mining practice. The alter-
natives open to him promised little. As can be deduced from
Mike G'riffin's contribution to the Porthcawl Conference, to call
a coalfield strike would almost certainly have proved disastrous,
for there was evidence of there existing amongst many of the
"eastern" miners a good deal of animosity towards what they
interpreted as the Board's "pampering" of their western counter-
parts. The response in these quarters to a strike-call would un-
doubtedly have been at best patchy.
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Had. Paynter responded to the Board' a initial announcement (of
dismissals) by appealing for help to the national officers of
his union, he would almost certainly have received a smart rebuff
or at least a non-committal shrug from the benighted shoulders
of that one-time radical, Will Lawther. Along with Arthur Deakin
and Tom Williamson, Lawther had. been part of the ruling T.U.C.
triumvirate which had ensured that the Movement continued to favour
policies of wage-restraint and all-round "moderation" even after
the fall of the Labour Government. It is difficult to imagine
this man as harbouring anything other than the most unfavourable
of sentiments towards the committee men and militants of the
Neath Area (in which G-waun-cae-gurwen was situated). Paynter,
then, had virtually no choice but to follow the path which led
eventually to the conditional re-opening of the two pits. As
he followed it he waved a banier upon which the word. "Unity" was
written large enough to convince everyone that he and. his Exec-
utive were dedicated to eradicating sectionalism from their union's
repertoire of industrial action. For during, and after, the crisis
at G-waun-cae-gurwen the coalfield experienced one of the most
severe of its periodic rashes of unofficial strikes. Stoppages
occurred in every section of the coalfield: in Monmouthahire
and Rhymney as well as in the traditionally strike-prone ateas
of Neath, Maeateg and the Rhondda. They took the form of walk-
outs and stay-downs and their causes were many and varied ranging
from mass disquiet provoked by an unsafe shaft-cage at Merthyr
Vaic, to anger over the withdrawal of certain customary allowances
by management at Garw, to a protest over the alleged use of bad
language by a manager at Deep Duffryn. 33 In the midst of this
apparently anarchic outbreak of unofficial activity, the Executive' a
33. C.G. reports, July-November, 1956.
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unimpeachable conduct at c-waun-cae-gurwen served as an invaluable
antidote to any potential deterioration of the union's responsible
public image.
Paynter's tactics wcre not those normally associated with con-
fident, aggressive trade unionism but they were tailored per-
fectly to fit an atmosphere in which the prevailing confidence
arid aggression had about it an air of unreality. Perhaps, during
that early summer, his intimations concerning the impending decline
of the industry were strengthened; he had, after all, stressed
at the Annual Conference that unemployment amongst American
minors was increasing and he had attached a great deal of sig-
nificance to the less obvious warning signals implied in the
severe dearth of mechanised. mining in the pits of S. Wales. It
took little imagination to realise that, in the event of a slump
in the coal market, the most likely candidates for early closure
would be these inefficient, unmechanised units and few were less
_..mechanised than were East and Steer at Gwaun-cae-gurwen. They
were perfect examples of the backwardness against which Paynter
had been campaigning.
But any rewards in terms of personal satisfaction which he might
have reaped from his handling of the Civaun-cae--gurwen crisis were
almost certainly temporarily wiped out by the opprobrium heaped
upon him as a member of the Communist Party by the Press and other
hostile agencies during the Hungarian uprising and its immediate
aftermath. As it did in every other area of the country, the
34.  Steer and East remained open for another three and. five years
respectively: no mean achievement considering the fact that
over forty other pits were closed, before East finally ceased
production on October 27th, 1962.
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Communist Party received a mauling in south Viales during the last
three months of 1956. Anti-Soviet pickets were reported as app-
earing at a small number of pit heads (including those of National
and. Penailta) and. the Area Executive received a number of reso-
lutions demanding the immediate resignation of all Communists who
held. official union posts. These and other, similar, actions re-
ceived. a great deal of publicity in the local and national press
but appear to have presented. Communists with few real difficulties
in terms of retaining their elected positions on Lodge Committees
and Area Councils. Much more serious was the effect which the
Hungarian events wrought upon Communists themselves and. upon
the nature of their personal relationships with non-Communists
both inside and out of the union. Paynter, for example, recalls
that it became a risk for him to enter his local pub in Cardiff,
despite the fact that for yea's he had been a regular customer:
••• this hostility against me", he wrote,
"threatened to become violent".35
Homer was similarly vilified in the press as well as by the
non-Communist members of the union's national executive. Inter-
viewed on the Panorama television programme by a suitably out-
raged Wood.row Wyatt, he described the Soviet suppression of the
Nagy Government as being "regrettable" - a term considered. in-
sufficiently condemnatory both by Wyatt and by Homer's fellow
executive members who subsequently dissociated. themselves from
his television performance.6
35. W. Paynter, "My Generation", p. 155. His children were har-
assed. at school and his family suffered further as a result of
a letter, writteci to a Sunday newspaper by David Liewellyn
(M.P. for Cardiff North), purporting to associate him, as a
Communist, "with the bloodshed in Budapest, the murder of little
children and the other terrible things that were happening there".
6. C.G-., 20.12.56.
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He had been facing similar po.itical criticism since the previous
July when Sir William Lawther had issued a press statement in
which he lashed out at the Polish authorities' handling of the
Poznan workers' revolt: "These thugs and gangsters who masquer-
aded as Socialists", he declared, "must realise that never would
they be accepted in the world of free men and women in view of
crimes they had committed against worker&'. 37 And Homer's public
integrity was further challenged when Ernest Jones, Lawther' a
successor as miners' president, condemned Harrier f or announcing
that he would not allow the events in Hungary to drive him from
the Communist Party (which he described as "the only instrument
through which genuine socialism can be ultimately realised").
Jones said. that miners everywhere would "invite their secretary
to review his position and to take his handcuffs off". Replying
with typical pugnaciousness, Homer insisted that he was a "free
agent" and that he would accept no restrictions of any kind which
limited the free expression of his views .... "whether such re-
strictions emanated from the Communist Party or from the NU!".38
Meeting in London on 1' ov ember 22nd, t	 cri	 t	 c
the NUM carried by an overwhelming majority a resolution con-
decnning the Soviet action in Hungary. They also voted to write
to the president of the Soviet miners' union stating that British
unionists could see little hope for successful cooperation in
these "more tragic circumstances".39
 This kind, of indignant
37 . Ibid., 12.7.56.
8. Ibid., 22.11 .56.	 -
39 . NUM, E.C. Minutes: the committee also passed unanimously a
resolution condemning the Anglo-French action in Egypt.
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expression was not, however, particularly successful in weakening
the rank-and-file support which Communists received. Few major
resignations were forthcoming from Communist miners' leaders at
any level in S. VIales, although a number of leading figures in
other coaj.fields left the Party: notably, Bert Wynn, Alex Moffatt
and Lawrence Daly. And whatever remained of local hostility
towards Communists in the aftermath of the sordid Hungariar
Egyptian episodes was further dissipated by the arrival in South
Wales of hundreds of Hungarian refugees earmarked by the Covern-
ment as suitable candidates for colliery work.
3. Hungarians in Hirwaun
The Coal Board described its decisions to place Hungarians in
British pits as a "humanitari&n project" - surely, the first time
in history that pits had been described as sanctuaries of huinani-
tarianism. The rational executive of the NUM made similar noises
and recommended its Lodges to do the same. Both the Board and
the national executive emphasised that the employment of Hungarians
was not intended as a threat to British labour and. it was made
clear that not one of the refugees would be employed in any
British pit without the prior approval of the local branch of the
NUM.10
Individual Lodges however, responded far less warmly than did
their national leaders and. employers to the prospect of an 1mm-
ed.iate influx of foreign labour. Indeed, so cold was their res-
ponse that it does much to explain how the union' a Communists
140. C.G., 27.12.56.
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managed to ride out the storm of criticism directed against them
in S. Wales. The prevailing sense of animosity towards the
Hungarian refugees combined admirably with the traditional ex-
pression of native hostility towards the employers to form an
emotional barricade behind which Wel8h Communists were shielded
from the full force of the political backlash - despite all att-
empts by the British media to ensure otherwise.
The influx of Hungarians was the topic for a discussion which
took place in Cardiff, early in March, 1957, between the NUM's
Area officers and Lodge officials from pits which had been desig-
nated to receive the bulk of the refugees. Prior to the meeting,
it had. been discovered that the formula drawn up by prvious
national joint discussions of NCB and NUM officials (which had
envisaged spreading the inflWc widely across the coalfield) was
inapplicable due to the fact that accommodation was in very short
supply. Offers of domestic lodging facilities had not been forth-
coming and it became clear that the incoming refugees would have
to be accommodated in hostels, of 'ithinh	 'aer	 re&
to be just two which were suitable: one at Hirwaun, near the
Tower, Tirherbert and Rhigos collieries, the other at Rhydfelin
near Pontypridd and the lower-Rhondda.
Bound by the decision of their national executive, the S. Wales
Area officials of the union declared that they believed that
they were "interpreting the point of view of the miners in the
British coalfield" when they agreed to accept the employment of
Hungarian refugee labour. "The surge of sympathy felt for these
people at the time of difficulties in Hungary" was, they claimed,
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"very intense" and thbe1ieved that no difficulty would be ex-
perienced in integrating them into the pits of S. Wales.4.1
Further, the Area officers argued that the refugees would help
materially to solve the manpower problem from which the industry
still suffered and, by helping to increase production, they would
make it increasingly possible to realise the reforms asked for
by the Union. It was stated that refugee labour would be acc-
epted into the industry under the terms of the 194.7 Agreement
by which it was provided for the Lodge to have the last word
in deciding the issue and, secondly, that if, at any future date
there were any r ethindaucy at the pit a
	
&,tht, the
labour would be the first to be withdrawn.4.2
Despite these assurances however, the Lodge representatives were
"exceedingly critical" of thir Area officers' proposals. They
offered the following observations on the problem:
• The foreign labour which had been accepted into the industry
previously after the teritnatton. o the last 'a:r (e. ainl
Poles) had largely drifted to outside industries.
2. The kind, of labour available from Hungary was considered to
bç very unsuitable.
3. The behaviour of Hungarians already living in the hostels
"left a great deal to be desired .... Foreign labour already
in residence .... complained bitterly as to the conduct of
these people".
4. Native labour was being turned away from pits in the Aberdare
Valley where it was the intention of the Board to place many
of the refugees.
• SWNUM., E.C.M., 4.3.57.
42. Ibid.
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5. The acceptance of these men into the industry in 3. ,Tales
-	 would have an adverse effect upon the housing problem.
6. Foreign labour tended to undermine the standards of labour
in the industry.
7. The impending introduction into S. Wales of power loading
would. "tend to reduce the number of men required" and could
therefore, be the cause of serious redundancy in the near
future.4.3	-
The "vast majority" of Lodge delegates at the meeting intimated.
that their memberships were adamant in their refusl to accept
Hungarian labour into their pits; to 'whio the rea o1s
replied that the union had adequate safeguards in respect of their
members' conditions of labour and, further, that apart from the
alleged, bad conduct of these particular refugees, the problems
raised by the Lodge delegates were not insoluble. The executive
members urged the delegates to return to their Lodges in order
that they might seek a reversal of their members' previous de-
cision not to accept refugee labour.
Of the seven major objections listed against the proposed. influx,
it was that which alleged "bad conduct" amongst the Hungarians
which provoked most coverage in the local press. Lurid stories
of Hungarian drunkenezs and violence became commonplace: so much
so, in fact, that the secretary of the Tover lodge in Hirwaun
felt bound to report some of them formally to Payriter and the
Area executive. He warned the elected leadership that If the bad
conduct did not cease, then a "very serious position" would. be
likely to rise.4.5
43. Ibid.
41,.. Ibid.
4.5. Ibid., 19.3.57.
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The executive meaiberz were extremely zceptical of this and other
such reports; they claimed that they were "greatly exaggerated
by the press and local rumour"! 6 It was admitted however, that
there was little prospect of either the Board or of the union
winning the support of lodge members on the iszue.7
The executive's scepticism and despondency were hardly surprising.
Like most other communities which earned their bread by hard
physical labour, Hirwaun had never lacked its share of stop-tap
violence.	 The most likely explanations for the issuing of
the complaints are to be found, firstly, by examining the pol-
itics of some of the more influential of the Hirwaur2 "complainers
and, secondly, by remembering that 1 957 had brought to the pits
of South wales the first whiffs of job-insecurity to have floated
across the field for over a decade.
14.6. SWNUM., E.C.M., Report of interview with Division Coal
Board, 15.3.57.
47. Ibid.
48. An iron-producing community prior to it becoming a centre
of coal production, Hirwaun was well-endowed with public
houses and sections of its population had long subscribed.
to a code of social behaviour which owed more to the pro-
tection of bar-room honour than it did to any sense of
christian decorum whith may have emanated from the pulpits
of the village's many chapels. The "Hirwaun Boys" were
a force to be reckoned with. They had, after all, part-
icipated in a succession of international skirmishes at
the village's dance venues: skirmishes which had. involved
American troops (1944-14.5), Polish refugees (i9)+7-4.8) and
scarcely less foreign contingents fro,rn Dowlais, Resolven,
Tirherbert and Penrhiwceiber.
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Dealing with the politics first. It will be remembered that
Hirwaun's largest pit, Tower, suffered a brief spell of Company
Unionism during the early 1930s (See, above, Chapter 12, pp.206-207)
Those who defected to this creed became known to the local
SWMF "loyalists", not by their usual South Wales nicknames
( Inon_pols It
 or "scabs") but as "White Guards" - a title which
gives a fair indication of the political complexion of some of
the influential rank-and-file activists of this area.k9 Though
two decades had passed since these "White Guards" had been de-
feated, it is hardly fanciful to suggest that those same act-
ivists (or at least those of them who had survived) might not
have been averse to fanning the flames of gossip which surrounded
the Hungarians. For, as Chapter 2 attempts to illustrate, there
existed in the minds of such activists in the 1930s a tendency
to regard spencerite (Company) unionism as constituting the van-
guard of fascism and, in 1957, the analysis applied to the
Hungarian events by the Daily Worker was that they had been ex-
acerbated by Horthyite fascist elements and rea±ionary Catholics,
both of whom were alleged to be funded by the C.I.A.
On a somewhat more mundane level, it must be pointed out that
there were other Lodges, like that of Lady Windsor Colliery for
example, which had experienced no incursion of spencerite union-
ism and. which were not renowned as havens fcr political radicals,
but which nevertheless opposed the employment of Hungarians as
vigorously as did the Hirwaun Lodges. There are two possible
(and linked) explanations for this.
ii-9. Recordings made in Aberdare, Trecynon, Rhigos and Hirwaun,
1975-78.
Firstly there undoubtedly existed in the pits of S. Wales a
number of variations of that universal distrust which workers
exhibit towards any large influx of strangers into a work-
place which has been tightly organised as a result of many years
of effort by the native workmen. Secondly, it was becoming
obvious, by 1957, that the post-war years of near-unlimited
demand f or coal were drawing to a close. Power-loading (or
the promise of it) was waiting in the wings and the Smell of
mass-redundancies was in the air. The world1orce had witnessed
the partial closures of the Gwaun-cae-gurwen pits and the corn-
plete closure of no fewer than 55 of the Division's collieries
since nationalisation.
Just how widespread these misgivings were can be deduced from
a ballot which was conducted 'on the coalfield during the previous
January. The workforce was requested by their national executive
to vote for the removal of the i'e-Day ee onus - an old.
demand which would ensure more consistent bonus earnings for
all grades of miner.5 ' The Coal Board complicated matters prior
to the ballot by indicating that they would remove the 5-Day
Week Bonus only if there was a general acceptance of Hungarian
labour into its pits. This served to transform the ballot so
50. List of Closures: Miners' Library, Spnsea.
51 • The "Bonus" consisted of payment for an extra shift if
(and only if) the full five shifts were worked: so that
if a miner worked the normal five shifts in one week, he
would automatically receive six shifts equivalent pay.
On the other hand, if he missed a shift or part of a shift
he would then lose his bonus. The national executive wanted
the substitution of this system by another whbh automatically
attached a fractional bonus (e.g. one and one-fifth shifts)
to each complete shift worked.
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that a vote against the original executive recommendation would
be interpreted as a vote against the acceptance of Hungarians.52
The result was that the recommendation was defeated by 4-51 ,000
votes to 266,O00.	 Under almost any other circumstances, this
would have constituted an extraordinarily inconsistent result:
the Five Day Week Bonus disqualification system had. long been
the object of universal rank-and-file distaste. But the result
appears to have caused no surprise whatsoever to any of the Nat-
ional or Area leaders - such was the disquiet which the Hungarian
question provoked.
By July, it was reported that there were 2,000-odd vacancies
spread across 67 3. Wales pits. The Coal Board revealed however,
that just I c- Hungarians had been placed in employment in eight
pits, none of which were in the vicinity of Hirwaun.54-
52. Letter from Homer (NUM Gen. Sec.) to CB, 25.3.57.
53. NUM (E.G.) Minutes,
54-. SWNUM., E.G. Minutes, 9.7.57. Collieries employing Hungarians:
Numbers Acceptable
Area	 Colliery	 to Pit Committees_ Numbers Employed
International
Bryn
G-lync orrwg
Britannic
National
Albion
Celynen South
Llanliilleth
Total
The remaining 1 26 "acceptable" placings were to be filled by Hung-
arians who, in July, were still undergoing pit-training elsewhere.
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It was late August before a number of the residents of the Hirwaun
minors' hostel were found employment at the nearby Tirherbert
Colliery. Employed on surface haulage jobs, they appear to have
been isolated by the rest of the workforce so that they experienced
only the most minimal contact with the Tirherbert miners during
working hours. To illustrate just how complete this isolation
was 1 in September the Area executive received a letter from
the members of the Tir1erbert Lodge Committee in which they con-
tended that daywagemen were "obliged" to
"come into contact with Hungarian workers,
inasmuch as the brakesmen handling the loaded
and unloaded wagons and the locomotive drivers"
were "bound to handle this traffic in immediate
contact with the Hungarian workers" .
In reply, the executive council informed the Lodge members that
their attitude was unreasonable and it advised them to
"continue working with the Hungarians if such
a situation arose in the future".
These were hardly the actions of men bleeding with sympathy f or
the crushed spirit of Hungarian democracy and they do little to
vindicate the observations of certain commentators who have ar-
gued that the Communist executive officers of the miners' union
were forced to cling desperately to their desks f or fear of being
forced from their positions by massive rank-and-file outrage at
the scandalous behaviour of the Soviet government. 	 As early
as March 1957, the S. Wales executive agreed to pay for the in-
55. NUM (SWA) Minutes, E.C.M. ,  10.9.57.
56. Henry Felling is one of the worst offenders in this respect.
His account of the events of 1957 (c/f. "The British Communist
Party, op.cit., pp. 174.-I 75) suffers badly from the limitations
set by his adopted method of research; it is made up entirely
of reports printed in the "Times" and "Manchester G-uardian".
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sertion of May Day greetings in the columns of the "Dailv
Worker" 57 and, by 'the following August, it financed the visit
to Hungary of three delegates in response to an invitation from
the Hungarian Miners' Union. 8 Delegations were also dispatched
during the same year to Poland, Czechoslovakia and. Moscow 59 and.
S. Wales was not alone in this respect; delegates from the
Scottish, Yorkshire and Derbyshire Areaa also attended functions
organised during 1 957 by Communist Parties within Soviet-occupied
60
Eastern Europe.
It is almost certainly the case thac the gossip and. rumour which
surrounded the behaviour of those of the Hungarian refugees who
were housed at the miners' hostels did. a great deal to ' cloud the
significance of the brutal events which had provoked their leaving
of Hungary in the first place Like an unexpected salve, it
helped. heal the wounds which Communist union officials had. suf f-
ered. during their initial November mauling. But to attribute
to the influence of gossip and rumour the continued. popularity
of these officials would be absurd. Communists survived, prim-
arily because they continued to be rated. highly as trade-union
representatives; and no matter how much the Soviet action stuck
in the throats of certain miners, they knew in their guts that
what mattered more to them was the protection of the gains which
they and their union - complete with its Crnmunist leaders - had
made in the decade since nationalization.
57. STNUM., E.C.M., 19.3.57.
58. ibid., 20.8.57.
59. Ibid., d4.3.57. and 20.8.5f.
60. Ibia., 2.)+.57.
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1+. Political Business & Union Business.
The hostility shown towards the Hungarians could be interpreted
as a failure on the part of the workforce to put its money where
its mouth had been for so many years - namely, on the side of
those who sought to throw off the chains of imperialism or to
rid themselves of repressive governments. It is true that the
S. Wales executive donated £500 to the fund set up to relieve
distress amongst Hungarian refugees and that this was exactly
twice the amount which it donated to a similar fund set up in
aid of Egyptians made homeless by the British and French invasion
of the canal zone.	 But by the early months of 1 957 it was
obvious that there existed less enthusiasm amongst Lodge lea-
de.rships for attacking the Soviet action in Hungary than for
attacking Britain's role in the Egyptian farce. The Annual
Report of the S. Wales miner, (which was published in April)
for example, contained references to both situations, but where-
as the tone of its remarks concerning Hungary reflected the con-
fusion which the Soviet action provoked amongst the miners' ex-
ecutive, its Egyptian recarks nere ambiuoisl critical of t
British C-overnment's actions. 2
At the Area Annual Conference, there was little mention of
Hungary during the political debates, but overwhelming support
z'as forthcoming for a Rhigos Lodge resolttion attacking the
British and. French actions in the Middle East and equal support
• S1NUM., A.C.R., 1957., pp. 116-117. The Area B.C. also issued	 -
an appeal to the lodges, which resulted in a donation in ex-
cess of £1 ,200 for the relief of Hungarian distress.
62. Ibid.
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for a Seven Sisters' Lodge resolution wh1h argued for an in-
crease in the interchange of workers' delegations from both
C ommunist and non-C ommunist countries:
"Workers do not always agree with their respective
Governmenta", declared its proposer, "but workers
themselves aspire to the same things all the world
over, and that is Peace and friendship".
This "re-direction" of critical emphasis indicates clearly that
the blow which the Communists had suffered during the months
immediately following November, 1956, was a temporary one. At
no stage after the initial crisis were they in danger of being
rejected. by the workforce, 'hether at Lo&ge or Area level.
Indeed, the Agenda f or the 1 957 Annual Conference contained a
large number of anti-TUC resolutions, many of which smacked. of
Communist-influenced authorship. The overwhelming support which
these resolutions received at the Conference does not in itself
constitute proof however, that the assembled delegates had somehow
"forgiven" or exonerated those amongst them who were Communists.
Neither does it mean that the coalfield's political conscience
had been jettisoned as a result of Communist subversion. It
indicates, rather, how marked was the degree of frustration gen-
erated amongst the Lodges by the TUC's insistence upon continuing
with its policies of "moderation" and "peaceful co-existence"
with the Tory government. This frustration eclipsed the in-
dignation which the Hungarian events provoked amongst Labourites
and, by the Spring of 1 957, the Soviet invasion had become more
a topic for polemical debate between Communists and non-Communists
than a burning issue upon the outcome of which might depend the
63. Ibid..
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political fate of the coalfield. Indeed, the major participants
in this debate displayed what appeared to be a remaz?kable degree
of unity in their attitudes towards a whole range of contemporary
topics, some of which had seriously fragmented Labour Party op-
inion. The Annual Report of the S. Wales miners, f or example,
devoted a very large amount of spa.ce to explaining the case
against Britain's retention of the . Bomb. 	 One of the dots-
inant themes of the 1 957 Annual Conference was one which stressed
the need for unilaterial disarmament and. for a withdrawal of the
country's forces from NATO. Speaker after speaker denounced,
in the same breath, the Government's expenditure on Ipoionou
armaments and its attack, as they saw it, upon the social ser-
vices and living standards of the working class. Explicit and
highly-popular criticisms were voiced of those in the parlia-
mentary Labour Party and TUG who allegedly avoided open confron-
tation with the Conservatives: a Pentremawr resolution, for
example, demanded that the TUG
".... take effective measures to combat the policy
of this Tory Government. Our standard of living
has been systematically re&uce& bj ever- concei'r-
able means, from the slashing of food subsidies
to the Rent Bill; every measure brought by the
Tories has been designed with the same end in view.
The full power of this Organisation, with the TUG,
should be used to bring about the downfall of
this infamous Government at the earliest possible time".
Such was the degree of unanimity communicated by these debates,
that an unwary observer might have been excused for believing
61f. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
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that the unpopular domestic and foreign policies of the Tory
Government had served to weld. together previously opposing strands
of coalfield opinion. For the first time since the initial flush
of nationalisation had faded from the cheeks of the coalfield,
there appeared to reign a sense of coiplite accord within
the ranks both of the Lodges and miners' executive.
But the surface appearance flattered the trueneture of this
"unity". An examination of just two of the important "harmon-
izing" issues reveals that, even after ten years of nationalisation,
the S. Wales miners' union continued to fracture into familiar
political and geographical divisions. A new sense of "unity"
had emerged, but it was to prove to 'be a belated unity which
operated. mainly along the Left-wing of the union and which was
to prove its worth in the late 1960s and early '70s, rather than
at the moment of its consolidation.'
The first of these "harmonizing" issues concerned the opposition
which was aroused on the coalfield by the Conservatives' Rent
66
Bill.	 It provoked such anger that an one area, Aberdare,
meetings were convened during March with a view to staging a one-
day protest strike. 6 Pay-nter and his executive announced that,
66. On January 11th, 1957, the Area Executive Committee convened
a meeting with the Welsh Mining Members of Parliament to
discuss proposals by the Conservatives to push through a
Bill which would provide for (amongst other things) a con-
siderable all-round increase in house rents as well as the
decontrol of previously controlled houses when there was a
change of tenancy. Security of tenui'e was to disappear in
n enormous number of cases and house-rents were to be all-
owed to float upwards by as much as two-thirds if the land-
lord could prove that ho had made changes or aructural im-
provements to his property. SWNUM., A.D.C., 5.3.57.
67. Aberdare Leader, 1 .3.57.
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although they were fully aware of the "very strong feeling ob-
taining in the coalfield on this matter", they believed that
it was too early in the campaign against the BiU to stage a
one-day token strike. At a delegate conference convened in
Cardiff on March 5th, he declared that the campaign should be
"worked up gradually .... because if a one-day
strike is not enough then the logic of the action
is that more days of token strikes must be taken,
and in the end a complete strike envisaged for
the whole coalfield. for as long a period as is
necessary to secure a change in the attitude of
the Government".
Arguing that "secondary action" would be ineffective after the
political use of a strike, he urged the assembled delegates to
cooperate in organising mass demonstrations to take place on
Sunday, March 31 st, and he announced that if they were well supp-
orted, "then a review of the ;osition could be undertaken".
The debate which followed tended to polarise the delegates into
two uneven camps. The first contained most of the Lodges and
all of the executive; the second, most of the "unofficial&' and
some of their sympathizers who, like the Nantgarw Lodge delegate,
expressed the opinion that Paynter and his colleagues were not
going far enough in their proposals:
"The Executive Committee", he complained,
"threatened the Government with a sloppage in
this coa].field if they went to war over the
Formosa incident and further threatened the
Government over the Suez situation".
68. SHNUM., A.D.C., 5.3.57.
2These were examples, he caid, of "threats
of strikes for political ends" and he went on
to admit that it was true that '.... possibly
millions would be killed if a third world war
were started't , but he argued that it was also
the case that ".... aged people and those on
fixed incomes were dying piecemeal of neglect
and semi-starvation".
He was of the view that the Executive Committee should "seriously
consider" bringing the coalfield to a stop, "in order to defeat
the Government on this issue". It was, he claimed, "a golden
opportunity for .... Labour .... to oust the Tories once and for
all"; it was time, he said, that the Left "did something": the
Conservatives were being discredited because of their own actions,
".... rather than because of positive policies being put forward
by the Labour Movement."
A delegate from one of the most militant centres, the Dulais
Valley, complained, that the planned Sunday demonstrations "re-
vealed a great weakness as far as the Executive Committee was
ccncerned" 7° and he stated that he was convinced, that if protest
demonstrations were to be organised at all, then
.... they should be organised on a working day
in order to demonstrate to the G-overnment the
depth of feeling prevailing on this issue amongst
the miners of this coalfield".
4
The executive received its most severe criticism however, from
Mike Griffin, delegate of the Penrhiwceiber Lodge and left-wing
Labourite who described the executive's proposals as being "too
69. Ibid.. The delegate was named as a Mr. Norris. It was unusual
to hear a cpeech of this nature from a Nantgarw delegate -
Nantgarw having little tradition of any form of industrial or
political militancy. Referring to its close proximity to Vales'
capital city, the miners' leader Dal Dan Evans once defined its
workforce as consisting of "Cardiff window cleaners".
70. Ibid. The de.egate, Mr. Bowen, was from the Diliwyn Lodge.
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insipid". He believed that the way to galvanise the coalfield
into action on this matter was to "call for a token strike of
one day and from such a strike the miners could march forward. to
,,71.greater heights of activity and protest against this Bill
Griff in's arguments failed to carry the day however, for Paynter
succeeded in swinging the Conference behind him by declaring that
he was "uncertain" as to whether or not the "overwhelming mass"
of his members were prepared to take the kind of action suggested
by the Penrhiwceiber delegate. It was out of line with Labour
Party policy on this issue and he feared that he would be unable
to mobilise many of those of the coalfield's Lodges which, in
the past, had shown a greater willingness to support the proposals
of the union's comparatively "moderate" and pro-TTJC national ex-
ecutive, than they had shown villingness to support the proposals
of their own Area executive.
Predictably, G-riff in and his allies refrained from accepting de-
feat with even a mod.icuia of grace. In true "imofficia' ashon,
they proceeded, instead, to circularize Lodges, urging that they
undertake a one-day strike on May I st. So flagrantly did they
advertise their intention to stop the pits of the Aberd.are Valley,
with or without the support of the rest of the field, that it
caused a number of Monmouthshire Lodges -.amongst them Celynezi
South - to remind the Area executive that it should "take a serious
note of this position" and. proceed to discipline the "unofficiala"
involved. 72 The executive responded by issuing its own circular
which reminded Lodges that they were obliged to reject all over-
71 • Ibid.
72. S?INtJM., LC.IM., 19.3.57., and. 27.3.57.
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tures from unofficial sources and to stick to the line laid down
at the coalfield Conference. This, in turn, was rejected both
'oy the A'berdare men and by several Duláis Valley Lodges including
that at Seven Sisters which forwarded to the executive a petition,
signed. by every Lodge member, demanding strike action on May I st.73
Once again, the executive threw out the demand and. recommended
all Lodges to partake in the demonstrations arranged for Sunday,
March 31 at.
The Dulais Valley Lodges obeyed, but those of Aberdare struck
work as they had planned. Attendance at the demonstrations mean-
while, was "exceedingly low", despite the fact that the executive
had undertaken considerable propaganda work by loudspeaker, leaflet
and personal canvassing to ensure a good turnout. 7
 The best
demonstrations were those held in the Maesteg and Swansea dis-
tricts, but in the remainder of the field the response was poor.
Not surprisingly, far more attention was paid by the Press to the
unofficial stoppages which took place shortly afterwards in the
Aberdare Valley. Successful inasmuch as they halted a number of
important and productive pits, they also appeared to contradict
the findings of the post-mortem which the executive carried out
on the failed demonstrations. An executive spokesman declared
that his committee was of the opinion that the Rent Bill was
"not an issue around which one could mobi)4se mass opposition
to the Tory Government", and, further, that his committee was
"cognisant of the fact that no serious political campaigning had.
been done in this coalfield in the last 2Oyear&' and that the
73. Ibid.
7l. Ibid., Aberdare Leader, 5.1.57., Neath Guardian, 5...57.,
Western Mail, 1 .4.57,
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low attendance was therefore to be expected. 75
 He and. his coil-
eagues proposed that a fresh campaign be launched with a view
to organising a "mammoth demonstration in Cardiff on Gala Day
in Opposition to the general policy of the Tory Government".
This apologetic retreat was attacked vehemently at the coalfield.'s
Annual Conference by delegate-speakers from the Ferrihil]. and.
Aberorave Lodges as well as by the Penrhiwceiber Lodge delegate
who declared that the decision of the Aberdare Valley Lodges
to strike had been vindicated. in the light of the failure of the
tactics advocated. by the executive council:
"To protest by calling mass-meetings and demon-
strations was not enough" he declared. "If the
working-class movement is to defend. itself against
the attacks of the Tory Government then the only
way to do so is by taking industrial action. In
the past", he continued, "the Tories have made
direct attacks upon the workers by seking red.-
uctions in their wages. In the post-war period,
these attacks have been more subtle and. have been
made indirectly by means such as the Rent Bill,
withdrawal of subsidies, prescription charges, etc."6
He supported a Fernhili resolution which called. upon the union's
national executive to "vigorously oppose the new Rent Act and,
if necessary, organise a nationwide strike to defeat this opp-
ressive measure of the Tory Government". Conference carried the
resolution unanimously.
Sensing the mood of the occasion, Payntei delivered. a presidential
address which brist].ed with political barbs. The Tory Government,
75. SWNTJL, E.C.F., 16.4.57.
76. Ibid.., A.C.R., May1957.
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he said, was operating openly as the ' 1politcal mouthpiece of
big business". Echoing G-rfffin, he declared that the old policies
of wage-cutting by the employers was now being replaced by
"indirect cuts in real wages by the employers' government".
Political means were being used, he said, to attack the wage
standards secured by the trade-unions, so were not the unions
"compelled to engage in political action against Government
policy?" By confining their activities to wge claims, he argued,
the unions were dealing with effects not causes and, inevitably,
they secured no final or effective solution to the problems of
their members.
It was, he said, equally erneous to accept the viewpoint that
the unions zhould have to wait for a G-eneral Election to change
the Government. This policyof "acquiescence and passivity"
had never been the setting for victory by Labour in elections:
"To adopt this attitude", he argued, was to "allow the Tories
to determine the date and conditions for an election most fav-
ourable to themselves" and it gave them a license to proceed
with policies which could place any succeeding Labour C-overnment
'.... in such difficulties that progressive reforms would. be
delayed and the prospect of a return for the Tories assured".
Such an outlook, he declared, had "no plape whatever" in a
movement aiming to realise socialism in Britain. e did not ad-
vocate a General Strike, but called instead, for a "combined
campaign of opposition using the powerful resources of the Trade
tJriions to mobilise public opinion against Tory policy".77
77. Ibid.
G-iven the oircumsbances and the recent failure of the Rents Bill
demonstrations, he could. have said little else. Had. he called.
for a General Strike, he undoubtedly would. have alienated those
amongst his members who had. expressed. their distaste for the
action undertaken by the Aberdare Lodges. Had he spoken more
mildly in favour of preparing the ground in traditional fashion
for the next General Election, he would have Tallen foul of the
union's "Leftists" who were demanding immediate action.
His alternative strategy was vague enough to pacify both sides.
It combined .elegant socialist analysis and rhetoric with de-
liberately fudged conclusions. For the moment, Paynter was
slumming amongst the "Left-talkers": he was consciously wrapping
himself in the banner of Popular-Frontisrn without appearing to
notice that it had. become asthreadbare and as ineffective as
a jester' a suit in the court of a bankrupt king. He refrained.
from specifying whom, exactly, his members should front-up with.
Did he believe that they should attempt to instigate a movement
in which the Aberdare militants would be free to raise their
clenched fists in unison with those in the great Gaitskellite
wedge who were intent, at that moment, upon severing from the
Labour Movement the last potent symbols of red-blooded socialism?
Almost certainly not. The idea was too preposterous. His words
were not designed for careful analysis. They were meant to con-
vey the impression that the miners' executive was firmly on the
side of those who regretted the moribund nature of the opposition 	 -
to Tory policies which the parliamentary Labour Party provided.
372
Nevertheless, thrwere carefully guarded words, calculated. not
.to raise the hackles of those amongst the union's Labourites
who, primed with indignation by the Hungarian outrages, inter-
preted every anti-C-aitskell murmur as having its genesis in
Moscow. Paynter's words were symptomatic of a malais which
appeared increasingly to afflict the elected political and in-
dustrial leaders of S. Wales. 78
 It manifested itself in public
as a loss of political direction. Some were afflicted. more
severely than others: Paynter, for example, displayed relatively
mild, symptoms, though they undoubtedly were aggravated by the
discomfort to which he was subjected during the Hungarian crisis.
A more obvious sufferer was Aneurin Bevan who appeared increasingly
to stumble from precipiece to precipiece Like Lear attempting
to nullify the effects of losing Cordelia, his socialist child.
For comfort, he turned. in his confusion to the halls of his
political enemies wherein presided 'G-aitskell and. C-eorge Brown,
rearranging the realm as eagerly as had any Regan and G-onerill
79before them.
Bevan and. Paynter were dragging at their political anchors and.
even less than in previous years did the Labour Party and the
miners' union provide them with safe havens. Whilst Bevan stru-
ggled to make sense of Gaitskell's assumption of power, Payriter
experienced another defeat at the hands of the predominantly
Right-wing national executive of his union. It was a serious
defeat and a frustrating one, in as much a it concerned the
second of the "harmonizing" issues referred to earlier: namely,
78. In 1957, Paynter was 51+ years of age, Bevan was 60 and Homer 63.
79. Wilson was almost, but not quite, suitable for the role of
Edmund the Bastard, Michael Foot admirably qualified. to pay
Lear's faithful Fool.
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that of wages and of the executive's role as representatives
of mass rank-and-file opinion.
By 53,450 votes to 31 ,300, the S. Wales miners rejected the
national executive's recommendations to accept the proposed in-
crease in wages which it had negotiated with the Board during
the early months of 1957. In doing so, the niiners supported.
the criticisms which Paynter had directed at the proposed deal.
He had argued that the wages offer was completely inadequate"
and that it constituted no real improvement in the financial
conditions of his members. More importantly perhaps, he de-
dared that the proposed increase was framed in such a way that
it "deviated considerably" from the agreed Wages Structure for
daywage men and that it was "likely to permanently injure (the
Union's) chances of securinguniformity in the rates of wages
grade by grade throughout the country". The proposed differ-
ential increases between the wages of surface and underground.
workers would, he argued, tend to promote disunity within the
80
workforc e.
He was arguing the old S. Wales line and it drew its usual res-
ponse from the Midlands and the North East: at the national
- ballot, the NEC's recommendations were carried by 495,000 votes
to 231,000. It was not the dimension of ,the national defeat
which concerned Paynter however, as much as the size of the South
Wales minority which had supported the NEC and. rejected the analysis
of its own Area leaders.
80. SYNtJM. A.C.R., 21 .5.57.
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The ballot exposed traditional Lodge divisions. Support for the
Area executive was strongest in the west and weakest in the east.
Table 1, below, lists the numbers of Lodges by District which
voted for or against the NEC's recommendation: (Since the Lodges
were of varying sizes, the vote entitlements differed and are
included after the numbers of Lodges).
The diminutio4f support for Paynter's executive was remark-
ably even as one moved further away from the centres which trad-
itionally had. sustained the unofficial movements. This was the
case even in the Swansea District where, of the five Lodges
which voted against Paynter, four were situated in areas of the
field in which organised unofficial action had been fairly scarce
(i.e. in the far west and in the south of the Western District;
the fifth was a Vale of Neatl'i Craftsmen's Lodge).
In the Maesteg District, of the six Lodges which voted against
the Area executive, five had never figured. in lists of collieries
which had taken an active part in the unofficial movements.
Pay-nter's support in this District centred upon those areas which
traditionally had supplied the most militant workforces: Maesteg
itself, and the Carw and Ogmore Valleys.
In the Aberdare and Rhondda District, thq picture was a good
deal more complicated. As in the Merthyr and R.hymney areas,
there existed in those valleys a number of relatively large and
productive mines where high-wage piecerate workers were obviously
8. i.e., Blaenhirwaun, Carway and 'ilernos in the far west and
Carngoch in the south.
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reluctant to forego the opportunity to increase their earnings -
even though the increase might be at the expense of their daywage
colleagues. Numerically, the Lodges were split clean down the
middle but, once again, of the 12 Lodges voting against Paynter's
recommendations, only 3 (Tymavrr, Naval and Penrhiwceiber) wexe
known to be fairly reguiliar participants in unofficial movements,
whilst 9 of the 1 3 Lodges which voted in support of Paynter w'e
regular participants in such movements.82 The Lodges were not
split in terms of size, productivity and potential earnings-
capacity. Relatively large and. productive pits like Abercynon,
Cambrian, Fernhill, Lewis Merthyr and Tower voted in favour of
Paynter's recommendations, whilst others of sinilar sefftcattos
voted against. (e.g. Penrhiwceiber, National and Ferndale 8 & 9).
Three of the Lodges which voted against Paynter (Albion, Aberaman
and Fforchaman) were widely i'eputed to have never recovered their
self-confidence as Lodges after their experiences at the hands
of Powell Duffryn management in the years before nationalisation83
and., nebulous though this factor is, it nevertheless may help
explain why a majority of Merthyr and. Rhymney Lodges voted, to
play it safe and accept the ready-cash offered by the NEC rather
than support Paynter and. his executive).
For the most part, the mines in this district were amongst the
).argezt and most productive on the coalfeld. Few of them had
partaken in any of the post-nationalisation unofficial movements
and. their elected officials were generally to be counted amongst
those who stood to the. Right on the .Area executive. Of the 13
82. i.e., Cambrian Fernhill, Glenrhond.da, Lewis Merthyr, Glamorgan,
Rhigos, Tirherbert, Tower and Tydraw.
83. See, above, Chapter 3.
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pits which voted, against Paynter; eight were ex-Powell Duffryn
pits whilst amongst the eleven which supported him, only two
had. belonged. to Powell Duffryn. Moreover, whilst only one of
those pits which voted, against him (Risca) possessed a post-war
reputation as a consistently strike-prone Lodge, at least six of
those which supported. him had. witnessed, during the previous two
decades, a large number of serious disputes and. conflicts. This
was especially true of Bed.was Nine Mile Point and Taff Merthy,
all of which had. provided. settings for some of the most fierce
-	 conflicts of the Miners' Pederation's campaign to eradicate its
rival, the spencerite Company Union.
In the Monmouthshire District, no such distinctions are obvious,
although the most strike-prone Lodges tended to vote for Paynter
rather than against him. In terms of pit size and. output, of
the eight Lodges in this District which contained. memberships of
800 or over, four voted. for Paynter and four voted against him.
Al]. eight produced. roughly equal annual tonnages, so that there
were no great differences between them in terms of earnings
potential.
Throughout the rest of the field however, the correlations were
much clearer and more consistent. Those Lodges which had parti-
cipated in post-war unofficial movement; tended overwhelmingly
to support Paynter's line. In their role as "unofficials" they
almost invariably had opposed. the conciliatory methods favoured
by the National Executive. The difference on this occasion was
8.. Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory, 1957, Lizt of
Coal Mines.
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that they found themselves in the happy position of having as
their allies their elected President and his executive.
It was this reconciliation, rather than the patching-up of the
quarrel over Hungary between pro-Communists and non-Communists,
which did. most to create upon the field a sense of the possibility
of there re-emerging the kind of solidarity of purpcse which
might succeed in achieving a number of those- primary objectives
which had been close to the hearts, both of Paynter and of the
"unofficial&', for many years. They had. long demanded the erad-
ication of piece-working and of payment differentials between
coalfields; they favoured an immediate ectension of rank-and-file
participation, both in the workings of the union and. of the
pits; and they advocated. a swift phasing-out of regular over-
time working and of compulsoy arbitration.
Their chances of achieving these objectives were not enhanced.,
either by the size of the national vote against Paynter's line,
or by the size of the South Wales minority which opposed him.
The old geographical divisions of the coalf laid remained very
much in evidence. Nevertheless, receiving the support of the
"unofficials" appears to have encouraged Paynter to throw caution
to the wind, in as much as he began to state in public many of
his privately-held. doubts concerning th; nature of the nation-
alised industry. By this, the tenth year of State ownership,
ho clearly had. become tired of defending the kinds of unimaginative
policies of "moderation" which for so long had emerged. from a
national executive dominated. by Right-wingers who insisted in-
variably upon preserving their Divisional estates even at the cost
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of national unity. lienceforward, Paynter's statements made it
clear that he would not demure from burning down as many of his
and other people's bridges as he deemed it necessary in order
that he might move forward to construct new alliances and there-
by to create a more powerful and efficient Union.
At the 1 957 South Wales Miners' Conference, he subjected the
nationalized set-up to the most comprehensive-and penetrating
criticism it had yet received from any quarter. 1-larking back
to the early part of the century, he recalled that Nationalization
had been "conceived by the pioneers of Socialism as a half-way
step to socialization and as an ally in the struggle to end
private enterprise", and he reminded the delegates that the Coal
Industry Nationalization Act had been constructed "in far diff-
erent political and economic dircumstance&' to those which
existed in 1 957 . 85 He reminded his audience that, in 194-7, it had
been believed that workers in the nationalized industry would
exercise a decisive control in the running of the industry and
that any benefits which accrued would be shared by the British
people. The experience of ten years however, had "shattered
these illusions" and he declared that the "new social order"
appeared to be as far away in -1 957 as it had appeared to be in
194-7. He summarised the experience as follows:
1. "Nationalization changed the form of ontrol f or the better,
but fundamentally the industry remained a source of profit
for the previous owners and big business generally.
2. "That those placed in control of the industry Nationally and
in the Divisions were selected in the main from the Executivo
Staff of companies industrially or commercially associated
with the old owners.
85. SWNUM., A.C.R.., 1957, "esidontialAddres&', p. 10.
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3. "That progressively the Trade Union men appointed to the Board
were subordinated to control by production executives, a
*
process accelerated since the Fleck Report.
L,.. "That the participation of the workers in control and. dir-
ection of the industry is non-existent and. consultation is
superficial and largely window-dressing.
5. "That the wages and conditions of miners have not improved
to the measure that could be reasonably expected".8
His Summary was a sound one. Under the Nationélisation Act, thern
Bcard. had not been permitted to accumulate substantial profits
and its existing funds had proved insufficient to meet the re-
forms necessary if the industry was to hold and attract the re-
quired manpower. This situation had been aggravated by heavy
interest charges and losses from imported coal which, together,
liquidated the restricted. trading prorit. 8 Reorganisation and.
modernisation meant large capital expenditure; the Government
provided the capital on loan; the industry, in turn, had to repay
the capital plus interest. To those miners who attempted to
unravel such mysteries, it must have appeared that the financial
set-up of coal nationalisation was designed to facilitate their
own exploitation in the interests of the State and big business.
* Fleck Report: see p. 381 below.
86. Ibid., p. 11.
87. The impositions on the industry were staggering. The
Government purchased. the mineral rights and. the pits, but
the industry was burdened. not only with capital costs but
also with interest payments to the Government. Before any
of these payments were made from trading profits, profits
tax had to be paid to the Exchequer.
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The Coal. Board openly admitted. to selling oal to industry at
88less than its economic cost and it would have been difficult
for any mineworker to conclude anything other than that the cum-
ulative loss of £37 million carried by the industry since
nationalisation had been artificially created and that it ought
not to have been charged upon the industry.
In Appendix Two (below) it is described how the Coal Board caine
to be dominated by former directors of coal-owning or associated
companies. Ten years on, those members had earned for themselves
a reputotion for continuing to execute the kinds of financial
and. administrative ploys which had distinguished them during the
"private" era. This included price-fixing as part of a general
policy laid down by the State, and little was done to counteract
it by the snrinkling of trade union leaders appointed to exec-
utive positions on the Board. Except in. one or two isolated
instances, these individuals functioned in the industrial relations
sectors and, even there, they found themselves hidebound. on policy
matters by collective Board decisions. Neither was their position
likely to improve after 1957, for the Government had ordered an
investigative body, known as the Fleck Committee, to examine Coal
Board administration and it had advised against industrial re-
lations personnel being recruited from the trade unions and part-
icularly from the miners' union. The Board, in turn, had adopted.
the advice and in recent appointments in certain Divisions and
National level, had selected people with no trade union back-
ground or with no knowledge of the industry. 89 To Paynter, at
88. NCB "Tenth Anniversary Brochure", Hobart House, January 1 957.
89. SWNUM., A.C.R., 1957, "Presidential Address", p.13.
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least, this trend, together with other adninistrative changes,
tended to mould the organisation of the NCB "nearer to the pattern
of big monopolies like Imperial Chemicals". At the 1957 Conference,
he recalled Vesting Day and the speeches which were mide at the
pitheads on that historic morning:
"A new day has dawned f or the miners -
they were coming into their own in the industry".
But he claimed that the experiences of the subsequent ten years
had disillusioned them; workers' participation in management
by direct representation or through consultative machinery had,
he argued, "proved an empty pipe dream t1 , and he remind his
audience that none of the basic relationships existing within
- the industry had changed during the first decade of nationalisation:
•/ bad set of employers", he claimed, had been replaced "by a
better set, but the relationship of master and servant still
operates".9°
He admitted however, that the union had secured more improvements
during the ten years of nationalisation than it had secured "in
fifty years from the old owners" • But he warned that such a com-
parison was "absolutely superficial" if it-was intended as an
estimate of the changes that ought to have taken place. Among
the main reforms achieved during the first ten years had been the
Five Day Vleek Agreement. But this, in turn, had been encroached.
upoz by the Extended Hours Agreement covering overtime-work
and the Saturday shift. Two weeks paid holiday per year; a
National Minimum wage; a new Wages Structure covering all Daywage
90. Ibid..
men; better wage levels throughout the industry and improved pensions
for retired miners. These advances were greatly appreciated
by the membership, but Paynter, f or one, considered that they
would have occurred "inevitably" in the conditions which pre-
vailed during the decade following nationalisation. 	 Full em-
ployment, a scarcity of mining manpower, and above all, a rising
demand for coal tQ supply the needs of post-war industrial ex-
pansion helped compel these changes in the coal industry as they
did. in many other industries during these years.
The changes had not however, been sufficient to retain or att-
ract the manpower which the industry needed and they had not
succeeded in lifting mining to a competitIve positIon In the
labour market. The union's members had been aware, since the
early I 950s, of an increasing hardening in the Board' s responses
to their claims for further improvement in wages and. conditions.
The Board, had refused stubhonly to reduce the hours of work
for surface-men92 - it had refused to modify its attitude on
the issue of waiting-time payments for pieceworkers 93 and nego-
tiations for the removal of the Five-Day Week Bonus were ham-
strung by the Board's insistence that the issue be placed before
a National Reference Tribunal.
91. Ibid., p. 114.
92. The union negotiated f or parity of working hours: i.e. 8
hours per shift inclusive of mealtimes.
93. The union claimed that pieceworkers should be paid average
piece rates for waiting-time. Thiswas later modified (in
the face of Coal Board intransigence) to a nominal figure
between the day rate and the pieceworkers' average and.
finally modified to a claim that waiting-time should be
calculated on a daily basis and not (as in 1957) on a weekly
basis. Even this was turned down, kowever, and the claim
submitted to a National Reference Tribunal.
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The whole question of compulsory arbitration provoked a parti-
cularly violent antagonism amongst the ranks of the "activists"
and their new allies; for, under the terms of the existing con-
ciliation machinery, the union, which, by the nature of things,
was almost always the applicant, was obliged to refer unsettled
questions to arbitration or else to drop them. This state of
affairs had been accepted by Lawther, Homer nd the rest of the
union' s lead.erchip back in the war years and they had not ob-
jected when it was carried over, intact, into the period of
nationalised ownership. The philosophy underlying compulsory
arbitration was that the National Interest was paramount. But,
with the ending of the war, it became obvious to a &eat many
dissatisfied members that the term "National Interest" needed
a clear definition, especially if it involved (as it did in the
coal industry) the abandonme!ft of the right to strike on any
issue and its substitution by a three-man Tribunal whose decisions
were final and binding on the parties involved.
The "National Interest" obviously referred. to the interests of
everyone within the nation. But it was equally obvious that not
everyone in the nation had the same interests. The interests of
those who sold their labour for wages or salaries were not the
same as those who bought that labour and used it to make profits
for themselves. Paynter emphasised this distinction:
"Wages and salaries", he said, "are not identical
with profits and dividends. Some people argue that
it is in the National Interest that wages should be
restrained, that donsumpton of goods should be cur-
tailed and the economy kept solvent, and. that in-
creased wages are only possible if there is in-
creased production.
385
"These are arguments against wages and other
claims and the basis for the intervention of
Arbitration Boards in industrial disputes. But
all these arguments are, in fact, in defence- of
private interests and against the interests of
the mass of people who comprise the nation
"In a setting of this kind, no matter how well-
meaning the members of Arbitration Boards may be,
they cannot ignore the factors of G-overnment
policy, the pattern of settlements already made
and the effects of' any Award they may make upon
industry generally. In the main they reflect in
their decisions the policy of the State as al-
ready determined" .
This was as true of the coal industry as of any other. But,
unlike unions operating in other industries, the NU had. aec-
epted arbitration by outside bodies as part of its conciliation
machinery and. consequently hid. found. itself increasingly shackled
in negotiations by the suspicion that the members of the Coal
Board. were prepared automaticafly to refer to the Tribunal
any issue over which they and. the union disagreed. Paynter
considered. that the only efficient remedy to this situation was
one which restored the union's right to strike; this, he said,
would give the union added power in negotiations and the right
to decide finally whether arbitration should be resorted to.
Such a change, he insisted, would lead, not to frivolous or irr-
esponsible strikes, for the union was, i his words, a " responsible
organisation and could. not exist if it pursued policies that pre-
jud.iced. the interests and well-being of its members".95
94.  SWNUM., A.C.R., 1957, "Presidential Address", PP. 16-17.
95. ibid.
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Like the "unofficials", Paynter found. himself struggling to
interpret the significance of the changes which were transforming
the face of the industry. As the shadows of impending pit clo-
sures deepened, new words and phrases entered the jargon of
negotiation: words like "disillusionment" and phrases like
"integration scheme", "Divisional Power Loading Agreement",
"rat ionalised. wages structure", "coalfield. pieceworking disparity"
and so on. Paynter and his allies attempted to make others aware
of the meanings which lay behind this new language in the same
way as Homer had attempted, some twenty years earlier, to force
the union to come to terms with the changes wrought upon the
industry by a decade of economic depression and near-monopoly
ownership. To succeed, in 1957, Paynter expressed his determin-
ation to "eradicate once and for all" what he termed
".... the romantic nonsense spoken by too many
people in the Movement, who would have us believe
that natjonalisation and the National Coal Board
represent the millenium as far as the miners are
concerned".
Compare these words with those which he had used. regularly during
the previous ten years to con lemn the continuance of unofficial
strikes: he pushes "irresponsibility" into the background; his
allegations of "Luddism' disappear altogether; the soft words of
conciliation become submerged beneath a new hardness. The lang-
uage begins to communicate a sense of personal relief - as if
suddenly he has decided that all of his previous "tactical" support
for nationalisation constituted little moze than a succession of
hopeless compromises. He appears in these speeches to have gone
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out of his way to gather up and bless the oost virulent of the
old. criticisms with which the "unofficials" had sniped at him
during the preceding decade. Evoking the spirit, if not the
text, of the "Miners' Next Step", he gave notice of his inten-
tion to shrug off the largest remnants of industrial "coflab-
orationism' and forcefully reminded his contemporaries that
natlonalisation was, as he put it, ".... not an end in itself"
but only a means to an end. Its role and f.mction in the late
1950s, he argued, revealed the "end." as being nothing more than
a "cheap product for capitalist industry to strengthen and per-
petuate capitalismt' .
96. Ibid., p. 1ti-.
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Conclu10
The preceding work paints a picture of a complex and divided
labour force reacting to mass unemployment, the consolidation
of "combine" ownership, war and nationalisation. Certain themes
recur consistently: the efforts of miners to protect "custom
and practice"; the residue of Job-insecurity end mutual anin-
osity between men and management; the conflicting loyalties of
militant workers and. union representatives: the union's inter-
ecine conflicts and ideological tensions. In an attempt to dis-
courage the formulation of too many easy assumptions concerning
the nature of pit politics and trade-union leadership in South
Wales, much of thi3 thesis has concerned itself with explaining
why it was that these themes were subject to so many variations
in different parts of the coalfield.
It points out, for example, that only a minority of South Vales
pits were strike-prone and. that, even within this minority, there
were few workforces which could be described. as uniformly strike-
prone. Detailed. analysis of individual strikes reveals divisions
within pits and. even within pit-districts. (See, especially,
the wartime Boys' Strikes and the "sectionalist" piece-rate
workers' strikes of the 1950s).
The divisions appear most marked. when statistical comparisons
are made of the strike-proneness of pits situated within broadly
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different geographical areas. Such a comparison shows, for
example, that the anthracite area hosted a higher proportion of
strikes than did the central steam-coal area. This has led. ob-
servers to assume that there prevailed amongst anthracite workers
a higher propensity to strike than prevailed amongst steam-coal
miners. In turn, this has promoted. a good deal of theorizing
aimed at establishing correlations between strike-propensity
and a number of possible determinants - ranging from the varying.
percentages of miners owning their own homes to the size and top-
ographica]. location of collieries and colliery communities.
None of these correlations are convincing. For the most part,
they serve to mask the real reasons for the variations. These
are to be found, not amongst periDheral sociological variables,
but in the coalfield's recent industrial history and, especially,
in the statistics which trace the slumps and booms of the coal
market.
Most miners find no difficulty in explaining the geographical
variations (though they are never reticent in proposing theories
concerning the importance of house-ownership). They argue that
the anthracite area experienced more strikes than the steam-coal
area during the I 930z because the demand for anthracite remained
relatively steady whilst that for steam-coal floundered in the
depths of depression. Overly-deterministic though this may
sound, it is the correct explanation.
* Relevant maps are included at the end of this chapter, in
Appendix One.
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As any one of the strike analyses in this thesis testifies,
• anthracite strikes and go-slows were identical to steam-coal
strikes and go-slows. There were just more of them. Part One
attempts to explain why. It argues that the mass unemployment
of the early I 930s knocked the guts out of the majority of im-
portant steam-coal lodges (which were already reeling from the
impact of the defeat suffered in 1 926) and that many of them
barely survived the effects of the opposition i'anged against
them by the coal combine companies. For the greater part of
the 'thirties, strikes were a luxury denied moat of these lod's,
The prospects for strikes improved somewhat during the last third
of the decade when the steam-coal market picked up and unemploy-
ment eased. By that time however, a new breed. of union loader
and a re-modelled union executive were consolidating important
changes in the workmen's organisations and activities - changes
provoked by the effects of the spread of combine ownership and.
the prevalence of mass unemployment. Not surprisingly, they had.
their greatest impact in the central steam-coal area - not merely
because the lodges of that area were receptive to anything which
might ease their miseries, but also because it was the area which
housed. the most talented and energetic of the ideological supp-
orters of the workmen's new leader, Arthur Homer. His favourite
political slogans - those extolling the virtues of "united frontism" -
were translated into the language of Trade Unionism. He and his
supporters attempted, whenever they were able, to kick aside the
old. barriers of the Federation and. to strengthen the power of
the central, lay, executive. To maintain that power, it was
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necessary to ensure that a new sense of discipline prevailed
amongst the workforce - a task which proved a good dea] easier
in the weak steam-coal lodges than it did in the strong anthra-
cite ones where the new demands of the miners' executive were
sometimes regarded, as an irrelevant and unwelcomed. imposition.
The anthracite lodges could point, with justification, to their
successful defence of custom and practice and to the relatively
high earnings of their members.
The war perpetuated and. even exaggerated this division. With
just a few highly publicised exceptions, the steam-coal lodges
maintained dIscipline and remained virtually strike-free until
j 94. Wartime strikes, like those of the pre-war years, were
concentrated in areas outside of the Left's central sector strong-
holds. The significance of this discipline is considerable when
it is examined in the light of the tensions which arose - esp-
ecially amongst younger miners - during these years. Following
the example of Homer (after forgiving him his farcical display
of political gymnastics, 1939-i 9i4i), the lodge leaders postponed
"to the post-war Elysium" their most ambitious demands and, in
so doing, exposed themselves to charges of "collaborationism"
from their union's less accommodating members.
Apart from the odd, sharp confrontation (notably at Penrhiwceiber
and. across the coalfield. as a whole during the Porter Award
episode), this antagonism did. not manifest itself in any coord.in-
ated and sustained form until the emergence of wor1en's unofficial
committees in the late 1940s. A the records of the steam-coal
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lodges show, efforts were made by the militants of the central
sector to link-up with their natural allies in thelodges of
the Dulais and lower-Swansea Valleys in attempts to strezgthen
their challenge to the conciliatory policies favoured by the
national and area executives. The link_upN had been postponed
by the election of a Labour Government pledged to nationalise
the mines. Ironically, it was the anti-Soviet policies adopted
by this government which eroded the loyalty and discipline of
many Communist officials in the central lodges (as well as else-
where on the field) and encouraged them to seek out new allies
in the anthracite west.
The trtues of "disciplined unity" were challenged by militants
from the very same lodges which, during wartime, bad been their
most enthusiastic champions. The existence of the union had. long
since ceased. to be under serious threat from the employers.
Coal demand everywhere outstripped supply and the militants of
the central lodges reflected, in their actions, the prevailing
mood of self confidence. Strikes began to occur in their sector
with a regularity equalling that of the most militant of the
anthracite sectors. The NCB consistently condemned three Welsh
"black-spots" - the Rhondda, Maesteg and i'Ieach areas - for their
outrageously high strike records.
Once again however, examination of disputes - statistics reveal
that, even within these "black-spots", there was never an even
spread of strike-prone lodges. Moat strikes occurred at the old.
centres of militancy like Fernhill, Cambrian, Parc and Dare and.
Glenrhondda. The same applied to the Maesteg area - as indeed,
'I
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it did to the lodges of the less strike-prone areas to the east:
Aberdare and Rhymney. In these, the most quintessentially
'?owell Duffryn" of all of the Coal Board's areas, the lodges
which remained least affected by strikes were those which had
all but disintegrated at the hands of Powell Duffryn management
a decade and a half earlier. The most strike-prone, on the
other hand, were those like Tirherbert, Tower, Bwllfa and
Penrhiwcetber, which had maintained some meaure of independence.
These are the exceptions which serve to modify any crude, econ-
omically-determined explanation for the area variations in the
incidence of strikes. Each one of them has i'ts own combination
of variables to account for its consistent militancy. Some have
been examined in this thesis: Fernhill, an "independent" colliery
company, with a traditionally militant and somewhat isolated
workforce, escaped the clutches of the big coal combines; Cam-
brian had long been the nucleus of one of the tightest and most
formidable workmen's combine committees on the coalfield; Pare
and Dare contained within its ranks an unrivalled concentration
of left-militants; the BwUf a pits had traditionally acted together
and retained, within the Powell Duffryn empire, a strong sense
of separate identity (they were only "acquired" by the combine
in 1936). These were the lodges which often provided the union's
area and coalfield leaders - men whose efforts to rebuild and
to strengthen the union during the I 930s	 aided immeasurably
by the fact that they were sometimes able to operate out of rela-
tively securQ bases.
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This long-term consistency of lodge militancy and the contrasts
which it provoked (when viewed alongsid.e the parallel absence of'
strikes amongst most lodges) gives some idea of just how heavily
the shadow of the 1930s hung across the coalfield. Ex-anthracite
miners recall how shocked they were - as late as the mid-I 950s -
at the "lack of union confidence" and "managerial authoritarianism"
which prevailed in the ex-Powell Duffryn pits, like Aberaman,
to which they were transferred. One miner declared that the
workforces of these pits had "forgotten" how to strike and that
Powell Duffryn had reduced their old "oust oizzs aa praoices" to
harmless rubble. But, he added, this did not mean that these
same workforces were not "solid unionists" nor even that they
were "anti-militant". It was just that, since the mid-'thirties,
they had. transferred their "hopes" for advancement onto the shoulders
of the coalfield's central executive - rather than subject them-
selves to the threats of dismissal and blacklisting which usually
followed. displays of militancy within their lodges.
This would certainly account for the somewhat anomcilous elections
of a succession of Communist and. Left-Labour militants to the
highest positions on the South Wales miners' union. After all,
in government elections the coalfield invariably returned a solid
phalanx of Labour M.P' a - few of whom could accurately be des-
cribed. as socialist revolutionaries. In addition, the Communists
and Left-Labourites were frequently opposed in union elections
by pro-TUG Labour "moderates", many of whom were prepared to
fight hard, and sometimes dirty, campaigns. Yet the coalfield.
supported Left-wing militants.
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This apparent inconsistency was demonstrated most dramatically
in j956/57, during the controversy over Homer's reluctance to
condemn the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary. Despite the
torrent of abuse heaped upon him and his fellow Party members
by outraged Labourites, the "threat" to his position lasted only
as long as it took the South Wales miners to decide that the
incoming Hungarian refugees posed a potential danger to their
industrial security and organisational unity. - Consciously or
unconsciously, they checked their list of industrial and political
priorities and plumped for protecting the union. Any political
animosity they may have felt towards Homer's statements on
Hungary took second place - so much so, in fact, that even as
early as March, j957, it was obvious that his efforts to over-
come the Coal Board's attempt to postpone the abolition of the
Five Day 'Veek Bonus disqualification until the lodges had agreed
to accept the Hungarian refugees* had more than won back for him
any support lost as a result of his political associations.
The relationship between "formal" politics and. pit-politics in
South Wales has never been simple or straightforward. The Horner/
Hungary episode raises many questions concerning the links which
working men perceive between industrial experience and political
practice. The examinations of strikes in earlier chapters deny
the existence of convenient correlations between strike-proneness
and political consciousness, Instead, they highlight the corn-
plexities of both phenomena. Strike-proneness (like strike-shyness)
* See, above, Chapter 11^, Part : "Hungarians in Hirwaun".
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was never an accurate indicator of the prevalence of this or that
state of political consciousness on the coalfield. To argue that
it was is to deny the strikes (and the strikers) their proper
historical and economic context. Left-wing militants in the
Rhondda lodges during the first years of the post-war Labour
government regarded the "sectionalism" of the anthracite and.
Monmouthshire unofficial strikers with something just short of
contempt. Detailed examination of these strikes indicates that
the great siajority had no more to do with the expression of
ideological passion than had a fart at the coal face - both could
be interpreted as modes of political protest but much would. de-
pend upon the predelictions of the interpreter.
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dix Two
anisation and Ownership of the South Vales
Coal M.ning Industry, I 926-i 91i.7.
Th Technical Advisory Committee which reported on the state of
the coal-miping industry .ri March, 1 915, consisted entirely of
loading mining engineers who were ail either acting managing
directors of colliery companies or else former managing directors
who had been appointed, like the Committee's Chairman, Charles
Rci 'l, to the directorate of the Ministry of Fuel and Power during
wartiiiie.1
They produced a report which called for a thorough overhaul o
production methods and organisation throughout the industry.
Posi.hly because of their own present, or past, positions in
the privately-owned coal industry, they did not actually rec-
oimnend that the government should take it into public ownership,
but their report nevertheless made no serious attempt to conceal
the shambles which constituted. a good. part of the existing struc-
ture of ownership in the industry.
Some of the Committee members were, or had been, directors of
several of the largest coal companies in existence at that time.
Powell Duffryxi, one of the Yery largest "purely" coal-mining con-
cern in the world, was represented. on the Committee by its
1	 Charles Carlow Reid (after whom the Report was naaid) was,
in 194-5, Director of Production, Ministry of Pus]. ani Poor.
Me was formerly G-eneral Manaor ar4 Director of the Fife
Coal Company. The Report's official t.LtlC was: "Coal Mining",
Report Q' the Techiical Advisoiy Cbunittee, 194-5; HMQ. Cmd. 6610
2.
Director of ProJuction, DOUglas Alfred Hann. Ho must have bceri
somehat amused at the rather envious statement issued by the
Comiittce regsrding the rmture of co1rnine-ownorsbip in Britain
as compared with tht on some of the Continental fields:
"ONnershl.p within the industries of the three
continental countries (Germany, Poland and Holland)
is highiy concentrated. In the lluhr, at any rate,
this has rendered possible the closing down of many
uneconomic mines or the merging of adjacent mines
into a single production unit, and the fuller
working of the economic mines.
"In Britain ownership is dispersed, and th1 fact
ha not been conducive to concentration at the more
productive mines, and makes it difficult, if not
impossible, under ordinary peace-time conditions,
to ensurc that the abilities of the best mining
engineers are readily available".2
Dou& as Hann's amusement would have arisen from the 1ioiiledge
that, had he been asked to name one single colliery company in
Souh flale which had succeeded in overcoming the difficulties
l stc' y the Coaun ttee regarding the rat ionalisation and concen-
tration of production, he could have answered "Powell Duffryn".
The whole question of how best to centralize and reorganize
colliery ownership had nagged the British coal industry like an
abscessed tooth through the three decades preceding nationalisa on.3
By the md-'Twenties, the Government felt compelled to
2. Coal M1'iin" Report, op.cit. 1 70
3. Ste, espccai1y, A.W. Neuman: The Econumic Organisation of
the B'itish Coal Industry", Londun 1 93)+ Chipter three.
3.
introduce leiislatior dencd to go some way tov, Talds
 
aiding
the proceiz of amalgamaLion. and centralisation of production
and oner3hp. It formed the Coal MLiec Reorganisation Comm-
ission and armed it with poiers which required colliery owners
to submit schemes for arnaigamaton in accordance with Part One
of the Mining Industry Act of 1 926, If the coal-owners failed
to LO so, then the Commissioners themselves ifere to prepare and.
suomi a scheme.
The Commirsion issued a report on colliery amalgamations in j93j,
and by the middle of 1 932 hd circulated amongst the coal-owners
notes on the application of the scheme. During the follo4ng
two years the genera]. response of the coal-owners, in the form
of ache-Des for voluntary aa]gamationz, was considered unsatia-
fatory and the Commission took steps to prepare schemes of
c.nptio y amalgamat ions in several districts.
At the cod of I 93 1f a scheme for the federation of ccllierie in
We-t iorlczhit'e was submitted by the Commisbion to te Board of
Trctie s a scheme of "partial amalgamation under the Mining
Industry tet. of 1926, and the Coal vines Act of 1930. This
scheme was, in ay 1 935, rejected by the Railway and Canal Comm-
zsion, both on merits aria on law, without cdli on counsel
for the objectors. Subsequently the Board of Trade asked the
Comaission to refrain from initiating fresh inquiries in regard
to pos,ibie acaamat1ona pending considration by the Govern-
mnL c'C the vhole position and poser of the Cowmissiôn.
On My 5th, 1 9.36, a Bill was intruducod into the House of' Commons
by the President of the Board of Trade to enable the duties of
the Coal Mines fleorganisation Commission urid€r part 2 of the
Coalmines Act, 1 930, to be more effectively discha.cgod, and to
provide for the continuation of Part 2 of the same Act ufltil
December 31st, 1942. Powers were to be given to the Commission
to prepare reoranistion schemes to amalgamate certain prop-
erties and to settle the conditions of the amalgamations. At
the second reading of the Bill in the House of Commons there
was very th.termined opposition, ebpecally with regard to the
right of appeal against proposals of the Commission. In conse-
quence the G-overnment decided to withdraw the Bill.
On Novemb...r 11 th , 1937, the text of the Governmerit's new Coal
P.22 was issued, and was passed into law as the Coal Act, f 938.
This measure provided for the transfer, in amcnded and strengthened
form, of the functions of the Coal Mines R.eorganisation Commission
to the Ca1 Commission set up under the Act. That Commissicn
was giVeLl responsibility both for the acquisition and. administration
of coal roralties and. also for endeavouring, where necessary in
the interets of oconoaical and efficient working, to effect a
reduction in the number of coal mining underakingz. An outline
plan f or reorganising the coal mining industry into a smaller
number of larger units was contained in a memorandum issued by
the Coal Commission in June 1939. The Commission stre'3sed the
advantages of voluntary over compulsory amalgamdtions, and de-
clared. that the issue of the mcmorand.um must be regarded as a
invitation to the industry to co-operate with them in giving
effect to the law. This matter was again rcferrecI to in the
5.
reports of the Coal Coission for the years 1938 arid 1939 under
tho Coal Aet, 1938, issued in June, 192^0. In this report it wars
stated that the Commission hoped to review the response to this
momorandum toarda the end. of 1939, and. early in 92+O to report
to the Board of Trade on any areas which the Commission might
think that conditions calling for the exeroirse of compulsion
had risen When war broke out the Coinrnisson decided, with
regret, but without hesitation, that it was impossible to expect
colliery-owners to address themselves to "those far reaching
questions" 2^ at a time when the war had confronted them with so
many difficulties in carrying on their ordinary business.
Peapte the relative ineffectiveness of the Reorganisation	 -
Commission, however, a great many voluntryhf amalgamations occ-
urrer3 between 1 926 and nationalisation. Those which took place
in South Wales had a very special significance for the coalfield's
wcrkforce - in as much as they occurred during a period when the
mincrr' union was reeling from the blows it had received during
the 19 26 Lockout and as a result of the mass unemployment which
had. followed the coUape of large sectors of the coal-export
market. A the amalgamations and take-overs multiplied, so the
economic well-being of scores of mono-industrial cining comrnun-
ities became dependent upon decisions which were being made by
an ever-decreasing number of colliery-company controllers and
directors.
2^. "Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory", 194-2, p. 306.
Large coal ines require large capita]. investments and, in the
depressed rnark& conditions of the I 920s and '30s, few South
Wales communities found themanives the recipients of such in-.
vestments. When they did, they almost inevitably found theta-
selves indebtedtt to one or other of a ama].].. number of coal combine
Companies - the only agencies capable of raising the necessary
capital,
The Taff Merthyr pit - which, soon after its opening, hosted the
most dramatic and prolonged battles b&vveen the Miners Federation
and the spencerite Company union 5
 - is a case in point.
5. See D. Smith, op. cit.
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Sunk in 1 926, Taff Merthy was the most up-to-date pit in South
Wales Compared to the vast majority of other pits on the coal-
field, it was highly mechanise. It uti]ized the most avancd
productoxi systems, mechanical conveyances and commurications
networks - all of which were financed, during a period of consid-
erable market fluctuation and doubt, by the tto largest prod-
uction companies on the coalfield: Powell Duffryn and Lord
Davis's Ocean Coal Company.
Both companies were amongst the largest in Britain. 6 At the end
of 1926, the Powell Duffryn organisation exercised dix'ect control
over sevcitcen key collieries on the South Walse coalfield, in
location3 centred on Aberdaz'e, Ystrad Mynach, and Ne Trethgar.
The eleven collieries controlled by Ocean were centred on the
southern PJindda area.7
Li Dufy
Ab eraman
Aberdare
Abernant
Abertridwr
Bargoed.
Br ithdjr
D er I
Lianharan
Llantrisant
Mouuta Ash
New Tredegar
Pengarn
Ystrad. )fynach
0cc
Aborgwynfi
Treorchy
Treharris
Ton Peutre
Blaengarw
Yny.ybwJ.
Nantymoe 1
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6. Annual tonnages of the largezt colliery companies in 1 927:
South_1Xgi5
Powell Duffr
Ocean Coal
Lbbw Vale Steel, Iron and Coal
Nixons NaviCat ion
Lewis Morthyr Consolidated. Collieries
Cory Bros.
Tredegar Iron and Coal
D. Davis and Son
Ainagamated Anthracite
Guest, Keen and Nettlefolda
over 5,000,000 tons
2,750,000
2,000,000
2,000,000
2,000,000
i ,680,000
j,250,000 "
I ,250,000 "
1,070,000
•1 ,000,000 "
GreatBritan (sample of the largest)
Bolsover ColLiery Company	 -,0O0,OOO tons
Dornin Long (Inc. Boickow, Vaughn & Co.) 	 3,350,000 "
Pease and Partners Ltd.	 2,000,000 "
Airdale Castloford Collieries Ltd.	 I ,750,000 "
Bowes and Partners 	 I ,500,000 "
• 1929 figure
Source: "Colliery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory",
Vols. 1927 and 1930.
7. Powell Duffryn and Ocean Coal owned pits in the following
coLimunitie3 during 192/27:
Source: "ColLiery Year Book and Coal Trades Directory",
Vol. 1927
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The interests of both companies however, extended far beyona
those collieries which they cantroUed directly.
The Chairman of the Powell Duffryn Board of Directors in 1 927
was Joseph Shew K.C. who, besides being a director of the Taff-
Merthyr Steam Coal Company, (the owners of the Taff-Merthyr pit)
was also at that time chairman of Chalet Colliery Limited on. the
Kent coalfield, 8 and the Ithywney Iron Company which owned mines
in Pengam, Den and Rhymney. He was also chairman of the coal-
owning and exporting firm of Michael Whitaker Limited of Leeds,
President of the Humber Coal Exporters and Shippers Association,
and had previously been President of the National Couno.l of '
Coal Traders.9
He was joined on the directorship board of the Rhymney Iron Com-
peny by five of his fellow Powell Duffryn directors: C.P. Ogilvie,
C.B.0S Clark-e, E.M. Hann, E.L. Hann, W.J1. Hann and William Woolley.
Indeed, the only non-Powell Duffry-n director on the Rhymney Iron
Board was Even Williams, famous President of the Mining Association
of Great Britain and leader of the coal-owners during the great	
-'a-
dispube of 1 926. He was also a director of Lloyds Bank, Chairman
of the coal-owning Thomas Williams concern, and of the Pacific
Patent Fuel Company. In addition, he held directorships in the
Markham Steam Coal Company (which owned a very large iine in
Moximouthshire employing 2,800 men), in the Tredegar Iron arid
Coal Company, and in the Blackwood firm known as Oakdale Navigation
Collieries Limited,
8 The Sales Agent for Chilet were Stephenson Clarke & Co., of whom
more will be heard later.
9. The 'ester part of the information in this chapter has been obtained
from anni.wl editics of the "Colliery Yerir i3ok nd Coal Trades Direc-
'rr	 .	 mf jc	 ;c' i.-- ,	 e	 iii be -'+ '-c'
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Through Iilliarnz' fellow director on lthymney Iron, C.B.0. Claike,
Powoll Duffryn maintained a connection with the small, but imp-
ortant, coalfield of North Wales. (He was chairman of RuabonCol
and. Coke Company which controlled, the large I-fafod collieries near
Wrexham). Links between Powell Duffryn and the Staffordshire
coalfield. were maintained through the figure of Sir F.K. MeClean
of IIenlc.y-on-Thames who was a director of the-Cannock Chase Coll-
iery Company, as well as being another of the Powell Duffryn dir-
ectors on the board of the Taff-Merthyr Company.
The AGent, General Manager and Director of Tail Merthy was
Edmund L. Hnr4n who also sat, as we have seen, on the Board of
Rhymney Iron. In addition to being Powell Duffryn t s General Man-
ager and a member of the extremely powerful family of executive
managers and engineers, Edmund Hann was a nember of the Central
Conittoe of the Mining Association of Great Britain.
His assistant general manager at both Powell Duffryn and. Rhymney
Iron was Douglas Alfred Jlann who was accompanied on the directoria].
board.s of both those companies by his rc)atives, W.R, and F.P. Hann,t
Edmund. and. Frank P. Hann held additional directorships in John
Lancaster and Co. Ltd., the owners of the Arrail Griffin, Six
Bells collieries in Monmouthahire. Frank P. Hann also held the
post of Managing Director of the following companies: Newport
Abercarn Black Vein Seam Coal Co. Ltd., Powell's Tillery Steam
Coal Co. Ltd., Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and. Coal Ltd., and Lancaster'3
Steam Coal Collieries Ltd., with collieries in Abercarn, Crumlin,
Abertillery, Talywain, Ebb Vale, Cwm and Blaina.
11
The Secretary of the Powell uffryn Company, Alfred Read, M.B.E.,
served the same function in the Rhymney Iron Company.
The Chairman of the Ocean Board, of Directors in 1 927 was David
Davis, (later Lord Davis) Liberal M.P. for Montgomery from 1906.
Like Evan Williams, he was a director of a major national bank
in Davis's case, the Midland Bank. Besides being Chairman of th.e
Welsh Council for the League of Nations Union, he was also a
director of the Great Western Railway, Chairman of the very large
colliery firm of Burnyeat, Brown and Co. Ltd., whose annual output
from its Treorchy and Ynyaddu pits 1
 topped the mi11ion tc	 tk,
and for whom Davis's Ocean Coal Company was the sole Selling
Agent. Davis was the Chairman of the Taff-Merthyr Steam Coal
Co. Ltd., upon whose directorship board, as we have seen, sat so
many Powell Duffr3n directors. He was joined on that board by
Ms fellow Ocean directors Sir Henry Webb and Thomas Evans, and
the Secretsry M.A. Anderson.
He sat as Chairman of United National Collieries Limited, the
Board of which also included the Ocean directors A.E. Yarrow,
A.J1 Cruiekshank, and. Edward Edwards.11
 The Ocean Coal Company
was also the selling agent for United National.
Another of the Ocean directors, E. Jones, of Maesmawr Hall,
Caerws, was connected with the South Wales colliery companies
of Budds Blackwood and G-orsllan, and the Rusbon Coal & Coke Ltd.,
of North Wales. (The Chairman of Ruabon was Powell Duffr'n' a
CIB#O Clarke).
1 O, Treorc1y tberorki I , 2 and. 3 pits. Ynyrddu: Nine Mile Poir..t Colliiry.
.	 alao ss with Davs o the Joud ot Buryctit, Brwrt.
1 2.
The extensive nature of Ocea-t's boardroom influence in the Uxited
National and Brnyeat, Brown companies was further strengthened
by the fact that the long-standing Managing Director of both -
companies was himself a director of both Ocean and Taff-Merthy.
Economic Centralism
The i-icidenee of' direotorial permutation within the south 'cale8
coal companies became even more marked as the motivation for
ownership and. management integration became directed as much to-
yzarcis t 1'e preservation of oligopoly positions through the ac-
quisition of the "competitive fringe' t by the largest of the coal.
copnies as towards a process of consolidatin the existing
interests with the aim of achieving a higher degree of scientific
mc'ngement of the whole industry than had previously existed.
The process of acquiring the "competitive fringe" by means of
mergers involved a series of multifaceted economic events which
had differing impacts upon various numbers of interested inviduals
i-1 gt'oups.	 The relative impact of the costs and. benefits re
suiting from a merger was not always evenly distributed amongst
the interested groups. It may have had, for instance, a very
uneven effect upon the smaller of the various merged companies -
i.e,, thoze companies which were being "absorbed" into the big
conglomerates - simply because a merger was almost always an
investment decision which would have been rationalised on economic
grounds, promoted to serve narrow self-interests, and consummated
ftr a variety of non-economic factors in a4dition to the usual
economic exit's.
;	 '	 . -.	 R. r	 4'-. , (	 '	 r", ,1'P e ;i-u" r') ¶
Becau&e the us of merger in the growth process is often such a
peody means of :.ncreasing the size of firms, some merging firma
will grow faster in size thin ñn profitability.Y Many firms
M
that had a large peroentae o 	 ithuced growth followed a
programmt
	 consicuos investment" winch had differentiated
effects Upc.it th interests of the various groups involved in
those economic events and in the allocation of resources. Alle-
gat ions have boen made, for instance, that the Powell Duffryn
organistiori zarved.tt the mines in the Bwllfa Dare area of
rnc and capital too soon after acquiring the m
 from their
prevIu owners, the Lleweilyn family. 15 Powell Duffryn, on
the oth' han&, would, no d.oubt, have argued that the.measurcs
whteh they book to reduce the size of the Bwllfa workforce ansi
to cci rth'ate production on Bwflfa Nos. 2 and 3 pits were dic-
tated sinpiy by eooncic necessity.
Th LlrvreUyr fernily, long after the "takeover" had occurred,
were regarded by their ex-empioyees as being almost tIpatern...
alJ	 in ti-eir style of management when comparcd with Powell
14 See Carol J. Loomis, "The 500: A Decade of Growth", "Fortun&,
July 1966; cited in S.R, 1eid, 'Mergerd, 1anagers and the
Economy", N€,'q York 1968.
154 Recordigs made in Trecynon, 0ctcber 1975'.
)14.
DufTryrl .16
 It is ironical that there was, as we shall see, per-
hap rio other single figure on tbe coalfield who did more to
promote the growth of colliery cor.pany amalgamation after 1 926
than the leading member of the LleweUyn family, and owner of
the Blifa Mines, Sir David Richard Liewellyn.
The 1 925 Royal Commission on Coal laid great emphasis upon the
necessity for company amalgamations as a means of achieving a
vital reduction in the costs of production. Between 1920 and 1928
a conzidcrabie increase in the size of company units was notice-
able.1 ' They covered in the period as many as 1 72 pits normally
employing 126,000 workers throughout ritain. These pits com-
prised 17 different schemes, subsequently reduced to 14 by the
aigahtion of the South Wales anthracite groupsv '8 By the time
• Ncuman 1ublishd his work on the organisation of the British
ccl industry (in 1932^ ) "growth" had become something of an end
in iti;elf.
Neumcn emplayed the normal measurements for growth, i.e., in terms
of increased sales, assets, and numbers of employees. But it has
been pointed out that compinies which transftrm themselves through
eror and acquiiitions often grow from bases that were origIn-
oily relatively small, and in doing so tended to dominate any
list of heavy gainers in percentage sales growth.19 Similarly,
16. Ibid.
1 7. A.M. i\eumari, tTne Lconcmic Orgonization of tiie Brtish Coal
Industry", Chapter 3, Section 2.
i e. Report of the Board of Traae: s 1 2, on the Working of the
Act, 19 2b , Cu:i, 3214, Cited by Ncuaiart.
I 9. Carol J. LoolDid, op.cit.
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a large company which suddenly becomes even larger does not nec-
esri1y undergo this transformation because of internally gen-
erated increases in productivity and overall output. Very fei
colliery cornpanes could claim that almost all growth had been
inturnally generated by the mid-'Os; it was the "competitive
fringe" (or rather, in the case of South Wales, the "uncompetitive
fringe") which was to provide the nourishment -for the rapid growth
of "combines" like Powell Duffryn and Ocean Coal.	 -
In a declining market situation such as that which existed in
South Wales during this period, a mosoive growth in sales for
the expan.Ung coibine did not necessarily guarantee maazive 'bene-
fiis to the stockholders of companies absorbed. into large' con-
cert's, mct it certainly did not guarantee the brightest of poas-
ible proapocs for the employees of those companies.
Historically, the promoters of' mergers have operated in their
sel± interest, and, exce pt where mergers were motivated purely
by produotion and distribution economics (as was the ease with
so of the South Wales me'gers during this period), they appear
to have been inspired largely 'by banks and othr professional
promotrs 20 Neuman, for instance, quotes 'the £2,000,000 finan-
cirig of the reorganisation of a number of Lancashire colliery
companies which subsequently became knovm as the Wigan Coal Cor-
poration Liraited:
"All this regrouping was carried. out under the
pt onae of the Bank of England .... through its
uLidtary the securities Management Trut, Ltd.,
in co-operation with the C'.j
20. J,[.	 h4a, "Survey of the Evidcec and. Findings on Mrger&',
PrirL."., )
 I 93, p. 1 b7,
:'.t,,ij	 p..
i6.
The directors of the new concern were nominated by the Bank of
England.
Investment bankers appear to have been the largest promoters of
mergers during the period 1 927 to 1 937, and for very obvious
reasons. Many mergers, and. some acquisitions, involve the flo-
tation of new securities. "Reputable" business houses merely
carrying on their business in "normal" times bring a very alight
voiuuie of securities for the banker to handle. But if these
business houses can be brought together in a new organization
it my mean a large flotation of stock. In the U.S.A. during
1928 and. early 1929, when there was an insatiable demand for
8CC U2' it lea,
some investment houses employed. men on
conimission who did nothing but search for pot-
entia). mergers . .. A group of businessmen and
financiers in discussing this matter in the summer
of 1 928 agreed that nine out of ten mergers had.
the 5nvestment banker at the core".22
This tendency was very much .apparent in many of the South Wales
mergers. The growth of the Amalgamated Anthracite Collieries Ltd.
is a case in point. In 1927 this company, which, six years later,
was to.control over 75% of the an^hracite output of the South
Wales coalfield., "absorbed" United Anthracite Collieries Ltd.
V!hflst the latter company's annual production had only been in
the region of 150,000 tons (compared. to Amalgamated Anthracite's
1,070,000 tons), it must nevertheless have come s no great stir-
prize to observers to witness the rise of United Anthracite's
ohirrnan, Sir F.. Szarvasy, to the chair of Amalgamated Anthracite' s
bo mir d.
22e Vi.L Thp 911ie p'rsiztence of the Mørgr Moveiont" American
in	 Vc 1 2	 Nr' - . n 7'L (	 '"	 ii "
1 7.
Although outwardly chairman of much jhe smaller of the two con-
cerns, Szarvasy was deeply involved in the merger as an investment
banker. He was chairman of te Anglo-Federation Banking Corpor-
ation, resham Mutual Indemnity, Ltd., and. a director of Martins
Bank Ltd., and of the 1928 Investment Trust Ltd. lie was also
chairman of British Anthracite Sales Ltd.., aM a director of
the Daily Mail and C-enera]. Trust Limited..
Neuman, in discussing the reorgaritsation of the British coal-.
fields, 23 pointed to the kinds of intsr-directorial links be-
tween the larger coal companies which have been outlined in this
chapter. The links were, as we have seen, particularly common
in the large8t of the steam-coal-producing "combines" like
Powell Duffryn and Ocean Coal. They were no less common however,
in the corpanies which mined the other two broad categories of
coa]. found. on the field - anthracite in the west and bituminous
in the east.
More significant still, were the inter-direotorial links which
tretched. across the geologicdi barriers of the coalfield and.
transcended many of the old differences which had existed between
- the three coal-producing sectnz prior to the First World War.
23, Neuian op. cit., p. j56.
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A large number of different colliery companies there may have
been in the various sections pf the coalfield by the mid-'Thirties -
especially when compared with the Ruhr - but the control of those
companies lay in the hands of a relatively small number o major
directors.
It is little wonder then, that the attitud.e of the controllers
of the South Wales coal industry was, on the whole, extremely
hostile to the varipus attempts by the government to legislate
a reorganisation of the industry and to regulate prices and out-
put. Szarvasy, for instance, chastised the Governmenta attempts
to use the Coal Mines Act of 1 930 to force through mandatory re-
organisation. He reflected the general "condemnation" of
"political interference" in the coalmining industry voiced by
the mine-owners when he addressed a meeting of the Amalgamated.
Colliery shareholders in 1931:
"Legis3ative interference with business gives
encouragement to lethargy rather than stimulation
to individual enterprise and. courage, which alone
will in the end bring about a better set of cir-
cumstances and which, as we all 1ow, have in the
past proved the stimulating factors in any recovery
and success achieved by this company".25
Ll2lns
If one definition of "individual enterprise" is the ability to
collect as many individual directorships and chairmanships	 is
possibla, then the Board. of Directors of Amáiamated Anthracite con-
tamed a proliferation of enterprising individuals.
25, The imes, 29.J.31.
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zrvay's deputy chairman on the Board was one of the most
influential of all Welsh company dLrectors and one of the prime
manipulators of compwy ownership and organisatiori on the coal-
field: the ta1esmar1tt of the Bwllfa pits, Sir 1.R. Liewellyri.
The following list gives some, though not all, of the companies
with which he was connected either simultaneously or at diff-
erent times between 1926 and his death in 19)4:
Locality ot Mines
Western Coalfield.
Aberdare
Llanelly
Maeateg
Hirwaun
Pontardula is
Pontiliw
C lydach
Bwllfa Dare
Port Talbot
Ferndale
Tylorstown
Treherb ert
laesteg
Cym.rner
Mid-Steam Field
(Ea stern C oalfield.)
Bwllfa Dare
Cwmaman
Merthyr Vain
Troedrhiw-
Mountain Ash
Clydach Vale
Re solven
Glyn Weath
ithondda
.berdare
C iifynnyd.d.
G-ilfach C-och
G-lyn Heath
Bed.linog
Fochriw
Abercynon
Cwmbran
Pontaewyd.& I
G-waun cae C-urwen
Cwmaman
G-lyn Heath
Llaxtharan
Merthyr
T onyrefail
Llwynypia
Lianharan
Penygraig
Cymmer
Trimsaran
Cwmmawr
Abererave
Seven Sisters
Ystalyfera
C wsnllynf cii
Brynammari
- Cernant
Blaina
astern CoalfieldPowell Dutft n (bt h)	 9
P.D' br' .	 after 193 merger,
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Couipaies
Amalgamated Anthracite
Llewellyn & Sons Ltd.
North' s Navigation
Duffryn Aberdaro
Graigola Merthyr
l3wllfa & Merthyr Dare
Cynon Colliory Company
D. Davis and. Sons
Troed.y-x'hiw Coal Co.
Celtic Collieries Ltd..
Imperial Navigation
Welsh Asocia ted Collieries
Bwllfa & Cwmaman
Llevellyn (Plymouth)
Lleweliyn (Cyfarthfa)
Liewe llyri (Nixon)
J3laenclydach C ouiery
Ynisarwod Collieries
Vale of Neath Collieries
Naval Colliery Company
Aberdare Craig Coal
Albion Steam Coal
Brittanic Merthyr
Clyn Neath Collieries
Cuest, Keen & Nettlefolds
Cwaun cas Curwen
Ciimarnan Coal
1bk Colliery Ltd.
South..
 Rhondda Colliery
Thomas Merthyr Colliery
Welsh Navigation Steam
Clamorgan Coal
Meiros Collieries
Cambrian Collieries
DuI'fryn Rhond.da
Welsh Anthracite
Diliwyn Colliery
Hencler son' a Wclsh Anth.racit e
'Executive Poit1Ofl
Deputy Chairman
Chairman & Managing
Director
5,	 '5
& Consulting
Engineer
Chairman
H
'S	 Managing
Director
5,
St
et
St	 tt
5I	 -
ft
	 5
I,
I,
It
U
ft
Director
ft -
Managing
Direct or
Director
'I
I'
I,
Direct or.
'I
It
II
It
I'
I'
'I
'5
It
ft
	 p
'5
C'
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Llowellyn's co-deputy Chairman was Lord Melhett, formerly the
Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred Mond. St., Mberal M.P. for Carmarthen, 19214-
1928. Melchett was Chairman of' I.C.I. Ltd.., Chairman of Inter-
national Nickel Company Ltd., and. ofb the Mond. Nickel Company Ltd.
He was a Director of the Westminster Bank, of the Industrial'
Finance Investment Corporation, and. of the South Staffs Mond C-as
Company, as well as being Chairman of the Economic Board for -
26Palestine.
The Managing Director of Amalgamated Anthracite was Sir Alfred - *
-	 Cope, K.G.B., who sat, with a clutch of fellow Amalgamated dir-
ectors including Sir D.R. Llewelly on the Board of Henderson's
Welsh Anthracite Collieries Ltd., - a company which had. taken over
Pillbach, Tirbach and. Brynamrnan Anthracite Collieries Limited.
He also held a directorship, as did Sir D.R. Liewellyn and other
Amalgamated directors, on another Amalgamated Anthracite sub-
sidiary, Welsh Anthracite Collieries Ltd.., which had. been cquired
by Amalgamated. to take over -mines owned by Ashburnham Collieries
Ltd., arid G-waunc3awdd. Abercrave Colliery Ltd..
J
The dtrectors of Amalgamated Anthracite included W.M. Llewellyn,
brother of Sir D.R., and together they provided perhaps the most
spectacular link between the anthracite and. steam-coal areas.
-	 W.M.'s commercial links were only a little less numerous than
big brother's. Both were to hold directorships simultaneously
in both Amalgamated Anthracite
	 PoweU Duffryn' a.
26. 7ho vasWho 1929-1940.
c_I.e
In 19O both P.R. and w.M. wore involved in the formation of the
second largest 7 coal combine seen to date on the South Vlales
coalfield (P.D'S being the laraest). Entitled "Vieleh Associated
Collieries Ltd.", it ha been formed by merging the coal interests
of G-uest, Keen and Nett3ef olds with a large combination of corn-
panies including the Cambrian Collieries at Clydach Vale (pur-
chased by P.R. on behalf of G-.K.N. for £7L.5,OOO, August 2nd,
1 929), the Clamorgan Collieries, Llwynypia; the Naval Collieries,
Penygraig, and the Brittanic Collieries, Gilfach Goch. In add-
ition, the Welsh Associated Collieries Ltd., acquired not less
than 9O, of the issued share capital of the following companies:
G-uoret, Liewellyn and Merrett Ltd. (the coal sal&s and
exporting agency)
D, Davis & Sons Ltd.
Bwllfa & Cwmaman. Collieries Ltd.
Llevellyn (Nixon) LtcL
Llewellyn (Plymouth) Ltd.
Llewellyn (Cyfarthfa) Ltd.
Troedyrhiw Coal Co. Ltd.
P.R. Llevzellyn & Sons Ltd.
Aberdare Graig Coal Ltd.
Duf'fryn Rhondda (i 929) Ltd.
Cynon Coal Co. Ltd.
It as the creation of Welsh Associated Collieries which completed
the transformation of the great majority of the most productive
pits in the central coalfield into units of production of a major
coal combine. As such, they became, theoretically at least, less
vulnarable to local union pressure. The workmen's lodges of in-
dividual pits found themselves faced no longer with the task cf
27. With the majority-held companies listed, J.A.C. ws the
largest combine €ver seen to that date: L8 mines, 3+,84O
workiion. In addition, the d.A,C. o.vned ai roiivat1y 25,OL.)O
ons (rolLhig tkk)
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confronting a small ownr; they were now faced with shrehol era
and directors who, like those of Powell Duffryn, were conentrated,
for the mo part, in the exclusive residential areas of ?yfar
and. Sussex. Under their new oNxlers, the pits became subject to
whatever the combine's policy happened to be; pits like those
at Bwllfa became sIdeshoas in a company circus which gre# larger
as the coalfield upon which it played. continued to slide ix'rever-
sibly into docline.
The_CThct Coiliires and the Inds.
There were, of course, a number of colliery companies which re-
mained. indeperdent of the combines right up to nationalisation.
Two stch companies in the central part of the coalfield. were those
of Fernhili. and Cwmgwrach. However, a close examination of both
como3nies' directorships reveals two very differtnt pictures of
"independence",, for whilst the directors of the Cwmgwrach mine
(Cwingwrach a rid Empire Colliery) had. virtually iio business in-
tcrests in any colliery companies other than Gwmgwrach and Empire,
those of Fernhill were as deeply involved in permutations of dir-
ectcr3hips and chairmanships as any Powell Duffryn or Amalgamated
Aithraeite controller. Fernhi.Ll Collieries belonged to what might
best he called a "gho combiue".
Fernhil]. was literally surrounded by the collieries of other
"combines" - those of Powell Duffryn, Cory Brothers, Ocear Coal,
and Glenavon G-arw Ltd., whilst Cwmewrach and Empire were sit uated
cime to mines oned by Amalgamated Anthracite and Cory Brothers
ii tie Ileath Valley.
2J..
The chairman and managing director of e.rnhill was Sir John.
Beynon, Deputy Lieutenant for Monmouthshire, and it is around
this figure that the nebulous s.tbtances of the "ghost combine"
circulate. He was chairman of the two-million ton per annum
Ehbw Vale Steel, rron and Coal Ld., Chairman of John Lancaster
& Co. Ltd.., Lancaster's Steam Coal Co. Ltd., Newport Abercai'n
Black Vein Steam Coal Ltd., Powell's Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd.,
and a Director of Ebbw Vale Iron & Coal Co. Ltd. The "indepen-
denc&' of Pernhil]. is called further into question when the
directorships of the listed companies are examined. In all the
boardrooms of the companies named, he was accompanied by P.?. Harm
(who, besides being a member of that illustrious family was also,.
in 1930, G-eneral Manager of Powell Duffryn'a), Sir Philip C.
lienriques, U, Beynon (also a Director of Fernhill), Si Fred-
erick MIlls Bt. (a past President of the National Federation o
Iron and Steel	 aiid obt rnt, a ireor o
the huge Dorman Long Combine of Yorkshire, Durham and Kent.
The only "local representatin" (in the sense of a local man
appearing on the Fernhill Board. of Directors) was the inclusion
of T • L. Mort of "&'ynrhedyn", Tx' eherbert. 	 -
A similar lack of "local representation" was evident on the Board
of Cwmgwrach and. Empire. As earlyas 1926 the Board consisted
of two members of the Braithwaite family of Bristol, accompanied
by two ladies, Mrs. Brockett-Grover and. Mrz. A. Jones, from
Peterson-S-Ely and Hex'tfordshire respectively. The Board was
completed. by a. Dr. Forsdik. from ReLents Park and a gentleman
named ecs from Port Talbot. Mr. Reca was also a Director of
25.
the CilfrevT :Level, which employed about 250 men The C an	 was
thetA, the least "attachc-d" in a directarship zene of all the
colliery ompanies of any size operating within this area.
During the inter-war years, the cal companies of South Walesj
went almost as far as the railway companies in the width of the	 *
field from which they drew their directors. The railway com-
panies had. been exceptional in their choice, 28 taking in finance;
major customers, the peerage and the services, but the coal com-
panies were not far behind.; Powell Duffryri, for instance, before
the merger, in the Spring of 1 935, with Welzj'i Associated. Collieries,
possessed. a Board ofDirectors which included, one seer of the
realm, three baronets, and three knights. All of these dignitaries
had made their "pile" either from the ba1 industry or from Uied.
industries. The Chairmanship and General Management of the
company, before and after the 1935 merger, remained. firmly 1n
the hands of' coal "career" men engineers like the Harms au
H. McVickx' who had previously been Powell Duffryn company agents
on the coalfield. itself.
-
Other interests were strongly represented however: the selling
agencies for the new combine were represented on the board by
the ,continuing p'esence, after the 1935 merger 3 of H.H. Merrett
and. W.M. LleveUyn - both directQrs and owners of the selling
agency for 'e.sh Associated Collieries - arid. E.W.. Ganderton,
Lord Hyndley, Sir Stephenson H. Kent ari&WilliarnMcGilvray, all
28. PJ, Jervi, "Bpsses i4 British Buines&', iondon 4972g..
of the firm Stephenson Clarice & Associated Companies Ltd., pro-
viously soLe veudor of Powell Duffryn. Banking interests were
represented, as we have seen, by Sir Evan Williams and E.L. Hann,
both of whom were directors of major banks. (L19yd8 and West-
minster respectively)
There was a vertical connection with customera through Sir D.R.
A
LlcwJ.lyn and Lt. Col, Hon. C.H.C. C-uest M.P., both of whom were
connected with the iron, steel and coal firm of cuest, Keen and.
/
Nettlefolds, Limited. The connection with the armed service$
was, of course, a strong one - in as much as the Royal Navy,.
amongst other naviea, burned a great, though rapidly decreasing,
amount of Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries' coal. Unlike
the railway companies however, the Powell Duffryn board contained.
no admirals or even miühipmet.
The merger of Powell Duffryn and Welsh Associated Collieries
meant that, by 1936, there were only seven coal companies, or
ghost combines, producing over one million tons of coal per annum
on the South Wales coalfielth
Combine TonnaSes in 12€
Powell Duffryn (with subsidiaries)
The ttBeynon Interests" (see p. 24)
Amalgamated Anthracite
Ocean (with ttaubsjdiariett)
Cory Brothers
Tredegar Iron and. Coal
North° a Navigation -(.q ft]ra'
ul_pp
14,000,000 tons
5,900,000
4,300,000 "
4,150,000 "
?,100,000 "
I ,400,000
c,coo,000
t,003,000 "
Source: "Colliery Year Book and Cai Trades Directory",
Vola. j937 and 1939.
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Of these companies, &t least one, North's NavLgation, was urzder
control of the LlcweUyn .-Merrett axis.
The Final !erevs
-ì
These inonopolisizg tendencies eased. off only slightly during
the ten years following the Spring merger of 1935. By 1939,
Powell Duffryn's output had remained fairly stady, but both
Cory Brother's and. Ocean's had dropped back slightly from their:
1935 levels.
In I 940, Powell Duffryn acquired the undertakings of Cilely
Collieries Ltd., of Tonyx'efail and, in 1942, the undertakings
of one of the largest of the Welsh colliery companies, Cry
Brothers & Co. Ltd., complete with their productive Penrikyber
Navigation Subsidiary.29
Glenavon Garw Collieries Ltd., had acquired the International
Colliery Company of Blaengaz'w, and were now producing over one
million tons per annum. By 1944, the Ocean Combine had become
officially known as Ocean Coal & Wilson Ltd.,- comprising the
parent company - Ocean - plus Burnyeat Brown& Co. Ltd., United
National Ltd., and Ocean's share, with Powell Duffryn's in the
Taff- Merthyr Steam Coal Co. Ltd. Ocean's had. also acquired the
whole of the issued share capital of the International Colliery
Company, and had purchased. the Nantewlaeth Colliery from Glenavon
arw Collieries Ltd. Government approval of these monopolising
actions was very forthcoming: the Coal Commission' quickly certified
1
29. Powell Duffrya output in j 942 was calculated to be in the region
of 20 ui11jorj' tOns cited in J.T/. Price, "A History of Powell
Duffryn in the Aberdare Valley". Powell Duffryn Review,
April, 1943.
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a scheme to concentrate the control of the two secondary corn-
panies in Ocean's hands with the aim of effecting, ultimately,
a complete transfer to Ocean oç the other two companies' assets.30
The Monmouthahire area of the Eastern field had undergone an-i
ownership reshuffle, Partridge Jones and John Paton had acquired.
from the Beynon "ghost" combine the Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and
Coal Company Limited, (including its subsidiaries: John Lan-
caster & Company Limited, Powell's Tillery Steam Coal Limited,
and I'Te.wport Abercarn Black Vein Steam Coal Company Limited).
The same company acquired the share capital of the Tirpentwys
Black Vein Steam Coal and. Coke Cornpany Limited..
On the ee of nationalization however, the Powell Duffrync-
pany dominated the pit-ownership lists in the steam-coal area
andAma1garnated Anthracite owned a near-monopoly of the iaportant
pits on the anthracite field.31
30. "Colliery Year Book and coal Trades Directory", j95.
Pidweflt
Rhyrmae.y Merthyr
Senghenydd
Nantgarw
Winds or
Merthyr Vale
Navigation
Plymouth
River Level
T irherbert
Trane
29.
31 Powell Duffryn CoUiries in j 946
11eAea
Abercynon	 Croeafan
Albion	 Liartharan
l3argoed	 Ogilvie
Britannia	 periallta
Elliot	 Pengam
Northern Area
Aberanan	 Deep Duffryn
Abergorki	 ]Duffryn Aberdare
(Tower)
Bwllf a
	 Ferndale
Castle	 Pforchaman
Cwmneol	 Lower Duffryn
Cwm Cynon	 Mardy
Rhonclda V lley Area
Bertie & Trefox' 	 G-lamcrgan
Britannic	 Margaret
B3.acnclydach	 Maritime
Caribrian	 Pandy and Anthony
Cwni	 Tymawr
Western krea
Duffryn RhondO.a	 Ynysf'aio
Ama3.amated Anthracite Collieries (j946)
New Cross Hands	 Cawdor
Tirythil	 Cwmgorse
Liandebiex	 G-elliceidrim
Little Vein	 G-reat Mountain
Fontybrern	 New Dynant & C1o&yz'yn
Carway	 Jubilee
Aberperwm	 Rook
Cvim Rhydygae 	 CE.fn Coel
Cianamznan	 Yniscedwyn
Ctu'nOS	 Ystradgynlais
Diamond	 Ammariford
Woino	 Pentremawr
Gwaun-'cae-Gurwen	 C-lyncorrwg
.30.
The Board, of Directors of the Amalgamated. Anthracite had. changed,
little in character since the early Thirties; 8zrvasy still
provided the main link with City finance through i-us Chairman-
ships and Directorships of numerous banking and. investment cor-
porations. 'There was however, a new link with other British
coalfields in the figure of Major G-.D. Mayhew, appointed. Director
of Amalgamated Anthracite whilst Chairman of the South Derbyshire
Coalowners Association, Senior Partner in the firm of Mining
Engineers, Mayhew & Mayhew of Tamworth, Chairman of Hall's
Collieries Limited, (based. in the Swacllincote area), and a Dir-
ector of the Newdigate Colliery Company in Warwickshfre and of
the Somorrostro Iron Ore Company Limited. Liewellyn representation
on the Amalgamated Anthracite Board had. disappeared. by 191f6;
Sir D.R. Liewellyn had. died, in i911,O, and. hi brothers, L.M. arid.
M.H., had left the board. in i9 i.O and 19LJ1. respectively - for the
pleasures of rearing sbowjuinpers and. packhounds. Griffith Liewellyn,
another of Sir D.L's brothers, retained his place on the Powell
Buffryn board. until,19L6.
Griffith had married one of the Harm daughters and, in so doing,
had. forged. a familial link between two, of the most powerful fam-
ilies in the history of Welsh coalmining. Sitting with him on
the Powell Duffryn Board right up to nationalisation were three
members of the family which he had. married, into. Between them,
the Hann trio held. the following directorships in addition to
their Powell Duf±ryn positions: Cile3y Collieries, Penrikyber
NavIgation, Cory Brothers, (all three companies being subsidiaries
of Powell Duffryn) North's Navigation, Taff Merthyr, (in which
51;
Powell Duffryn reta.ined their controlling share with Ocean Coal)
- Cuest, Keen and Nettlefolds, and the Westminster Bank.
Through the figures of J.P. Stephenson-Clarke, E.W. C-anderton -
and Sir F.K. McClean, Powell Duffryn continued it linka up to
194.6 with companies in the coalfields of Kent, Durham, Yorkshire
and Staffordshire. Sir Even Williams continued to maintain dir-
act links with Powell Duffryn customers through his association
with various industrial enterprises, including the Lianelly
Tinpiate Company, and he also retained his Directorship of Lloyd.
Bank.
The ttgho combine" built up by ir John Beynon was maintained
and continued after his death by LA. Phillips who, as well as
being a director of the Fernhil]. Colliery Company, was also a
director of Partridge Jones and. John Paton, Ltd., the combine
which, as we have seen, had made considerable acquisitions amongst
the coal companies of the Monmouthshire section of the field
during the war years.32
Shortly before nationalisation, the "independent" Cwmgwrach and.
Enpire Colliery CQmpany received onto its Board a well-known
consulting engineer named Johii Kane. Based in Cardiff 1 Kane had
1ongbeeri associated 1n an advisory capacity with Powell Duffryn'z
efforts to standardise and rationalie its production methods.
He was also a d.irector of lenhafocl Col1ieres, the North Rhcndda
Colliery Company and the Welsh Navigation Steam Coal Company.
32. 7iheri he died in 194.5, John 'yndham Beynon left a will ol'
£3t7,327; ColLlievyCUaz'dian, i7.8.5 -
32.
Hi appointment causd, it seems, a good deal of disquiet amongst
the employees of the Cwrngwrach colliery who saw it as a possible)
incursion by what they termed. q, "P.D. Big-shot", with his "PID.
system", into their workplace.33
Thiø disquiet implies that the colliery's workforce considered
itself to be in a relatively favourable position - as employees
of	 •tindopenntfl company - when compared. with the position
of the employees of the type of combine company epitodzed by
Powell Duffryn. They most certainly expressed. an  extreme reluc-
tance to become another segment of the 'P.D. empire"0
That empire was no:t destroyed on Vesting Day, January 1st 194.7.
Its title disappeared. from the lists of British coal-owners, as
did all other titles of the large coal companies, but the image
of Powell Duffryn was indelibly smudged across the new ensign
of the South Wales Division of the National Coal Board.. Colliery
surface buildings, winding towers, washeries, power stations, even
streets, continued. tø bear the Powell Duffryn insignias. They
haunted the communities of the Rhymney, Taff, Rhondda and Aber-'
dare valleys as long as the collieries remained there. It was
one thing for a government in Westminster to pass a Bill abolishing
privat ownership in the coal industry, but quite another fo it
to abolish the visual and political relationships which had. evolved.
over generatIons between dominant companies and dependent comm-
unities in mining areas such as that of South Wales.
33. Taped inte'viet with Glyn yii).lir s, ex-'Cwmgv'rach collier;
recorded Spring, 1973.
33.
This snso of continuity" was reinforced, by the fact that the
nc; NCB m&riarexial hierarchy was chosen a1mos entirely froiu
the ranks of th incumbent "private" manacrial hierax'ohy. Four
out of the NCB' six newly-appointed Area General !anagers, for
instance, were ex-Povrell Duffryr Agents 01' General anager,
Not one colliery manager in any of the collieries under special
study in this thesis was replaced during the transference of
o'rnership in the industry in I 96/4.7, and it' must have caine as
110 sur'ise to the ex-employees of Fo,-eli Duffryn to find that
their new boss - the man appointed to the Coal Board's highest
position (that of Chairman) - was himself an ax-Powell Duff.ryn
director, Lord. Hyndley.
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